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PREFACE
The object of this monograph is to attempt to evaluate some of
the causes for the secession of our Southern states which, to me,
seem generally to have been underestimated. Lack of time has
prevented the utilization of much available newspaper, pamphlet,
t
and manuscript material of considerable value; but great confi-
dence is felt that the evidence is typical, if not exhaustive. The
work deals with matters which even today in a measure arouse
the passions or prejudices of men; the greatest effort has been
made, therefore, to preserve a detached point of view. A better
contemporary understanding of the economic relations of the sec-
tions before 1861 might have moderated the bitterness of the
sectional controversy; a better understanding of them even now
would soften its memories.
The subject of this study was suggested to me while I was
preparing a master's thesis on the subject "Early Projects for a
Railroad to the Pacific" under the direction of Professor F. H.
Hodder, of the University of Kansas. The preparation of the
study was begun in 1916 under the supervision of Professors E.
B. Greene and A. C. Cole and completed under the supervision
of Professor T. C. Pease, of the University of Illinois. I am in-
debted to each of these men for very valuable criticisms and sug-
gestions. I have used the works of many men who have written
on related subjects, and am under greater obligations to them
than citations in the footnotes or bibliography can indicate. The
materials used in the preparation of this monograph were found,
with few exceptions, either in the Library of the University of
Illinois, the Library of Congress, or the Library of the Univer-
sity of Chicago. To the officials and staffs of these institutions, I
am grateful for much assistance and many courtesies.
ROBERT R. RUSSEL.

INTRODUCTION
THE BASES OF SOUTHERN SECTIONALISM
The most significant fact of American history from about 1820
to 1875, at least, was sectionalism. The section which was at all
times most clearly defined was the South. The term South, how-
ever, did not have the same connotation at all times and to all
men. Until about 1845 the term South was commonly applied
only to the South Atlantic states. The states of the lower Missis-
sippi valley were gradually brought under the term as their
economic and social organization and general conditions approx-
imated those in the old South and differentiated from those of the
states of the upper part of the valley, for Southern sectionalism
had bases in several distinctive features besides latitude.
Foremost of these was the existence of slavery. For reasons
chiefly geographical, slavery had never flourished in colonial days
above Mason and Dixon's Line as it had below it, and the insti-
tution had been abolished there during or shortly after the Revo-
lutionary War. Into the Old Northwest, slavery had not been
extended; while into Kentucky and Missouri and the region to the
south it had been carried in the same form as in the South At-
lantic states. To be sure, the slave population was not evenly dis-
tributed throughout the South. The great majority of the slaves
were concentrated in the so-called black belts, which corres-
ponded roughly to the areas best adapted to the cultivation of
cotton, tobacco, sugar cane, rice, and hemp, and the concentra-
tion became more pronounced as the Civil War approached. Out-
side the black belts the South was upon an essentially free-labor
basis. Within the black belts the plantation predominated over
the farm; outside, the farm prevailed. But the slaveholding
planters were the dominant element in Southern society, and the
people of the farming districts had interest in slavery in that they
found markets for their surplus products chiefly in the planting
regions. The institution of slavery came to be regarded as abso-
lutely essential to Southern prosperity. Consequently Southern
men defended it as right, shaped their political policies to protect
it and secure its extension, and demanded that attacks upon it
cease.
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There was basis for sectionalism, also, in divergent economic in-
terests and conditions. To what extent the divergence was due to
geography, to what extent due to other factors, including social
organization, it is not necessary here to inquire. The Southern
states, however, were engaged largely in the production of a few
great staples cotton, tobacco, and sugar not produced in other
states of the Union. Of these staples only a small proportion was
consumed at home; much the greater part was exported either to
the North or to Europe. The portion exported abroad constituted
considerably more than half the nation's total exports. Manu-
facturing and mining had made, and were making during the
period under survey, little progress in the South compared with
the same industries in other sections; the exports of the South
were exchanged in part for agricultural products of the West but
chiefly for manufactured goods of the East or Europe. The ocean
commerce of the South, whether coastwise or foreign, was carried
almost altogether in Northern or European vessels; foreign goods
for Southern consumption came largely by way of Northern
ports. Only a small percentage of the Southern population was
urban; the cities and towns of the section were few and small
compared with those of the East or even those of the growing
Northwest. The banking capital of the country was largely con-
centrated in the East; the South was not financially independent.
Divergent economic interests of the sections led to the advocacy
of different policies, on the part of the Federal government, as re-
gards tariff, taxation, navigation laws, and the amount and ob-
jects of government expenditures. The disparity of the sections in
industry and commerce was to many Southerners an evidence of
lack of prosperity in the South commensurate with that of the
North, and, consequently, was a cause of dissatisfaction, and was
galling to Southern pride. The causes of Southern "decline"
were sought for; it was variously attributed to geography and
climate, qualities of the people, misdirection of private enterprise,
mistaken policies of the state and local governments, and the un-
equal operation of the Federal government, but not, generally, to
slavery. Remedies were proposed, corresponding roughly to the
causes, as analyzed.
Other bases for sectionalism were of much less importance. Be-
cause of early conditions of settlement, and especially because
later immigration was mostly into the non-slaveholding states,
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there were slight differences in the racial types of the sections.
The sparsity of population and the social organization in the
South were accountable for backwardness in general education
and cultural development. Early conditions of settlement, agri-
cultural pursuits, slavery and the plantation system, and sparsity
of population largely explain the variation from other sections in
political ideals and methods.
It is the purpose of this study to attempt to discover to what
extent Southern sectionalism had its basis in divergent economic
interests and conditions. The study is primarily a study of public
opinion. It will require an examination of the opinions of South-
ern men as to the divergence of economic interests and the extent
of the disparity of economic development in the sections, the
causes of such disparity, and the proper remedies therefor. Actual
economic conditions and changes will be described and explained
only in so far as such description and explanation are essential
to an understanding of Southern public opinion. It is hoped, how-
ever, that incidentally some additional light may be thrown upon
the economic status of the ante-bellum South, and that some con-
clusions may be drawn as to the justification for Southern discon-
tent. Frequent references will of necessity be made to the sec-
tional quarrel over slavery, and the attempt will be made to main-
tain proper proportion between the minor aspects of sectional-
ism herein treated and the major issue of the sectional struggle.
In seeking to analyze Southern opinion relative to the matters
mentioned above, several movements in behalf of the economic
regeneration of the South will be described, and the accompany-
ing discussion examined. Evidence of economic discontent can be
found in the discussion of some of the outstanding political ques-
tions of the day, and such bodies of discussion will, therefore, be
analyzed. In the years 1837-1839, a number of direct trade conven-
tions held in the South Atlantic states gave earnest consideration
to direct trade with Europe as a remedy for Southern decline.
During the 18405, especially the latter half of the decade, there
was much discussion of the practicability and desirability of de-
veloping manufactures, especially cotton manufactures. The
political crisis of the years 1847-1852 furnished the occasion for
considerable consideration of the economic relations of the sec-
tions. During the 18503, direct trade with Europe was almost
constantly a subject before the public. Between 1852 and 1859,
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a series of Southern commercial conventions, whose original ob-
ject was to devise measures for effecting the economic regenera-
tion of the section, met in various cities of the South. The tariff
question was not dead during the period studied, and during the
18503 policies of state and local protection of industry were pro-
posed and discussed. The agitation of the late fifties in behalf of
secession, as well as the movement for the revival of the foreign
slave trade of the same period, gave evidence of discontent with
the economic position of the South. Finally, every phase of South-
ern sectionalism was brought out by the actual dissolution of the
Union and the necessity of inaugurating Confederate government-
al policies. Time and the scope of this work have not permitted
adequate consideration of the sectional aspects of two important
problems of the ante-bellum South, namely, the building of rail-
roads, especially into the Northwest and to the Pacific, and the es-
tablishment of a satisfactory banking and credit system.1 It is
not believed that the omissions will vitiate the conclusions reached
in any material degree. The period covered by this study has
been rather arbitrarily limited.
"'Early Projects for a Pacific Railroad" was the subject of an unpublished
master's thesis of the author.
CHAPTER I
AGITATION IN BEHALF OF DIRECT TRADE WITH
EUROPE, 1837-1839
In colonial days the exports and imports of the Southern col-
onies compared very favorably in amount with those of the North-
ern; but shortly after independence from Great Britain was
achieved, it became apparent that the importing business of the
nation was being concentrated in Northern ports. As the years
went by the concentration became more and more pronounced.
While the exports of the staple producing states grew at a phe-
nomenal rate, the value of the imports into Southern ports re-
mained almost stationary or grew very slowly. This was particu-
larly true in the case of the Atlantic ports. In the case of New
Orleans, for long almost the sole outlet for the commerce of the
rapidly filling Mississippi valley, there was early in the last cen-
tufy^phenomenal increase in both exports and imports; but after
about 1835 the latter increased very slowly, while the former con-
tinued to grow at the same remarkable rate. Prior to the Civil
War the imports of the Northern states greatly exceeded their ex-
ports. In the Southern states the reverse was the case. A com-
parison of the exports from all Southern ports with those from all
Northern ports shows that after about 1830 the former always
exceeded, and sometimes greatly exceeded, the latter. The im-
ports of the Southern ports, however, were only a fraction of the
imports of Northern ports, and became proportionally less as the
years went by.
1 If the growing superiority of the North in popu-
lation be remembered, and the comparison be made on the basis
of population, the disparity is still striking. It indicates that either
the people of the South did not consume their proportionate share
of the nation's imports, or that Northern merchants imported
largely on Southern account, or both.
A study of the growth of population of Northern and Southern
seaports likewise reveals a growing disparity in favor of the
former.2 The ante-bellum South had no large and growing ports
except New Orleans and Baltimore, the latter of which was on the
line between the two sections.
^ee Appendix, Table I.
2
See Appendix, Table II.
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The available statistics of the shipping built or owned in the
two sections again reveals a disparity in favor of the North as
great or greater than that in the value of imports or the popula-
tion of the seaports. If the comparison be limited to vessels en-
gaged in the foreign trade, it is even more to the advantage of
the North.3 These facts would seem to indicate that the foreign
commerce of the Southern states was carried largely in Northern
or foreign vessels, and that the coasting trade of the South, if
large, must have been conducted largely in Northern vessels.
The comparative growth of Northern and Southern seaports,
the tendency to concentration of the importing business of the
United States in Northern cities, especially New York, and the
disparity between the shipping industries of the two sections, in
short the "commercial dependence" of the South upon the North,
were matters which received considerable attention in the ante-
bellum South, not only from citizens of the seaports themselves
but from the section as a whole. Southern men quite generally
looked upon commercial dependence as an evidence of the failure
of the South to prosper as it should. They gave consideration to
the relation of commercial dependence to the comparatively slow
accumulation of mobile capital in the South and to the inadequacy
of credit facilities, because of which they were handicapped in
their efforts to construct internal improvements and to develop
the varied resources of the section. They canvassed commercial
dependence as a cause for the slower increase of population in the
South than in the North a matter of much concern because of
its bearing upon the sectional struggle over slavery. The causes
of commercial dependence were sought, therefore, and efforts
were made to devise and apply remedies.
The whole subject was first thoroughly discussed, and the first
efforts made to effect a revolution in the manner of conducting
Southern commerce, by a number of direct trade conventions
which met in Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia in 1837, 1838,
and 1839.
The direct trade convention originated in Georgia. While the
financial crash of 1837 deranged the currency and the exchange
and credit operations of the country, it seems not to have affected
the old South as disastrously at first as it did other sections of
"See Appendix, Table III.
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the Union.* It was seized upon as affording a good opportunity
for attempting to effect the establishment of direct trade and a
change in the method of marketing cotton. With these objects in
view, William Bearing and other gentlemen, of Athens, issued a
call for a convention to meet in Augusta in October, 183 7. The
call stated that a crisis had arrived in the commercial affairs of
the South and Southwest, "the most favorable that has occurred
since the formation of the American government, to attempt a
new organization of our commercial relations with Europe."
6 The
first Augusta convention was followed in April and October, 1838,
by a second and a third and, in April, 1839, by a fourth, in Char-
leston.
Each of this series of conventions was composed of from one
hundred to two hundred delegates, elected by local meetings. The
great majority in each case was from Georgia and South Caro-
lina, but there were scattering representatives from North Caro-
lina, Tennessee, Alabama, and Florida Territory, and an attempt
was made to enlist as many Southern states as possible. Although
the state rights, anti-tariff men gave tone to the proceedings, the
conventions were bi-partisan in composition; they were not got up
for partisan purposes, and party politics played a minor part in
their deliberations. Among the delegates were bankers, merch-
ants, and planters, as well as men active in politics. The lists of
delegates included such well known names as Robert Y. Hayne,
A. P. Hayne, George McDuffie, James Hamilton, Ker Boyce,
James Gadsden, Colonel Blanding, F. H. Elmore, H. S. Legare,
J. H. Hammond, J. E. and J. A. Calhoun, Chancellor Harper, and
C. G. Memminger, of South Carolina, Thomas Butler King, A. H.
Stephens, George W. Crawford, J. M. Berrien, G. B. Lamar,
Judge A. B. Longstreet, and Joseph H. Lumpkin, of Georgia, A. J.
Pickett, of Alabama, and Spencer Jarnaghin, of Tennessee. John
C. Calhoun was not present in any of these conventions, but their
purposes met with his approval.
7 The presence and active partici-
pation of such men are sufficient to indicate the deep interest in the
'Charleston Courier, Oct. 7, 1837.
*Niles' Register, LV, 43, 189. The delegates of the third Augusta convention
presented William Dearing with a silver cup in recognition of his part in inaugu-
rating the direct trade conventions.
"Charleston Courier, Aug. 14, 1837.
'Calhoun to Sidney Breese, July 27, 1839, Calhoun Correspondence.
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objects of the conventions. Numerous local meetings and the ac-
companying press discussion give testimony to the same effect. In
addition to the debates and resolutions and the newspaper com-
ments, the views, objects, and plans of the conventions were set
forth in several quite able addresses and reports. The report from
the committee of twenty-one of the first convention was read by
George McDuffie, chairman.
8 He was made chairman of a com-
mittee to address the people of the South and Southwest upon the
objects of the convention, and wrote the address.9 At the second
convention the report of the general committee was read by Robert
Y. Hayne, chairman, and a committee, of which A. B. Longstreet
was appointed chairman, was instructed to prepare an address to
the people.
10 At the Charleston meeting, Robert Y. Hayne read a
report upon direct trade, which he had prepared, and which was
adopted by the convention; 11 F. H. Elmore read a report from
another committee, composed chiefly of merchants from interior
towns.12
Three delegates from Norfolk, Virginia, attended the second
Augusta convention and took a prominent part in its proceedings.
As a result of growing interest, a direct trade convention was
called to meet in Richmond in June, 1838. This meeting was fol-
lowed by another in Norfolk in November. Besides these two
large conventions there were a number of more local gatherings
which discussed the same subjects. The great majority of the
delegates at Richmond and Norfolk were from Virginia, but sev-
eral came from North Carolina. These gatherings were bi-par-
tisan in composition, as were those in Georgia and South Caro-
lina, but they did not succeed so well in keeping partisan politics
out of the proceedings. Among the delegates were such prom-
inent men as John S. Millson, J. M. Botts, James Caskie, Francis
Mallory, Edmund Ruffin, Myer Myers, and W. C. Flournoy. At
Norfolk, John Tyler presided. These conventions, too, left sev-
*CharIeston Courier, Oct. 24, 1837.
DeBow's Review, IV, 208 ff.
"Report is in Savannah Daily Republican, April 6, 9, 19, 1838. The ad-
dress is in the Charleston Mercury, Aug. n, 1838; DeBow's Review, XIII, 477-
93; Niles' Register, LV, 40 f.
"DeBow, Industrial Resources of the South and West, III, 92-111.
"DeBow's Review, IV, 493-502; DeBow, Industrial Resources, etc., Ill, m-
116.
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eral ably written reports, notably, the report of the committee on
commerce of the Richmond convention,13 a report prepared and
submitted to the same convention by Francis Mallory but with-
drawn because of the opposition it encountered,14 and the report
of the general committee of the Norfolk convention, read by John
S. Millson. 15
There was substantial agreement in all of the conventions in
regard to the manner in which Southern commerce was con-
ducted, the evils attendant thereon, and the benefits to follow the
establishment of direct trade with Europe. The staple growing
states were described as being in a "state of commercial depen-
dence, scarcely less reproachful to their industry and enterprise
than it is incompatible with their substantial prosperity."
16 What
would be more natural than that those who furnished the nation's
exports should also receive its imports? Yet, while the South fur-
nished two-thirds of the exports, she received directly only one-
tenth of the imports of the United States. Francis Mallory esti-
mated that nine-tenths of the exports went directly to Europe,
while five-sevenths of the imports from abroad came indirectly
by way of Northern seaports. The direct imports of Charleston
were said to have amounted to several millions in 1807; by 1833
they had dwindled to one-half million; since that time they had
gradually increased, but were still insignificant.
17 The same was
said to be true of Virginia. At the time of the Revolution exports
and imports had been equal; from that time to 1831 imports had
steadily declined; since 1831 there had been some, though not
marked, improvement.18 Though Southern exports went directly
to Europe, the business was not conducted by home merchants,
but chiefly by agents of Northern and English firms. Southern
"Richmond Enquirer, June 22, 1838.
"Ibid., June 26, 1838; June 19. Mallory's report may be found in pamphlet
form also.
"Ibid., Nov. 30, 1838. In addition to the reports already mentioned, were
a
"Report on Manufactures" and a "Supplementary Report on Manufactures,"
both adopted by the Richmond convention. Ibid., June 26, 1838.
"Charleston Courier, Oct. 24, 1837, report of the general committee of the
first Augusta convention.
"Savannah Daily Republican, April 7, 1838, report of the general committee
of the second Augusta convention.
"Richmond Enquirer, June 26, 1838, Mallory's report.
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seaports were described as mere appendages of Northern sea-
ports, "places where their agents and factors do business, and
who, having but little local interest, withdraw from them after a
few years residence, with all their gains, to swell the wealth of
the place of their early affection and attachment."
19 In Virginia,
Northern steamboats often went up the rivers buying and selling
directly to the farmers, the lumbermen, and the country mer-
chants; the cargoes were paid for by bills on New York, and the
money never entered Virginia. Interior merchants purchased their
stocks in New York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore without the inter-
vention of jobbers in Southern ports.20
The profits Northern merchants and shippers made from con-
ducting Southern commerce were believed to be very great and to
account in large measure for the prosperity of Northern cities,
while the loss of those profits explained the impoverishment of the
cities of the South. The address issued by the second Augusta
convention, after estimating at $630,000,000 the duties paid by
the Southern states since the establishment of the Constitution of
the United States, continued:
If we suppose the value of the goods upon which the six hun-
dred and thirty millions of duties were levied, to have been but
four times the value of the duties, it amounted to $2,500,000,000.
How were these goods brought to this country and distributed?
The northern merchant has come hither and bought from the
southern planter produce of equal value, abating from the price
all the expenses, direct and incidental, of transportation. He has
insured them in northern offices, and shipped them abroad in his
own vessels exchanged them at a small profit for foreign merchan-
dise brought it home paid one-fourth its value to the govern-
ment added that amount and all the expenses of importation,
and fifteen to twenty per cent, for his profits, to the price, and
exposed it for sale. The southern merchant has now gone to him
lingered the summer through at heavy expense bought a por-
tion of the goods, reshipped them in northern vessels to southern
ports added twenty-five per cent, more to the price, to cover his
expenses and profits and sold them to the southern planter. All
the disbursements made in this process, save such as are made
abroad, are among northern men; all the profits, save the south-
ern merchant's, are made by northern men . . . Every item in the
endless catalogue of charges, except the government dues, may be
considered a voluntary tribute from the citizens of the south to
"Richmond Enquirer, June 26, 1838, Mallory's report.
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their brethren of the north; for they would all have gone to our
own people, had we done our own exporting and importing. 21
At Charleston, Robert Y. Hayne quoted a report of a com-
mittee of the Alabama Legislature in which it was estimated that
over one-third the price of cotton went to New York agents and
shippers. Hayne himself was content to put the tolls at 10 or 15
per cent.
22
George McDuffie thought the "voluntary tribute" paid
annually to the North for carrying Southern commerce amounted
to $io,ooo,ooo.23 A Virginia delegate said the state could save
$1,000,000 annually by importing directly.24 But this direct an-
nual drain was not the only loss occasioned the Southern people;
there were also the
"consequential losses," that is, the capital
which would have accumulated had the South conducted her own
commerce. Commercial dependence had operated to prevent the
accumulation of capital in the South, and the deficiency of capital
had handicapped enterprise.
The greatness of New York City was pictured all said to have
been built upon Southern staples and Southern trade. "You hold
the element," ran the address of one of these conventions, "from
which he derives his strength, and you have only to withdraw it
to make him as subservient to you, as you now are to him. You
have but to speak the word, and his empire is transferred to your
own soil, and his sovereignty to the sons of that soil." 25 But the
benefits were not confined to New York; the virtual monopoly of
Southern commerce had "either directly or indirectly made the
whole of the North and Northwest what they are," according to
the call of the first Augusta convention.
26 Because of it, "the one
people has risen like the rocket, and the other has fallen like its
stick their positions must have been reversed, if the southern
people had maintained their foreign trade." 27 Glowing descrip-
tions were given of the prosperity of Southern states and cities
after direct trade should be restored. Were direct trade estab-
lished, according to the address calling the second Augusta con-
vention, "there would be an end to the unequal barter of which
"Niles' Register, LV, 41.
"DeBow, Industrial Resources, III, 93.
"Charleston Courier, Oct. 24, 1837, report, first Augusta convention.
"Richmond Enquirer, June 15, 1838.
^Nilei Register, LV, 43, second Augusta convention.
"Charleston Courier, Aug. 14, 1837.
"Niles' Register, LV, 42.
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we have spoken. The doleful cry for northern funds would be
hushed. The speculators upon southern distress would cease. The
disorders of the currency would be healed. The relation of the
commercial agency would be changed. They would be acquaint-
ances and friends, identical in feeling and interest; enjoying
mutual confidence, and interchanging mutual favors .... The
fountain and the streams of commerce lying all within our land,
would enrich it to an extent that none can foresee. Our works
of internal improvement would receive a new and ever-accelerat-
ing impetus. Our drooping cities would be revived our creeping
commerce winged; and all the blessings, physical, moral, and in-
tellectual, which invariably accompany affluence and independ-
ence, would be ours." 28
In regard to the causes for the "decline" of the shipping and
the import trade of Southern ports, the conventions exhibited dif-
ferences of opinion. First, there was the view that for many years
the North had possessed great advantages over the South for these
lines of business by reason of its superior wealth and larger ac-
cumulations of capital. Not only must ship owners and importers
be men of large capital, but they must have the backing of
wealthy communities.
And men of the South Carolina school, the followers of Calhoun
and McDuffie, who predominated in the Augusta and Charleston
conventions, were ready with explanations for the more rapid ac-
cumulation of capital in the North than in the South. It was, they
said, because of the unequal operation of the Federal government.
The tariffs had long enriched the manufacturing sections at the
expense of the agricultural. Furthermore, while the people of the
South had paid their proportionate share of the Federal revenues,
these revenues had been disbursed chiefly in the Northern cities,
and this process, going on year after year, had transferred a stag-
gering total from the one section to the other. A minority report
in the Richmond convention rehearsed the old story of the as-
sumption of the state debts by the Federal government and the
refunding of the national debt carried out under the guidance of
Alexander Hamilton. The refunded debt had been distributed be-
tween the North and South in the ratio of three to one, and,
because of this inequality of distribution, had acted as a mortgage
'
Regist'er, LV, 43. Cf. Richmond Enquirer, June 26, 1838.
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of the one section upon the other, great sums having been trans-
ferred from the South to the North in the form of interest paid
to Northern bond holders from the common treasury.29 It was
claimed, also, by men in these conventions, that for long the funds
of the Federal government had been deposited almost altogether
in Northern banks, thus giving Northern business men a decided
advantage over Southern in the ability to secure financial assist-
ance. Those who held these views of the causes of Southern de-
cline saw basis for hope for revival in the gradual reduction of the
tariff, according to the provisions of the Compromise Tariff law of
1833, the recent extinguishment of the national debt, the destruc-
tion of the United States Bank, and the evidence of a new policy
in distributing deposits of the public funds.
Another alleged cause for Southern commercial dependence,
closely related to the one just mentioned, was the inadequacy of
credit facilities. An examination, however cursory, of business
methods in the South in that period makes it clear that a success-
ful importing firm would have to command very great resources
of capital or credit or both. It was proverbial that the planters
lived each year upon the prospective income from the next year's
crop. The country merchants, who extended them long credit,
could not buy, therefore, except on long time. Importers, who
bought on sixty or ninety days time, had to sell to the merchants
upon from six to twelve or sixteen months. Country merchants
were sometimes unwilling to give negotiable notes; they consid-
ered a request to do so a reflection upon their business integrity.30
Southern importers and jobbers did not, unaided, possess the
means, and Southern banks were unable to lend them sufficient
support, to enable them to extend to retail merchants the long
credits which the latter received in the North.
A correspondent of the Charleston Courier attributed the loss
of foreign trade to the fact that country merchants began to buy
of Northern jobbers because of the longer credits obtained.31
Robert Y. Hayne enumerated long credits as one of the causes of
the decline of Southern commerce.32 McDuffie said he confidently
SBRichmond Enquirer, June 26, 1838, Mallory's report.
**Ibid., June 22, 1838, remarks of Mr. James and Mr. Caskie; June 26, 1838,
Mallory's report.
"Oct. 17, 1837.
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believed that, if the planters would "adopt the system of expend-
ing, in the current year, the income of the year preceding ....
it would dispense with one-half of the capital that would otherwise
be necessary for carrying on our foreign commerce by a system of
direct importation."
33 One of the questions dividing public opinion
in Virginia in that period was the policy of authorizing an increase
of bank capital in the state. It was the subject of animated de-
bates in both the Richmond and the Norfolk conventions. Those
favoring the increase thought the unwise policy of the legislature
in refusing the authorization largely responsible for the decline of
direct trade in Virginia.
It is to the credit of the men of these conventions that they
recognized other causes for Southern commercial dependence
than the action or non-action of the Federal and state govern-
ments. They recognized that agriculture had in the past proved
more attractive to capital than the shipping or mercantile business;
land and negroes had been considered the best investments. The
existence of a prejudice against other pursuits than agriculture and
the professions was admitted. Some were willing to credit the peo-
ple of the North with habits of industry not possessed by their own
people and with superior commercial enterprise; they spoke of the
"voluntary tribute" which the South paid the North. The able re-
port of the general committee of the Norfolk convention, read by
John S. Millson, traced the decline of Virginia's foreign commerce
to a very early date. Before the Revolution, the report said, bus-
iness was conducted by British capitalists, and even then the resi-
dent merchants were foreigners. At the time of the Revolution,
British capital was withdrawn. True, the same thing happened in
the North, but to a less degree, and the North was better pre-
pared to take the place left by the British. Furthermore, agricul-
ture became unprofitable in the North at an earlier day than in the
South, and capital had been diverted to other industries. The
committee further candidly admitted that "the decline of a con-
siderable portion of our foreign import trade may be accounted
for in the fact that we now derive from the Northern states
many of those articles that we formerly imported from abroad."
Such a diversion of trade was not a subject for regret.34 A com-
mittee in the Charleston convention likewise reported that the
"DeBotv's Review, IV, 221.
"Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 30, 1838.
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consumption of domestic goods had increased greatly, was still in-
creasing, and was estimated by merchants to extend already to
one-third of the whole consumption. The committee believed,
however, that the quantity of foreign goods consumed in the South
was sufficient to justify merchants in Southern seaports embarking
in the importing business and to enable them to compete with
Northern importers, who, of course, supplied a larger demand.
35
It was generally denied that Northern seaports possessed any
natural or physical advantages over Southern seaports for con-
ducting foreign commerce. The direct course of trade was the
natural course, and the indirect the unnatural. Direct trade would
save one set of jobbers' profits, the cost of shipping coastwise, the
difference between the discount of Southern notes in New York
and Charleston (or the cost of whatever other mode of payment
was employed), and the expenses retail merchants incurred in go-
ing North to lay in their stocks. Southern harbors were said to be
as good as Northern. However that may be, it is certain that
ocean going vessels entered Southern harbors to receive their ex-
ports. These ships often came in ballast, and, it was reasonably
argued, would be willing to carry imports at low freights. Ship-
ping was considered adequate, though there was recognition that
regular packet lines were needed.
36 The South was said to have
timber for ship-building; but, in the thirties, not much was said
about the desirability of promoting ship-building or ship-owning:
the big object was to save the "importers' profits." Now and then
someone suggested that the importing business in Southern cities
was rendered precarious by visits of yellow, or "strangers'," fever;
but residents of the South were generally ready to defend their
coast cities against the prevalent belief that they were unhealthy.
37
Various plans and measures were suggested for promoting
direct importations of foreign goods. Some were intended to over-
come the obstacle to direct trade which lay in the lack of mercan-
**DeBow's Review, IV, 495, Elmore's report.
M
It is a rather significant commentary, however, that much of the import
trade of Charleston was made by her own merchants through New York, the
goods being transhipped there. DeBow's Review, IV, 499.
M
DeBow, Industrial Resources, III, 98; Buckingham, Slave States of Amer-
ica, I, 67 ff. In 1838, Charleston experienced the most costly epidemic of yellow
fever of her history to that time. The severity of the epidemic was partly due
to the conditions resulting from the great fire earlier in the same year. Charleston
Mercury, Sept. 13, Oct. 26, 1838; Niles' Register, LV, 52, 161.
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tile houses with sufficient capital to enable them to embark in the
importing business. The first Augusta convention took the view
that, while individual merchants were not possessed of resources
necessary, the requisite capital could be got together by associa-
tions of individuals, and to that end it appointed a committee to
memorialize the state legislatures in behalf of limited co-partner-
ship laws. In response to the committee's memorials the legisla-
tures of Virginia, South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, Tennessee,
and Florida Territory enacted the desired legislation, and subse-
quent conventions urged men of means to avail themselves of the
opportunity thus afforded.
38 The opinion was expressed that there
was an overproduction of cotton in the South, and that planters
could profitably invest a portion of the proceeds of their crops
otherwise than in land and negroes. If for a few years the plant-
ers would apply one-half their net income to commerce, abundant
capital would be supplied to conduct the whole foreign com-
merce.39 This suggestion, however, could not carry great weight,
for, though subject to fluctuation, it was not until 1839 that there
was a marked decline in cotton prices, and the average for the
years 1835 to 1839 was fourteen cents, a higher average than that
of any equal period since 1820 to 1824.* The question of capital,
it was considered, would be a serious one only while the revolution
in trade was being effected, for, once established, the profits of
direct importations would supply the capital requisite for their
continuance. 41
Other recommendations of the direct trade conventions dealt
with the great obstacle to direct trade which lay in the inadequacy
of credit facilities in the South. The second Augusta convention
was especially detailed in its recommendations. It requested
banks to form European connections that they might be able to
assist importers with letters of credit. It recommended that the
banks in the seaports discount paper from the interior for the
"Savannah Daily Republican, April 6, 10, 1838; Niles' Register, LV, 43, 189.
The Charleston convention adopted a resolution directing the chairman to ap-
point and designate the spheres of committees whose duty it should be to call
meetings of the people and recommend to them to invest a portion of their sur-
plus capital in limited partnerships with merchants in trading centers and towns
of their respective states. Charleston Courier, April 19, 1839.
"Ibid., Oct. 24, 1837; DeBow's Review, IV, 222.
40
Donnell, E. J., History of Cotton, passim.
"Savannah Daily Republican, April 10, 1838.
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importing merchants paper for longer periods than six months as
well as for shorter periods. The banks of the interior were re-
quested to cooperate by collecting and remitting the proceeds of
such paper to the coast with as little delay as possible. "It is not
to be concealed that without the aid and support of the banks, the
difficulties in our way will be greatly multiplied. It will depend
upon them, in great measure, to determine the fate of our great
measure."42 The banks had suspended specie payment in May,
1837, and were beset with great difficulties. The convention de-
vised a plan for equalizing the domestic exchanges and keeping up
the credit of the banks during the period of suspension. In sub-
stance the plan was that the banks of the principal Southern cities
receive each other's notes and adopt some sort of a clearing house
system, and that other banks maintain the value of their notes and
keep down the rates of exchange by redeeming their notes at the
seaports. A committee was appointed to urge the banks to adopt
the plan.
43 The plan had good points, but was too complicated to
be adopted at the time. The banks did make a more or less con-
certed effort to resume specie payments in 1838, but after a few
months were again forced to suspend, in October, 1839. The Vir-
ginia conventions contented themselves, after hot discussions, with
passing resolutions asking the legislatures of Virginia and North
Carolina to authorize increases of banking capital.
44
Many other suggestions designed to promote direct importa-
tions were made. Individual citizens were urged to be more enter-
prising. It was declared a sacred duty to buy of those merchants who
traded directly in preference to those who bought foreign goods
from Northern jobbers. Interior merchants were requested not to
go North for their stocks until they had investigated the possibil-
ities of making their purchases in their own seaports. A local Vir-
ginia convention, in 1838, recommended the organization of an as-
sociation of retail merchants pledged to deal, after September I,
1839, with the importing merchants of Virginia cities only, "pro-
vided those merchants would sell as cheaply as the Northern mer-
chants;" and sixty or seventy citizens actually signed a pledge not
"Savannah Daily Republican, April 10, 1838.
"Ibid., April 6, 1838.
"Richmond Enquirer, June 19, Nov. 23, 1838. These states did not have
free banking laws at that time.
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to patronize any merchant who would not join the association.45
The pledge system was advocated in the Norfolk convention, but
the convention refused to recommend it.46 Complaint was made
that the tax laws of the states descriminated against commercial
capital in favor of land and slaves.47 Some Southern states and
cities taxed sales; port and wharf charges and fees were said to be
too high.
48 The Charleston convention adopted a resolution re-
questing the state legislatures to repeal discriminatory taxes.
49
A motion introduced at Norfolk to ask the Legislature of Virginia
to exempt direct imports from taxation was defeated.
50 The
prejudices of the people against mercantile pursuits were de-
plored: "The commercial class must be elevated in public opinion
to the rank in society which properly belongs to it." It was
recognized as an evil that the great majority of the merchants,
commission merchants, and factors in all the seaport cities of the
South (and interior towns too, for that matter) were either
Northerners or naturalized citizens. Commercial education was
recommended to train Southern youth to enter the field. Robert
Y. Hayne advanced to his son, William C., the capital necessary
to enter into a partnership with one of the old importers of Char-
leston. His purpose, he wrote, was to "try what can be done to
rear up a young brood of Carolina merchants, which I believe to
be indispensable to put our Southern America on a right foot-
ing."
51 Manufacturers and exporters of foreign countries were
asked to establish agencies in Southern cities for selling their
goods,.as they had done in New York and other Northern seaports.
The Norfolk convention considered this quite important; it ap-
pointed a committee of seven to get in communication with
European firms.
52
"Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 13, 1838, account of a meeting in Elizabeth City
County, Oct. 6, 1838.
"Ibid., Nov. 20, 1838.
"Charleston Courier, April 17, 1839, "Report on the Taxation of Commer-
cial Capital," submitted by Mitchell King in the Charleston convention.
"DeBow's Review, IV, 498.
"Charleston Courier, April 19, 1839.
""Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 23, 1838.
"Hayne to J. H. Hammond, Jan. 18, 1839, /. H. Hammond Papers.
"DeBow, Industrial Resources, III, loo; Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 20, 30,
1838. Early in 1839, George McDuffie was in England in the interest of a plan
of his own "to form associations of from twenty to thirty planters to buy directly
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The direct trade movement of these years was very closely re-
lated to efforts being made in the South Atlantic states to es-
tablish connections by railroads or canals with the Ohio valley.
South Carolinians were the chief promoters of a great project,
which ultimately had to be abandoned, to build the "Louisville,
Cincinnati, and Charleston Railroad."63 The State of Georgia had
undertaken the construction of a trunk line, the Western and At-
lantic, from Atlanta to the Tennessee river.84 Virginia had chart-
ered the James River and Kanawha Canal Company, which, as
the name indicates, was intended to provide continuous water
communication between the seaboard and the Ohio. 65 All of the
direct trade conventions very heartily endorsed these projects for
connecting the South and West as most promising measures for
securing direct trade. The West sold to the South, it was said; if
it could also buy in the South, such a demand for goods would be
created in Southern seaports that there could no longer be any
question of their ability to import directly. "W
T
e must contend
for the commerce of the West," read Mallory's report, "the sec-
tion that gets that commerce will get the commerce of the coun-
try." A resolution adopted by the Norfolk convention declared
internal improvements to be the foundation cf an import trade.56
The general committee of the Second Augusta convention said
that direct trade was inseparably connected with the extension of
intercourse to the West. "And when the great West shall find a
market and receive their supplies through the seaports of the
South, a demand will be furnished, the extent and value of which
cannot be too largely estimated."
57
Calhoun, who took a deep in-
terest in both projects, believed that direct trade could not be es-
from English manufacturers without commissions or profits to agents, factors,
or merchants except a small commission to Liverpool houses selected to sell the
planters' cotton and send their orders to the manufacturers." He believed the
planters could save 25 per cent upon their purchases in this way. McDuffie to
J. H. Hammond, March 31, 1839 (Manchester, England), J.H.Hammond Papers.
*3This project is discussed at length in U. B. Phillips, History of Transpor-
tation in the Eastern Cotton Belt, ch. IV; and T. D. Jervey, Robert Y. Hayne .
and His Times.
"Phillips op. cit., ch. VII.
"Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, from 1776 to!861, p. 182.
""Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 20, 23, 1838.
"Savannah Republican, April 9, 1838.
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tablished until railroads had been extended to the West. 58 On
the other hand, discussion of the establishment of direct trade
with Europe would stimulate interest in projects for connecting
the seaboard and the Ohio valley. Many of the members of the
direct trade conventions were closely associated with the internal
improvement projects, and, though it would be inaccurate to say
that the former were got up to give impetus to the latter, that
was undoubtedly one of the objects of the conventions. The rela-
tion was made very clear in the message of Mayor Pinckney, of
Charleston, August, 1838. During the previous year, he said,
Charleston had held meetings, "giving a decided impetus to those
great enterprises, the Cincinnati railroad and a direct trade with
Europe, of which the latter will supply the former with its life
blood, and of which the united operation will assuredly achieve
the commercial independence of the South, and, with it, the per-
manent prosperity of our beloved city."
59
Although the money panic of 1837 was the occasion for the
convening of conventions which proposed to attempt to change the
course of Southern trade, the movement cannot be considered the
outgrowth of depressed economic conditions. In 1837 and 1838,
it was believed that business had received only a temporary, al-
though sharp, check, and that enterprise would soon be in full
swing once more. As were the rapid building of railroads, canals,
and turnpikes, the direct trade movement was a manifestation of
the spirit of progress and enterprise which had seized upon East,
West, and South alike. The movement came to a temporary close
when general stagnation of business settled upon the country in
1839 and continued for several years thereafter.60
It is noteworthy that these direct trade conventions were con-
cerned almost exclusively with economic conditions and means for
improving them. The slavery question, which was being given
considerable prominence about this time both in Congress and out
MCalhoun to Sidney Breese, July 27, 1839: to James Edward Calhoun,
Nov. I, 1841, Calhoun Correspondence.
""Report; Containing a Review of the Proceedings of the City Authorities
from the 4th of Sept., 1837. By Henry L. Pinckney, Mayor.
60The Charleston convention adjourned to meet in Macon, Georgia, in May,
1840; the meeting did not occur. The Norfolk convention arranged for another
to meet in Raleigh, North Carolina, in November, 1839; there is no record of
the meeting of the convention.
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by reason of the debates in Congress upon the exclusion of ab-
olition literature from the mails and the treatment of abolition
petitions in Congress, was rarely mentioned. A decade later no
direct trade convention could be held, no plan for achieving
commercial independence proposed, nor, for that matter, for erect-
ing a cotton mill, building a railroad, opening a mine, or in any
wa;/ promoting the material progress of the South, without con-
sideration of, or due advertance to, its relation to the sectional
struggle over slavery and the extension thereof. The argument
would then without fail be advanced that the South must develop
her strength and resources and achieve commercial and industrial
independence in order to be prepared to defend her rights and
honor in the Union, or, if worst came to worst, her independence
out of it. George McDuffie did indeed allude to the existence of
causes, tariff and slavery, which made the dismemberment of the
confederacy "one of the possible contingencies for which it is the
part of wisdom to provide";61 but as yet such considerations were
very infrequently advanced, at least in public. The direct trade
conventions of the thirties were in the main what they purported
to be, namely, bona fide efforts on the part of Southern men to
promote the prosperity and progress of their states and section
and, particularly, their seaports.
Several reasons may be advanced to explain the comparatively
little interest displayed in the direct trade movement outside the
three states of Georgia, South Carolina, and Virginia. North
Carolina had no seaport which was considered to have the requi-
site natural advantages for becoming a great Southern emporium.
Most of her exports and imports were made by way of Virginia
and South Carolina. Her population was conservative and com-
paratively devoid of state pride. Alabama and Louisiana had
seaports in Mobile and New Orleans. Both states were young,
and were growing rapidly in population. Their agriculture had
been prosperous. Just before the financial panic of 1837, both
had enjoyed several years of speculative prosperity, which had
been fully shared by Mobile and New Orleans. The rapidly grow-
ing population of the two towns consisted largely of immigrants
from the North of Europe; civic pride had not yet developed. The
crash of 1837 was more severe in the Southwest than in the older
"DeBow's Review, IV, 219.
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Southern states, and the time was not auspicious for interest in
any new movements.
The direct trade conventions accomplished no tangible results
in the way of changing the course of Southern commerce. They
afford evidence of discontent in the older states of the South with
their material progress. They show that the belief was held, and
no doubt they contributed to its spread, that commercial depen-
dence was an evidence and, at the same time, a cause of "South-
ern decline." It is unnecessary to point out the common element
in the view that the East was being enriched at the expense of the
South because of the commercial vassalage of the latter and the
quite prevalent belief that the operation of the Federal govern-
ment had been unequal in its effects upon the material progress
of the two sections. The direct trade conventions were another
manifestation of the economic discontent of which evidence had
been given during the nullification controversy.
CHAPTER II
MOVEMENT FOR THE DIVERSIFICATION
OF INDUSTRY, 1840-1852
The industrial revolution was not well under way in the South
until almost a generation after the Civil War. While the ante-
bellum South was not completely devoid of manufacturing and
mining, the progress of those industries did not keep pace with the
progress of agriculture. Southern industry was no more diversified
in 1860 than in the earlier decades of the century. In this respect
the South presented a contrast to the North, where the industrial
revolution was proceeding apace. Elsewhere in this thesis sta-
tistics are given which illustrate the comparative industrial
progress of the sections.
During the 18405, Southern agriculture suffered a long and quite
severe depression. During the same period cotton factories were
being established at a more rapid rate than in the decades im-
mediately preceding or following, and there was unusual progress
in a few other lines of industry. The profits of manufacturers
seem to have been large in comparison with those of planters.
These conditions were chiefly responsible for the beginning of a
more or less organized agitation" in favor of the establishment of
manufactures. As the agitation developed, social and political
arguments were adduced to support the economic. The argu-
ments of the proponents of diversified industry did not go uncon-
troverted, however. The history and analysis of this discussion
shed light upon the subject of economic discontent in the South
before the Civil War. An essential similarity will be noted be-
tween some of the ideas at the basis of the agitation in behalf of
manufactures and ideas which animated the direct trade move-
ment described in the preceding chapter.
The decade 1840-1850 brought the severest depression to agri-
culture, particularly to cotton culture, that the South experienced
prior to the Civil War. During the preceding decade cotton prices
had averaged 12.6 cents, and the industry was profitable. During
the 18405, however, the average price was about 8 cents, and the
cotton planters were greatly disheartened. The decade opened
with cotton between 8 and 9 cents; the following year prices were
slightly higher; but after 1841 prices steadily declined until
33
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middling upland sold for 5 cents in New York, January I, 1845,
the lowest price ever paid for American cotton.1 A contributor
to the Southern Quarterly Review wrote: "At no period of our
history, from the year 1781, has a greater gloom been cast over
the agricultural prospects of South Carolina, than at the present
time." 2 John C. Calhoun wrote his son-in-law: "Cotton still con-
tinues to fall. Its average price may be said to be about 4 cents
per pound. The effect will be ruinous in the South, and will
rouse the feeling of the whole section."
3 For years, 1845 was re-
membered as the year of the great cotton crisis. The depression
in agriculture was not confined to the cotton belt. Edmund Ruffin
wrote from Virginia that prices were so low that agriculture could
scarcely live.
4 Similar reports came from the Northwest, which
still depended largely upon the cotton belt for a market for grain,
pork and bacon, and live stock. The replies to Secretary of the
Treasury Walker's circular (1845) requesting information upon
which to base recommendations for a revision of the tariff, even
after due allowance has been made for partisan bias, testify to the
low state of agriculture in the South and West.5 A North Caro-
linian reported that for three years the profits of agriculture in
his state had not been more than 3 per cent, because of poor
crops and low prices; horses and mules were imported from Ohio,
Indiana, Kentucky, Tennessee, and western Virginia, and prices
were one-third lower than they had been during the ten years pre-
ceding. Similar replies came from South Carolina, Georgia, and
Alabama. Replies from Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, and Missouri rep-
resented the profits of agriculture to be from 2 to 5 per cent.
Scarcely a response was optimistic about the outlook for agricul-
ture.
The grain growing states were the first to experience a revival
of prosperity. In 1846, the crop failure in Ireland and large
deficiencies in Great Britain and in many parts of the Continent
*C. F. M'Cay, "The Cotton Trade from 1825-1850," in Hunt's Merchants'
Magazine, XXIII, 595-604; E. J. Donnell, History of Cotton, passim; M. B.
Hammond, The Cotton Industry.
VIII, 118 (July, 1845).
'Calhoun to Thomas G. Clemson, Dec. 27, 1844, Calhoun Correspondence.
*Ruffin to Hammond, May 17, 1845, /. H. Hammond Papers.
'Exec. Docs., 29 Cong., I Sess., II, No. 5. A digest of the replies is in
DeBow's Review, VI, 285-304.
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created an extraordinary demand for foodstuffs, which, together
with the repeal of the English Corn Laws the same year, led to a
remarkable increase in the exports of provisions from America
in that and the following year.
6 Other factors soon contributed to
the revival, and Western agriculture entered upon a period of
remarkable prosperity, unbroken until I85/.
7 The revival of pros-
perity in the cotton industry was delayed for two or three years.
The crop of 1846 was short, while the very conditions which
caused a great increase in the prices of provisions prevented a
considerable rise in the price. It was a saying in the South that
dear bread in Europe meant cheap cotton. The crops of 1847 and
1848 were large, but breadstuffs continued high in Great Britain,
Europe, in 1848, was in revolution, and cotton prices remained
low. In the fall of 1849, however, cotton was high. Pacification of
Europe, revival of business in France, fine harvests and conse-
quent cheap bread in England, the exhaustion of old stocks of raw
cotton, and the belief that the new crop was short, caused the sea-
son to open with cotton at 9.5 to 11.5 cents at New Orleans. The
average for the year was between n and 12 cents, and the price
was maintained the following year. Though the price fell again
in 1851-1852, it never again, before the war, fell to the level of the
18403. The average price for the decade 1850-1860 was 10.6 cents.8
As cotton prices fell the older cotton states were the first to find
its culture unprofitable. Their lands could not compete on equal
terms with the newer lands of the Southwest; they faced not only
reduced prices and diminished returns but also loss of popula-
tion through emigration. As early as 1841, J. H. Hammond, of
South Carolina, in an address before the State Agricultural So-
ciety, showed a thorough grasp of the situation and proposed the
remedies which were so fully discussed during the following
"Census of 1860, Agriculture, cxli.
TOther factors were the construction of railroads and canals connecting the
East and the Northwest and the development of the Eastern market.
*Donnell, History of Cotton, passim. Donnell's annual reviews of the cotton
trade were taken from the New Orleans Price Current. His statistics were from
the New York Shipping List. I have also used C. F. M'Cay's annual reviews of
the cotton trade, which appeared regularly for several years in the December
numbers of Hunt's Merchants' Magazine. See also DeBow's Review, XXVII, 106,
for cotton prices.
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years.
9 In the past, he said, the production of cotton could not
keep pace with the demand, but now production promised to out-
run consumption. Already the price had been forced down to a
figure, 8 cents, at which cotton culture in South Carolina was
profitable only on the richest soils. As remedies, Hammond pro-
posed, first, improved methods of cultivation and diversification of
agriculture. The planters must grow grain in sufficient quantities
to supply the home demand; they must raise live stock and save
the "immense sums which are annually drawn from us in ex-
change for mules, horses, cattle, hogs, sheep, and even poultry."
Tobacco, indigo, sugar cane, and grapes might be introduced. But
these remedies would not suffice; capital must be diverted from
agriculture to other pursuits. The state had mineral resources
which could be developed. "Already furnaces, forges, bloomeries,
and rolling mills have been put in operation with every prospect
of success at no distant day." He hoped coal would be found near
the iron. Manufactures might be developed. The state possessed
splendid resources of water-power. A beginning had already been
made in cotton manufacture. Manufactures should not be fostered
by legislation at the expense of other industries; but where they
grew up spontaneously they were undoubtedly a great blessing
increasing population, providing a home market for agriculture,
and saving large sums which otherwise would be sent out of the
state. An industrial revolution was inevitable, and the change
could be effected with less anxiety and loss if begun early and
conducted judiciously. Hammond regretted the revolution in in-
dustry and in "manners and probably the entire structure of our
social system" which the failure of the old system was likely to
occasion, but saw no grounds for apprehension.
In the following years the discussion increased in volume. The
Charleston Patriot published, in 1842, a series of articles in which
it was maintained that there was an overproduction of cotton and
the people of South Carolina were urged to abandon in part the
raising of that staple and turn their attention to manufacturing.
10
*F5Ie 20,219, / H. Hammond Papers. It is worthy of note that Hammond
had been a nullifier in 1832; as governor, in 1844, he was ready to lead his state
in separate resistance to the Tariff of 1842; and shortly after he wrote the famous
Letters on Southern Slavery, Addressed to Thomas Clarkson, Esquire.
"Nuts' Register, LXII, 71.
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Georgia newspapers were recommending to their people to do the
same. 11 Professor M'Cay, of the University of Georgia, who for
many years reviewed the cotton trade for Hunt's Merchants'
Magazine, warned planters that production was outrunning con-
sumption.
12 In February, 1845, a convention of cotton planters
was held in Montgomery, Alabama, to organize the planters of the
cotton belt for the purpose of limiting production and forcing
prices up.
13 The committee on agriculture of the Southwest-
ern Convention, at Memphis, in 1845, complained that interest in
agricultural improvement had given way to interest in internal im-
provements and politics, and that there was an overproduction
of cotton. The committee recommended that planters grow less
cotton and produce their own bread and meat; that scientific
agriculture be encouraged by the establishment of agricultural
societies and agricultural journals, and by state legislatures; and
that capital be diverted from cotton planting to manufacturing.
14
There was still talk, however, of possible competition from India
if prices should rise,
15 and the low prices were frequently attrib-
uted to speculation in cotton and to a combination of English fac-
tors with the Manchester buyers.
16
It was in South Carolina that a serious attempt to arouse the
public mind in favor of the diversification of industry was first
made. The situation there was unusual. Not only was the de-
pression in the cotton industry most severely felt, but the peculiar
political bias of a large element threatened, in 1844 and 1845, to
lead to another crisis similar to that of 1832 and 1833. When the
Tariff of 1842 was enacted, the South Carolina Legislature had
been content to pass resolutions denouncing it and declaring that
it would be endured as long as there was hope of repeal by the
Democratic party after the next election.17 In the next Congress,
1843-1845, the Democrats were in the majority in the House; but
an attempt to revise the tariff, by the McKay bill, was defeated,
ll
Niles' Register, loc. cit.
"Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, IX, 523.
"Niles' Register, LXVIII, 4.
^Journal of the Proceedings of the Southwestern Convention began and held
at the city of Memphis on the 12th of November, 1845, pp. 41-55.
"Donnell. History of Cotton, 276.
"New Orleans Bee, Mar. 2, 1844; Niles' Register, LXVI, 38.
"Ibid., LXIII, 232-235, 344-345.
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May, 1844, by an alliance of twenty-seven Northern Democrats
with the Whigs.18 This desertion by Northern Democrats and,
shortly thereafter, the publication of the celebrated "Kane Let-
ter," in which the Democratic candidate for the presidency clever-
ly "straddled" the tariff question,
19 caused many in South Caro-
lina to abandon hope of relief from the burdens of the tariff
through the instrumentality of the Democratic party. Meanwhile,
the blocking of the annexation of Texas by representatives from
the non-slaveholding states had occasioned the cry of "Texas or
disunion" in South Carolina and other Southern states. Under
these circumstances a group of South Carolina politicians, led by
R. B. Rhett, Armistead Burt, and I. E. Holmes, with the support
of the Charleston Mercury and several other papers of like stripe,
and the sympathy of Governor J. H. Hammond, George McDuffie,
and Langdon Cheves, declared, in the summer of 1844, for state
resistance to the Tariff of 1842 and attempted to lead the state
to adopt that policy.
20
It was with some difficulty that John C.
Calhoun, F. H. Elmore, and other leaders checked the "Bluffton
Movement," as it was termed, and caused saner counsels to pre-
vail. 21 Governor Hammond, indeed, in his message to the Legis-
lature, November 26, 1844, arraigned the tariff, expressed the
opinion that no relief could be expected from the incoming Polk
"Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i Sess., 622.
"National Intelligencer, July 25, 1844.
""I. E. Holmes to Hammond, July 23, 1844, /. H. Hammond Papers; Ham-
mond to Capt. R. J. Colcock, Sept. 12, 1844 (asking for the plans of the Citadel);
George McDuffie to Hammond, Sept. 22, 1844; General James Hamilton to Ham-
mond, Oct. 4, 1844; R. B. Rhett to Hunter, August 30, 1844, Correspondence of
R. M. T. Hunter; Charleston Mercury, Aug. 8, 1844, an account of the dinner
given to R. B. Rhett at Bluffton, July 31, 1844, where the movement was
launched and whence it got its name; ibid., Aug. 9, editorial, "Our Position and
Our Pledges" (by A. J. Stuart, senior editor); Niles' Register, LXVI, 369, quot-
ing letter from I. E. Holmes to the Charleston Mercury; ibid., LXVII, 49, quot-
ing letter from Judge Langdon Cheves to the Charleston Mercury. Cf. Stephen-
son, Texas and the Mexican War, ch. IX.
M
F. H. Elmore to Calhoun, Aug. 26, 1844, Calhoun Correspondence. "The
excitement in a portion of Carolina has gradually subsided, and will give no
further trouble. I had to act with great delicacy, but at the same time firmness
in relation to it." Calhoun to Francis Wharton, Sept. 17, 1844, Calhoun Corre-
spondence. Cf. James A. Seddon to Hunter, Aug. 19, 22, 1844, Correspondence
of R. M. T. Hunter; Niles' Register, LXVI, 434, account of the big Charleston
meeting of Aug. 19, 1844.
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administration, and urged the Legislature to take such measures
as would at an early day bring all the state's "moral, constitu-
tional, and, if necessary, physical resources, in direct array
against a policy which has never been checked but by her inter-
position."
22 But the Legislature tabled all resolutions for resist-
ance, and by a large majority voted confidence in the Democratic
party. This action was taken just after the notorious Twenty-
first Rule of the House, prohibiting the receiving of abolition peti-
tions, had been defeated at Washington.23 The leaders of the
Bluffton movement credited their defeat to the presidential as-
pirations of John C. Calhoun, and complained very bitterly of
what they termed his desertion.
24
The resistance faction, as well as many anti-tariff men who still
placed reliance in the Democratic party, attributed the crisis in
the cotton industry to the tariff. They thought the view that
there was an overproduction of cotton unworthy of considera-
tion.25 England, they said, could not consume cotton because the
Tariff of 1842 had deprived her of the American market for man-
factured goods. I. E. Holmes professed to believe that the opera-
tion of the tariff would in a few years render cotton planting en-
tirely profitless, and that no other industry could be found to
which labor could profitably be turned.26 Rhett and McDuffie
warned tariff men in Congress that South Carolina might be
"driven" to manufacture for herself. 27 Calhoun wrote: "The
pressure of the Tariff begins to be felt, and understood, which will
lead to its overthrow, either through Congress or the separate
action of the South."28
"NileS Register, LXVII, 227 ff.
Hammond to McDuffie, Dec. 27, 1844, /. H. Hammond Papers; F. W.
Pickens to Calhoun, Dec. 28, 1844, Calhoun Correspondence; Niles' Register,
LXVIII, 347 (Aug. 1 6, 1845), quoting from the Charleston Mercury a letter
from ''Bluffton Politician," dated on the anniversary of the Bluffton dinner;
Cong. Globe, 28 Cong. 2 Sess., 7.
"Hammond to McDuffie, Dec. 27, 1844, /. H. Hammond Papers.
"Letter of Judge John P. King, Charleston Mercury, Nov. 5, 1844.
"Niles' Register, LXVI, 369, quoting the Charleston Mercury; National In-
telligencer, Aug. 6, 1844.
"Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., I Sess., 612; Appx. 108, 658; Hunt's Merchants'
Magazine, X, 406.
"Calhoun to Thomas G. Clemson, Dec. 27, 1844, Calhoun Correspondence.
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Against these convictions, the Whigs and many Democrats took
issue. The Charleston Courier declared without equivocation for a
moderate tariff. 29 A pamphleteer, replying to a letter of Judge
Langdon Cheves, declared that free trade would not save the
state. The ruin of the state was due to the lack of stimulus which
manufactures would give to agriculture and commerce; and it
was the hostility of politicians which prevented manufactures from
being established.
30 R. W. Roper, a rich planter, generally aligned
in politics with the Hammond or anti-machine faction of the
Democratic party, came out for the policy of encouraging do-
mestic manufactures as an amelioration of the tariff. In an ad-
dress before the State Agricultural Society, in November, 1844, he
traced the depression in the cotton industry to overproduction,
and declared for diversified agriculture and the encouragement of
manufactures and commerce, not only as a remedy for economic
ills but also as a means of becoming independent of the North.
"As long," he said, "as we are tributaries, dependent on foreign
labor and skill for food, clothing, and countless necessaries of
life, we are in thraldom."
31
Roper's address was vigorously at-
tacked in a series of articles in the Charleston Mercury under the
caption, "Shall we continue to plant and increase the overgrowth
of cotton? Or shall we become manufacturers of cotton stuffs?" In
the opinion of the author of these articles, there was no overpro-
duction of cotton; but the ills of the South came from overtaxa-
tion. South Carolina, he said, could not develop diversified indus-
try with her system of labor, and it was not desirable that she
should.32
Late in the year 1844, there appeared a series of articles headed
Essays on Domestic Industry; or an Inquiry into the Expediency
of Establishing Cotton Manufactures in South Carolina, by Wil-
liam Gregg, of South Carolina. The articles first appeared in the
Charleston Courier. Upon request they were reprinted in pam-
phlet form. They attracted wide attention throughout the South,
being republished in nearly all the newspapers of Georgia, Ala-
MQuoted in the National Intelligencer, Aug. 6, 1844.
*A Reply to the Letter of the Hon. Langdon Cheves. By a Southerner.
"Roper to Hammond, Oct. 28, 1844, /. H. Hammond Papers; Niles' Regis-
ter, LXVIII, 103, 120. The address was reviewed in the So. Quar. Rev., VIII,
118-148 (July, 1845).
"Niles' Register, LXVIII, 54, 103, 120.
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bama, and other states.33 They constituted the most elaborate
argument for the diversification of Southern industry that ap-
peared before the Civil War. Already a cotton manufacturer,
Gregg later increased his interests. He was known until after the
Civil War as the most successful cotton manufacturer in the
Southern states and the ablest advocate of the policy of develop-
ing manufactures in that section.
3*
Gregg described the depressed condition of agriculture in the
state and the tendency of capital and enterprise to migrate to
more fertile lands. The causes lay not in the tariff but in lack of
energy on the part of the people, want of diversified agriculture,
and dependence upon the North for numerous articles of manu-
facture which might be produced at home. He called attention to
the rapid progress then being made in cotton manufacturing in the
neighboring states of Georgia and North Carolina and advised the
people of South Carolina to emulate the example. He showed
that the requisite capital was available. As for a labor supply,
slaves could be used, and in many respects would be preferable to
whites; but he did not overlook the possibility of employing the
thousands of poor whites, who as a class were an unproductive
element in society. Later he became an earnest advocate of the
employment of this class both on economic and philanthropic
grounds. Gregg understood the difficulties which infant industries
would have to meet. He, therefore, advised the establishment of
factories by joint stock companies rather than by individuals,
and confinement for several years to the manufacture of only
coarse goods, thus taking fullest advantage of the ability of South-
ern mills to command cheaper raw materials than Northern mills.
It seemed politic not to antagonize unduly the anti-protectionist
sentiment of South Carolina: Gregg assured his readers that no
laws would be asked for the protection of the enterprises in which
it was proposed to embark. He did not believe that manufactures
would ever predominate over agriculture in the state; and those
who advocated diversification did not wish such a result, he said.
"DeBow's Review, X, 349. The essays are, in a somewhat abridged form,
in DeBow's Review, VIII, 134-46; also in the appendix of D. A. Tompkins, Cot-
ton Mill, Commercial Features, A Text-Book for the Use of Textile Schools, etc.
(Charlotte, N. C, 1879).
**DeBow's Review, X, 348-52, a short sketch of Gregg's career.
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At the next session of the South Carolina Legislature, Novem-
ber, 1845, charters for several companies to erect cotton factories
were applied for. At the time corporations were somewhat un-
popular in the South, and opposition was met. Gregg thereupon
wrote a pamphlet entitled An Inquiry into the Expediency of
Granting Charters of Incorporation for Manufacturing Purposes
in South Carolina. Copies were distributed among the members
of the Legislature. After a sharp struggle the charters were grant-
ed by large majorities.35 The Graniteville company, in which
Gregg was a large stockholder, was one of those chartered. Only
the most substantial citizens were permitted to take stock.
36
Gregg was made manager; the factory was soon built and put in
successful operation. He was allowed to carry into practice his
philanthropic ideas in regard to the poor whites. Cottages were
built and rented to the operatives, free and compulsory education
established, a church constructed, and intemperance forbidden.
No negroes were employed. The factory was one of the few in
the South that continued to pay dividends during the hard years
of 1850-1854."
Many others, following the publication of Gregg's essays, came
forward to advocate the diversification of Southern industry, par-
ticularly by the erection of cotton factories near the cotton fields.
Governor Crawford, of Georgia, urged the Legislature to adopt
some plan to restore the fertility of the soil and foster manufac-
tures.38 The Tennessee House of Representatives appointed a
select committee to report on manufacturing resources.39 The
state of Alabama engaged Mr. Tuomy, professor in the State
University, to make a survey of the mineral resources of the
state.40 The Richmond Whig published, in 1846, the Letters from
the Hon. Abbott Lawrence to the Hon. William C. Rives of Vir-
ginia, which, while primarily a plea against the repeal of the tariff,
hailed the movement in the South for diversification of industry,
""DeBow's Review, X, 351.
86Ker Boyce to Hammond, Dec. 12, 1845, /. H. Hammond Papers.
'"DeBow's Review, X, 351; XVIII, 789 f.; Hunt's Merchants' Magazine,
XXI, 671. Cf. Ingle, Southern Sidelights, 85.
"Niles' Register, LXIX, 162.
"Ibid., LXIX, 400.
*"DeBow's Review, IV, 404. Tuomy later became state geologist and issued
his First Annual Report, 1850.
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and urged the people of Virginia to manufacture and develop the
state's mineral resources. 41 DeBow's Review, the first number of
which appeared in January, 1846, lent its influence to the cause.42
Numerous articles in that journal testify to the growing conviction
that there was an overproduction of cotton, and that the South
should diversify agriculture and divert capital to other industries.
In South Carolina, 1849, an organization styled the "South Caro-
lina Institute for the Promotion of Art, Mechanical Ingenuity,
and Industry" was formed. This organization was a direct out-
growth of the movement for diversification of Southern industry.
43
The .interest in cotton manufactures spread to the Ohio valley.
One of the most active advocates was Hamilton Smith, a wealthy
lawyer and business man of Louisville, Kentucky, who had ac-
quired large holdings in coal lands near Cannelton, Indiana. In
1847, he wrote a series of articles for the Louisville Journal dem-
onstrating the advantages of coal over water power in cotton fac-
tories, and the advantage of the Ohio valley over the East as a
seat for such factories by reason of proximity to the cotton fields.
His articles were widely copied in Southern and Western news-
papers, and some of his letters were inserted in the Manchester,
England, Guardian. In the following year, Smith and several
other public spirited citizens of Kentucky, Indiana, Mississippi,
and Louisiana, being desirous of proving their faith by works,
organized a company which constructed a model factory at Can-
nelton. Charles T. James of Rhode Island, the most successful
builder of steam cotton factories in the United States, became in-
terested in the project, and superintended the erection of the fac-
tory. A journal, the Cannelton Economist, was established to con-
duct a campaign in the behalf of manufactures.**
The agitation in behalf of building cotton factories received en-
couragement from the fact that considerable capital was actually
being invested in the new branch of industry and seemed to be
"Also published as a pamphlet, 1846.
**I, 5. In the number for Nov., 1847, a Department of Domestic Manufac-
tures was begun, which was continued with few interruptions for several years.
"DeBow's Review, VIII, 276; XI, 123.
^Ibid., XI, 90 f.; VI, 75 ff.; VIII, 456-61; Western Journal and
Civilian, II, 139; Hamilton Smith, The Relative Cost of Steam and Water Power,
the Illinois Coal Fields, and the Advantages Offered by the West, particularly on
the Lower Ohio, for Manufactures.
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yielding good profits. All through the 18405, the journals of the
South recorded at frequent intervals the establishment of fac-
tories, especially cotton factories, in that section. In 1843, the Bal-
timore American stated that in North Carolina a revolution had
been effected in the trade of cotton yarns within a few years.
45
Niles' Register, in 1845, remarked the number of cotton factories
being erected alongside the cotton fields, and prophesied that in a
few years the Southern states would supply coarse cotton clothing
for millions.46 In the tariff debates of 1844 an^ 1846, congressmen
from North Carolina and Georgia, particularly, invited attention
to the rapid development of cotton and other manufactures in
their states.47 The numerous acts incorporating manufacturing
companies passed during these years by the legislatures of states
which had not yet enacted general incorporation laws would seem
to testify to a development of manufacturing. During the last few
years of the decade and the first few years of the next, the ac-
counts of new factories, built or in process of building, became
more and more frequent; and the development began to attract
notice in the North. Said Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, 1850:
"We seldom take up a paper published in the Southern and
Western States of the Union, that does not contain some new de-
velopment of their manufacturing enterprise."48
By 1849 the movement to "bring the spindles to the cotton" had
become popular in all quarters of the South. According to De-
Bow's Review, every month added more and more to the interest
shown in manufactures.49 The next year Hamilton Smith wrote:
". . .for the last two years, one of the most prominent topics of dis-
cussion in the newspapers of the South and West has been, not
whether cotton mills could or could not be operated at home, but
when, where and by whom, they should be put in operation."50
'"Quoted in Niks' Register, LXIV, 272.
"Ibid., LXV1II, 87, April 12.
"Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 598, Cobb, of Ga., in the House; 28
Cong., i Sess., Appx., 108, McDuffie, of S. C., in the Senate; 28 Cong., i Sess.,
512, Berrien, of Ga., in the Senate.
"XXIII, 247. Cf. XVIII, 227. "The progress of manufacturing industry at
the South and West has been very rapid in the past two years." Ibid., XXII,
646, (1850).
"VII, 454-
"DeBoiv's Review, VIII, 550.
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The people of the South became firmly convinced that their
section had rare advantages for the manufacture of cotton goods,
and could compete successfully with New England. Statements
were frequently made and rarely contradicted that mills already
in operation were earning profits of from 15 to 20 per cent. The
representations of Gregg, Hamilton Smith, and others, relative to
the advantages possessed by the South, seemed sound. The most
authoritative statements were those of General Charles T. James,
of Rhode Island. James claimed to have superintended the erec-
tion of more than one-eighth of the cotton spindles in the United
States. He had shown his faith in the South and West by taking
stock in the steam factory at Charleston, South Carolina, and the
one at Cannelton, Indiana.
51 Leaders in the diversification move-
ment appealed to him to give information which might help to
arouse interest and educate the people in the subject. In response
he wrote, in 1849, a pamphlet entitled, Practical Hints on the
Comparative Cost and Productiveness of the Culture of Cotton
and the Cost and Productiveness of its Manufacture, etc. 52 The
pamphlet was widely read and quoted, as were a number of
articles which he wrote. He compared the great profits of cotton
manufacturers with planters' profits; undertook to demonstrate
the superiority of steam-power, which the South must use, over
water-power; and dwelt upon the advantages the South possessed
in having fresh raw material at hand and the saving in freight
charges to be effected by establishing the factories near the fields.
He gave the assurance that no great reserve of capital was neces-
sary to embark in the business. Factories could be started on
credit, and capital would accumulate just as had been the case
in New England. No fears need be entertained in regard to labor
supply: if the factories should be opened, the labor and skill
would be at hand. The South would not experience the difficulties
in effecting this revolution in its industry which New England had
encountered thirty years before; for she could start with the best
machinery, and could avoid the mistakes made in the North.
James's statements were violently attacked in the New England
press.
53 A warm debate was conducted by James and Amos A.
"DeBow's Review, IX, 671 ff.; Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXII, 311,4.55.
"Published also in DeBow's Review, VII, 173-6, 370-2; VIII, 307-11, 462-6,
556-60. The substance is in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXI, 492-502.
Review, IX, 558, quoting the New York Herald.
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Lawrence, a prominent Massachusetts cotton manufacturer,
through the columns of Hunt's Merchants' Magazine. Lawrence
said the South could not manufacture because she lacked capital,
and factories could not be successful if built with borrowed money.
He contended that James had underestimated the profits of cot-
ton planters and overestimated those of cotton manufacturers. He
controverted James's statements in regard to the superiority of
steam-power over water-power. William Gregg and Hamilton
Smith joined in the controversy in support of James.54 The South-
ern press thought Lawrence's articles were dictated by self-inter-
est, and that James had completely prostrated his reviewer. The
New England manufacturers were represented as being hostile
to the new enterprises in the South. James himself wrote: "For
years the Northern press has been loud and frequent in recom-
mendations to the South, to enter the field of enterprise, and man-
ufacture her own staple During the time, however, the man-
ufacturers have uttered no note of encouragement."
55
But the wide spread interest manifested in manufacturing dur-
ing these years and the welcome given every evidence of industrial
enterprise were not due solely to the prevalent belief that there
was an overproduction of cotton, and that spinning the yarn and
weaving the cloth would yield a higher profit upon capital in-
vested than did the production of the raw material. Manufac-
tures were approved as promising an avenue of escape from an ill
balanced economic system and its attendant evils, social and po-
litical.
In the first place, home manufactures would free the South
from dependence upon the North for numerous articles which
might be produced at home; just as diversified agriculture would
free it from dependence upon the West for horses, mules, pork,
and bacon; or as direct trade would free it from commercial de-
pendence upon the East. Dependence upon other sections of the
Union was felt to be "degrading vassalage," a subject for morti-
fication and humiliation, and because of it the North was being
enriched and the South impoverished.
"Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXI, 628-33; XXII, 26-35, 184-94, 290-311,
107-8; XXIII, 342-3; DfBow's Review, VIII, 550-55; IX, 674-75.
"Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXII, 309.
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Northern men were constantly boasting of the superiority of
their section of the Union; every foreign traveler drew a pic-
ture of contrast. The wealth and population of the North, the size,
prosperity, and attractiveness of its cities and towns, the mileage,
cost, and efficiency of the railroads and canals, the manufactures
and mines, ships and shipping, the farms, the price of land and the
methods of agriculture, the homes, shops, and places of amuse-
ment, the schools and colleges, number of students and percent-
age of illiteracy, newspapers and their circulation, the develop-
ment of literature and art all were contrasted with those of the
South, and almost invariably to the advantage of the North. It
was pointed out that Southerners depended upon Northern ship-
ping, bought Northern manufactured goods, flocked to Northern
watering places, sent their sons to Northern colleges, and read
Northern literature. The conclusion was that the North had
reached a higher degree of civilization, prosperity, and comfort.
The disparity was generally credited to superior industry and en-
terprise in the North and to the blighting effects of slavery in the
South.
Southern people admitted the contrast it was impossible not
to do so. They generally, by no means without exception, ad-
mitted that the North was more prosperous. When John Forsyth,
in his lecture on "The North and the South," asked the question,
"Why is it that the North has so far outstripped the South in com-
merce, the growth of its cities, internal development, and the arts
of living?"
56 he but made an admission that Southerners com-
monly made. J. H. Hammond wrote: "It has so often been as-
serted, that in population and its ratio of increase, in wealth,
aggregate and average and the facility of its accumulation, in in-
dustry, intelligence and enterprise the North is vastly in advance
of the South, and by consequence that it is the strong and pro-
tecting, while the South is the weak and dependent section all
these things have been so long and so generally asserted in the
South as well as the North, that they have gained almost universal
credence."57
"DeBow's Review, XVII, 365.
"Southern Quarterly Review, XV, 275. Cf. J. H. Hammond to Wm. Gil-
more Simms, Mar. 9, 20, 23, Apr. 6, 1849. /. H. Hammond Papers.
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Now the superiority of the North in these respects was not to
be viewed with equanimity in any case by the loyal and progres-
sive Southerner; and his discontent was augmented because of
his belief that the North was prospering at the expense of the
South. The feeling of a large element in the South in regard to
the matter is well illustrated by the following typical quotation
from an Alabama newspaper:
At present, the North fattens and grows rich upon the South.
We depend upon it for our entire supplies. We purchase all our
luxuries and necessaries from the North .... With us, every
branch and pursuit in life, every trade, profession, and occupation,
is dependent upon the North; for instance, the Northerners abuse
and denounce slavery and slaveholders, yet our slaves are clothed
with Northern manufactured goods, have Northern hats and
shoes, work with Northern hoes, ploughs, and other implements,
are chastised with a Northern-made instrument, are working for
Northern more than Southern profit. The slaveholder dresses in
Northern goods, rides in a Northern saddle, .... sports his North-
ern carriage, patronizes Northern newspapers, drinks Northern
liquors, reads Northern books, spends his money at Northern
watering-places, .... The aggressive acts upon his rights and
his property arouse his resentment and on Northern-made
paper, with a Northern pen, with Northern ink, he resolves and
re-resolves in regard to his rights ! In Northern vessels his products
are carried to market, his cotton is ginned with Northern gins,
his sugar is crushed and preserved by Northern machinery; his
rivers are navigated by Northern steamboats, his mails are carried
in Northern stages, his negroes are fed with Northern bacon, beef,
flour, and corn; his land is cleared with a Northern axe, and a
Yankee clock sits upon his mantel-piece; his floor is swept by a
Northern broom, and is covered with a Northern carpet; and his
wife dresses herself in a Northern looking-glass; ... his son is
educated at a Northern college, his daughter receives the finishing
polish at a Northern seminary; his doctor graduates at a Northern
medical college, his schools are supplied with Northern teachers,
and he is furnished with Northern inventions and notions.58
Some of those who preached diversification of industry not only
affirmed, as did the anti-tariff men for that matter, that the North
was growing prosperous, wealthy, and powerful at the South's ex-
pense, but demonstrated why it would continue to do so as long
as the latter persevered in her unwise application of labor. They
""Quoted in F. A. P. Barnard, An Oration Delivered before the Citizens of
Tuscaloosa, Alabama, July 4th, 1851, p. 12.
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laid down the general propositions that an agricultural people is
always exploited by an industrial people, and that wealth tends
to flow toward industrial centers. In the opinion of M. Tarver, it
was because she parted with her staples at prime cost and pur-
chased almost all of her necessary supplies from abroad at cost
plus profits, that the South was "growing poorer while the rest of
the world is growing rich, for it is easy for the world to enrich
itself from such a customer on such terms."59 Governor J. H.
Hammond, who in his address before the South Carolina Insti-
tute set himself the task of showing philosophically why a people
of one occupation can never attain prosperity and influence,
thought one industry was not enough to absorb all the genius and
draw out all the energies of a people.60 According to the Rich-
mond Enquirer, "commercial and manufacturing nations levy a
heavier tax on their dependents than any despot ever exacted
from subject provinces. Labor employed in commerce or manu-
factures, in the general, pays three or four times as much as farm-
ing labor, and in the exchange of one for the other, the farmer
gives the manufacturer three or four hours' labor for one."
61 Sim-
ilar was the reasoning of F. A. P. Barnard, of Alabama State
University: The kinds of labor in which the element of skill most
predominates are the most productive. Therefore, the wealth of a
people depends as much upon the direction given to labor as upon
the amount of labor employed. An agricultural people might be
rich, though only in the case Nature is lavish in her bounties; but
"riches thus bestowed, while the means of greater riches remain
unemployed, will never give contentment."62
But no matter how the North reaped profit from Southern in-
dustry, there could be no doubt of the advantages of retaining
the profit at home. Everything that manufactures had done for
the North and for England they would do for the South. Her
stagnant cities would grow, and new ones spring into existence.
KDeBow's Review, III, 203.
"Ibid., VIII, 503 if. Cf. Hammond to William Gilmore Simms, Dec. 20,
1849. /. H. Hammond Papers.
"Quoted in DeBow's Review, XX, 392. See also Fitzhugh, Sociology for the
South, ch. XIV, "Exclusive Agriculture," and ch. XVIII, "Head-work and Hand-
work."
"Oration Delivered before the Citizens of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, July 4th,
1861, p. 16 f.
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Surplus capital no longer would be under the necessity of seeking
investment elsewhere. Railroads would be built, and steamships
launched upon the rivers; dykes would be built, and marshes
drained; capital would be forthcoming to develop the mineral re-
sources which the people of the South were beginning to realize
she possessed. For the planter and the farmer a home market
would be provided, not subject to the fluctuations of the foreign
market. Diversified agriculture would be stimulated; the planter
would no longer have to resort to distant states for his mules,
pork, corn, and hay.63
Nor did the proponents of diversification neglect to depict the
social benefits to come with new industries. With the develop-
ment of manufactures, towns and villages would spring up among
the scattered population. More and better schools could be estab-
lished; for the chief cause of backwardness in educational progress
in the South was the sparsity of population. Churches could be
brought within the reach of a greater number. Colleges could be
supported at home, and Southern parents would no longer be
under the necessity of sending their sons North for a good college
training. With the increased wealth and population which manu-
factures would bring, the South could adequately support her
own press and literature. Said Hammond, after having given a
glowing description of the revivifying effects of manufactures upon
his state: "I am not conjuring up ideal visions to excite the
imagination. All these things have actually been done. They have
been, in our own times, and under our own eyes, carried out and
made legible, living, self-multiplying and giant-growing facts in
Old England and New England; and they have been mainly ac-
complished by the incalculable profits which their genius and
enterprise have realized on the product of our labor."**
But the prophets of a new order met prejudices against manu-
factures which they could not wholly dispel. Politicians had too
often described the cities and factory towns of the North as
hotbeds of poverty, ignorance, vice, crime, and unreligion, the
seats of abolition and the numerous isms with which the land was
"The best examples of the home market argument are in Barnard, op. cit.,
and an article, ''Should the Loom Come to the Cotton, or the Cotton Go to the
Loom?" Western Journal and Civilian, I, 319-332.
"DeBotv's Review, VIII, 516. See also Fitzhugh, Sociology /or the South,
chs. XII-XV.
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afflicted. Manufactures had been too frequently described as in-
compatible with liberty, freedom, culture, and virtue, and agri-
culture glorified as the only industry capable of producing a
liberty-loving and chivalrous race.65 Often the proponents of di-
versification considered it necessary to give the assurance that no
large towns, but only villages, would be created, and that there
was no danger of manufactures ever predominating over agricul-
ture in the planting states.
66
Too, it must be noted, there was a
feeling all too prevalent in the South that manual labor, and par-
ticularly mechanical labor, was degrading and beneath the dignity
of white men. Young men of intelligence and ability, who might
have become skilled mechanics, managers, or superintendents of
factories, felt that they would lose caste by entering a cotton fac-
tory. Such employment was less becoming gentlemen than agri-
culture, the professions, or even the mercantile business. The dig-
nity of labor had to be proclaimed. Few more scathing denuncia-
tions of Southern social standards, as well as of the inertia,
lethargy, and lack of foresight of Southern men, can be found
than some of those uttered by Southern men who were trying to
point the path of progress and urge their people along it.
67
One argument in behalf of manufactures by no means infre-
quently used was that they would give employment to the "poor
whites." The poor whites were the non-slaveholding whites of the
black belts, the hill country, and the pine barrens. Some of them,
upon worn out and abandoned plantations or their small hill
farms, engaged in agriculture in feeble competition with the
planters. Others obtained a precarious subsistence by doing oc-
casional jobs for the planters, by hunting and fishing, by begging
or stealing from the slaveholders, or by trading with the slaves
and inducing them to plunder for their benefit. They were not
employed by the planters to work in the cotton fields, and would
have been unwilling to work with the slaves had opportunity been
afforded them. As a class they produced less than they consumed,
**DeBow's Review, VIII, 508; XI, 127; XII, 49; XVII, 178; So. Quar. Rev.,
VIII, 142.
"DeBow's Review, VIII, 522; XI, 130-132.
"So. Lit. Mess., XX, 513-28 (Sept., 1854); So. Quar. Rev., VIII, 460 ff.;
DeBow's Review, VIII, 134, 506; XVII, 363; XIX, 614; XXIV, 383; Barnard,
op." cit., 23; Aaron V. Brown, Speeches, Congressional and Polifical, and other
Writings, 668.
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and, therefore, were a burden upon society. Their ignorance was
as general as their poverty; vice and crime were common among
them. Their number is difficult to estimate. In 1849, Governor
Hammond estimated at 50,000 the number of those in South Car-
olina whose industry was not "adequate to procure them, honest-
ly, such support as every white person in this country is, and
feels himself entitled to."68 William Gregg put the number at
125,000, more than one-third of the white population of the
state.69 The number in other Southern states was probably some-
what less in proportion to population. Charles T. James said
there were thousands of poor whites.
70
James Martin, of northern
Alabama, spoke of a "large poor population, almost totally with-
out employment."
71 Hunt's Merchants' Magazine referred to
them as a "mass of unemployed white labor."72
Many of the advocates of manufactures believed the employ-
ment of this class of unfortunates desirable from every viewpoint.
They were said to be more than glad to avail themselves of the
opportunity to work, even at most moderate wages, at labor
deemed respectable for white persons; and, when so employed, to
quickly assume the industrious habits of Northern operatives. By
employment in factories, they would be brought together in vil-
lages, where the influence of church and school could reach them.
In this way and only in this way could they be elevated to a state
of comparative comfort and independence and social responsibil-
ity. From the viewpoint of the prosperity and power of the com-
munity at large, the employment of the poor whites would be of
incalculable benefit: it would transform thousands of them into
productive citizens and enormously increase the wealth of the
region. The number of this class in some states was said to be
sufficient to work up into goods all the cotton grown therein. This
product would be a clear gain; for the employment of the poor
whites in factories would withdraw little or no labor from the
production of the raw material. How, it was asked, could the
South keep pace with the North in the race for power and wealth,
"DfBow's Review, VIII, 518.
"Ibid., XI, 133.
'"Ibid., VIII, 558.
"Ibid., XXIV, 383.
"XXII, 649.
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when so large a part of the total possible labor force was com-
paratively idle?
73
Many thoughtful Southerners regretted that so much of the
capital, enterprise, and intelligence in the South was employed in
directing slave labor to the almost complete neglect of a large
part of the white population.
74 Thomas P. Devereaux, a large
slaveholder of North Carolina, thought it the great evil of slav-
ery, that it rendered a mass of white producing ability more than
unproductive; and there is evidence indicating that many shared
his opinion.
75 But whether slavery was responsible for the exis-
tence of the poor white class or not, its opponents in the North
and elsewhere charged it with that responsibility, and it would
seem that the defenders of the institution should have welcomed
every opportunity for remedying the evil and proving the charge
unfounded. Too many slaveholders, however, opposed manufac-
tures on the very ground that they would aid in developing a
class consciousness among white labor, which would be hostile to
slavery.
In fact, it was already evident that such a class consciousness
was developing, particularly in the cities and towns. It manifested
itself in a movement to drive the slaves from the cities and from
mechanical employments, and restrict them to agriculture. In
1849, C. G. Memminger wrote Hammond that the opinion was
gaining ground in Charleston and even in the low country, that
slaves should be excluded from mechanical pursuits, and their
places filled by whites; and that there would soon be a formidable
party on the subject.76 Several years earlier, a bill had been drafted
and presented to the North Carolina Legislature to limit the em-
ployment of slaves in mechanical callings, but had been met and
defeated by the objection that it interfered with the rights of the
slave owners; an act of the Georgia Legislature, December 27,
1845, forbade negro mechanics to make contracts.77 In the cities
there was constant friction between the white stevedores, porters,
"See notes 68-72.
"DeBow's Review, XI, 135.
"Devereaux to Hammond, April 17, 1850, /. H. Hammond Papers. Cf. So.
Quar. Rev., VIII, 449 if.; XXVI, 446.
"Memminger to Hammond, April 28, 1849, /. H. Hammond Papers.
"Devereaux to Hammond, April 17, 1850, ibid.
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draymen, and mechanics and the negroes. 78 Everywhere there
was opposition to slaves learning trades.
79
The slaveholders feared this self-assertion of white labor; for,
as Memminger put it, were the negro mechanics and operatives
driven from the cities, whites would take their places, everyone
would have a vote, and all would be abolitionists. Those urging
manufactures, he thought, were aiding and abetting the free labor
party, which was the only one from which danger to slavery was
to be apprehended.
80 General A. H. Brisbane, who was leading
in the agitation in behalf of manufactures in South Carolina, and
who was instrumental in founding a mechanics' institute in
Charleston, complained of the opposition he met at every turn
from the slaveholders of Charleston and the seaboard.81
On the other hand, some slaveholders thought more danger was
to be apprehended from the poor whites under existing conditions
than if they should be brought together in cotton factories with
constant employment and adequate remuneration. In the latter
case, they would see that their occupation depended upon the
preservation of a system necessary for the production of cotton.
In the opinion of Thomas P. Devereaux, if a notion should arise
among the poor whites that slavery barred their way to the full en-
joyment of the fruits of their labor, deprived them of a market for
their produce, and hindered the advancement of their children,
the slaveholders would have an enemy in their midst far more
to be feared than abolition preachers.
82 Brisbane believed it bet-
ter for white labor to develop in the South, where it could see its
dependence upon black labor, than in the North, where it could
not, and would, therefore, be the fanatical enemy of slavery.
Over against the discussion of the desirability of providing em-
ployment for the poor whites must be set the discussion of the
~'*DeBow's Review, XXVI, 600, extract from the Report of the Committee
on Negro Population of the South Carolina Legislature; ibid., XXX, 67-77.
"F. L. Olmsted, Cotton Kingdom, II, 98; Lyell, A Second Visit to the
United States, II, 36, 81-83. And see below, pp. 218-220.
""Memminger to Hammond, April 28, 1849, /. H. Hammond Papers.
"Brisbane to Hammond, Oct. 8, 1849, ibid.; cf. Gregg to Hammond, Dec.
I, 1848.
"Devereaux to Hammond, April 17, 1850, ibid. Cf. W. B. Hodgson, of
Georgia, to Hammond, Nov. 20, 1850, ibid.; So. Quar. Rev., XXVI, 447; DeBow's
Review, III, 188; VIII, 25. See also Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South, 147.
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practicability of employing slaves in factories. During the period
of overproduction of cotton there was a belief that slave labor
engaged in producing the staple was redundant, and that it was
desirable to divert some of it to other industries. The division of
slave labor between the factory and the field would increase the
profits of agriculture and enhance the value of slaves.83 Slave
labor was tried in several cotton factories, notably the DeKalb
and the Saluda factory, both of South Carolina, and the alleged
success of the experiments was cited as demonstrating that, should
agriculture become oversupplied with labor, manufacturing would
open channels to draw away the surplus.84 From some of the
comments made, it is hard to escape the conclusion* that many
Southerners were interested in manufactures only so long as it ap-
peared possible to conduct them with slave labor; when exper-
ience finally demonstrated the superiority of white labor, their
interest declined. Other men opposed from the start the employ-
ment of slaves in factories. It would weaken slavery; for, as one
said, "Whenever a slave is made a mechanic, he is more than
half freed .... "86 Moreover, were slaves employed, whites could
not be; for whites would not work side by side or in competition
with slaves.
The movement to bring the spindles to the cotton was almost
synchronous with the period of acrimonious sectional controversy
over the extension of slavery which began with the annexation of
Texas and continued until the general acceptance of the Com-
promise of 1850 gave a temporary respite. Southern men were
becoming dismayed at the growing strength and vigor of the
attacks upon slavery. The growing disparity of the sections in
numbers and power was toe striking and too ominous not to excite
most serious concern. The old political alliance of South and West
could no longer be depended upon, and especially not in the case
of the slavery issue, to thwart the antagonistic policies of the
North. Leaders, from the great Calhoun down, cast about for
means of maintaining Southern rights and preserving Southern
equality in the Union. A large minority of the people in the South,
"'Richmond Whig, Sept. 19, 1851; DeBow's Review, XII, 182-5.
"Richmond Enquirer, Aug. 30, 1850; Charleston Mercury, May 24, 1849;
Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXIII, 575; DeBow's Review, IX, 432; XI, 319.
"Ibid., VIII, 518.
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in one state a majority, were convinced by 1850 that the Southern
states should withdraw from the Union. Widespread discussion of
secession caused consideration to be given to the preparedness of
the South for separate nationality. The intemperateness of the
sectional quarrel and, especially, the necessity for augmenting the
political power of the South, whether to maintain her rights in the
Union or her independence out of it, gave a powerful impetus to
all movements for promoting the economic development of the
South, including the encouragement of manufacturing.
The arguments in favor of encouraging home manufactures
which were suggested by political necessities or purposes took
several forms. One frequently employed was well illustrated by
an editorial in the Richmond Dispatch. After one of the instances
of interference with the execution of the Fugitive Slave law by the
people of Boston, the Dispatch estimated the value of the Boston-
made shoes used in Virginia, and suggested that Virginia people
should manufacture the shoes used in the state. "That it is time
for Virginia to think of doing some such thing the high-handed
measures lately adopted in Boston sufficiently prove. As long as
we are dependent upon these people, they will insult us at pleas-
ure. Let us cut loose from them thus far at least."86 The reason-
ing was weak: If Boston people insulted the Virginians while yet
the latter were good customers, would they not more readily do
so should the Virginians cease to patronize Boston shoe factories?
More logical was the reasoning of J. D. B. DeBow and others
who, while recognizing that Southern enterprise might not con-
vince the enemies of slavery, said it would prepare the South for
the crisis which they professed to believe was inevitable. "We
have long ago thought," wrote DeBow, "that the duty of the peo-
ple consisted more in the vigorous prosecution of their industry,
resources and enterprise, than in bandying constitutional argu-
ments with their opponents, or in rhetorical flourishes about the
sanctity of the federal compact. This is the course of action,
which, though it may not convince, will at least prepare us for this
crisis which, it needs no seer's eye to see, will, in the event, be
precipitated upon us by the reckless fanaticism or ignorant zeal
of the 'cordon of free States' surrounding us on every hand. 'Light
up the torches of industry,' was the advice of old Dr. Franklin to his
countrymen, on discovering that all hope from the British cab-
"Quoted in DeBow's Review, XI, 82.
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inet had fled forever. Light up the torches, say we, on every hill-
top, by the side of every stream, from the shores of the Delaware
to the furthest extremes of the Rio Grande from the Ohio to the
capes of Florida."
87
Another and more frequently used argument was that diversi-
fied industries would be favorable to a more rapid growth of
population in the South, and population was necessary to political
power. The North had been growing more rapidly in population
and political influence, it was said, because immigration from
abroad had gone almost exclusively to that section. This was not
because slavery had repelled immigration, but because the South
had offered no inducements. Southern agriculture was ill adapted
to European labor. And what other industry had the South? The
construction of railroads had attracted a few Irish and German
laborers; but the demand was insufficient to bring a great number.
Let industry be diversified, however, and the South would get a
share of the influx from abroad. Northern people might come
South. Emigration from the Southern states would be checked.
The population of the North would then increase less rapidly,
that of the South more rapidly; the relative political strength of
the South would thus be preserved.
88
Not all, however, considered immigration desirable. Many
feared that immigrants would be hostile to slavery. The diversi-
ficationists attempted to overcome these fears. The immigrants
could be assimilated and converted into defenders of Southern
institutions, they said. In proof of this view they pointed to many
men who had come from the North, and were among the staunch-
est defenders of the South. They further contended that a large
foreign element in the North was a greater menace to slavery than
such an element in the South would be; for in the latter it would
become convinced of the necessity of the institution.89 Just as
does the fear among the slaveholders of the development of a class
"DeBow's Review, IX, 120. Cf. ibid., IV, 211; XI, 680; William Gregg to
Seabrook, May 10, 1850, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers; Richmond Whig,
Feb. 12, 1851.
"Barnard, Oration Delivered, before the Citizens of Tuscaloosa, Alamaba,
July 4-th, 1851, 29; DeBow's Review, VIII, 558-60; XI, 319; Hunt's Merchants'
Magazine, XXI, 498.
"Barnard, loc. cit.; A. H. Brisbane to J. H. Hammond, Oct. 8, 1849, /. H.
Hammond Papers.
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consciousness among the native white labor, this fear of immigra-
tion illustrates the difficulties in the way of creating a public senti-
ment in the South favorable to progress along other lines than
agriculture.
During the secession movement of 1849-1852, which has been
alluded to, many Unionists supported the efforts to develop South-
ern manufactures, promote direct trade, construct internal im-
provements, and otherwise build up the South in an economic
way, as a substitute for disunion. Their position was based upon
two chains of reasoning: (i) Economic regeneration of the South
would tend to preserve the political equilibrium of the sections
and thus enable the Southern states to maintain their rights
without forsaking the Union. (2) The basic causes for the war
being waged against the Union were economic discontent and the
belief that the Union had been unequal in its material benefits.
The Unionists, in so far as they admitted Southern "decline," at-
tributed it to causes not connected with the operation of the gov-
ernment or the Union. Successful programs of economic improve-
ment would allay discontent and prove their contentions in re-
gard to the advantages of the Union. This aspect of the political
basis for the agitation in behalf of manufactures will be discussed
in somewhat greater detail elsewhere.
Although the discussion of the desirability of diversifying
Southern industry by no means ceased about 1852, as we shall
see, the active agitation in behalf of "bringing the spindles to
the cotton" may be said to have come to an end about that
date. The explanation of this lies partly in the fact that the
comparative prosperity of cotton culture during the fifties weak-
ened the force of the economic arguments for diversification,
90
but chiefly in the fact that the agitation no longer was encouraged
by reports of large profits and the erection of new factories.
Accounts of new enterprises continued to appear throughout
1851, and then ceased almost abruptly. In their stead there began
to appear reports of reduced profits, failures, and, later, explana-
tions for the sudden collapse of a movement so auspiciously
begun. It was not until the later years of the decade that the press
again spoke optimistically of the progress of cotton manufactures
in the South. William Gregg, who knew more about this sub-
"See ch. VIII.
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ject than any other man, writing on the very eve of the war, stated
that all the progress made in cotton manufacturing in the South
during fifteen years was made in "about five years from 1845
to 1850." The meager statistics available tend to sustain this
judgment. According to the estimates of contemporary reviewers
of the cotton trade, the Southern states consumed a quantity of
raw cotton in the year 1849-1850 which was not materially exceed-
ed until i859-i86o.
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During the years 1850 and 1851 the cotton
manufacturing industry was suffering a depression. It is probable
that, could factories newly built or building in 1850 have operated
at full capacity, the total consumption for the year would have
equalled that of the years immediately preceding the Civil War.
The United States censuses for 1840, 1850, and 1860 may be con-
sidered sufficiently reliable to show general tendencies. The value
of the product of cotton factories in states south of Maryland was
$1,912,215 in 1840, $5,665,362 in 1850, and $8,145,067 in 1860.
Thus, while the value of the product nearly trebled between 1840
and 1850, it increased only about 43 per cent during the following
decade. The value of the output of cotton manufactures in the
United States as a whole was $46,350,453 in 1840, $65,501,687 in
1850, and $115,681,774 in 1860, an increase of 41 per cent during
the first decade and 76.6 per cent during the second.92
The progress made in cotton manufacturing in the South during
the 18405 must be attributed chiefly to the unprofitableness of
cotton culture during the same period and to the conviction of men
with capital that manufacturing would yield a higher rate of inter-
est upon money invested. In some cases, it is true, subscription to
the stock of cotton manufacturing companies seems to have been
made by public spirited citizens prompted more by a desire to
benefit their communities or states or to advance the cause of
the South than by the desire for profit. To some degree, too, the
agitation was instrumental in securing the liberalization of laws
affecting joint stock companies, and may have contributed indi-
rectly to the development of manufactures. The cessation of
progress about 1851 cannot be attributed to any abatement of
"See Appendix, Table IV, for estimates of the cotton consumed in the North,
South, and West, 1839-1861.
"Compendium of the Sixth Census, 361; Compendium of the Seventh Cen-
sus, 1 80; Eighth Census, Manufactures, Introduction, p. xii.
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interest on the part of the public. Some of the causes for de-
pression and failure in the South affected New England factories
as well. Others were peculiar to the South, and serve to illustrate
the difficulties which had to be overcome there, perhaps among
any agricultural people, before new industries could become firmly
established.
One cause of the depression in the cotton manufacturing indus-
try was the sharp rise in the price of raw cotton from 7 cents in
June to ii cents in October, 1849, double the price of October,
1848. With the exception of the year 1851-1852, the price of cot-
ton remained comparatively high until the Civil War. With the
rise in price, the quantity of cotton taken for Northern mills fell
from 503,429 bales in 1848-1849 to 465,702 in 1849-1850 and 386,-
429 the following year, while the estimates of consumption of the
South and West for the same three years were 130,000, 137,000,
and 99,000 bales, respectively.93 To add to the hardships occa-
sioned by high priced raw material, there had been a general
fall in the prices of cotton goods, caused partly by the recent rapid
extensions of cotton manufactures in the United States and partly,
it was said, by the increased quantities of English goods put upon
the American market after the Walker tariff of 1846 had become
effective.94
Strangely, the factories of the cotton states seem to have weath-
ered the first year or two of hard times better than factories
farther north, and Southern men submitted the fact as evidence
of the superior advantages of those states for cotton manufactur-
ing.
95 In the autumn of 1850, Joseph H. Lumpkin, of Georgia,
said that he knew of no bankruptcy in any cotton company in the
South; while seventy-one mills were reported idle within thirty
"3
See Appendix, Table IV.
"Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXIII, 595 ff., Dec. 1850; XXV, 465.
mDeBow's Review, X, 93, 143. Virginia and Maryland factories did not
escape the hard times. A convention of manufacturing interests meeting in Rich-
mond, late in 1850, reported that -of the 54,000 spindles in that state, 7,000 were
running at three-fourths time, 8,000 at one-third time, 22,000 at full time but
three-fourths wages, while the remainder were either idle or practically so; the
whole averaged about one-half time. In Maryland the conditions were worse.
Of 28 factories, 8 were idle, and only 2 were running full time. Hunt's Merchants'
Magazine, XXIV, 262. The iron industry as well as the cotton manufacturing
industry was complaining of depression. The reason assigned was English and
Scotch competition.
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miles of Providence, Rhode Island, and numerous others in the
North were either idle or upon short time, some Southern com-
panies were declaring a dividend of 10 per cent.
96 The Savannah
News reported that Southern factories were prosperous, while
some Northern mills were closing; and added, "These facts prove
what we have often asserted, that we have a decided advantage
over the North in the business of manufacturing yarns and
coarse cotton goods."
97 Thomas Prentice Kettell, of New York,
wrote: "It is the transition of the seat of manufactures from the
North and East to the South and West, under which northern
manufacturing capital is laboring."
98 But factories in the cotton
belt did fail during the years 1850, 1851, and 1852, establish-
ments changed hands at much less than the original cost, and the
profits of all were greatly reduced. Moreover, Southern factories
revived much more slowly than those of New England. Many of
them dragged out a sickly existence until a year or two before the
war, when they again became prosperous. The example of these
factories discouraged further investments of capital.
99
MDeBow's Review, XII, 46. (From an address delivered before the South
Carolina Institute at its Second Annual Fair, Nov. 19, 1850.) As late as 1855,
William Gregg wrote: "With the exception of the Saluda company and the
Charleston factory, there have been no positive failures and very few embarrassed
concerns [in South Carolina], and they labored under most of the defects that
I have named as elements of embarrassment. There was no failure among the
Georgia factories during the terrible pressure of 1850 and '51; they are now, with
one or two exceptions, doing well. Those in the vicinity of Augusta, ten miles
off, are paying 20 to 30 per cent. The DeKalb factory, near Camden, in our
state, is making 15 per cent.; Vaucluse, just above us, is making money. . . ."
The net earnings of the Graniteville Company were reported at 8 per cent in
1850, ii
l/2 per cent in 1853, and 18 per cent in 1854. Report of William Gregg,
President of the Graniteville Manufacturing Co., 1855, quoted in DeBow's Re-
view, XVIII, 788.
"Quoted in ibid., XI, 322 (Sept., 1851).
"Ibid., XI, 641. It is not probable that Southern mills suffered less than
New England mills making the same class of goods.
This was notably true of the failures at Augusta, Ga. There canals had
been dug, and, it was supposed, enough water power secured to drive the spindles
of a second Lowell. Factories sprang up on a large scale. A long chain of changes
and reverses followed. Ibid., XXVIII, 483. William Gregg wrote, in 1860:
"The failure of the Augusta Mills has done more to put back the progress of
manufacturing at the South than any other failure that has taken place." Ibid.,
XXIX, 229.
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Cotton factories in the South experienced difficulties other than
the high price of raw material and the low prices of goods.
10 The
factories were often cheaply constructed, and the best machinery
was not always provided. Several of them employed steam power,
which proved too costly and put them under a big handicap from
the start. Local pride in many cases had much to do with raising
capital and, consequently, in selecting sites. As a result the mills
were often injudiciously located with respect to health, steady
motive power, and marketing of goods. The labor problem was
a difficult one. Negro labor required too much capital, if bought,
and proved unsatisfactory in any case.101 The whites, though
they worked for lower wages than the mill operatives of the
North, from ignorance and long habits of indolence, were difficult
to train and control.102 Because of the unskilled labor, Southern
factories required more efficient superintendents than Northern
factories, but did not pay sufficiently high salaries to command
them. (The superintendents were in most cases from the North.)
There was the difficulty, also, of forcing the products of infant in-
dustries upon a market already supplied with Northern and
English goods;
103 and there is evidence that New England manu-
facturers resorted to quite modern methods in meeting threatened
competition from the South. The story was told of a Georgia
factory that put upon the market an article known as "Georgia
Stripes," which proved very popular. New England mills imitated
it with a cheaper article, and drove it from the market. The fact-
100For discussions of the causes for failure of Southern factories see: (i) Re-
port of William Gregg, President of the Graniteville Manufacturing Co., 1855
(pamphlet), also in DeBow's, XVIII, 777-91. (2) Extract from a letter of James
Montgomery, an English manufacturer. Ibid., XXVI, 95 ff. (3) Letter from James
Martin, a successful cotton manufacturer of Florence, Alabama. Ibid., XXIV,
382-6. (4) Hunt's Merchant's Magazine, XLII, 376 f. (5) William Gregg.
"Southern Patronage to Southern Imports and Domestic Industry," in DeBow's,
XXIX, 77-83, 225-32, 494-500, 623-31, 771-8; XXX, 102-4, 216-23.
101
Russell, Robert, North America, 295.
10JSee Ingle, Edward, Southern Sidelights, 74 ff., for a discussion of wages
paid in the South. The best success was had where provision was made for hous-
ing the employees, enforcing temperance, and providing schools and religious
instruction, as at Graniteville, S. C., and Prattsville, Ala. DeBow's Review,
XVIII, 777-90.
10
*Colwell, Stephen, The Five Cotton States and New York (pamphlet,
i860).
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ory then turned to "Georgia Plains." Samples were sent North;
and soon the market was flooded with Yankee Georgia Plains.104
Southern manufacturers selected sound raw material and made
goods of high quality; but their Southern customers apparently
preferred low prices to quality, which was more difficult to recog-
nize. And, despite statements of Southern writers to the contrary,
the probabilities are that the Yankee goods were better in propor-
tion to price.
105
Again, the idea was too prevalent that an effort
should be made to supply the local demand, and that a little of
everything should be made; it would have been better to special-
ize. The consumer seemed to prefer goods from a distance to
those of home manufacture. "Yankee made," "made in the
North," or "just from New York," were advertisements which
appealed to the purchaser. Manufacturers frequently complained
of the want of home patronage; but, except in times of unusual
sectional bitterness, appeals to local pride or patriotism were rath-
er ineffective.
One of the chief obstacles to the success of Southern establish-
ments was the lack of sufficient capital. The factories were too
often begun with insufficient capital, were in debt from the start,
and maintained no reserve of cash to enable them to buy raw
material when the price was low and hold back the product from
a depressed market. Frequent items are met in Southern papers
telling of consignments of goods to Northern cities. The papers
of the South were inclined to boast of such incidents without stop-
ping to inquire the reasons for their occurrence.
106 Because of
insufficient capital, the cotton manufacturers of the cotton states,
as were the tobacco manufacturers of Virginia, were constantly in
need of advances. The advances could most readily be secured by
drawing upon agents in New York or other Northern cities, who
sold the goods. This system meant that the goods sometimes had
1MDeBow's Review, XXIX, 627.
1M
Daniel Lord said the Southern people "found the Yankee-made a better
article, and deaf to all appeals to their Southern pride and patriotism, would
have it." The Effect of Secession upon the Commercial Relations between the
North and the South and upon each Section, 17. Edwin Heriot, of Charleston,
said the established opinion in the South was that Northern articles were better,
although the facts were just the reverse. DeBow's Review, XXIX, 218.M
Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXXI, 384. Cf. DeBow's Review, XI, 322;
F. L. Olmsted, Journey in the Seaboard Slave States, II, 184 (Putnam's, 1904).
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to be sold in a depressed market to meet the drafts. Southern
manufacturers could not sell directly to Southern merchants or
jobbers, because the latter bought on long credit, which the man-
ufacturers were unable to extend. Both mill owners and merch-
ants experienced difficulty in procuring loans from home banks
whether because of inadequacy of banking facilities, or, as some
believed, because of banking policy, we will not pause here to
inquire.
107
"'On system of advances and long credits and the question of banking facili-
ties, in the South, see below, pp. 100-107.
CHAPTER III
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SOUTHERN
MOVEMENT, 1844-1852
Discontent with the economic conditions of the South, absolute
and as compared with those of other sections, found expression
in the direct trade conventions of 1837-1839. It also was expressed
in the agitation in behalf of the diversification of industry. While
it cannot be said to have been the sole or even primary cause for
the Southern movement which culminated in secession, its influ-
ence upon that movement was by no means negligible, especially
in its earlier stages.
The story of South Carolina nullification, to begin no farther
back, can receive only a brief summary here. About 1825 and
following years, strong opposition developed in the older planting
states of the South, especially South Carolina, to the policy of a
high and protective tariff and heavy expenditures for internal im-
provements. The basis of this opposition lay not only in the fact
that the protected industries and the internal improvements at
government expense were in other sections, but also in the ap-
parently, or really, impoverished condition of the old planting sec-
tion compared with other sections of the Union. In no state were
conditions more favorable to the growth of discontent than in
South Carolina. Industry was not at all diversified. The price of
cotton had fallen. Land values were declining. Population was
increasing slowly, if at all. Charleston was making comparatively
little progress. These conditions were attributed in great measure
to the protective tariff and the extravagant expenditures of the
Federal government. Failing to secure a reversal of the objection-
able policies, opponents of the tariff hit upon nullification as a
remedy. Upon nullification as the issue two parties developed.
The State Rights party, or Nullifiers, held nullification to be a
constitutional mode of resisting palpably unconstitutional laws,
which they considered the tariff laws to be, and thought it justified
by the oppression suffered under the tariff. They professed to
believe that nullification would result in a repeal of the tariff,
but were prepared to resort to the remedy even should war and
disunion be the consequences. The Union party, on the other
hand, opposed nullification as unconstitutional and certain to lead
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to war, which could result only in the crushing of South Carolina.
Furthermore, many of the Unionists either denied that South
Carolina was not prosperous, or, admitting it, attributed the lack
of prosperity to other causes than the tariff. After a violent
struggle of four years duration a convention was called, which
adopted an ordinance nullifying the tariff laws of 1828 and 1832.
While Andrew Jackson prepared to employ force, Congress en-
acted the Compromise Tariff of 1833. Thereupon the South
Carolina Convention repealed the nullification ordinance. In other
Southern states there was much sympathy with South Carolina's
opposition to the tariff; many citizens accepted in whole or in part
the doctrines of the Nullifiers. This sympathy was especially
strong in Georgia and eastern Virginia, and quite strong in North
Carolina and Alabama.1
After 1833 the division of the people of South Carolina into
Nullifiers and Unionists was largely perpetuated, the former being
in a growing majority. The Nullifiers first affiliated with the Whig
party, which took form about 1834; about 1838-1840 the great ma-
jority of them were led back into the Democratic fold by Calhoun,
and continued thereafter to call themselves Democrats. After this
latter date the Unionists of South Carolina were to be found in the
dwindling Whig party and in what may be termed the Jackson
wing of the Democratic party. It was the policy of the leaders
of the dominant faction to conciliate and assimilate the Unionist
faction; this policy was successful in the main. In other Southern
states, particularly the cotton states and Virginia, the large ma-
jority of those who had sympathized with the South Carolina
Nullifiers in 1832 continued in their devotion to the principles of
the nullificationist leaders. Perhaps the majority of this class
(Georgia and North Carolina may be exceptions) were aligned
with the Whig party during the early years of its history. Most
of those so aligned, however, shifted to the Democratic party,
either with Calhoun during Van Buren's administration, or later,
in Tyler's time. Of those who remained with the Whigs, some
were ostensibly converted to Whig principles; others retained
JThe above statements are based upon standard special works and mono-
graphs covering this period, and upon Correspondence of John C. Calhoun; Cor-
respondence of Robert Toombs, A. H. Stephens, and Hotvell Cobb; Correspond-
ence of R. M. T. Hunter; and other of the more accessible sources.
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both their state rights, free trade, and reform principles and their
Whig affiliation until almost the end of the Whig party. In the
Democratic party the line of cleavage between the Calhoun wing
and the Jackson-Benton-Van Buren wing remained fairly distinct
until the Civil War. It was the former element which rallied to the
support of John C. Calhoun when he came forward in 1843 as
the free trade and reform candidate for the Democratic nomina-
tion for the presidency.
2
The Calhoun wing of the Democratic party held extreme state
rights principles. Furthermore, it had been and continued to be
the conviction of this following that (i) the government of the
United States was too extravagantly administered; (2) the South-
ern people paid more than their proportionate share of the rev-
enues and received back much less than their proportionate share
in the form of disbursements; (3) they were compelled by govern-
ment to pay tribute to Northern manufacturers, shipowners, and
merchants, by virtue of the tariff, fishing bounties, exclusion of
foreign vessels from the coasting trade, and heavy government
expenditures in the North; (4) and these continual and uncom-
pensated drains upon the resources of the Southern states were
enriching the North and impoverishing the South. No Nullifier
would admit that the Southern states had the prosperity or were
making the material progress to which their resources, population,
and the industry of their people entitled them. "Abolish Custom
Houses," wrote Calhoun, in 1845, "and let the money collected in
the South be spent in the South and we would be among the most
flourishing people in the world. The North could not stand the an-
nual draft, which they have been making on us 50 years, without
being reduced to the extreme of poverty in half the time. All we
want to be rich is to let us have what we make."3 Such views as
"It would be impossible in a study of this scope to develop the statements
made in the above summary analysis of the party alignment in the South. They
are based upon a wide variety of sources quoted elsewhere in other connections;
special mention might be made of the Correspondence of John C. Calhoun and
the /. H. Hammond Papers. It is believed the conclusions here presented ac-
cord in the main with the evidence and conclusions of Cole, Wh\g Party in the
South; Phillips, Georgia and Staff Rights; and Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia,
and Thomas Ritchie. It is believed, also, that evidence presented elsewhere in
this study tends to substantiate the conclusions given here.
'Calhoun to J. H. Hammond, Aug. 30, 1845, Calhoun Correspondence, 670.
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these were expressed in every tariff debate, in the discussion of
almost every rivers and harbors bill, fortifications bill, pensions
bill in fact, whenever a proposal was introduced in Congress
which involved the raising or appropriation of money. They were
presented, as we have seen, in the direct trade conventions of
1837-1839. They came out in almost every comparison of the
progress of the North and South and in every defense of slavery;
for it was necessary to trace "Southern decline" to other causes
than slavery.
It was the constant purpose of Calhoun and other leaders to
reform the "fiscal action of the General Government." But it had
early become the conviction of some of his followers that the gov-
ernment was beyond redemption, and that the proper policy for
the Southern states to pursue was separation from the North. The
bitter feelings engendered and the fears for slavery aroused by the
several quarrels over governmental policies affecting that institu-
tion had led many to calculate the value of the Union from an
economic viewpoint who otherwise might not have done so. A
consideration of the benefits and disadvantages of the Union led
a number to form the conclusion that disunion was not a con-
summation to be dreaded and avoided but a measure which would
promote the prosperity, power, and happiness of the South.
>
An example of their reasoning may be found in a great speech
against the Tariff of 1842, which George McDuifie, of South Caro-
lina, made in the Senate, 1844. He warned the advocates of pro-
tection that there was a point beyond which oppression would not
be endured, "even by the most enslaved community in the world."
He pictured the Union divided into three confederations the
North and Northeast as one, the West as another, and the South-
ern states as a third. He showed that
The manufacturing States could not adhere to the protective
system one year. They would have no revenue, and would be
driven to direct taxation; whereas the Southern confederation
would become the importing States, receiving in exchange foreign
manufactures for their rice, cotton, tobacco, and sugar; that the
Southwestern confederation would be exchangers with the South-
ern confederation of their products for the products of Europe; for
they would never be so foolish as to buy of the New England Con-
federation at forty per cent higher in price than need be paid for
the same goods in the southern confederation. ... In ten years
there would be such a difference that a person absent so long re-
turning, would be struck with the change in the condition of these
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sections of the country. The West he would see grown up into a
great and flourishing empire; the South the seat of commerce and
the arts; the great cities of Boston and New York rebuilt in
Charleston and New Orleans, and more flourishing than in their
original, uncongenial climates. But in New England he would find
the prosperity, comforts, wealth, etc., resulting from partial legis-
lation all gone: houses falling to ruin, cities deserted, furniture
selling by auction, and all the indications of indigence prevailing...
4
McDuffie was arguing for a repeal of the tariff; but others in
his state used similar arguments in favor of disunion. During the
short-lived Bluffton movement, to which reference has already
been made, disunion sentiments were openly expressed. Judge
Langdon Cheves in a long letter to the Charleston Mercury made
a thinly veiled argument for disunion;
5
as such it was taken both
South and North.8 A few months later another correspondent of
the Mercury in an article headed,"Reflections on Re-perusing Judge
Cheve's Letter," put the case for secession without any indirec-
tion whatsoever. "The institutions and municipal policy, and geo-
graphical position, and popular feelings and pursuits of the north
and south can never harmonize as one people. Speak it out for
it is spoken sub rosa in every group of domestic and political
coterie that the sections divided by interest can never assimilate
in sentiment and national amity." 7 Both Cheves and his reviewer
described how separation would promote the prosperity of agri-
culture and commerce in the South.
The saner leaders in South Carolina, at the time of the Bluffton
movement, were insistent that any measure taken, whether seces-
sion or nullification, must be taken by a united South, and they
labored under no delusions in regard to the attitude of the South
as a. whole. In the spring of 1844 the cry, "Texas or Disunion,"
had awakened response in several Southern states; 8 but as soon
'Cong. Globe, 28 Cong, i Sess., 206 (Jan. 29).
'Niles' Register, LXVII, 49 ff.
'A Reply to the Letter of the Honorable Langdon Cheves, by "A South-
erner" (pamphlet); Adams, J. Q., Memoirs, XII, 91.
T
April 4, 1845; Niles' Register, LXVIII, 88 ff.
*Ibid., LXVI, 313, meetings in South Carolina; ibid., LXVI, 123,
quoting the New Orleans Tropic; ibid., 229, 312, accounts of meetings in Barn-
well District, South Carolina, and Russell County, Alabama; ibid., 3 1, quoting the
Richmond Enquirer, and other Southern papers; ibid., LXVI, 405, disunion
meetings in Lawrence county, Alabama, and in several districts in South Caro-
lina; Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 613-619.
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as it had achieved its purpose of securing the Democratic nomina-
tion for the presidency for a Southern man who was sound on the
Texas issue, the Democratic leaders proved most anxious to clear
themselves of any taint of disunion which the Whigs tried to fix
upon them.
9 The Charleston Mercury admitted that other states
would not join South Carolina in resistance.10 General James
Hamilton wrote in a public letter: "I cannot but express my be-
lief that South Carolina is not now ready for separate action, nor
the southern states for a southern convention." He expressed the
same view privately.
11
Langdon Cheves suggested that, instead
of South Carolina undertaking separate resistance, an active
propaganda be conducted throughout the South to develop among
the people a feeling of unity and a sense of their oppression. He
would have had a course followed similar to that pursued in the
Thirteen Colonies prior to the American Revolution: "Let asso-
ciations be formed in every southern, and, if possible, in every
southwestern state, and let them confer together and interchange
views and information; let leading men through committees and
private correspondence collect, compare, and concentrate the views
of men in their respective states, and when ripe for it, and not
before, let representatives from those states meet in convention,
and if circumstances promise success, let them then deliberate on
the mode of resistance and the measure of redress." 12 It became
the settled policy of certain South Carolina leaders to bring the
Southern states together in convention, to break down party dis-
tinctions throughout the South, as they had largely been broken
down in their own state, and to "fire the Southern heart."
There was little in the course of events during the next several
years to modify the views of men of the South Carolina school or
to deplete the ranks of the disunionists. The Walker tariff, the
Independent Treasury, and the veto of rivers and harbors bills
'Niles' Register, LXVI, 313, 347, 369, 391, 406, 411, quoting the Richmond
Enquirer as denying connection with the "Texas or Disunion" cry and proposed
Southern convention at Nashville; ibid., LXVI, 313, 346, and the National In-
telligencer, July 23, on the meeting in Nashville to protest against the proposed
"Texas or Disunion" convention; National Intelligencer, July 27, Aug. 10, n.
10
Aug. 9, 1844, "Our Position and our Pledges," in Niles' Register, LXVI,
406 ff.
"Ibid., LXVI, 420; Hamilton to Hammond, Oct. 4, 1844, /. H. Hammond
Papers.
"Niles' Register, LXVII, 49.
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pleased but did not satisfy the free trade and reform element.
Then with the introduction of the Wilmot Proviso, 1846, there
began an acrimonious struggle over slavery which continued al-
most without interruption until about 1852, when the general ac-
ceptance of the Compromise of 1850, and the defeat of efforts to
resist it, ushered in a short period of relative calm. The disposi-
tion evinced by the majority in the North to exclude slavery from
the territory acquired from Mexico and other manifestations of
hostility to the institution, together with the growing political pre-
ponderance and unity of the free states, caused the majority in
the South to fear for the security of slavery and other substantial
Southern interests. Southern leaders were put to' it to know how
to meet the issue. Under these circumstances disunion was fully
canvassed as a remedy, immediate or ultimate.
The long debates in Congress, the accompanying discussion in
the press and from the platform, the Southern conventions at
Nashville and their preliminaries, and, finally, the contests waged
in several states between those who favored acquiescence in the
compromise measures and those who counselled resistance, af-
forded ample opportunity for a thorough discussion of the ad-
vantages and disadvantages of the Union and the expediency and
propriety of secession. The discussion revealed how extensively
the ideas were held that the Union was a detriment to the prosper-
ity and economic progress of the South, and, the corollary, the
South would be more prosperous and develop more rapidly were
the Union dissolved. The discussion also, no doubt, contributed to
the spread of these ideas. It also revealed, and no doubt increased,
the number of those who, while they did not look for disunion to
bring positive economic advantages, expected it to bring no serious
disadvantages in short, those who could look to disunion with
complacency, for whom it "had no terrors."
Very early in the struggle over slavery in the territory to be
acquired from Mexico declarations were given in the South of a
determination to resist the adoption and enforcement of the Wil-
mot Proviso "at all hazards and to the last extremity."13 As the
"Virginia resolutions, Mar. 8, 1847, in Ames, State Documents on Federal
Relations, 245-7, were the first official declaration. Other state legislatures, as
well as party conventions, and numerous meetings of citizens adopted similar
resolutions. See Hamer, Secession Movement in S. C., 1847-1852, pp. 5, 6, n,
16 f., 29, 30 f.
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struggle progressed these declarations were renewed, and extend-
ed, as the issues were presented, to include other threatened acts
of Northern aggression. To prove that these were not merely idle
threats, Southern men talked long and angrily of Southern rights
and Southern honor and pictured the ruin that would be brought
to the South by abolition which they professed to believe would
be the ultimate consequence of restriction of slave territory and
loss of the sectional equilibrium. Many also endeavored to dem-
onstrate that the South could safely stake the Union upon the
issue of the struggle, because the South would suffer very little, if
not actually gain, from a dissolution, while the North stood to
lose so much in the event that she would yield rather than permit
the Union to be destroyed "calculating the value of the Union,"
this was termed.
After the election of 1848 and after the Taylor administration
had seemed to show anti-slavery leanings, the task of calculating
the value of the Union was undertaken in earnest. In the press, in
numerous pamphlets, in Congress, during the debates on the
compromise measures, threats of a dissolution in case the South
should be denied justice were reenforced by more or less elabor-
ate comparisons of the economic advantages or disadvantages of
the Union to the various sections. Many of those who thus cal-
culated the value of the Union were conditional disunionists. They
professed to be ready to stake the Union upon the satisfaction of
their demands. In all probability their demands would not have
been so great or so firmly made, had they attached greater value
to the Union; nevertheless, they intended to preserve the Union
if it could be done without too great sacrifice. But another class
was in evidence during the crisis, the disunionists per se, who
favored disunion irrespective of the character of the settlement of
the pending questions of conflict. They would have seized the op-
portunity to demand guarantees of the North which they would
have had no expectation of securing. In their opinion the interests
of the two sections had become so diverse that they could no
longer live amicably under one government. The Union had be-
come a disadvantage to the South: she would be more peaceful,
happy, and prosperous out of it.
As might be expected, the first manifestations of this ultra sen-
timent were in South Carolina. As early as November 2, 1848, H.
W. Connor, of Charleston, wrote Calhoun that he believed "there
73] ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SOUTHERN MOVEMENT 73
has been and probably still is a design to revive the old Bluffton
move with the same motive and end."14
'
The following February,
J. H. Hammond expressed to Calhoun his belief that the crisis was
at hand. 15 In the summer of 1849 the South Carolina Telegraph
began openly to agitate for a dissolution of the Union; and by
early in 1850 nearly every newspaper in the state was advo-
cating disunion.
16 The Charleston Mercury expected it.17 Mean-
while Governor Seabrook was in correspondence with the govern-
ors of other Southern states relative to what action they might be
expected to take if the Wilmot Proviso or other objectionable
measure should be adopted by Congress.18 Georgia newspaper
editors, in the summer of 1850, boldly inserted communications
in their columns, without any marks of disapprobation, openly
advocating disunion. Prominent leaders like Joseph H. Lumpkin,
William L. Mitchell, W. F. Colquitt, A. G. McDonald, and Joseph
E. Brown were known as disunionists, per se.ig John B. Lamar
wrote Howell Cobb that if it were not for Cobb's influence Geor-
gia would be more rampant for disunion than South Carolina ever
was.20 There were disunionists per se also in Alabama, Missis-
sippi, North Carolina, Virginia, and Tennessee.
It was this disunion element chiefly which was responsible for
the meeting of the Nashville Convention of June 1850. The idea
of getting the South together in a Southern convention was an old
one in South Carolina at least. 21 After the conflict over the Wil-
"Calhoun Correspondence. Cf. Hamer, op. cit., 26.
"Letter of Feb. 19, 1849, Calhoun Correspondence.
"National Intelligencer, Feb. 15, 1850.
"Ibid., loc. cit.
"Gov. W. D. Mosely, of Fla., to Whitemarsh B. Seabrook, May 18, 1849,
Seabrook MSS. "I do not now see any other executive to whom to address your-
self besides those you have already approached." Franklin H. Elmore to Sea-
brook, May 30, ibid.
"John H. Lumpkin to Howell Cobb, July 21, Toombs, Stephens, Cobb Cor-
respondence.
'"Letter of Feb. 7, 1850, ibid.
"Unionists had proposed a Southern convention in 1832 as a substitute for
nullification. Boucher, Nullification Controversy in South Carolina, 197-203. It
was discussed in 1835-1838, when the questions of abolition literature in the
mails, abolition petitions in Congress, and kindred questions were causing angry
controversy. Calhoun to Hayne, Nov. 17, 1838, Calhoun Correspondence; Ambler,
Thomas Ritchie, A Study in Virginia Politics, 173; Benton, Thirty Years' View,
74 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SOUTHERN SECTIONALISM, l84O-l86l [74
mot Proviso Lad been fairly joined, Calhoun sounded the views of
leading men of his following throughout the South upon the
subject.22 A call could have been secured at any time from South
Carolina; but in view of the well known disunion tendencies of
that state, it was deemed advisable that it should originate else-
where. Finally the call was issued by a delegate convention in
Jackson, Mississippi, October, 1849. If the report of Daniel Wal-
lace, secret agent of Governor Seabrook, of South Carolina, may
be credited, men who were former residents of that state and dis-
unionists, were very influential in the proceedings.
23
In South Carolina opposition to the Nashville Convention was
almost negligible. The character of the delegates elected, their
correspondence, and the comments of the press leave little doubt
that it was intended to use the Nashville Convention to promote
disunion.24 In most of the other slaveholding states the call of the
convention at first met with hearty response. But opposition soon
developed. Thomas H. Benton denounced it as a disunion plot.25
The Whigs generally condemned it; they distrusted the disorgan-
izing proclivities of some of those active in promoting it. The
compromising spirit shown in Congress in the early months of
1850 strengthened the opposition to the Southern Convention by
making it appear unnecessary as well as dangerous.
26 Six slave
states, Louisiana, North Carolina, Missouri, Kentucky, Maryland,
II, 700. It was again mooted in 1844, particularly during the "Texas or Disun-
ion" agitation. James Hamilton to J. H. Hammond, Oct. 4, 1844, /. H. Ham-
mond Papers; Nile/ Register, LXVI, 229, 312, 369 (accounts of meetings in
S. C and Ala.); Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 613-619.
"Calhoun to a member of the Alabama Legislature, 1847, Benton, Thirty
Years' View, II, 698-700; Joseph W. Lesesne to Calhoun, Sept. 12, 1847, Calhoun
Correspondence; Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, Nov. 18, 1847; H. W. Connor to
Calhoun, Nov. 2, 1848; John Cunningham to Calhoun, Nov. 12; Calhoun to
J. H. Means, Apr. 13, 1849.
"D. W. Wallace to Gov. Seabrook, June 8, Oct. 20, Nov. 7, 1849, Seabrook
A/SS.
"A. H. Brisbane to Hammond, Jan. 28, 1850, /. H. Hammond Papers; Na-
tional Intelligencer, Apr. 20, May 18, June 5, 1850. Cf. Hamer, op. cit., 46-48.
Wm. Gilmore Simms wrote Hammond: "I regard the Southern convention as in
fact a Southern confederacy. To become the one it seems to me very certain is
to become the other." Quoted in Trent, William Gilmore Simms, 179.
"National Intelligencer, Mar. 20, 1850, account of a meeting in St Louis,
Mar. 7.
M
Cf. Cole, Whig Party in the South, 157-62, 168-72.
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and Delaware, failed to send delegates. In Georgia a very small
percentage of the voters participated in the election of delegates.
27
Western Virginia and several populous counties in the east took
no part in the election of delegates,
28 and only six delegates from
the state attended the convention. Only South Carolina, Tennes-
see, Alabama, and Mississippi were represented by full delega-
tions, and in the two last the delegates were appointed by the
legislatures.
When the Nashville Convention met the disunionists soon saw
that any action looking to immediate resistance was impossible,
and, therefore, worked for a second meeting.29 Several disunion
per se speeches were made, the most notable being that of Beverly
Tucker, of Virginia.
30 The resolutions and the address to the
people of the slaveholding states which were adopted declared, in
effect, that the compromise measures then pending in Congress
were unacceptable and called for the extension of the Missouri
Compromise line to the Pacific as a sine qua non.3i The adjourned
session of the convention met in Nashville, November n, 1850,
with seven states represented, by delegations reduced in size.32
Most of the Union men of the first session refused to attend the
second, and the disunionists easily dominated it.33 The resolu-
tions denounced the compromise measures which Congress had
adopted, and recommended a congress or convention of the slave-
holding states "intrusted with full power and authority to deliber-
ate and act with a view and intention of arresting further aggres-
sion, and, if possible, of restoring the constitutional rights of the
South, and, if not, to provide for their future safety and inde-
"National Intelligencer, Apr. 11, 1850.
'"Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, 249; letters of Wm. 0. Goode to R. M. T.
Hunter, Mar. 29, Apr. 20, May II, 1850, Correspondence of R. M. T. Hunter.
"Hammond to Wm. G. Simms, June 16, 1850, /. H. Hammond Papers.
"DeBow's Review, XXXI, 59-69; reviewed in So. Quar. Rev., XVIII, 218-
23. See also Hammond to Simms, June 16, 1850, /. H. Hammond Papers.
"The resolutions and the address are in Ames, State Documents on Federal
Relations, 263-9. Proceedings in National Intelligencer, June 4-16, 1850.
"Proceedings in ibid., Nov. 16.
"Perhaps the most noteworthy incident of the meeting was the three hours
speech of Langdon Cheves, of South Carolina, advocating secession. This speech
was published as a pamphlet and widely used in the state contests over the
acceptance of the compromise measures.
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pendence." This action was intended to influence the contests
then being waged in four states over the Compromise of 1850.
After the passage of the compromise measures spirited contests
ensued in South Carolina, Georgia, Alabama, and Mississippi be-
tween those who would acquiesce and those who would resist. In
South Carolina the submissionists or Unionists were in a small
minority. The real contest lay between the cooperationists and
the separate-actionists. The former believed that South Carolina
should secede, but only in case other cotton states should take
similar action at the same time. The separate-actionists wanted
a convention called to take the state out of the Union, in company
with others, if possible, if not, alone. They professed to believe
that if South Carolina should secede and the Federal government
should undertake coercion, the other Southern states would come
to her support; if, as was possible, the Federal government should
not adopt coercive measures, South Carolina would be prosperous
and happy as an independent nation. The issue was not fairly
joined until after the failure of the secession movements in Geor-
gia, Mississippi, and Alabama was certain; then the contest be-
came very spirited. At an election held October 13 and 14, 1851,
to choose delegates to a Southern congress, which the Legislature
had called, the cooperationists cast 25,045 votes to their oppon-
ents' 17,710 and carried all of the congressional districts but
one.
34 This result was interpreted as instructing the delegates to
the State Convention, who had been elected in February. The Con-
vention accordingly adopted a preamble and a resolution which
declared the right of secession and resolved that secession was
justified by the course of the Federal government but that South
Carolina "forbears the exercise of this manifest right of self-gov-
ernment from considerations of expediency only."35
In Georgia, Governor Towns, acting upon instructions from the
Legislature, called a convention to meet December 10 to consider
the compromise measures. During the campaign for the election
of delegates, the Union party, which favored acquiescence in the
compromise, was opposed by a Southern Rights party, which
counselled resistance. The great majority of the Whigs and a re-
spectable minority of the Democrats supported the Union candi-
"National Intelligencer, Oct. 18, 20, 21, 1851; Hamer, op. cit., 123.
15
Journal of the State Convention of South Carolina . . . 1852, p. 18.
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dates; while the majority of the Democrats entered the Southern
Rights party. Under the leadership of Howell Cobb, A. H. Steph-
ens, and Robert Toombs the Union party won with a large major-
ity of the popular vote and an overwhelming majority in the
convention. After this victory the Union party perfected an organ-
ization and entered the state campaign of 1851 with Howell Cobb,
Democrat, as its candidate for governor. The Southern Rights
party nominated as its candidate ex-Governor A. G. McDonald,
who had presided over the second meeting of the Nashville Con-
vention. Again the Unionists won a substantial victory. Similar
events occurred in Mississippi. Upon the passage of the com-
promise measures, Governor John A. Quitman called an extra
session of the Legislature which, in turn, called a state convention
to meet November 10, 1851. A Union party was formed to con-
test the election of delegates to the convention and the regular
state elections of November, 1851. It was composed of the great
majority of the Whigs and a minority of the Democrats. H. S.
Foote, Union Democrat, was the nominee for governor. The
Union party was opposed by a Southern Rights party, officially
designated the Democratic State Rights party, led by Quitman
and Jefferson Davis and composed chiefly of Democrats. The
Unionists won a sweeping victory in the September elections for
delegates to the convention, and elected Foote governor over
Jefferson Davis by a small majority in November. The Conven-
tion adopted resolutions accepting the compromise measures and
declaring secession not to be a constitutional right.
36 In Alabama,
Governor Collier refused to call a special session of the Legisla-
ture, which might have called a state convention. Sentiment was
clearly in favor of acquiescence in the compromise. However,
Southern Rights associations were formed, as in other states, and
the right of secession was made an issue in the campaign for the
election of members of Congress in 1851.
The contest in South Carolina evoked the publication of numer-
ous long pamphlets, several long and laborious articles in the
Southern Quarterly Review, and the proceedings of meetings of
Southern Rights associations, as well as voluminous discussion in
the press and innumerable stump speeches. Both separate-act-
ionists and cooperationists again and again represented secession
"Journal of the Convention of the State of Mississippi . . . 1851, p. 47.
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not only as a remedy for Northern aggression against slavery
(although that was the chief consideration) but also as a measure
desirable irrespective of the slavery question. The opponents of
separate action demonstrated conclusively that separate secession
would adversely aifect the prosperity of South Carolina and,
especially, the commercial interests of Charleston, even should it
be permitted to be peaceful; but it was a rare voice that spoke
of the advantages of the Union.
37 The cooperationists were charged
with going beyond the separate-actionists in depicting the evils of
the Union.38 J. D. B. DeBow, then of New Orleans, a strong
Southern Rights man, objected to most of the papers and docu-
ments issued by the South Carolina press because "they go far
beyond the necessities of the case, and frame an argument for
disunion at all hazards, even were the slavery question closed up
and amicably settled."
39
Early in the contests in Georgia, Mississippi, and Alabama the
leaders of the Southern Rights parties saw that the people
would not go for secession, and sought to shift the issue from
the expediency to the constitutional right of secession;
40 there-
after arguments for disunion per se, such as were used so freely
in South Carolina, were used rather charily. But the people
had opportunity to become acquainted with all the disunionist
doctrines.
Outside the four states named the compromise measures were
"The best arguments against separate secession are in: Speech of Mr. Mem-
minger at a -public meeting of the friends of cooperation . . . Charleston, Sept. 23,
1851, . .. ; "Letter from W. W. Boyce to J. P. Richardson, President of a con-
vention of the Southern Rights Association of South Carolina held at Charleston,
May, 1851," republished in National Intelligencer, Nov. 13, 1860; The Letters
of Aricola, by Hon. Wm. Elliott; Letter of Gen. James Hamilton "To the People
of South Carolina," Nov. n, 1850, National Intelligencer, Dec. 2, 1850.
^National Intelligencer, Oct. 14, 1851, quoting the Greenville, S. C., South-
ern Patriot.
DeBou>'s Review, X, 231.
40This was not a mere abstract question: There was still a probability that
South Carolina would secede alone, and the other Southern states would then
be compelled to determine their course with reference to the coercion of a seceded
state. Furthermore, a general recognition of the right of secession would prepare
the way for future contests over its expediency.
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acquiesced in without noteworthy contests.
41
Disunionists, espec-
ially disunionists per se, were in a small minority. There were
such, however, and they presented the disunion arguments. There
was considerable discussion of the proper policy to be pursued in
case the cotton states should secede, and considerable speculation
in regard to the probable effects of separation from the North
upon the economic systems of the respective states. Furthermore,
disunionists in states most likely to secede indulged in much
speculation as to what other states would be included within the
boundaries of the proposed Southern confederacy, and advanced
arguments to prove that it would be to the interest of Virginia,
Maryland, or other particular state to go with the South in the
event of a dissolution. Men in the states which were the subjects
of such speculation had to take cognizance.
In analyzing the arguments of an economic nature which were
used in behalf of secession or in behalf of taking advanced ground
in the sectional struggle, it is not necessary to specify whether
they were used by conditional disunionists or unconditional dis-
unionists. The arguments used by the one class differed little
from those used by the other; furthermore, it is not always easy
to classify any gi^n individual on this basis.
The most elaborate calculation of the value of the Union made
during the crisis may be found in a long and well-written pamph-
let, published early in 1850, entitled, "The Union, Past and Fu-
ture, How It Works and How to Save It,"42 by Muscoe R. H.
"In North Carolina the minority was rather strong. In the Legislature of
1850-1851, resolutions affirming the constitutional right of secession were defeated
with difficulty. In the congressional campaign of 1851 the right of secession was
an issue; the opposition gained two seats in Congress as a result. Cole, Whig
Party in the South, 192; Win. K. Boyd, "North Carolina on the Eve of Seces-
sion," in Amer. Hist. Assoc., Rept., 1910, p. 171. Cave Johnson, of Tennessee,
heard secession per se arguments in his state. Letter to James Buchanan, Jan.
20, 1850, in St. G. L. Sioussat, "Tennessee, the Compromise of 1850, and the
Nashville Convention," Miss. Vol. Hist. Rev., II, 313-47.
"Published anonymously in Charleston, 1850; republished, several years
later, in DeBow's Review, XVIII and XIX, passim. The pamphlet was re-
viewed by E. Haskett Derby, Boston lawyer, in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine,
XXIII, 371-83, and in a pamphlet Reality versus Fiction, Boston, 1850. Gar-
nett answered Derby in an article in Hunt's, XXIV, 403-431, "The Union, Past
and Future: 'A Brief Review' Reviewed." Derby closed the argument, Hunt's,
XXIV, 659-681. For other reviews of Garnett's pamphlet see So. Quar. Rev.,
XIX, 189-226; DeBow's Review, X, 132-146, article, "The Future of the South,"
by Thomas Prentice Kettell.
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Garnett, of Virginia, a relative of R. M. T. Hunter and Henry A.
Wise, and an able and influential politician of the state rights
school. Garnett reviewed the slavery struggle, and found that the
South had reached a point where she must insist upon "sufficient
guarantees for the observance of her rights and her future po-
litical equality, or she must dissolve a Union which no longer pos-
sesses its original character." He proposed to put before the
North what she would lose if the South should be forced to take
the latter alternative. He calculated the value which the laws dis-
criminating against foreign shipping had been to the North an
enormous sum according to his method of calculation. The oper-
ation of the tariff, he analyzed in the usual anti-protectionist man-
ner, and calculated that between 1791 and 1845
"tne slavehold-
ing States paid $316,492,083 more than their just share, and the
free States as much less . . .
"; and this when, according to his
statement, the whole amount of duties collected in the same per-
iod was only $927,050,097. In the only other branch of public
revenue of any consequence, the proceeds of the sales of public
lands, the disproportion of Northern and Southern contributions
had been still greater. From the subject of taxation Garnett
passed to disbursements. The free states had received much
larger donations of the public lands. Of expenditures for collec-
tion of customs, for "bounties on pickled fish, and the allowances
to fishing vessels," for coast fortifications, for light houses, for
the coast survey, for internal improvements, for Revolutionary
pensions, and even for the post office system, the South had re-
ceived much less and the North much more than her proportion-
ate share. The public debt, held mostly in the North, had been
the source of yet more enormous benefits to that section. In sum-
mary, he said: "The heads of the federal expenditures which we
have examined give a fair notion of the rest; and it may be safely
assumed, that while the South has paid seven-ninths of the taxes,
the North has had seven-ninths of their disbursements."
According to Garnett this inequality in the operation of the
Federal government as respects the sections would account for
the growth of cities and the prosperity of the North. The effect
upon the North of a dissolution of the Union would be ruinous.
She would have to rely on direct taxation to support her govern-
ment. The South on the other hand would pay less taxes and
disburse them among her own people. She would conduct her
own commerce and that of the great Northwest. "Norfolk and
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Charleston and Savannah, so long pointed at by the North as a
proof of the pretended evils of slavery, will be crowded with
shipping, and their warehouses crammed with merchandise." The
future of Southern agriculture would be equally brilliant. By
virtue of her command of the great staple of cotton, her great
natural advantages, and her strategic location "midway in the new
hemisphere, holding the outlets of Northern commerce, and the
approaches to South America and the Pacific, through the Gulf,"
the Southern confederacy would occupy a powerful position in the
world. The pamphlet was concluded with a glorification of slavery
and agriculture and a depiction of the demoralizing influences of
factories; for Garnett would not encourage manufactures in his
free trade republic.
More frequently .quoted, perhaps, than Garnett's pamphlet was
an article in the Democratic Review, January, 1850, written by the
editor, Thomas Prentice Kettell, and entitled, "Stability of the
Union."43 It was a plea to the people of the North not to attack
an institution upon which their prosperity so largely depended; it
was similar in strain to the pleas frequently advanced by organs
of the manufacturing and commercial interests of the North.
44
Kettell said nothing about unequal operation of the Federal gov-
ernment, but emphasized the profits realized by the North from
manufacturing for the South, carrying her commerce, and acting
as her banker. The annual pecuniary value to the North of a
union with the South, he estimated in a table45 containing the fol-
lowing items:
"Also in DeBow's Review, VIII, 348-363; DeBow, Industrial Resources, III,
357-366.
^See, for example, DeBow's Review, IX, 93-100, quoting the New York
Courier and Enquirer; Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XX, 292 ff., letter of
Colonel Alexander Hamilton, of New York.
"Democratic Review, XXVI, 13. Quoted in Congress by Thomas L. Cling-
man, Cong. Globe, 31 Cong. I Sess., 203 ff.; by Downs, of Louisiana, ibid., Appx.,
172; by Averett, of Virginia, ibid., Appx., 396; Thomas L. Harris, of Illinois,
ibid., Appx., 411. Mr. Harris said: "But, Mr. Chairman, several gentlemen,
both here and in the other end of the Capitol [Senate], have relied upon an
article in a late number of the Democratic Review to show that the North is
reaping upward of $88,000,000 from its connection with the South, while it is
careful not to show that the South derives any benefit from the North." See
also Aaron V. Brown, Speeches, Congressional and Political, and Other Writings,
302 (Governor of Tennessee); Charleston Mercury, Feb. 15, 1850, quoted in
National Intelligencer, Feb. 20.
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Freights of Northern shipping on Southern produce. . .$40,186,178
Profits derived on imports at the North for Southern
account 9,000,000
Profits on exchange operations 1,000,000
Profits on Northern manufactures sold at the South. . 22,250,000
Profits on Western produce descending the Mississippi 10,000,000
Profits on Northern capital employed at the south . . . 6,000,000
Total earnings of the North per annum $88,436,178
There was nothing in KettelPs article to indicate that the South-
ern people received any pecuniary advantages from their union
with the North. Southern men quoted his table not only to show
why the North should grant justice to the South, but also what
the South would save annually by a dissolution of the Union.
Of the speeches in Congress in which the value of the Union
was calculated, perhaps the most notable was that of Thomas L.
Clingman, Whig, of North Carolina.46 He dwelt upon the inequal-
ity of taxation and disbursements, and told what ample revenues
a Southern confederacy could command with a tariff of thirty
or even twenty per cent. "Subjecting the goods of the North to a
duty, with those from other foreign countries, would at once give
a powerful stimulus to our own manufactures." He described the
advantages the Southern states possessed for cotton manufactur-
ing, and added, "We should thus have that diversity of pursuits
which is most conducive to the prosperity and happiness of a peo-
ple." John C. Calhoun in his last great speech, March 4, 1850, did
not calculate the value of the Union; he did, however, reiterate his
conviction that unequal taxation and disbursements had caused
that loss of equilibrium between the sections which, he said, was
the
"great and primary cause" of the belief of the Southern people,
"that they cannot remain, as things now are, consistently with
honor and safety, in the Union." Unequal distribution of the taxes
and disbursements had transferred hundreds of millions from the
South to the North. This had increased the population of the
**Cong. Globe, 31 Cong., i Sess., 200-207, speech in the House, Jan. 22,
1850; Thomas L. Clingman, Speeches and Writings, 245 ff. Clingman expressed
similar ideas in a speech in the House, February 15, 1851, Speeches and Writ-
ings, 275 ff. This speech was regarded in the South as the platform of the
ultras. See National Intelligencer, Feb. I, 1850.
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latter by attracting immigration from all quarters and sections.
Had the South retained her wealth and her equality in the terri-
tories, she would have divided, at least, the immigration.47
Space will not permit an account of the contents of the numer-
ous pamphlets and speeches occasioned by the contests in South
Carolina and elsewhere over the acceptance of the compromise
measures. One example will suffice to illustrate their tone and
temper. John Townsend, a prominent cooperationist of South
Carolina, in a vigorous pamphlet entitled, The Southern States,
Their Present Peril and Their Certain Remedy, named aboli-
tionism as the peril and secession as the remedy; but it was a
remedy for more than the dangers threatening slavery. In the
usual strain he told of the unequal operation of the Federal govern-
ment and its effects. He described the vast resources of the
South, and said:
How different will be the aspect of things in the whole South,
when this tide of wealth is dammed up within our own borders,
and made to roll back ajpaong our own people; and when our im-
mense capital is employed by our own merchants in establishing
a direct trade between our own Southern ports and our custom-
ers all over the world . . . The arts will revive, manufactures will
spring up around us; our agriculture will rear its drooping head,
our commerce will expand, mechanic labor, meeting with ample
rewards will pour in upon us, and emigration [sic], no longer dis-
couraged by the uninviting aspect of our country will flock to our
shores.48
In the United States Senate, R. B. Rhett, who had been elected
to fill the vacancy caused by the death of Calhoun, was led by an
attack made upon him by Henry S. Foote, of Mississippi,49 to
make a long speech explaining why he was a secessionist he was
the leader of the separate-actionists in his state. He reviewed the
"Works, IV, 542-73.
**P. 17. Other secessionist pamphlets or articles were: Wm. H. Trescott,
The Position and Course of the South; E. B. Bryan, The Rightful Remedy. Ad-
dressed to the Slaveholders of the South; [A. G. Magrath], A Letter on South-
ern Wrongs and Southern Remedies: Addressed to the Hon. W . J. Grayson in
reply to his Letter to the Governor of South Carolina on the Dissolution of
the Union.
"Foote charged Rhett with having said that he expected, through the
agency of the Nashville Convention, by making demands to which he knew
Congress would not accede, to break up the Union. Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., I
Sess., 96.
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history of the struggles over slavery, and charged thaf^the North-
ern people were animated by a desire for its final extinction. But
the action of Congress with respect to slavery in the territories, he
said, was only a sequence in a course of policy inimical to the
South which had been pursued many years. "If I mistake not,
from the very foundation of this Government to this day, the
operation of it in its financial and pecuniary relations, has had
but one uniform tendency; and that has been, to aggrandize the
North at the expense of the South." He traced the 'history of
the tariff from the beginning, and reviewed the whole subject of
taxation and disbursements in a manner very similar to that of
Garnett's pamphlet. "Is it wonderful," he asked ''that under such
a course of policy, the poorest section of the' Union should be the
richest, and the South should, with all her vast resources, linger
in her prosperity?" He traced the decline of Southern commerce,
and estimated the value to the North of the monopoly of the
coasting trade. "The South," he said, "is nothing else now, but
the very best colony of the North any people ever possessed."
50
Rhett's colleagues understood his speech to be an argument for
secession per se. Senator Cass so took it, and condemned it.51
Senator Mason, of Virginia, declared that his state had no sym-
pathy with those who "preferred disunion."52 Senator Downs, of
Louisiana, asked why discuss further the compromise measures
when Rhett had himself admitted that he did not find in them
sufficient reason to justify the disunion movement which he had
set on foot in South Carolina. 53 In the House, E. K. Smart, of
Maine, replied in detail, with a yet more imposing array of sta-
tistics than Rhett had used, to the latter's speech and to one of
somewhat similar tone which had been made in the House by A.
G. Brown, of Mississippi.
54 He did so, he explained, because "I
have often thought that a fair and candid investigation of the
benefits and advantages of this Government, enjoyed by the
South, would disarm the spirit of disunion; that our southern
friends, by an examination of the facts, would be induced to de-
mand less of the North."
*Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 42-8.
"Ibid., 32 Cong., I Sess., 146.
"Ibid., 32 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 49.
"Ibid., 32 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 98.
"Ibid., 32 Cong., I Sess., Appx., 464-71.
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Unionists did not fail to seek other causes than the quarrel over
slavery and the fears for the security of that institution for the
existence of disunion sentiment in the South. F. A. P. Barnard, in
an address to the citizens of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, said he be-
lieved there were causes much deeper than the slavery agitation
for the war which had been waged to the knife against the Union.
The agitators had seized upon the soreness produced in the
Southern mind by the infringement of undeniable rights as the
most available means of accomplishing their ulterior designs. He
retold the story of South Carolina nullification; the people of that
state were still bitter from the old feud, he said. A conviction pre-
vailed that the Union had been unequal in its benefits: "Such a
conviction has been, is probably at this moment, partaken by
very many who feel no disposition to rush into disunion as a
remedy. Indeed the impression seems extensively to exist, that,
by the operation of the Federal Constitution, through Federal
Legislation, the South has oeen made in some sort, tributary to
the North." He told of Southern dependence upon the North for
manufactures, of the sensitiveness of the Southern people about
the matter, and their analysis of the causes of their dependence.
"From this condition of things our people have become impatient
to be free; and this it is ... more truly than any other existing
evil, which has caused the word disunion to be of late so often
and so lightly spoken among us, and the thought of what it signi-
fies to be contemplated with so little horror."
85 The Richmond
Whig thought much of the dissatisfaction in South Carolina had
originated in having attributed to the Federal government conse-
quences which were rather attributable to the competition of
fresher and more fertile states of the South, engaged in the cul-
ture of the same staple as herself.
56
The Unionists in the cotton states in their contests with the
Southern Rights parties found their best tactics to be to defend
the compromise measures, appeal to the patriotism of the
^Oration Delivered before the Citizens of Tuscaloosa, Alabama, July 4,
1851, 12.
""March 5, 1851. A similar statement is in an editorial of March 22.
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masses,
57 impeach the motives of Southern Rights leaders, and
picture secession as a measure that would bathe the nation in
blood. They showed that secession meant division of the South;
for the border states could not be expected to secede.
58 In par-
ticular localities they pointed out how separation would injure es-
tablished commercial and agricultural interests. In general they
did not find it necessary tc refute at length the doctrine that the
prosperity of the South suffered from an unequal operation of the
Federal government. No doubt many shared this view to some ex-
tent. Yet there was a fundamental divergence in the views of the
two groups as to the Union's economic effects upon the sections.
Unionists were inclined to depict the unexampled peace and
progress in wealth and strength of the great republic and to con-
sider the South a partaker therein.
59 The Mobile Daily Advertiser
said Alabama was never more prosperous. "Why cannot secession
orators be serious?"60 Said H. S. Foote of Mississippi: "It is
sufficient for us to know that the Union is of inappreciable value
to every portion of this widespread Republic; . . . That the gen-
eral action of the government has been more or less unequal and
oppressive to our local interests of the South, cannot be denied."
61
Particularly in Georgia, the most prosperous of the cotton states,
was the plea effective that the state owed its prosperity to the
Union. The Richmond Whig ascribed the Union victory in
Georgia to prosperity the refusal of the people to be convinced
that the Union had inflicted any injury upon them.62 General
James Hamilton, who traveled through the cotton states in the
"Henry W. Hilliard said: "The value of the Union which binds these States
together is incalculable; its priceless value defies all the ordinary methods of
computation; it is consecrated by battles, and triumphs, and glories, which be-
long to the past; .... it secures to us innumerable blessings; it looks forward to
a future still more prosperous and more glorious than the past." Cong. Globe,
31 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 34.
"Speech of Senator Jere Clemens, in Huntsville, Alabama, Nov. 4, 1850, in
National Intelligencer, Nov. 10; letter from Joel R. Poinsett to the people of
S. C., Charleston Mercury, Dec. 5.
*9
Grayson, W. J., Letter to the Governor of South Carolina on the Dissolu-
tion of the Union, p. 8. This is one of the best of the Union pamphlets.
'"Quoted in the National Intelligencer, Dec. 6, 1850.
"Cong., Globe, 32 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 59, reply to Rhett.
"Mar. 5, 1851.
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compromise year, made a similar diagnosis; in Georgia and Ala-
bama the high price of cotton had neutralized the disunion senti-
ment, while Louisiana had "an average sugar crop and would
acquiesce."
63
Unionists, in so far as they admitted "Southern decline," were
disposed to emphasize explanations for it other than the fiscal
action of the Federal government. The majority of them were
Whigs, who had, in general, supported those protective and fiscal
measures to which disunionists ascribed the woes of the South.
The Unionists dwelt upon such causes for lagging prosperity as
overproduction of cotton, lack of diversity in agriculture, and the
failure to encourage home manufactures. They showed how the
older states had suffered from the emigration of their citizens to
the richer and fresher lands of the Southwest. Up to this time at
least, the Whigs had given mo/e earnest support than the Demo-
crats to those movements for the diversification of industry which
have been described in previous chapters, and at this juncture
they advocated it as a better method than secession for securing
the rights and prosperity of the South.64
The position of New Orleans as an exporting and importing
center for the Mississippi valley plainly operated against the
growth of disunion sentiment in Louisiana; men of that state in-
sisted that the valley could not be divided.
65 Few from Kentucky
and Missouri calculated the value of the Union. Humphrey
Marshall, of Kentucky, offered an explanation for the strong at-
tachment of those states for the Union. There was a region, he
said, where cotton and sugar did not grow, and where manufac-
tures and navigation were not the only employments. "The inter-
ests of that people are identical, no matter whether they live in a
free State or a slave State, and they cannot be induced to sacrifice
their welfare or their friendship for the triumph of any extreme
doctrine about slavery.""
36 Governor Crittenden expressed the
same idea: "To Kentucky and the other Western States in the
68
"To the People of South Carolina," in National Intelligencer, Dec. 2, 1850.
84
See Barnard, F. A. P., Oration Delivered before the Citizens of Tuscaloosa,
Alabama, July 4, 1851. Cf. Cole, Whig Party in the South, 206-211.
"Speech of Downs in the Senate, Cong. Globe, 31, Cong., i Sess., Appx., 171.
w
lbid., 31 Cong., i Sess., 409.
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Valley of the Mississippi, the Union is indispensable to their
commercial interests." 07
In North Carolina the disunion per se arguments were well re-
futed. The absence of identity of interests between the two Car-
olinas was occasionally emphasized. Said Congressman Stanley,
Whig:
"
.... we are invited to contemplate the glories of a
Southern Confederacy, in which Virginia and South Carolina are
to have great cities, to be supported by the colony or plantation of
North Carolina!"68 Perhaps in no state other than the older cot-
ton states was a greater disposition shown to listen to the uncon-
ditional disunion arguments than in eastern Virginia. But there
were strong deterrant influences: trade both with the North and
South; prospects of valuable commercial relations with the West
when the great internal improvement system already projected
should make Virginia -he "thoroughfare and rendezvous of our
great and united sisterhood of states;"69 and, more important, the
devotion to the Union >f the western part of the state, whose
economic interests were imilar to those of other parts of the Ohio
valley rather than to th" se of the South.
70
It will have been ob.- erved that disunion sentiment and a dis-
position to put a low estimate upon the value of the Union were
not uniformly distributed throughout the slaveholding states. It
is true that the states in which the strongest secession movements
developed were those in which the ratios of black to white popula-
tion were highest. (However, it is difficult to demonstrate that
within such states secession sentiment was especially strong in the
black belts.) But the states in which the disunion movements
were strongest were also the states most dependent commercially
and industrially or, to use Calhoun's phrase, they were the
"exporting states." They were the states, too, in which the doc-
trine that the Federal government operated to make one section
tributary to the other in an economic way had early found wide-
spread acceptance.
"Coleman, The Life of John J. Crittenden, I, 350-52. Cf. Speech of Henry
Clay in the Senate, Cong. Globe, 31 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 127.
m
lbid., 31 Cong., I Sess., Appx., 409.
"Letter from William C. Rives, U. S. Minister to France, in National In-
telligencer, May I, 1850.
TO
Cf. Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, 248 f.
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The evidence in regard to party affiliations is, perhaps, more
conclusive as to motives. In the South as a whole the overwhelm-
ing majority of the Whig party, as we have seen, was Unionist and
accepted the compromise measures without much dissatisfaction.
It would seem that the disunionists of 1850, and those who con-
templated disunion with complacency, were chiefly of the Calhoun
wing of the Democratic party; many of them had been Nullifica-
tionists. The Union Democrats of 1850, on the other hand, were
chiefly of Jackson, Benton, and Van Buren antecedents.
In South Carolina the alignment is not diffiicult to see. The
Unionists were, in the main, the remnants of the Whig party. Of
the leaders of the Union group, J. J. Pettigru, B. F. Perry, Judge
John Benton O'Neall, Richard Yeadon, and W. J. Grayson were
Whigs, Joel R. Poinsett was a Jackson .Democrat; all had been
Union men in 1832. Waddy Thompson, 'j^Vhig, was the one con-
spicuous example of a former Nullifier turnjed Unionist. Of the sep-
arate-actionists, all the prominent leacjfs who had figured in
Nullification days had been Nullifiers; i^ .this category fell R. B.
Rhett, B. F. Duncan, F. W. Pickens, I. ^Holmes, W. F. Colcock,
A. Burt, and Maxcy Gregg. With one #ception these men had
been leaders also of the Bluffton movement of 1844. Of the co-
operationists of 1851, the majority of the prominent leaders had
been Nullifiers; of this class were A. P. Butler, J. H. Hammond,
James Hamilton, William S. Preston, F. L. Wardlaw, and W. W.
Boyce. Other prominent cooperationists had been Unionists in
1832; in this class were ex-Governor J. P. Richardson, Daniel E.
Huger, Richard I. Manning, C. G. Memminger, and James Ches-
nut. Langdon Cheves had been a cooperationist in 1832. All of
the secessionists named were Democrats except William S.
Preston, cooperationist, who was a state rights Whig.
In July, 1850, John H. Lumpkin, of Georgia, wrote Howell
Cobb: "All who are for resistance and for disunion will be found
in the ranks of the democratic party; and if their history should
be known, they will be found out to be old Nullifiers in i832."T1
Other Union Democrats of Georgia complained of those "secession
views which have long been entertained by a school of Southern
politicians which have always injured and weakened, never bene-
"July 21. Toombs, Stephens, Cobb Correspondence.
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fited or strengthened the Democratic party." 72 The Union Demo-
crats were almost exclusively from the northern counties, which
had never accepted the teachings of the Carolina school. Such
prominent leaders of the Southern Rights party as C. J. Mc-
Donald, George M. Troup, Joseph H. Lumpkin, W. F. Colquitt,
H. L. Benning, William H. Stiles, J. N. Bethune, and John A.
Jones had long been leaders of the state rights wing of the Demo-
cratic party. However, in Georgia perhaps to a greater extent than
any other Southern state, the Whig party had retained its state
rights element; this element, with exceptions such as J. M. Ber-
rien, cooperated with their fellows in the Union movement of 1850.
The latter fact probably explains why the Union Convention of
1850 did not deny the constitutional right of secession as did the
Unionists in Alabama and Mississippi. 73
In Alabama the nullifying state rights faction went into the
Democratic party with Calhoun about 1840; after that time the
state rights element of the Whig party was comparatively small.
But the cleavage between the Calhoun wing of the Democrats, led
by such men as Dixon H. Lewis, J. M. Calhoun, W. L. Yancey,
the Elmores, and David Hubbard, and the Jackson wing whose
leaders were Wm. R. King, Benjamin Fitzpatrick, Jere Clemens,
W. R. W. Cobb, etc., remained clear for years.74 In 1845
Dixon H. Lewis wrote of the "Calhoun wing of the Party." It
was this wing of the party which formed the Southern Rights
party in 1851, and sought to prepare the state for secession. The
other wing not only allied with the Whigs to form the Union party
but denied the constitutional right of secession.
75
In Mississippi the situation was very similar to that in Ala-
bama. J. A. Wilcox, a Union Democrat elected in 1851, identified
the Southern Rights men of his state, whom he denounced as
"John E. Ward and Henry R. Jackson to Howell Cobb, Feb. 28, 1852, in
Toombs, Stephens, Cobb Correspondence,
"Cf. Hodgson, The Cradle of the Confederacy, 283.
n
lbid., ch. XI; Garrett, Reminiscences of Public Men in Alabama, 297.
The author, in telling why David Hubbard, of Lawrence, a Calhoun man, never
attained the senatorship, says: "The same reasons which influenced the Jackson
Democracy in withholding their support in former days from the men who came
over with Mr. Calhoun, operated against him in these aspirations;
" Garrett
constantly recognizes the division in the Democratic party.
"Hodgson, op. cit., 294-296.
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disunionists, as "old-line Democrats." This term he defined as
designating those whom Jackson had driven from the party in
1832-1833. After that year, he said, they had acted with the Whigs
until 1840, when they followed Calhoun back into the Democratic
ranks. 76 This description is accurate with the exception that it
takes no account of a small element in the Whig party which had
not followed Calhoun in 1840, but which nevertheless cooperated
with the Southern Rights party in 1851. The leader of this party
was John A. Quitman, a native of South Carolina, a Nullifier, and
a supporter of Calhoun against Van Buren in 1844.
In no state can the division in the Democratic ranks be more
clearly seen than in Virginia. There the Calhoun men constituted
a well defined group. For a number of years they acted almost
as a third party holding the balance of power between the Whigs
and the Democrats. In 1843-1844 they tried to secure the Demo-
cratic nomination for the presidency for Calhoun. In 1847 they
were able, by taking advantage of factional fights in the general
assembly, to elect R. M. T. Hunter and J. M. Mason to the Sen-
ate. Thereafter they gradually tightened their grip upon the
Democratic party.
78 But in 1850, and later, leaders still spoke
of the "Calhoun wing" or the "States Rights party" almost as if
it were a distinct organization.
79 Their strength lay chiefly in east-
n
Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 282-285.
"Claiborne, Life and Correspondence of John A. Quitman, I, 211-15 a cir-
cular written by Quitman for his political friends, 1845. The factional differences
in Mississippi may be traced quite readily in the correspondence of Quitman.
In 1835, he wrote: "....the people of this state are one-third for Van Buren,
one-third Nullifiers, and one-third Whigs." P. 139. In December, 1838, he
wrote: "I shall cooperate freely arid boldly with all genuine Republicans, be
they Democrats or Nullifiers, in asserting the principles to which I have alluded."
P. 167. In 1845: "In politics I hold much the same position as Calhoun and
Troup In 1844 I preferred, as I had before and do now, Mr. Calhoun to
any other man for the presidency, but I acquiesced in the nomination of Van
Buren, and, until the appearance of his anti-Texas letter, gave him my zealous
support." P. 214.
7
*These statements are based upon numerous letters in the Correspondence
of John C. Calhoun, Correspondence of R. M. T. Hunter, and /. H. Hammond
Papers, as well as newspaper material, etc., and agree, I believe, with Ambler,
Thomas Ritchie and Sectionalism in Virginia.
^Correspondence of R. M. T. Hunter, especially letters: James A. Seddon to
Hunter, June 16, 1848; L. W. Tazewell to Hunter, Aug. 18, 1850; Seddon to
Hunter, Feb. 7, 1852.
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ern Virginia. Their leaders were very able; among them were R.
M. T. Hunter, J. M. Mason, James A. Seddon, Henry A. Wise,
Lewis E. Harvie, Beverly Tucker, William O. Goode, Wm. F.
Gordon, Willoughby Newton, Richard K. Cralle, M. R. H. Gar-
nett, and Edmund Ruffin. It was this wing that supported the
Nashville Convention and furnished most of the delegates; 80 in
this wing virtually all of the Virginia disunionists and those of
disunionist
-leanings were to be found in 1850.
Now, to be sure, the State Rights party claimed to be cham-
pions and defenders of slavery par excellence, as well as of other
Southern interests. But this claim was not admitted by their op-
ponents, and had no basis in actual property interest in slaves.
The Whig party contained at least its proportionate share of the
slaveholders. Whig leaders claimed, with justification it seems,
that most of the large slaveholders belonged to their party. Whigs
had, of course, reasons for supporting the compromise measures
originating in the party considerations; for the administration
under whose auspices the measures were enacted was Whig. But
after all qualifications are made, no explanation of the alignment
of the parties and factions in the South upon the question of
Union or disunion is complete which does not take in account the
previous history and the origin of the parties.
"Tucker, Goode, Gordon, and Newton were delegates to the first session of
the Nashville Convention, and Gordon was the only representative of Virginia
in the second.
CHAPTER IV
PLANS FOR ESTABLISHING DIRECT TRADE
WITH EUROPE, 1847-1860.
Although for a number of years after the direct trade conven-
tions of the 18305 no attempts were made to revive Southern
foreign commerce comparable to the efforts of those conventions,
at no time did the people of the South become reconciled to com-
mercial dependence upon the North. The suspension of the dis-
cussion of direct trade was due to the general stagnation of busi-
ness and the distrust of all enterprise which characterized a period
of several years following the commercial crisis of 1837.
In 1845 and 1846 there was discussion in Congress and the
country at large of the policy of adopting the warehousing sys-
tem. The system permitted goods imported from abroad to be
placed in bonded warehouses with payments of duties when the
goods were withdrawn, unless withdrawn for re-export, in which
case no duties were to be collected. The warehousing system met
with general favor in the South, and overenthusiastic individuals
hailed it as the panacea which would restore Southern foreign
commerce. 1 The cash duties system, they said, prevented South-
ern merchants, who generally had limited capital and credit, from
importing for re-exportation, and gave the advantage to Northern
importers of larger means. The warehousing system would enable
New Orleans to become the half-way house between Europe and
Mexico, and Charleston to conduct the commerce between
Europe and the West Indies. According to the memorial to
Congress from the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce, the want
of a warehousing system had driven the Mexican trade to Ha-
vana.2 J. D. B. DeBow thought that, if there was ever to be any
foreign commerce in the South, such a system must have a great
influence in bringing it about.
3
Congress enacted a warehousing
law, effective August 6, 1846.* Being a step in the direction of
Southern Literary Messenger, XI, 508, 567, 577, 584, articles by Lieut. M.
F. Maury.
'DeBotv's Review, II, 408.
'Ibid., II, 193.
'Acts and Resolutions, 29 Cong., I Sess., p. 83.
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free trade, it undoubtedly benefited commerce;
5 but more than a
warehousing law was necessary to effect a revolution in the course
of Southern trade.
With the reawakened spirit of progress in the South during the
latter half of the fifth decade, came a general renewal of dis-
cussion of direct trade with Europe. This period witnessed a re-
vival of prosperity in all parts of the Union. Numerous railroad
projects took form, and construction upon a large scale was un-
dertaken. With the extension of our national boundaries to the
Pacific and the discovery of gold in California, grandiose schemes
were conceived for establishing communication with the Pacific
coast by rail or water. In the South one manifestation of the new
spirit was a revival of the direct trade movement. In 1847 DeBow
said the subject of direct trade was once again receiving atten-
tion;
6 and numerous long articles in his newly founded DeBow's
Review attest to the revival of interest. He republished the pro-
ceedings of the Augusta and Charleston conventions and the re-
ports of McDuffie, Hayne, Elmore, and Longstreet. "We would
recall those scenes and times," he said.7 But whereas in those
times the direct trade movement was pretty much confined to
the Atlantic seaboard, now it spread to the Gulf ports and the
entire South. Until 1861 nothing was recognized with more stead-
fastness and unanimity as a proper element in the policy not only
of seaports but of the South as a section than the encouragement
of direct trade. It was a subject of constant discussion in the
press. Conventions were held to consider plans for promoting it.
It held a prominent place in all the sessions of the Southern Com-
mercial Convention, which met regularly from 1852 to 1859, and
was given consideration in the less regular Cotton Planters' Con-
vention. Plans for achieving it demanded consideration from
chambers of commerce, city councils, and state legislatures, as
well as from individuals.
In the fifties, as in the thirties, commercial dependence was be-
lieved to be responsible for the transfer of much Southern wealth
'Lieutenant Maury wrote a few years later: "These importers [direct] and
the warehousing system are recovering back for the South a portion of the direct
trade." DeBow, Industrial Resources, III, 14.
"DeBow's Review, III, 557.
''Ibid., Ill, 558.
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to the North in the form of profits; as in the thirties, it was said
that the Northern merchants and ship owners reaped large profits
from importing for the Southern states and conducting their
foreign and coastwise commerce. The estimated total of the sums
abstracted from the yearly product of Southern industry in the
form of importers' profits, interest upon advances, freight charges,
insurance, commissions, port and wharf charges, and the expenses
of Southern merchants who went North to purchase their stocks,
had grown with the nation's commerce and shipping, and, by the
processes of Southern arithmetic, had become enormous indeed.
Said William Gregg: "It is a hopeless task to undertake to even
approximate the vast sums of wealth which have been trans-
ferred from the South to the North by allowing the Northern
cities to import and export for us."8 Joseph Segar, of Virginia,
cited the report of the Secretary of the Treasury showing the im-
ports and exports of the United States for 1856 to have been
$314,000,000 and $326,000,000 respectively. "Now the commer-
cial profit of this vast amount of business inures almost exclusive-
ly to the north. The South has scarcely a say in the matter. She
not only surrenders nearly all the profit on the import trade, but
our productions the basis of our exports are mostly shipped
to Northern cities, and thence reshipped in Northern bottoms to
the foreign market, so that she actually loses the factorage on her
own productions. Such a state of things is an annual loss to her
of numerous millions, and her bitter reproach." 9 Another Virgin-
ian calculated, in 1853, tnat Virginia lost $9,539,037.76 annually
by "allowing" New York to carry her trade.10
To such statements as these, and there were hundreds of them,
it was not sufficient to reply, as Northern men frequently did, that
what the North got was only a fair commercial remuneration.
11
True, people in the South considered the remuneration too great
because the indirect course of trade, by reason of the greater mile-
age, the extra transhipments necessary, and the mediation of a
greater number of middlemen, each of whom must exact a profit,
made foreign goods more costly to the ultimate purchasers than
'DeBow's Review, XXIX, 82.
'Ibid., XXII, 515.
"Ibid., XIV, 501.
"Olmsted, The Cotton Kingdom, II, 301.
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would the direct course. Many believed they were being ex-
ploited by Northern merchants and financiers, made the prey of
manipulators, and made to pay extortionate prices. But the rather
characteristic reply quoted above portrays inability or unwilling-
ness to grasp the chief reasons for dissatisfaction in the South with
the manner in which Southern commerce was conducted.
As in an earlier period discussed, so in this it was believed that
Northern seaports owed their phenomenal growth and prosperity
very largely to their control of Southern foreign commerce. It
was a logical conclusion that, could this commerce be conducted
by Southern seaports, they would enjoy like prosperity. And in
the 18505 the people of every Southern seaport of any preten-
sions whatever had the natural and laudable ambition to make
it a great commercial center. William S. Forrest in his Sketches
of Norfolk rather naively related that upon September 26, 1850,
the Honorable Henry A. Wise, of Accomac, "spoke with startling
eloquence, and most convincing power of argument, of the reason
that Norfolk is not already a great city, and of the means by
which she may become a great Southern emporium."12 There was
much of this type of eloquence.
The public had no reason to be uninformed in regard to the
relative advantages and disadvantages of every Southern port.
The jealousy of rivals displayed in some of the cities is rather
amusing, considering the inconsequence of the majority of them;
although it had rather important influence upon the location of
railroads in the South, and possibly some small influence detri-
mental to the success pf projects for direct trade with Europe.
The citizens of Norfolk hoped much from her splendid harbor
and strategic location at the entrance of the Chesapeake. Rich-
mond, upon the James river, was a larger town, more centrally
located with reference to Virginia, possessed of the advantage of
being the capital of the state, and her people were determined to
make her the commercial capital of Virginia, if not of a much
larger territory. The people of North Carolina regretted the
"P. 260. The same thought recurs frequently, for example: ''There are
many thinking, practical, and intelligent men, who believe that Norfolk, at some
not very distant period in the history of the world, will be a great city. Every
person, who thinks upon the subject at all, knows well enough that the place is
not what it ought long since to have been. P. 281. Forrest quoted Jefferson and
Madison upon the future of Norfolk. P. 296, 297.
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necessity of resorting to Charleston and Norfolk because of the
want of a good port in their own state, and there was discussion
of the possibility of making Wilmington a great Southern empor-
ium. Charleston and Savannah were the only ports of any conse-
quence upon a long stretch of coast line, and were rivals for the
trade of several states. In the fifties Charleston was in many re-
spects the most progressive city in the South.
13 With the excep-
tion of New Orleans, she had more citizens of wealth and better
banking facilities than any other city south of Baltimore. Many
of her merchants were natives or residents of long standing, and
were imbued with a high degree of public spirit. Her chamber of
commerce was aggressive and resourceful. On the other hand,
Savannah, while she had all the drawbacks of Southern cities in
general, possessed certain advantages of location from which
much was hoped. She was more advantageously located for se-
curing railroad connection with the West.
Until the vast possibilities of the railroad for changing the es-
tablished course of trade were realized, the citizens of New
Orleans never doubted that their city was destined to become the
metropolis of America, situated as she was at the mouth of a
river which drains half a continent, and strategically located with
reference to the West Indies, Mexico, South America, and the
Pacific.1* Not until after about 1850 did the people of New Or-
leans awaken to a realization that the greatness of the city could
not be insured merely by permitting time and nature to take their
courses, but that they must resort to the methods less favored
cities employed. Then the city government was reformed; radiat-
ing railroads were projected, and their construction was pushed
vigorously. One, the New Orleans, Jackson, and Great Northern
aimed at the Ohio; the other, the Opelousas and Western, pointed
toward the west and was intended to be the first span of a road to
the Pacific. Great interest was taken in projects to establish com-
munication with the Pacific by way of the Isthmus of Tehuan-
tepec. The rivals of New Orleans were not neighboring cities on
13
Cf. Cordoza, J. N., Reminiscences of Charleston, 1 866; Trenholm, W. L.,
The Centennial Address before the Charleston Chamber of Commerce, llth
Feb., 1884.
"Cf. Cable, Geo. W., History and Present Condition of New Orleans, Tenth
Census, XIX, Pt. II, 213-95.
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the Gulf, although citizens of Mobile regarded her as one, but
cities of the Atlantic seaboard which were being connected with
the Mississippi valley by railroads and inland waterways.
Mobile was the only other Gulf port of any consequence; her
ambitions far exceeded her legitimate expectations. John Forsyth
told of the aspirations and the sad deficiencies of Mobile in the
same breath: "Mobile is but a chrysalis of commerce .... She
stands trembling at the portals of a grand destiny which she has
not the courage to enter, and paralyzed by the coward fear that
the splendid columns and gilded domes, the sapphire pavements
and rubied windows of the temple of commercial grandeur, are
not for her enjoyment and realization." 15 This, of a town of about
25,000 inhabitants.
It was, then, from chambers of commerce, boards of trade,
merchants, editors, and public spirited citizens and officials of
Southern seaports that projects for establishing direct trade re-
ceived much, if not most, of their support. But the achievement
of commercial independence was represented not merely as a
measure which would promote the prosperity of individual sea-
ports, but also as one which would greatly benefit the South as a
whole; the interest in it was not confined to the seaports but was
general throughout the South.
The more general reasons why the loyal and progressive South-
erners were very desirous of promoting the material development
of the section have been given in connection with the account of
the movement to bring the spindles to the cotton.16 It was galling
to their pride that their section should be languishing and depen-
dent. They wanted a denser population, cities, towns, railroads,
development of natural resources, and the social benefits which
they believed would follow material development. They wished
to prove by the actual accomplishment that, contrary to the con-
tentions of its Northern and British antagonists, cities, commerce,
manufactures, and the "arts of living" could flourish in a slave
society. And, more important, they felt that the security of slav-
ery could no longer be safely entrusted to constitutional guaran-
tees and adroit political combinations, but that these must be sup-
ported by the power of wealth, numbers, and economic independ-
"Lecture on "The North and the South," DfBow's Review, XVII, 377.
"See ch. II.
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ence. If, as was possible, the Union should be dissolved, these
things would be essential to national existence.
Now direct trade and the retention at home of the "tribute" the
South paid New York were expected to supply the capital which
would build cities, give a stimulus to manufactures, mining, and
agriculture, make possible stronger financial institutions, help
finance railroads and other internal improvements, and, by conse-
quence, invite immigration and, thus, redress the political pre-
ponderance of the non-slaveholding states. According to the re-
port of the Committee of Ways and Means of the Alabama Legis-
lature, "As the proper adjustment of our foreign and domestic
trade, on the principle of economy laid down, involves the value of
city, town, and county property, agricultural and manufacturing
prosperity, the profits on bank, railroad, and canal stocks, as well
as population and political power, it becomes one of the highest
considerations to all classes."17
Furthermore, there were several evils in the Southern economic
and social system for which it was believed the establishment of
direct trade with Europe would be a specific remedy. One of
these was the absence of a permanent mercantile class whose in-
terests were identified with those of the South at large both
financially and politically. The merchants of most Southern
towns, interior as well as seaport, were largely Northern men or
foreigners who looked upon their abode in the South as tempor-
ary. James Stirling said two-thirds or three-fourths of the com-
mercial business was carried on by Northern men or foreigners.18
Most of the cotton buyers and commission merchants were non-
residents; the South was literally overrun by agents and collectors
of Northern mercantile houses. "The merchants of the South, like
the nobility of Ireland," wrote Lieutenant Maury, "are, for the
most part, non-residents. At the season when the Southern staples
are coming to market, these flock there from all quarters. When
the crop is disposed of, they return whence they came, with their
gains in their pockets, and, thus, a continued drain is kept upon
that country."
19
No city suffered more in this respect than New Orleans. The
wealthy Creoles owned the real estate and lived upon its rental.
"DfBotv's Review, XIV, 441.
"Letters from the Slave States, 320.
"So. Lit. Mess., XI, 588.
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They were extremely conservative, desired to keep down taxes,
and opposed new enterprises. The men who directed commerce
were strangers, who had no permanent stake in the city but pre-
ferred temporary gains to the future growth of the port. Their
earnings were expended or invested chiefly in the North.
20 The
busy season of New Orleans extended from October or November
to the following spring. During this period thousands of laborers,
attracted by high wages, flocked to the city from the Northern
states to return thence when the busy season closed. An English
observer estimated that of the population from November to May
fully a fourth part was migratory.
21
Practically the whole business of Mobile, Alabama commerce,
banking, the few manufactures was in the hands of Northern
men. Savannah, Georgia, had a large Northern and foreign ele-
ment; Augusta was known as a Yankee town the Yankee ele-
ment was not transient in this case. Charleston suffered less from
transients and temporary residents than any other Southern city
or town. Virginia towns, in general, had a more permanent and
more Southern population than those of the cotton states.
The want, in so many Southern towns of a permanent mercan-
tile class thoroughly identified with the interests of the section de-
prived the South of a class which, in every community, has much
to do with the undertaking of new enterprises. It was largely re-
sponsible, too, for the small part cities played in determining state
legislative policies. Then, thorough Southerners desired to be rid
of the swarms of Northern agents, temporary residents, and mi-
gratory population, because they were felt to be unfriendly to
slavery. Their presence, it was felt, would divide and distract
Southern counsels. Their influence upon native non-siaveholding
whites was feared.
Another feature of the economic system of the South which was
greatly deplored, and which it was believed direct trade with
Europe would go far toward remedying, was financial dependence
upon the East, particularly New York City. This was coming to
be considered a great evil at the time of the early direct trade
xDeBow's Review, XI, 77 ff., quoting a speech of James Robb in a Louis-
iana railroad convention, 1851.
ajames Robertson, A Few Months in America, 66. Cf. Robert Russell,
North America, 253. During the last decade before the war, however, conditions
in New Orleans were considerably improved in this respect.
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conventions; it was a matter of greater concern in the 18505. The
immense commerce of New York was believed responsible for the
centralization there of so much of the financial power and oper-
ations of the country. If direct trade could be established, the
importers' profits saved, and commercial centers built up, the
banking institutions of the South would be strengthened, and thus
enabled to meet the financial requirements of the section.
22
The Southern people were largely dependent upon New York
City for the financing of the marketing of their crops. Every fall
when Southern staples began to move, planters and shippers made
great demands for cash and credit. Southern banks made such
loans as their facilities would permit, and in the case of New Or-
leans and Charleston they were by no means small; but the chief
burden fell upon New York.
To make this clear it is necessary to review briefly the manner
in which Southern crops, particularly cotton, were marketed. Vir-
ginia products (chiefly tobacco and grain) consumed outside the
state were sold mostly in New York, even when destined to be
exported to Europe. Of direct exports a large portion was bought
and shipped by New York men.23 Part of the cotton was sold
in the ports to speculators and others, many of whom were New
Yorkers. The remainder, and perhaps the larger part, was sold
in the North or in England through factors and commission mer-
chants representing New York or Liverpool houses. The planters
or merchants received advances upon, or payment for, their cot-
ton chiefly in the form of sixty-day sterling bills or four-months
New York drafts. These bills and drafts were discounted by
Southern banks and forwarded to New York, where they went to
pay the debts of Southern merchants and others or to secure cash
with which to purchase the other bills which came flooding in as
the staples went forward. Sterling bills were bought in New York,
of course, because there came the larger proportion of the imports
and there normally was the demand for bills. Exchange was fre-
"DeBow's Review, XIV, 441; remarks of Mr. Wheeler in the Virginia House
of Delegates, Richmond Enquirer, Dec. 10, 1852; D. M. Barringer, of N. C., in
the Old Point direct trade convention, ibid., Aug. 3; H. C. Cabell, of Virginia,
Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLII, 323.
23i
'Letter of a Southern man to Governor Wise of Virginia," Richmond En-
quirer, Jan. 9, 1856; editorial, ibid., Dec. 17, 1852.
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quently in favor of the South (especially was this true in the case
of New Orleans), and at such times great sums of specie flowed
South to find their way back to the North during the dull seasons
of the year.
24
It is evident that the moving of the cotton crop and, in a large
measure, the price the planter received, depended upon the ability
and willingness of New York to buy New York drafts and sterling
bills. This was strikingly proven at the time of the financial crisis
of 1857. The effect of the crash can best be studied at New Or-
leans, the greatest cotton exporting port in America. The crop of
1857 was short, and the price was expected to be high. Factors,
finding money easy, "put out their acceptances" with a liberal
hand, expecting the crop coming in to meet all engagements. Cot-
ton went on the market at 16^/2 cents, with sterling selling at
ioo,}4 to 109^. On September 25 word came from New York
that exchange was almost unsaleable. Money became tighter and
tighter; sterling fell to 92^2-97; and presently banks refused to
take it at any price. Cotton buyers withdrew from the market. A
large portion of the cotton crop sold for several cents less than
the promised price.25
The crash brought the evils of financial dependence home to
the South as they had never been brought before. Southern journ-
als and writers pointed out that the South had not been respon-
sible for the panic. There had been no speculation in the South,
they said. True, she had embarked largely upon railroad build-
ing, but because of the scarcity of capital the building had been
sanely and economically done. The South was in a position to
enter upon a flood-tide of prosperity, "And yet and yet almost
in the twinkling of an eye, with the suddenness of an earthquake,
and unexpectedly as a stroke of lightning from a cloudless sky,
cotton was struck down, and became almost unsalable in the
"Kettell, Southern Wealth and Northern Profits, ch. VII; Hunt's Merchants'
Magazine, XXIX, 60; XLII, 318; report of a committee of the Cotton Planters'
Convention, Macon, 1858, in DeBow's Review, XXV, 713 f.; Stone, A. H., "The
Cotton Factorage System of the Southern States," Amer. Hist. Rev., XX, 557-65.
"New Orleans Daily Picayune, June I, 1858; Hunt's Merchants' Magazine,
XLII, 315, from "Banking at the South with Reference to New York City," by
H. C. Cabell, of Virginia.
^Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLII, 315.
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Southern market."26 The South lost millions of dollars ($35,000,-
ooo, said Senator J. H. Hammond in his "Mud Sill" speech) 27
upon the crop of the year 1857-1858.
The New Orleans Picayune pointed out the anomaly of the
greatest exporting port in America being "stranded because of a
money panic in Wall Street" cotton selling at 10 cents a pound
while it was 1 8 or 19 in London.
28 The moral was drawn that,
had the South direct trade, there would have been a demand at
home for sterling bills, and cotton could have gone forward with-
out waiting for the recovery of New York. The Picayune dared
hope that the disturbance caused by the panic might result in di-
rect trade for the South: "The power on which we have been de-
pendent so long has at length given way, and almost without
knowing it, we have come or are about to come, actually to realize
in practice what has hitherto been considered by many an idle
dream direct trade with Europe. And should this step ....
result in our permanent emancipation from a system whose ad-
vantages are far outnumbered by their disadvantages a system
which wrings from us annually, without any return except the loss
of influence and of power, millions of hard earned dollars we
should think the financial crisis, with all its manifold evils, cheap
to us."29
The immense loss occasioned the South by the crash of Septem-
ber, 1857, was but a striking example of the evils of the centraliza-
tion of commerce and finance in New York. The cotton states, as
did the West for that matter, experienced to a less degree the evils
of centralization every fall when the crops were moved. During
the idle months funds found their way to New York, there to be
used in business or speculation. When the crops of the South and
West began to move, there was a tightness in the money market,
which operated to depress prices.
30 And this did not signify, as
some planters asserted, that New York financial interests were
"Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., I Sess., 961.
""Quoted in DeBow's Review, XXIII, 656 f.
^This is a very moderate statement. For a less temperate one see Ibid.,
XXIII, 657-9, quoting the Vicksburg True Southron.
"Kettell, Southern Wealth and Northern Profits, 93, 94.
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interested in forcing down the price of cotton.31 It was far pre-
ferable to be dependent upon the money power of New York than
upon the money power of London; for normally New York was
interested in keeping the prices up. Since the Southern staple
constituted the chief export of the country, and there was a quite
steady demand for it in the world's markets, it became the basis
for securing credit in Europe. The cotton crop was at once an in-
dex to Northern manufacturers and merchants of the South's abil-
ity to buy in the home markets and of the nation's ability to pur-
chase abroad. The solicitude with which the business interests of
New York, especially in time of depression, looked forward to the
moving of cotton and speculated as to the crop and the price it
would bring, abundantly testifies to the role cotton played in keep-
ing the wheels of credit in motion. At the time of the crisis of
1857, New York financial circles considered it essential to revival
that cotton continue to move, whatever the price, and hoped the
planters would be willing to let it go forward at the low prices
shippers could afford to offer.
32
The cotton planters were not the only ones who suffered from
the financial dependence of the South upon the North. All who
sought to embark in business, to start manufactures, to develop
the mineral resources of the country, found themselves handi-
capped by their inability to secure proper financial support at
home. Most of the railroad bonds, for example, had to be sold
either in New York or other Northern cities or abroad. No won-
MMr. Wheeler of Portsmouth said in the Virginia House of Delegates, Dec.
2, 1852: ". . . the price, the worth, the market value of all we and the people we
represent own of every kind of property, is dependent upon the speculative
pleasure of the Merchants, the Bankers, and Brokers of New York. And why?
Because Wall Street can depress the money market when it pleases." Richmond
Enquirer, Dec. 7, 1852. See also A. Dudley Mann, DeBow's Review, XXIV, 373.
^Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXXVII, 583. Some of the cotton had not
been advanced upon, and the planters were able to hold it; but much of the
cotton did go forward. The importance of its movement to Northern business
was not overlooked in the South. "What saved you?" asked Senator Hammond.
"Fortunately for you it was the commencement of the cotton season, and we
have poured in upon you one million six hundred thousand bales of cotton just
at the crisis to save you from sinking. That cotton, but for the bursting of your
speculative bubbles in the North . . . would have brought us $100,000,000.
We have sold it for $65,000,000, and saved you." Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., I
Sess., 961.
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der the people of the Southern states, at a time when there was
almost a mania for railroad building, when they were becoming
aware of the existence of considerable mineral resources and the
possession of great advantages for certain lines of manufactures,
should chafe at, and try to be free from, the necessity of waiting
for the favor of distant money markets before entering upon a
career of expansion. Said a correspondent of the Charleston
Courier, 1854: "At present our principal sources for obtaining
funds are through the capitalists of the North and Europe. So
long as we are thus dependent, so long may we expect to be used
for their benefit, and be made subservient to their interests. When
they cannot find better investment they will advance to us freely,
and leave us when they can find others more profitable." 33
A good illustration of the way in which attempts to inaugurate
new enterprises in the South were handicapped by the financial
deficiencies of the section is found in the efforts which were made
to establish direct trade with Europe; for commercial vassalage
was effect as well as cause of financial vassalage. Just as they
had done in the thirties, retail merchants in the South bought of
Northern jobbers on long credit often twelve months. To com-
pete with the Northern jobbers, Southern importers and jobbers
would also have to extend the long credits. But while the North-
ern jobbers could procure funds upon their long time paper, the
Southern importers found it difficult or impossible to discount long
time paper in Southern banks.
The reference to long credits raises the question whether after
all, had it not been for this pernicious system, the credit facilities
of the South might not have been sufficient to permit the launch-
ing of many more new enterprises than were actually launched.
The New Orleans Commercial Bulletin enumerated the greater
facilities of the merchants of Northern cities for the extension of
long credits as one of the reasons why New Orleans had lost much
trade in the South and West: "The twelve months credit system
did the business, and attracted an immense amount of Western and
Southwestern trade to those cities, which would have otherwise
sought this port."
34 In the opinion of the Mobile Tribune the
South was bound to the North by long credits: destroy that sys-
"April 7, 1854.
"Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXXIII, 263.
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tern and there might be some chance for direct trade.35 In fact,
just as in the period of the early direct trade conventions, the long
credits system was frequently denounced and deplored, and the
people were frequently urged to free themselves from it. Yet, it
must be said, the people of the Southern states took long credits
too much as a matter of course, and did not adequately realize
their viciousness. There was almost no other factor that operated
so effectively to retard the accumulation of capital in the South.
The Southern people paid for these long advances and paid
dearly. They paid in interest. They paid in increased prices of
articles consumed; for, because of the precarious nature of much
of the Southern trade, risks were great, and Northern merchants
insured themselves well against such risks. They paid, often, in
the sacrifice in the prices of their staples incurred because of forced
sales necessary to procure money to meet their obligations at ma-
turity. J. L. Crocheran, of Alabama, said the South put herself
at the mercy of speculators by forcing one-third of her cotton
into the market in two months in order to pay advances received
during twelve.
36
The financial dependence of the Southern states was not credit-
ed only to the absence of foreign commerce, cities, accumulated
capital, and varied industries; there was considerable dissatis-
faction with the banking system. It was thought by some that
the banking laws were too conservative in several of the states.
The policies of the banks were criticized on the score that they
contributed to the centralization at New York.37 Representatives of
the mercantile interests complained that banks were partial to the
agricultural interests. It would take us too far from the subject
of this chapter to enter into a discussion of the bank laws and
banking operations in the several states. It would seem that in
^Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXXIII, 264. The dissatisfaction with the
long credits system was not entirely confined to the South. Some New York
men felt that the Southern trade was hardly worth the risks involved. Ibid.,
XXXIV, 522, article, "Some Suggestions on Southern Trade."
"DeBotv's Review, XXV, 40.
'7
Cabell, H. C., "Banking in the South with Reference to New York City,"
Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLII, 311-323; letters of "A Southern Man" to
Gov. Wise of Virginia, Richmond Enquirer, Jan. 9, u, Feb. II, 1856; Gregg,
William, DeBow's Review, XXIX, 495; Kettell, Southern Wealth and Northern
Profits, ch. VII; Fitzhugh, Sociology for the South, chs. IX, X.
.
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three states, Louisiana, South Carolina, and Georgia, banking
facilities were as adequate as the volume of business done would
justify; there, too, the bankers pursued enlightened policies.
38
There was undoubtedly great improvement in banking conditions
during the fifties.
There were difficulties to be overcome before direct importa-
tions could be established other than deficiency of capital and
credit, the long credit system, or the absence of a thoroughly
Southern mercantile class. One lay in the comparatively small
amounts of foreign goods consumed in the South. There is no
way of calculating accurately the value of the foreign imports
consumed in territory naturally tributary to Southern seaports;
but the probabilities are that it did not so greatly exceed the
direct importations as Southerners generally supposed. Some
Southern writers made the palpably untenable assumption that
the Southern population consumed foreign goods equal in value to
their exports to foreign countries, that is about two-thirds or
three-fourths of the nation's exports, or imports.
39 More reason-
able was the assumption that the per capita consumption of im-
ported goods in the South was equal to that of the North;
40 but
even that would seem to have been too liberal. A much higher
percentage of the Northern population was urban; and the per
capita consumption of articles of commerce by an urban popula-
tion is greater than the per capita consumption by a rural popula-
tion. Southern writers made much of the number of rich families
in the South who bought articles of luxury imported from abroad;
but there is no doubt that the number of families who lived in
luxury was exaggerated. That the slaves consumed comparative-
ly small quantities of foreign goods requires no demonstration.
Their clothing and rough shoes were manufactured either in the
North or at home. Their chief articles of food (corn and bacon)
were produced at home or in the West. The large poor white
element in the population consumed few articles of commerce,
M
Cordoza, J. N., Reminiscences of Charleston, 44 ff.; Trenholm, W. L., The
Centennial Address before the Charleston Chamber of Commerce, 31 ff.; Gregg,
William, Speech ... on a Bill to Amend an Act entitled 'An Act to authorize
aid to the Blue Ridge Railroad Company' .... Dec. 8, 1856, p. 29.
"For example, M. R. H. Garnett, The Union, Past and Present, How It
Works and How to Save It. Cf. DeBow's Review, XVIII, 294 ff.
"Richmond Enquirer, April 23, 1852, letter signed "Self Dependence."
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either domestic or foreign. The same is true of the rather large
mountaineer element, because, if for no other reason, they lived
beyond the routes of trade. Olmsted had these classes in mind
when he wrote: "I have never seen reason to believe that with
absolute free trade the cotton States would take a tenth part of
the value of our present importations."
41 One of the fairest of the
many English travelers wrote: "But the truth is, there are few
imports required, for every Southern town tells the same tale."*
2
That portion of the proceeds of Southern exports to foreign
countries which was not expended for foreign imports was ex-
pended for the products of the North and West. The sales from
the South into other sections of the Union were sufficient to pay
for only a fraction of the commodities purchased there for South-
ern consumption. The value of the cotton exported was greater by
far than the value of all other Southern exports combined; yet in
a normal year less than one-fourth of the cotton went to the
North.43 The exports to the North and West of sugar and mo-
lasses, tobacco, rice, grain and flour, timber, turpentine, and naval
stores were considerably larger in proportion to the exports of the
same commodities to foreign markets; but hardly large enough in
the aggregate to pay for the imports from those sections.
44
J. H.
Hammond estimated that in 1857 the South sold products abroad
to the value of $185,000,000, and to the North and West to the
value of $35,ooo,ooo.45 The latter sum is undoubtedly too small;
but a liberal estimate could not place the value of the exports to
"Cotton Kingdom, I, 27.
^Robert Russell, North America, 290.
**Donnell, History of Cotton, passim. In the year 1854, for example, 737,000
bales of cotton were shipped North as against 2,528,000 exported to Europe.
"According to the estimate of the New Orleans Price Current, in the year
1858-1859 four-fifths of the sugar and three-fourths of the molasses exported coast-
wise from New Orleans went to Baltimore and points north. DeBow's Review,
XXVII, 477. Sugar and molasses were also sent up the Mississippi in large
quantities. The exports of these commodities to foreign countries were not large.
Of the tobacco exported from New Orleans about three-fourths went to foreign
countries. Ibid., X, 448. No other Southern products were exported from
New Orleans in large quantities.
"Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., i Sess., 961. The value of the cotton alone shipped
North in 1857-1858 was about $32,000,000. Hammond, Cotton Industry, table op-
posite p. 358. Because of the panic of 1857, the consumption of cotton was
less than normal.
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the North and West at much more than 50 per cent of the value of
the exports to foreign countries. On the other hand, there was
almost universal testimony that Southern purchases of Northern
and Western commodities greatly exceeded in value the direct and
indirect imports from abroad. Most of the big items of Southern
consumption were furnished almost entirely by the North or
West. Practically all of the boots and shoes came from Massa-
chusetts; coarse cottons came from New England; the agricultur-
al implements not manufactured at home came from the North
and West, as did harness and saddles, carriages and coaches,
wagons, locomotives, and railroad cars, engines, furniture, and
numerous other articles. Great quantities of bacon, pork, lard,
and corn were shipped from the Northwest down the Mississippi
to be consumed in the cotton states. The cotton states also
bought large numbers of mules, horses, and cattle in Kentucky
and Missouri, states which in the fifties received practically none
of their imports, Northern or foreign, by way of Southern
ports.
40 In 1839 a committee of the Charleston Direct Trade
Convention had found that one-third of the goods consumed in
the South were of Northern production;
47 fifteen or twenty years
later no one estimated the value of the foreign goods at more than
one-half that of the goods of Northern and Western production.
Daniel Lord, a Northern writer, said the South imported from the
North ten dollars in domestic productions for every one imported
directly or indirectly from Europe.
48
The ability of the Southern people to purchase their proportion-
ate share of the nation's imports was further diminished, of course,
by the payment of those freights, profits, interests, commissions,
charges, and expenses which went to Northern men, and which
the advocates of a direct course of trade were so anxious to save.
Thus the very commercial dependence under which the South
^St. Louis was the distributing center for Missouri and parts of Kentucky
and Tennessee. Cincinnati and Louisville were distributing centers for Kentucky
and parts of Tennessee. In the fifties these cities received practically all of their
foreign and Northern goods from the East by interior routes. Western Virginia
traded with Cincinnati and Baltimore. Baltimore was rarely classified as a
Southern city by men from farther south.
"DeBow's Review, IV, 495.
"Lord, Daniel, The Effect of Secession upon the North and the South
(pamphlet, 1860), p. 15.
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chafed was one of the causes for the want of demand which made
the establishment of a more rational system difficult. There was
logic in the contention of the advocates of direct trade that, could
it once be inaugurated, the saving effected would increase the
South's ability to buy, and the increased demand would in turn
help to firmly esablish the system.
The meagre demand for imported goods rendered it necessary
for Southern importers to keep assorted stocks and for long per-
iods. In the North, on the contrary, the demand was large
enough to permit importers to specialize, and sure enough to en-
able them to replenish their stocks at frequent intervals. The
commerce of a port like New York was so great that it offered a
certain market for any cargo and certain freights for any part of
the world.49 Frequently cargoes were solcl at auction in New York
and Philadelphia, sometimes at ruinous prices, against which the
importers of smaller cities could not compete. But whatever the
demand for imported goods in the South, the demand for North-
ern goods was much greater. A large number of vessels was en-
gaged in the coastwise trade. The same vessels which carried
Northern goods to the South also carried the indirect imports of
foreign goods. Often Southern merchants went to Baltimore, Phil-
adelphia, or New York to lay in their stocks of Northern goods,
and while there could buy merchandise of foreign origin as well.50
"Almost every country merchant who visits Charleston has a
through ticket for New York in his pocket," wrote William
Gregg."
The question may occur, Why did not Southern seaports thrive
as distributing centers for the coastwise commerce? The explan-
ation lies in part in the fact just alluded to: Many interior merch-
ants purchased of Northern rather than Southern jobbers. Gregg
attributed this to a preference of the people for goods from New
York and to the hostility of banks to the mercantile interests
shown by their refusal to extend the support necessary to enable
the Southern jobbers to extend the long credits which customers
demanded. Charleston jobbers could sell cheaper than New York
jobbers, he said, and there was no adequate reason why Charles-
*Cf. Richmond Whig, Mar. n, 1851, editorial.
"DeBow's Review, XXIX, 500, 556.
"Ibid., XXIX, 776.
Ill] PLANS FOR ESTABLISHING DIRECT TRADE WITH EUROPE III
ton should not become a distributing center even without direct
trade.52 Whether the banks did not support the mercantile inter-
ests because they would not or because they could not, it is evi-
dent that the Southern jobber and the importer suffered alike in
this respect. Another writer said the country merchant bought
from the Northern jobber because he knew that the Southern
jobber bought his stocks in New York, and he did not wish to pay
two sets of jobbers' profits.53 But there was a deeper reason why
the seaports did not grow and prosper as distributing centers : the
quantity of goods to be distributed was too small. The commerce
of the Southern states was practically limited to transporting a
few staples from the interior to the coast and exporting them, and
to receiving foreign and Northern goods at the seaports and trans-
porting them into the interior. There was little internal com-
merce. There was no home market for Southern products. When
the first railroads were put in operation, there was general dis-
appointment at the lightness of the traffic upon them. There
was little to carry but cotton, which is not a bulky article. It is
noteworthy that before the Civil War there was hardly an inter-
ior town in the South worthy of mention as a distributing cen-
ter. In general, Southerners attached too much importance to ex-
porting and importing as factors in the growth of cities. They
overestimated the part foreign commerce was playing in the
progress of Northern cities, not excepting New York, and under-
estimated the roles of domestic commerce and manufactures, in-
cluding shipbuilding.
54
Today, of the eleven cities in the South
having over 100,000 inhabitants each, only three are seaports, and
the total population of these three is but 35 per cent of the total
population of the entire number.
Mercantile business in the South labored under serious disad-
vantages also from the great variations, from year to year, in the
**DeBow's Review, loc. cit.
"Ibid., XII, 300.
B4There were exceptions; see, for example, a speech of James Robb, of New
Orleans, in a railroad convention, 1851. "No city ever grew great by commerce
alone. Go back as far as they might, select the most favorably located cities in
the world, and they would find their prosperity was transient, evanescent, com-
pared with that of towns situated in the interior, where industry and labor were
cultivated and flourished " DeBow's Review, XI, 78. See also Hunt's Mer-
chants' Magazine, XXXIV, 137, quoting the New Orleans Commercial Bulletin;
DeBow's Review, XXIX, 630, William Gregg.
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ability of the planters to buy, resulting, in turn, from the wide
fluctuations in the cotton crop and cotton prices. 55 In the seaports
it was rendered precarious by the frequent visitations of yellow
fever. 56 The unhealthiness of the ports was partly responsible for
absenteeism and the general stagnation of business during the
summer months, when many merchants went North or to the in-
terior. Another reason for cessation of business activity in the
summer was the fact that the cotton went to market in the fall
and winter. This idleness during a large part of the year, to-
gether with the lack of variety and stability in the export trade,
goes far to explain why the South did not support a larger mer-
chant marine. During the cotton season ships from all quarters
were impressed into service, and at its close returned to other em-
ployment.
57
The bars in Southern harbors with the notable exception of
Norfolk were shallow; and the fast clipper ships, which carried
so much of the world's commerce, could not enter. Large vessels
were anchored some thirty miles below Mobile, and were loaded
and unloaded by means of lighters.58 A special type of vessel
was constructed to carry cotton from New Orleans.59 New Or-
leans citizens were most persistent in appealing to Congress for
appropriations for improving the navigation of the Mississippi;
but the sums granted were not a tithe of the amount necessary.
Elsewhere in the South, the constitutional scruples of congressmen
prevented them from demanding the inclusion in rivers and har-
MNew Orleans Daily Picayune, Jan. 14, 1858.
"Norfolk was scourged by yellow fever in 1853. Two out of three of the
whites died. Burton, H. W., The History of Norfolk (1877), p. 23. Enterprise
in Norfolk received a blow from which it took several years to recover. Third
Annual Report of the Merchants' and Mechanics' Exchange of Norfolk, Virginia,
Jan., 1860. The same year the plague raged in other Southern towns. In New
Orleans it was long remembered as the year of the great plague. There 8215
people died between May 21 and October 31. A vivid description is in DeBow's
Review, XV, 595-635.
"Kennedy, Joseph P., The Border States, Their Power and Duty, etc.
(1860), p. 25.
"Olmsted, Cotton Kingdom, I, 283; Hamilton, Peter J., Mobile under Five
Flags, 270.
89
DeBow, Industrial Resources, III, 16
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bors bills of items for the improvement of Southern harbors.60 The
bill of 1852 appropriated $50,000 for the improvement of Charles-
ton harbor. The appropriation was accepted, but proved entirely
inadequate.
61 President Pierce vetoed the first general rivers and
harbors bill presented to him, 1854, and after that no others were
passed before the Civil War, largely because of the constitutional
objections raised by Southern Democrats. In 1854 a convention at
Wilmington, North Carolina, said to be the largest convention
which had been assembled in the state, memorialized Congress in
favor of an appropriation for improving the bar at Wilmington.
The appropriation was secured by the North Carolina delegation
in Congress, William S. Ashe, a staunch Democrat, having charge
of the bill in the House.62 In 1857 the City of Charleston under-
took to dredge out the channel in the harbor at her own expense,
but the enterprise was soon abandoned.
63 A year later Senator
Hammond wrote: "Time, I think, will show that vessels of 1000
tons are as profitable as larger ones, to carry our trade, and these
can enter our ports."
6*
The discussion of direct trade included consideration of ways
and means to promote it. There were innumerable eloquent ap-
peals to the Southern states and to Southern cities to "shake off
their lethargy," to "rouse themselves from their slumbers," and to
emulate the example of their Northern "sisters." Individuals were
advised to devote their time and their capital to an enterprise so
well calculated to promote the prosperity of their section. Com-
mercial education was declared desirable, and a few professorships
of commerce were established. Retail merchants and the people in
general were urged to patronize those merchants of Southern sea-
ports who imported goods of foreign production directly from
'"Senator Benjamin, of Louisiana, stated, 1854, that Virginia had not ac-
cepted a dollar of the money voted to her for this purpose during the twenty
years preceding. Senator Mason, of Virginia, confirmed the statement. Cong.,
Globe, 33 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 1201.
"Report of the Commissioners Appointed at the Last Session of the General
Assembly to Inquire into the Feasibility of Improving the Channels of the Bar
and Other Approaches of Charleston Harbor. Nov. 20, 1852, p. 5.
"Cong. Globe, 33 Cong., I Sess., 1654, ff. Ashe said the last Legislature had
unanimously instructed the North Carolina representatives in Congress to work
for the appropriation.
''Charleston Mercury, July 12, 1859.
"Ibid., April 12, 1859.
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abroad in preference to those who bought such goods in the North.
A rather strong sentiment developed in favor of the imposition by
the state legislatures of discriminatory taxes upon goods of foreign
production imported into the respective states by way of Northern
ports.
65 As in the thirties, much was hoped from the construction
of railroads, particularly those which opened new territory or were
calculated to attract the trade of the Ohio valley to Southern
ports. More specific were the many projects for establishing
steamship lines between Southern and European or South Ameri-
can ports and the attempts to induce European interests to
establish steamship lines to the South.
Before 1839 only a few steamships had crossed the Atlantic. By
1850 the steamship was rapidly supplanting the sailing vessel in
carrying mails, passengers, and the lighter sorts of freight. Great
Britain had embarked upon a policy of encouraging the develop-
ment of a steam marine by granting liberal subsidies, and the
United States had followed suit by making liberal contracts with
steamship companies for carrying the mails to Europe and else-
where.66 The ports selected as terminii for steamship lines evi-
dently had great advantages in foreign commerce over those which
had to depend upon sailing vessels alone. There were, for example,
the advantages of greater regularity and saving of time; and as
the mails and passengers sought the steamlines,- it was natural
that the importing business should follow the same routes.
67 Need-
less to say New York captured the lion's share of the steamship
lines, and thereby increased her hold upon the nation's commerce.
These facts explain why so many of the plans formed in the South
for achieving commercial independence involved the establish-
ment of lines of regular steamers between Southern and foreign
ports.
In no state were more schemes for rehabilitation discussed than
in Virginia. For several years prior to 1850 internal improvements
had been an absorbing topic in that state. Among the improve-
ments projected or under construction none figured more prom-
inently than the Virginia and Tennessee railroad, which was to run
"The subjects of patronage of home importing merchants and discrimina-
tory taxation are discussed in ch. VI.
Cong. Globe, 31 Cong., I Sess., 1860; Bates, American Navigation: the
Political History of Its Rise and Ruin, 346.
"See Richmond Whig, March 11, 1851.
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from Lynchburg to the Tennessee line in the direction of Knox-
ville, and was designed to be a link in a chain of railroads from
the Chesapeake to Memphis and New Orleans. Another project
was the connection of the Chesapeake and the Ohio valley either
by canal, as some advocated, or by railroad. Besides increasing
the transportation facilities of the sections through which they
ran, these roads were expected to bring to Virginia ports, Rich-
mond, Petersburg, and Norfolk, trade from the Mississippi and
Ohio valleys, and together with foreign commerce, which they
would help to stimulate, restore to the Old Dominion the com-
mercial position she once possessed. The political crisis of 1850
served to call attention sharply to the dependent position of the
South, and lent a strong impetus to movements for commercial
independence. At this juncture the Portsmouth Pilot was led to
suggest a direct trade convention to meet at Old Point Comfort,
July 4, 1850.
The Old Point Comfort Convention, while not well attended,
enrolled among its delegates some very respectable men of Vir-
ginia and neighboring states.
68 The reasons which had brought the
delegates together were made very clear by the debates. Thomas
L. Preston described the advantages Virginia possessed for secur-
ing Western trade. Senator Morehead, of Kentucky, assured his
auditors that Kentucky was with the South in interests, feelings,
and associations, and preferred railroad communication with Vir-
ginia to connection with the North. Congressman Ewing, of
Tennessee, gave the warning that the safety of the South depended
upon preserving the equilibrium of the sections, which could be
done by developing commerce and manufactures in the South.
R. K. Meade, of Virginia, emphasized the profits derived by the
North from conducting Virginia's commerce, and the saving which
would be effected if the South would do her own business. The
resolutions adopted by the convention declared it to be the duty
of the Federal government to extend as much aid to a Southern
mail line to Europe as to Northern lines, recommended state
appropriations in aid of a line of steamers, and provided for a
committee to memorialize Congress and the Virginia Legislature.
In the closing days of the first session of the Thirty-first
Congress an unsuccessful attempt was made to secure favorable
"Proceedings are in the Richmond Enquirer, July 9, 12, 1850.
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action upon a bill providing for government aid for lines of steam-
ers from California to China and from Philadelphia to Antwerp.,
A. W. Thompson, a Philadelphia capitalist, was to be the con-'
tractor. Senator James M. Mason, of Virginia, moved an amend-
ment to the bill stipulating that the Atlantic line should alternate
trips between Norfolk and Philadelphia.^ The amendment was
accepted by the sponsors of the bill.
69 In the short session of the
same Congress (1850-1851) Congressmen Meade and Bocock, of
Virginia, tried to secure the passage of a similar bill based upon
Thompson's plan and the memorial of the Old Point Comfort Con-
vention; but it was defeated,
70
largely because of the opposition of
McLane, of Maryland, who was charged with fearing that aid to a
Norfolk line might compromise Baltimore's claims to government
subsidy for a line of her own,
71 and because of the opposition of
one or two Virginia representatives who could not overcome their
constitutional scruples against government subsidies. Meanwhile,
Thompson, taking advantage of the state of mind in Virginia, had
petitioned the General Assembly for aid in establishing the pro-
jected line between Norfolk and Antwerp.72 He stood ready to
advance two-fifths of the capital required, provided the state
would loan him the use of Virginia six per cent bonds for ten years
for the remaining three-fifths. Another proposal submitted to the
General Assembly about the same time was that a joint stock com-
pany be chartered, three-fifths of whose stock should be sub-
scribed by the state, and two-fifths by municipal and private cor-
porations and by individuals.73 A select committee of the House
of Delegates reported in favor of Thompson's proposition; but its
friends were unable to secure action before the Legislature ad-
journed, 1 85 1.74
In September, 1851, a well attended Mercantile Convention was
held in Richmond for the purpose of creating public interest in
direct trade and working out a plan in support of which all inter-
Cong. Globe, 31 Gong., i Sess., 2051.
'"'Ibid., 31 Cong., 2 Sess., -600, 613, 754, 768.
"Ibid., 31 Cong., .2 Ses's,,- 601, 613; Richmond Whig, Feb. 25, 1851. McMul-
lin, of Virginia, spoke flglainU' the bill. Cong. Globe, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., 758.
""Virginia Documents^i^o-i^i, doc. LXVI.
"Ibid., 1850-1851, doc'AxX'.
""Ibid., 1850-1851, doc. LXX; Richmond Whig, March 15, 1851.
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ests and factions in the state could unite.75 It proved impossible
to harmonize differences. The convention divided upon the ques-
tion whether a line of steamers should be recommended or it
should be left to future investigation to determine which was
preferable, steamers or sailing vessels. The latter alternative was
adopted. A resolution calling for Federal aid provoked a cleavage
along party lines, and had to be withdrawn. Resolutions offered
by D. H. London, Richmond importer and president of the
Central Southern Rights Association of Virginia, in favor of dis-
criminatory taxation of indirect imports were tabled by an almost
unanimous vote after an acrimonious debate. The net official act
of the convention was a blanket resolution in favor of lines of
steamers or sailing vessels to Europe and South America.
In May, 1852, the State Senate passed a bill based on A. W.
Thompson's plan;
76 but the House of Delegates allowed it to go
over to the next session, when, in spite of the support of Governor
Johnson, John Y. Mason, and an all but unanimous press, it was
defeated.77 The defeat was due to inability to agree upon the
mode and time of lending state aid, and to the rivalry of the little
bay ports. 78 It was the same spirit of jealousy which stood in the
way of the adoption of a practicable policy of internal improve-
ments. The net result of all the discussion and wire-pulling of
three years was practically nil as far as foreign commerce was con-
cerned; they did serve in a measure the secondary purpose of
securing tidewater support for state aid to railroads to the West.
Shortly after the Old Point Comfort Convention New York inter-
ests established a line of steamships between New York and the
Chesapeake; Virginians thought the action had been influenced
by the movements in that state looking to the establishment of
direct trade.73 In 1851 Richmond firms began shipping flour to
"Proceedings are in the Richmond Whig, Sept. n, 12, and 17, 1851. The
report from the Committee of 13, William Burwell, chairman, is in Virginia
Documents, 1851-1852, doc. I, p. 41 ff.; also in DeBow's Review, XII, 3041.
"Richmond Enquirer, Dec. 7, 1852.
"Governor Joseph Johnson's message of Dec. 5, 1853. Virginia Documents,
1853-1854, doc. I. Letter of J. Y. Mason to D. H. London, Sept. 18, 1852. So. Lit.
Mes., XVIII, 591 ff. Cf. Richmond Enquirer, Dec. 7, 1852. Mason had once
been secretary of the navy.
"Forrest, Wm. S., Sketches of Norfolk, 296; Richmond Enquirer, Apr. 30,
1852.
'"'Ibid., Dec. 10, 1852. Cf. DeBow's Review, XIV, 501.
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Rio de Janeiro and importing hides, coffee, and other South Ameri-
can products. This trade had attained some importance by i860.80
While these plans and projects were being debated in Virginia,
projects elsewhere had come to naught. The people of South
Carolina late in 1850 were considering secession. The time was
considered auspicious for inaugurating communication with
Europe by a line of steamers. A number of citizens of Charleston
secured from the State Legislature a charter for the South Carolina
and European Steamship Company to build two steamers to ply
between Charleston and Liverpool. Subscription books were
opened and the stock promptly taken. One of the steamers, the
South Carolina, was built at Green Port, Long Island and
proceeded to Charleston. After loading, it was found she could not
pass the bar. The vessel was sold, and the project abandoned.81
The only line of steamships between Charleston and a foreign
port before the war was the mail line to Havana, established in
1847 and owned by M. C. Mordecai, of Charleston. The mail
steamers between New York and Chagres touched regularly at
Charleston and Savannah. The Alabama Legislature, 1852, chart-
ered the Alabama Direct Trade and Exchange Company with
power to own ships, buy and sell produce and manufactures at
home and abroad, receive deposits, deal in domestic and foreign
exchange, and make advances on produce, manufactures, and
merchandise.82 No tangible results followed.
Considerable interest was manifested throughout the South,
1852-1854, in a proposal to establish a line of steamers between
some Southern port and the mouth of the Amazon river and in
the question of the free navigation of the Amazon. Peru and
Bolivia, upon the headwaters of the Amazon, declared the river
open to the commerce of the world, but Brazil refused to allow
foreign vessels to navigate it. Lieutenant M. F. Maury, Superin-
tendent of the Naval Observatory at Washington, became inter-
ested in the subject and memorialized Congress, May, 1852, to
establish a line of mail steamers between Norfolk, Charleston, or
Savannah and Para. He further suggested that diplomatic efforts
""DeBow's Review, XII, 32.
"A. Brisbane to Hammond, Feb. 25, 1851, /. H. Hammond Papers; DeBow's
Review, X, 203, 315; XVIII, 68; National Intelligencer, Oct. 18, 1851; Richmond
Enquirer, June 7, 1853.
"DeBow's Review, X, 445-47; XIII, 318; XIV, 437-49.
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be made to secure the free navigation of the Amazon.83 He
appealed to Secretary of State Webster to take the matter up, but
Webster refused to move.84 A series of long articles by Maury on
"Amazonia" was published in DeBow's Review and the leading
newspapers of the South.
85 Maury presented the subject in the
Southern Commercial Convention at Baltimore, December,
i852.
86 The subject was given consideration at the sessions of the
Commercial Convention in Memphis and Charleston, 1853 and
1854; both endorsed the project for a line of mail steamers.87
Maury represented that the Amazon valley would be settled and
developed and an immense commerce would grow up between the
region and the United States. The South was more advantageous-
ly located for such a commerce than was the North. Commerce
with South America would effect the commercial regeneration of
the South. It was this possibility which awakened so much inter-
est in the Amazon among Southerners.88 From time to time all
through the decade the opinion was expressed that the South
should "look to the south" rather than to Europe in her efforts to
develop a foreign commerce.
89 The line of mail steamers was not
established; but the Amazon was opened to the navigation of all
nations, largely as a result of Maury's efforts.
One of the most grandiose schemes for establishing direct trade
was that conceived by Col. A. Dudley Mann, of Virginia. He had
seen being built in England the Great Eastern, by far the largest
ship built to that time. In a letter to the people of the slaveholding
states, August, 1856, he proposed the establishment of a line of
four of these mammoth steamers to ply between the Chesapeake
and Milford Haven, England.90 So bold a plan captivated the
"Memorial, Western Journal and Civilian, VIII, 174-80.
"Maury to Blackford, Sept. 24, 1852, M. F. Maury Papers.
"Also in book form. DeBow's Review, XVI, 231. Articles are in ibid., XIV,
J 36-45, 449-6o, 556-67; XV, 36-43. See also ibid., XII, 381 ff.; XVI, 231-51.
**Western Journal and Civilian, IX, 321-28.
"DeBow's Review, XV, 254-74; XVI, 640; XVII, 201, 402-5.
M
Maury expected that the Southern states would soon have a redundant
slave population, and hoped the Amazon Valley would prove an outlet. Western
Journal and Civilian, IX, 328; DeBow, Industrial Resources, III, 13.
89For example, letter of Gov. H. A. Wise, of Virginia, to a citizen of Norfolk,
in Barton H. Wise, Henry A. Wise of Virginia, 216 f.; DeBow's Review, XXVI,
73-6.
"Ibid., XXI, 411-25.
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imaginations of the Southern people. The Southern Commercial
Convention at Savannah endorsed it.91 In July, 1857, an en-
thusiastic convention in its support was held at Old Point Comfort,
Virginia.
92 Ex-President Tyler presided; letters from Secretary of
State Cass and other members of the cabinet were read; books
were opened for subscriptions of stock. An appeal was made to
sectional feeling. With a view to secure a wide diffusion of the
stock among the people, subscribers were limited for a period
to one $100 share each. Most of the prominent men of Virginia
subscribed. President Buchanan headed the list in the District of
Columbia.93 The Virginia Legislature, almost without opposition,
granted a charter to "The Atlantic Steam Ferry Company,"
March, i858.
94 The thirty-six directors of the company must all
be residents of the slaveholding states or the District of Columbia,
and were to be apportioned on the basis of stock subscribed. But
by this time interest had begun to wane. The Commercial Con-
vention, meeting at Knoxville, August, 1857, had refused to
recommend the "steam ferry."95 Many pronounced it chimerical.
The project was not completely abandoned, however, until the
war.96
Several other direct trade projects were under way or under
consideration in Virginia on the eve of the war. A convention of
merchants and officials of fourteen railroads met at Bristol, Vir-
ginia, June, 1857, upon call of officers of the Virginia and Tennes-
see railroad, then on the point of completion, to consider the
subject of direct trade.97 William Ballard Preston, a former secre-
tary of the navy, was sent to Europe to disseminate information
in regard to the demand for foreign goods in Virginia and her
hinterland and to confer with capitalists, especially the owners of
the Great Eastern, upon the establishment of a steamship line.
French officials and capitalists were much interested in extending
mDeSotfs Review, XXII, 96. Mann was present and a member of the
general committee.
"Proceedings, ibid., XXIII, 321-24; XXIV, 352-74; Richmond Enquirer,
Aug. I, 3, 5, 1857.
3
Ibid., Aug. II, 17, 1857.
"Acts of the General Assembly, 1857-1858, p. 125; DeBow's Review, XXIV,
352, 375-
*5New York Herald, Aug. II, 17, 1857.
m
lbid., Mar. 19, 1861.
"Richmond Enquirer, June 8, 1857; DeBow's Review, XXII, 553; XXIII, 86.
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the foreign trade of the Empire at the time. Preston was able to
make a conditional agreement with officials of the Orleans Rail-
way Company relative to a line of steamers between Norfolk and
the mouth of the Loire.98 The Virginia Legislature ratified the
agreement by an act of March 27, 1858, incorporating the Norfolk
and St. Nazaire Navigation Company." One-half the stock was
to be subscribed in America, one-half in France; the directorate
also should be composed of an equal number of Americans and
Frenchmen. American interests were to subvent the company to
the extent of $12,500 per round trip this subsidy it was hoped
the Federal government would grant for carrying the mails and
the French government was to be asked to lend assistance. A
long correspondence between the president of the Merchants' and
Mechanics' Exchange of Norfolk and M. Lacoutre and other
gentlemen of France and the visit of an agent, John D. Myrick,
to France, resulted in the trial trip of the steamer Lone Star,
which was said to have been successful and to have proved the
feasibility of direct trade.
100 By an act of February 2, 1858, the
Virginia Legislature chartered the Southern Virginia Navigation
Company to establish a line of steamships or sailing packets be-
tween the Chesapeake and Europe.101 Before November, 1860, the
company had built one ship, engaged another, and had two or
three others under construction.102 On the very eve of secession
the Virginia Legislature incorporated a Richmond and Liverpool
Packet Company, and extended welcome to a proposal of M. Pierre
and Brothers, of Paris, to establish a line of steamers between
Virginia and France.
103
Elsewhere projects did not reach the stage of development they
did in Virginia. In 1857 W. C. Barney, of Washington, attempted
to promote a line of steamers between New Orleans and Bordeaux,
France. He memorialized Congress for the usual subsidy for carry-
ing the mails. The House Committee on the Post Office and Post
Roads reported favorably upon it. The Bordeaux Chamber of
**DeBow's Review, XXVI, 584-5.
"Acts of the General Assembly, 1857-1858, p. 127.
lv>Third Annual Report of the Merchants' and Mechanics' Exchange of Nor-
folk, Virginia, June, 1860, p. 13.
Acts of the General Assembly, 1857-1858, p. 187.
loaNew York Herald, Nov. 26, 1860.
103Acts of the General Assembly, 1861, p. 278, 342.
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Commerce promised cooperation and a loan. A prospectus was
got out and subscription books opened; but the project got no
farther.104 In 1860 British parties proposed to establish a line of
six iron steamers between New Orleans and Liverpool. The ves-
sels were to be built in England and fly the British flag, but one-
half the stock was to be subscribed by Americans. The project was
endorsed by the New Orleans Chamber of Commerce.105
Thus virtually all of these projects, and several not described,
for establishing lines of ocean steamers came to naught. Had the
Federal government not abandoned, 1859, the policy of subsidiz-
ing steamship lines, it is very probable that one or more Southern
lines would have been in operation before 1861. Trans-Atlantic
lines of steamships had not yet proved profitable without govern-
ment aid. The failure to secure steamship lines does not signify
that the direct foreign imports did not increase during the decade.
A few lines of sailing packets were established, and the number
of irregular vessels entered considerably increased, as did the total
value of the direct imports.
106 But there was no revolution in the
course of Southern commerce. In fact, the employment of steam
vessels in the coasting trade tended to fix Southern commerce in
its former channels. Several lines of steamships were engaged in
the coasting trade between New York and New Orleans and other
Southern ports in 1860. Such lines had been established in response
to the demands of actual commerce. The tendency of the times
was toward closer commercial relationships between the sections,
the efforts of the advocates of direct trade to the contrary not-
withstanding.
'DeBow's Review, XXII, 318-20; 410-14, 554; XXIII, 415-18.
"Ibid., XXVIII, 462-4.
*See the tables in the Appendix. I v t
CHAPTER V
THE SOUTHERN COMMERCIAL CONVENTION,
1852-1859
During the years 1852-1859 there met annually or oftener, in
turn at Baltimore, Memphis, Charleston, New Orleans, Richmond,
Savannah, Knoxville, Montgomery, and Vicksburg, sessions of the
so-called Southern Commercial Convention. After the first the
time and place of meeting and, to some extent, the organization
and program of each were determined by its predecessor; so there
was a degree of continuity in their endeavors. Several of the gath-
erings were very respectable in point of numbers; in most of them,
all or nearly all of the Southern States were represented; some able
and well-known men were among the delegates in every case; their
proceedings were watched in the South and even in the North with
considerable interest. As their name indicates, they were sectional
in character. The term "commercial" does not accurately indicate
their purpose, but cannot be considered a misnomer. A study of
this series of meetings is conducive to a better understanding of
the state of public opinion in the South during the decade before
the war upon questions affecting the material progress and pros-
perity of the section.
The origin of the Southern Commercial Convention is not to
be explained by any single event or isolated circumstance. A non-
political or semi-political convention was by no means a new thing
in the South in 1852. Although none of those assembled prior to
that time was quite of the type of the Southern Commercial Con-
vention, several may be considered forerunners of it. The direct
trade conventions of the late thirties may be so classed, although
they were more restricted in their objects, and not section-wide in
their representation.
1 Those held in Virginia were gatherings of
Virginians with a few scattering delegates from border North
Carolina counties.2 They were interested primarily in local prob-
lems, although there was recognition that the cause of Virginia was
in a way the cause of the South, and although the connection be-
tween them and the direct trade conventions of South Carolina
and Georgia was very close. The Charleston and Augusta conven-
'See ch. I.
'Savannah Republican, April 7, 1838.
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tions, likewise, were composed almost entirely of South Carolina
and Georgia men. Attempts to win the younger states farther
west to the cause failed of the accomplishment; they were urged
to send delegates to each of the conventions, but did not do so.
Among other reasons for this was the fact that the Southwest was
not yet concerned about "Southern decline."
More widely representative than the direct trade conventions,
but perhaps with less justification considered a forerunner of the
Southern Commercial Convention, was the Southwestern Conven-
tion in Memphis, November, i845-3 In composition and sentiment
it was more Western than Southern. Delegates were present from
Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Missouri, and Iowa Territory as well as
from states of the Southwest and South. The primary purpose of
the meeting was to present the demands of the West for the im-
provement by the Federal government of the navigation of West-
ern rivers demands which were very insistent for several years
prior to the building of railroads in the Mississippi valley. An
attempt was made to find constitutional justification for the im-
provement by the Federal government of the Mississippi and its
tributaries which would be acceptable to all parties in the West
and South. John C. Calhoun, who understood better than any
other Southern leader the growing power of the West and the
strength of the demand for improvement of Western rivers and
harbors, presided over the convention. He had not yet abandoned
hopes of attaining the presidency of the United States; he was
still firmly convinced of the desirability of maintaining the polit-
ical alliance of the South and West. In his address before the
convention and later in his report to the Senate upon the Memorial
of the convention, he went to such lengths in meeting the views of
the Western men that it was with difficulty he held his strict con-
structionist followers in line. 4 The convention dealt with other
'Proceedings are in Journal of the Proceedings of the Southwestern Conven-
tion, began and held at the city of Memphis on the 12th of November, 184-5. Cf.
DeBow's Review, I, 7-22; Niles' Register, LXIX, 212-14; Memphis Daily Eagle,
Nov. 18, 1845. There were present 529 delegates from 12 states and one territory.
*Calhoun's address to the convention is in the Journal of the Proceedings
of the Southwestern Convention, p. 7 ff. His report to the Senate on the Mem-
orial of the convention is in Works, V, 246-93. For Calhoun's motives, see Cal-
houn to James Edward Calhoun, July 2, 1846; to Thomas G. Clemson, July n,
1846; Duff Green to Calhoun, Sept. 24, 1845, Calhoun Correspondence. For re-
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subjects, it is true. It was employed to stimulate interest in rail-
road communication between the Mississippi valley and South
Atlantic ports; a system of railroads was outlined which would
effectually bind together the South and Southwest. 5 It endorsed
in a qualified manner the warehousing system, which some hoped
would promote the foreign commerce of Southern ports. It gave
some attention to the question of overproduction of cotton, and to
the diversification of agriculture and the introduction of manufac-
turing as remedies.
7 The sequel of the Memphis convention was
not so much the Southern Commercial Convention, however, as it
was the large Rivers and Harbors Convention held in Chicago in
July, 1847."
The alliance of the South and West had carried the Walker
Tariff bill of 1846; but the Rivers and Harbors bill of that year
had been carried by logrolling methods, the friends of Eastern
harbors, Lake harbors, and Western rivers pooling their interests.
President Polk vetoed the bill.9 He did not follow the constitu-
tional arguments employed by Calhoun in his report to the Senate
upon the Memorial of the Memphis convention, but employed
reasoning which Calhoun believed would preclude the possibility
of uniting the South and West in support of a reasonable program
of river improvement.
10 The Chicago convention, which was as
strongly dominated by the Whigs as the Memphis convention had
been by the Democrats and contained more Eastern men than the
Memphis convention had contained Southern, sought to make
capital of Folk's veto. There was an attempt to unite the West and
East upon broad Whig principles, much broader than Calhoun
could accept. It was more than intimated that the way to improve
rivers and harbors was to elect a president who would sign a bill
ception of Calhoun's address and report see Niles' Register, LXIX, 214, quoting
the Charleston Mercury; So. Quar. Rev., X, 377 ff., 441-512, 515; DeBow's Re-
view, I, 83 f.; Cong. Globe, 33 Cong., I Sess., 246; Calhoun to Mrs. Thomas G.
Clemson, June II, 1846, Calhoun Correspondence.
6
Journal, 29-40. See also Sioussat, St. G. L., "Memphis as a Gateway to the
West," Tenn. Hist. Mag., II. 77-114.
'Journal, 96-99; Memphis Daily Eagle, Dec. 17, 1845.
''Journal, 41-55.
'Proceedings in Niles' Register, LXXII, 309-10, 331-33, 344-46, 365-67.
"Messages and Papers of the Presidents, IV, 460-66.
"Calhoun to James Edward Calhoun, Aug. 8, 1846; to J. L. M. Curry,
Sept. 14; to Thomas G. Clemson, Sept. 20, Calhoun Correspondence.
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for that purpose.
11 The Memphis convention had been used to
stimulate interest in railroad communication between the Missis-
sippi valley and the South Atlantic seaboard; the Chicago conven-
tion was similarly used to promote various projects for railroads
between the East and the West.12
In October, 1849, a great Pacific Railroad Convention met in
Memphis.13 Its purpose was to crystallize sentiment in favor of a
railroad to the Pacific and give a demonstration of the strength of
the supporters of a Southern route, whose eastern terminus would
presumably be Memphis. Five days earlier a still bigger conven-
tion had been held in St. Louis, for the purpose of crystallizing
sentiment in favor of a railroad to the Pacific and canvassing the
support which a central route could command.14 Both of these
conventions professed to look upon the construction of the Pacific
railroad as a great national undertaking, which should receive
in some way the aid of the Federal government, and which would
redound to the benefit of the whole nation; but each was largely
sectional in composition and sentiment, and each saw the special
advantages, political and commercial, to accrue to the section and
locality fortunate enough to secure the eastern terminus of the
proposed railroad. Inasmuch as the Memphis convention was so
largely sectional and dealt with a project which occupied much of
the time of the later convention and whose accomplishment would
do much to promote the progress and prosperity of the South, it
may be considered a forerunner of the Southern Commercial Con-
vention.
"Calhoun to Duff Green, June 10, 1847, Calhoun Correspondence; Niles'
Register, LXXII, 266-67, 3*o; LXIII, 24, Daniel Webster's letter to the con-
vention; 219, Webster's speech at the opening of the Northern New Hampshire
Railway; American Review, VI, 111-22; DeBow's Review, IV, 122-27; 291-96.
"American Review, VI, III ff.; DeBow's Review, IV, 258.
"Minutes and Proceedings of the Memphis Convention, assembled October
23, 1849; DeBow's Review, VII, 36, 188, 550, 551. Cf. National Plan of an
Atlantic and Pacific Railroad and Remarks of Albert Pike, Made Thereon, at
Memphis, November, 1849; Cotterill, "Memphis Railroad Convention, 1849,"
Tenn. Hist. Mag., IV, 83-94.
^Proceedings of the National Railroad Convention, which assembled in the
City of St. Louis, on the fifteenth day of October, 1849. A third Pacific Rail-
road Convention was held in Philadelphia, April 1-3, 1850. Proceedings of the
Convention in Favor of a National Railroad to the Pacific Ocean Held in Phil-
adelphia, April 1, 2, and 3, 1850. Cf. Mo. Hist. Rev., 203-15.
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A local railroad convention which met in New Orleans in the
summer of 1851 appointed a committee to address the people of
the Southern and Western states in the interest of a general railroad
convention of the South and West to meet in New Orleans in
January, i852.
15 The address, while emphasizing the railroad
needs of the Mississippi valley and of New Orleans in particular,
did not overlook "Southern decline" and the necessity for united
action in the South to advance her commercial interests. "They
[the Southern states] have an interest in each other's prosperity,
founded upon common hopes, and fears, and dangers. . . . The
interests of Mobile, New Orleans, Charleston or Savannah in each
other's advancement are stronger than their interest in the ad-
vancement of Boston and New York. These interests should
preclude all jealousies and rivalries and induce a generous co-
operation in every instance where the benefit of the whole South
is at issue."16 The convention which met in pursuance of this
call,
17 while primarily interested in launching New Orleans and
Louisiana upon an internal improvement program, had many of
the earmarks of the later Commercial Convention. Delegates were
present from eleven states. Frequent references were made to
Southern commercial dependence and its remedy. A committee on
railroad routes, William Burwell, of Virginia, chairman, reported
a list of internal improvements which were regarded as not only
indispensable to the development of the agricultural, commercial,
and mineral wealth of the Southwestern states, but also as "essen-
tial to the equality and unity of the states of this confederacy."18
By this time conditions had reached a stage when a Southern
Commercial Convention could be assembled. The internal trans-
portation systems of the country were developing along lines
which pfbmised to bind the Northwest firmly to the East and the
Southwest to the old South. The Pacific railroad question had
taken on the form of a sectional struggle over the selection of
a route. The entire South had been interested in the discussion of
"DeBow's Review, XI, 74, 217, 340.
u
lbid., XI, 142-78 (quotation from p. 154); Address to the People of the
Southern and Western States, and more particularly to those of Louisiana, Texas,
Mississippi, Alabama, Tennessee, Arkansas, Kentucky, and Missouri, New
Orleans, 1851 (pamphlet).
"Proceedings, in DeBow's Review, XII, 305-332, 543-68.
"Ibid., XII, 315.
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diversification of industry and the development of cotton manu-
factures, and had been awakened thereby to a realization of the
disparity of the sections in industrial development. The people
of other Southern cities and states than those of the Atlantic
seaboard had become aware of Southern commercial decline and
its baneful effects, and were talking direct trade. Finally, and
more important, the sectional struggle over slavery had reached a
most bitter stage; the Southern Convention, the long dream of
men of the South Carolina school, had met in Nashville, and the
Union had been in danger of dissolution. True, a compromise had
been effected after a protracted debate; but it had been accepted
in the South with misgivings, and in several states only after
violent political struggles. And the effect of the whole episode was
not to allay sectionalism but to aggravate it. The old alliance of
South and West was breaking up. The number was growing
rapidly of those who felt that the South could trust only herself,
that the Southern people must unite and learn the art of co-
operation, that they must develop their resources and increase
their wealth and population, if the South were to maintain her
equality in the Union or her independence out of it.
It is difficult to state whence came the specific suggestion
which resulted in the call of the first meeting of the Southern
Commercial Convention. James D. B. DeBow, a true son of
South Carolina, had been a persistent proponent of the idea of
bringing the South together in convention, and had used DeBow's
Review to effect with that end in view. When the interest in
cotton manufactures was at its height, DeBow suggested a manu-
facturers' convention.19 He tried to arrange the meeting of an in-
dustrial convention in New Orleans in the spring of 185 1.20 He
claimed to have been one of the original Southern Convention men
and was disappointed that "action" could not be taken at Nash-
ville. After the compromise measures had been enacted he felt
that the danger to the South was only postponed. He, therefore,
favored a Southern convention to agree upon what would consti-
tute grounds for resistance, a Southern mercantile convention as a
proper means of strengthening the South by promoting shipbuild-
ing and direct trade, thus making possible the retention at home of
"DeBow's Review, IX, 256; X, 107.
"Ibid., IX, 256, 460.
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millions of wealth contributed annually to the North, and a
Southern manufacturers' convention to agree to pay no more
tribute to Northern looms.21 In the New Orleans Railroad Con-
vention of January, 1852, he proposed that the convention resolve
itself into an association for the promotion of the industrial inter-
ests of the Southern and Western states and provide for annual
meetings, but his proposal was not acted upon.
22 DeBow was al-
ways considered one of the founders of the Southern Commercial
Convention. C. G. Baylor, editor of the Cotton Plant, a Baltimore
publication, also advocated a convention, and later claimed to
have been instrumental in arranging for the meeting in Baltimore
in December, 1852.23 Finally, a number of Southern leaders, chief
of whom was Senator William C. Dawson, of Georgia, who
thought it time for the South to make a concerted effort to achieve
commercial and industrial independence, asked Baltimore business
men to inaugurate the movement.
24 Baltimore was chosen be-
cause she was the largest city in slaveholding territory, and it was
believed her name would lend prestige.25 A call was issued by
the Baltimore Board of Trade for a convention to meet in that
city December 18, 1852; the object as stated in the call was to
promote foreign and interstate trade.26 The delegates of the
Baltimore convention were carefully selected with the idea of
avoiding anything like a mass meeting.
27 A number of congress-
men from the South and the Ohio valley came up from Washing-
ton. The other delegates were mostly business men. Senator
Dawson was made president. Brantz Mayer read in behalf of the
Board of Trade a carefully prepared address of welcome.28 He
described the advantages of Baltimore, her merchants, her manu-
facturers, her banks, and her facilities for direct trade with
"DeBow's Review, X, 107.
"Ibid., XII, 554, S6i.
"Richmond Enquirer, Dec. 24, 1852; Memphis Daily Appeal, Jan. 23, 1853.
"DfBow's Review, XV, 257; New York Herald, April 15, 1854; New Or-
leans Commercial Bulletin, Jan. 17, 1855.
"Memphis Daily Appeal, June 23, 1853.
"Baltimore Sun, Dec. 17, 1852; DeBow's Review, XIII, 427.
"Baltimore Sun, Dec. 17, 1852; Richmond Enquirer, Dec. 24, 1852, C. G.
Baylor's remarks in the convention.
"Proceedings, in Baltimore Sun, Dec. 20, 1852; Richmond Enquirer, Dec.
24, 1852. The resolutions and Brantz Mayer's address are also in DeBow's Re-
view, XIV, 373-79.
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Europe. The Baltimore and Ohio railroad was about completed
to the Ohio river, and Baltimore would soon compete with New
York and Philadelphia for Western trade. The delegates were
assured that Baltimore was a Southern city, devoted to the
Southern cause, and disposed to join the South in achieving com-
mercial independence of New York, Boston, and Philadelphia;
the way to achieve commercial independence was to make Bal-
timore the commercial and financial center of the South. The
convention endorsed all of Baltimore's aspirations. The only
incident which occurred to mar the harmony of the proceedings
was a remark of William Burwell, of Virginia, that he considered
Norfolk a better port than Baltimore. Some consideration was
given to the Pacific railroad, for whose construction it was ex-
pected Congress would provide in the session just beginning, and
to other important internal improvements in the Southern states.
A line of steamships to Liverpool was recommended, and also
steam communication with the Amazon valley. The convention
sought to justify itself against the charge of sectionalism by the
following resolution:
Resolved, That while we disdain the slightest prejudice or
hostility to the welfare and prosperity of any particular section or
city, North or South, we would promote, as we think we reason-
ably might, consistent with the laws of trade, its great central
position, the commercial interests and prosperity of Baltimore, as
being well calculated to excite a wholesome and beneficial compe-
tition with more northern Atlantic cities, which could not fail
to be particularly advantageous to the whole South, Southwest,
and West, and, in fact, to the nation at large.
The convention sat but one day; it adjourned to meet in Mem-
phis in June, 1853. The proceedings present a striking contrast
with those of later conventions, which sat from four to six days,
with their wranglings, fiery declamation, numerous committees,
and innumerable resolutions.
The Baltimore convention did not give universal satisfaction.
The Richmond Enquirer thought the address of welcome made too
many allusions to Baltimore.29 Only Lieutenant Maury, it re-
marked, remembered that there was such a place as Virginia.
The press of New Orleans thought that the movement had been
got up by Baltimore to catch trade. New Orleans, they said, was
"Dec. 21, 1852. Cf. ibid., April 14, 1854.
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a better Southern city than Baltimore; and it was wrong for
Baltimore to try to injure New Orleans by diverting her com-
merce.30 The feeling was pretty general that the Baltimore Board
of Trade had attempted to turn what was intended for a Southern
movement to her own account.31 However, a beginning had been
made.
The Memphis convention was a somewhat larger body.32
Delegates were present from fourteen states, including Missouri,
Kentucky, Illinois, and Indiana. Thus, like the Baltimore gather-
ing, it was not strictly Southern; in fact, each was officially desig-
nated the "Southern and Western Commercial Convention." Like
the Baltimore convention, also, it was not marked by bitter sec-
tionalism. Senator Dawson again presided, and several other
prominent leaders of the South were among the delegates, notably
General John A. Quitman and H. S. Foote, of Mississippi, and
John Bell, of Tennessee.
The objects of the convention had not yet been clearly denned.
Upon taking the chair, Senator Dawson stated them as he under-
stood them. His statements may be taken as the expression of a
moderate leader who had had a considerable part in the inaug-
uration of the convention. The members of the convention were
not, he said, actuated by feelings of hostility to any section of the
Union; but it had been seen for years that the people of the
Southern and Western states were suffering from a want of the
proper development of the natural resources of their section. Im-
mediate action was necessary. The important interests of agricul-
ture, commerce, and manufactures were all proper subjects for dis-
cussion. Better transportation facilities, development of seaports,
direct trade, lines of steamers to Europe and South America, im-
provement of rivers and harbors, encouragement of manufactures,
"DeBozv's Review, XVIII, 354; Charleston Conner, Mar. 3, 1854, quoting
the New Orleans Delta; Memphis Eagle and Enquirer, June 16, 1853, letter from
C. G. Baylor, editor of the Cotton Plant (Baltimore); Memphis Daily Appeal,
June 23, 1853; New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, Jan. 4, 1855.
"The Baltimore Sun of Dec. 27, 1852, quoted a number of Southern papers
as expressing friendliness to Baltimore.
"Four hundred ninety-six delegates were present. Proceedings, in Proceed-
ings of the Southern and Western Commercial Convention at Memphis, Ten-
nessee, in June, 1853 (pamphlet, 64 pp.). See also the Memphis Daily Appeal,
June 7, 10, 20, 1853; DeBow's Review, XV, 254-274; Western Journal and
Civilian, X, 191-197.
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and, finally, the Pacific railroad, "the great work of the age and
the world," were all specified as subjects which deserved the con-
sideration of the convention.33
This statement suggested a wide range of discussion; the con-
vention went even beyond it. After considerable debate resolutions
were adopted asking Congress to appropriate money to improve
the channels of the mouths of the Mississippi river, the Des
Moines and Rock river rapids, and the harbors of Charleston,
Savannah, Wilmington, Norfolk, Mobile, and Galveston. Other
resolutions looked to aid from the Federal government in protect-
ing the lands along the Mississippi from inundation. Resolutions
were adopted relative to direct trade and steamship communica-
tion with Europe. Provision was made for a committee to prepare
for publication and distribution, particularly in the manufacturing
districts of Europe, a full report on the peculiar facilities offered
by the South and West for the manufacture of cotton. The con-
vention resolved that Southern youth should be educated at home
rather than in Northern schools. Native teachers should be em-
ployed, and textbooks written by Southern men should be used.
The state governments were requested to consider the establish-
ment of normal schools. There were long speeches on the free
navigation of the Amazon river a subject which Lieutenant M.
F. Maury had been agitating for a year or two. The projected
railroad across the Isthmus of Tehuantepec was endorsed, and
the government was requested to hasten the negotiations with
Mexico relative to the right of way. The New Orleans delegation
was especially interested in the Tehuantepec project. A St. Louis
project for a Mississippi valley railroad from New Orleans to
St. Paul via St. Louis was likewise endorsed, and Congress was
requested to grant unsold lands along the route in aid thereof.
But the subject that occupied the largest share of the time and
interest of the convention was the Pacific railroad.
"This," said
the New Orleans Delta, "was the Aaron's rod that swallowed up
all others. This is the great panacea, which is to release the South
from its bondage to the North, which is to pour untold wealth into
our lap; which is to build up cities, steamships, manufactories,
educate our children, and draw into our control what Mr. Bell
KDeBow's Review, XV, 256 ff.
133] THE SOUTHERN COMMERCIAL CONVENTION 133
calls 'the untold wealth of the gorgeous East.'
" 3 * The convention
unanimously adopted resolutions which declared the road a
national necessity, and requested Congress, as soon as the surveys
of routes which were then being prosecuted should be completed,
to adopt such measures as would insure the construction of the
main trunk at the earliest possible period. It refused to suggest
that the Federal government construct the main trunk; but it
did declare it right, expedient, and proper for the government to
make large donations of the public lands to the different states
bordering on either side of the Mississippi to enable all sections
to connect themselves with the main line by branches. No specific
route was recommended.
The third session of the Southern Commercial Convention was
held in Charleston in April, 1854. It was a much larger gathering
than either of its predecessors.
35 Senator Dawson again presided.
The convention sat six days. The debates were longer and covered
an even wider range of subjects than those at Memphis. The
Pacific railroad again occupied the center of the stage; but such
subjects as direct trade, the encouragement of manufacturing and
mining, the remission of duties on railroad iron, and the improve-
ment of rivers and harbors were discussed at some length. Among
the other topics which received consideration were opening the
Amazon river to the navigation of the world; the repeal of the
United States tonnage duties and fishing bounties; the admission
of foreign vessels to the American coasting trade; direct shipments
of cotton to the ports of Continental Europe European manu-
facturers purchased their stocks in Liverpool usually ; uniform
coinage among the nations of the earth; improved mail service
in the South; milling and lumbering; agricultural exhibits and
institute fairs; and education in the South. The tone and temper
of the gathering were unmistakable; it was a Southern convention
determined to find some means of advancing the interests of the
South as distinguished from the North. The multiplicity of sub-
ducted with approval in the Richmond Enquirer, June 24, 1853.
M
It was in fact the largest of the whole series. There were present 857 dele-
gates from 13 states. The proceedings are in the Charleston Courier, April n-
14, 17, 18, 1854; New York Herald, April 14-19 (taken in part from the Courier);
DeBow's Review, XVI, 632-41; XVII, 91-99, 200-213, 250-61, 398-410, 491-510
(taken from Charleston papers, chiefly from the Courier).
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jects pressed upon it for attention indicates the earnestness, at
least, of many of the men who composed it.
Several essays were made to define the objects of the Southern
Commercial Convention. C. K. Marshall, of Mississippi, offered
a resolution to the effect that, while commerce was the subject for
special consideration by the convention, other matters tending to
the accomplishment of the general design of the development of
the rights and resources of the Southern and Southwestern states
were legitimate subjects.
36 DeBow, who was unable to be present,
wrote to the committee in charge of arrangements stating his
understanding of the objects of the convention. He emphasized
the point that these conventions were successors of the direct
trade conventions of the late thirties, the Memphis conventions of
1845 and 1849, and the New Orleans Railroad Convention of
1852. He believed these conventions had contributed largely to
the great development which had been exhibited everywhere
throughout the South during the several years preceding. Further-
more, they had taught the South to see and feel with humiliation
her dependence upon the North, not only in industry and com-
merce but in matters not of a material character. As he saw it,
the task which lay before them was no less than the regeneration
of the South.37 This seems to have been the view also of gentle-
men who addressed the convention; and this must be set down as
the purpose of the Southern Commercial Convention when at its
best.
The lengthiest debates of the session were upon a scheme pro-
posed by Albert Pike, of Arkansas, for building the Pacific railroad
along a Southern route without aid from the Federal government.
The Legislature of Virginia was called upon to charter a Southern
Pacific Railroad company with sufficient capital to build the road.
The stock was to be subscribed by the Southern states and Cali-
fornia to the sum of $2,000,000 each, by cities, by private cor-
porations, and by individuals. Texas was expected to make a
liberal grant of public land. The Cherokee, Choctaw, and Creek
nations were to be invited to join the enterprise. The board of
directors was to consist of an equal number from each state. The
corporation was to be granted power by its charter to negotiate
"DeBow's Review, XVII, 92 f.
"Ibid., XVII, 95 ff.; Charleston Courier, April 10, 1854.
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with Mexico for, and to purchase if necessary, a right of way
through her territory to the Pacific or the Gulf of California; and
to agree that the company would maintain military posts along
the portion of the road which should lie in Mexico.
38
This extraordinary plan was opposed upon the floor by some
of the ablest and most practical men of the convention, including
Senator Dawson, Lieutenant Maury, Judge Nesbit, of Georgia,
Governor J. A. Jones, of Tennessee, and N. D. Coleman, of Mis-
sissippi the last two being railroad men. According to these men,
the plan was chimerical; it would be impracticable to unite the
Southern states upon it; it would disrupt the South; it was too
sectional; it savored too much of politics; definitely broke with the
Western states; was of doubtful constitutionality; and the consti-
tutions of several states forbade them entering any such corpora-
tion. Yet the convention, voting by states, unanimously endorsed
Pike's scheme: Pike was a brilliant orator and presented his plan
in a most convincing manner;
39 some support may have been
attracted among strict constructionists by the omission of any
demand for Federal aid; but the chief recommendation of the
plan was its sectional nature.
Sectionalism was running high at this time. The Kansas-
Nebraska bill was before Congress. A Pacific railroad bill had
been defeated in the short session of the Thirty-second Congress,
1853, largely because partisans of a Southern route feared that it
gave some advantage to the North.
40 Since that time partisans of
the several proposed routes had been exerting themselves to the
utmost to gain some advantage in the struggle. Surveys made in
1853 under the direction of Jefferson Davis, Secretary of War, had
shown that the best Southern route ran south of the Gila River in
Mexican territory.41 Very late in the same year the Gadsden
treaty had been negotiated with Mexico securing, among other
things, the desired route. While the Charleston convention was
sitting, the treaty was being considered by the Senate in secret
"Resolutions embodying the plan, DeBow's Review, XVI, 636-37.
"For debate see ibid., XVII, 205-13, 408-10, 492-506.
40This statement is based upon an unpublished study, made by the author,
of the struggles in Congress over the Pacific railroad.
"Reports of the Explorations and Surveys, to Ascertain the Most Practical
and Economical Route for a Railroad from the Mississippi River to the Pacific
Ocean, I, 4, 29.
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session; and, rumor had it, was meeting opposition, which was
attributed to the unwillingness of Northern men to purchase a
Southern route to the Pacific. 42 General Gadsden himself addressed
the convention in favor of a resolution in support of ratification of
the treaty and in favor of Pike's plan.43 Albert Pike took strong
sectional grounds in his speech in support of the resolutions
embodying his plan. He invited the attention of the convention
to the great Northwest, which, he said, never seemed to be taken
into consideration by Southern men. This region was bidding for
immigration: laws granting foreign immigrants the suffrage before
they had declared their intention of becoming United States
citizens were one inducement; the proposed homestead legislation
was another; the Kansas-Nebraska bill another. The North was
increasing her political power at the South's expense. "And with
this continued increase in foreign and Northern influence was it
not obvious that the prospect of the South ever getting a Pacific
Railroad was put further and further off every year?" The North
was looking out for her own interests; "the North knew full well
that wherever the Pacific Railroad went, there too, would go the
power and wealth of the country." The South should look to her
interests. He wanted his plan to be a "sort of declaration of inde-
pendence on the part of the South."
44
After the great meeting at Charleston, the Southern Com-
mercial Convention languished for a couple of years. The session
in New Orleans in January, 1855, was very poorly attended and
attracted little attention from the South at large.
45 There were
several reasons for the poor showing. The Western rivers were
low, making travel difficult. Congress and the state legislatures
were in session. The country was suffering somewhat from a tem-
"DtBow's Review, XVII, 210, 408; New York Herald, April 19, 1854.
"DeBow's Review, XVII, 408-9; letter from John R. Bartlett, one of the
Mexican boundary commissioners, taking umbrage at Gadsden's remarks in the
convention, Charleston Courier, April 28, 1854.
"I have followed the synopses of his speeches as given in DeBow's Review,
XVII, 208-12, 499-506. The same arguments are set forth in a very striking and
able manner in a memorial to the state legislatures which Pike prepared. Ibid.,
XVII, 593-99-
45Two hundred twelve delegates from twelve states. The proceedings are in
ibid., XVIII, 353-60, 520-28, 623-35, 749-60; New Orleans Commercial Bulletin,
Jan. 10-16, 1855.
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porary financial stringency.*
6 The presence of so many radicals
in the Charleston convention had discredited the movement in the
eyes of many of more conservative opinions.47
But the chief reason for the poor showing made was the attitude
of the people of New Orleans and vicinity. The city council took
tardy action, and the committee on arrangements did little. The
Governor of Louisiana neglected to appoint delegates. Several of
the New Orleans newspapers were antagonistic, expressing the
opinion that the convention had been decidedly hostile to New
Orleans from the beginning.48 A specific grievance was the refusal
of the Charleston convention to adopt resolutions requesting
Congress to make appropriations for the improvement of the navi-
gation of the Mississippi.
49 On the other hand there was a feeling
throughout the South that the people of New Orleans were only
lukewarm for the Southern cause. This feeling of hostility on the
one hand and distrust on the other found expression upon the
floor of the convention, and visiting delegates left with the feeling
that they had not been cordially received.50 The session at Rich-
mond, Virginia, early the following year, 1856, made no better
showing, only seven states being represented;
51 but in this case the
want of success seems to have been largely due to severe weather
and to the fact that, the meeting having once been postponed in-
definitely because of an epidemic of small-pox in Richmond, too
"Charleston Courier, Jan. 13, 1855.
*7Savannah Daily Republican, Nov. 17, 1856; DeBow's Review, XVIII, 523.
Senator Benton, of Missouri, had denounced the Charleston convention as a
disunion convention and Pike's plan for building the Pacific railroad as a plan
for dissolving the Union. Ibid., loc. cit.
*DeBow's Review, XVIII, 353; New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, Jan. 4,
1855. "This feeling of indifference and apathy is not at all to be wondered at.
All disclaimers to the contrary notwithstanding, the series of Southern Commer-
cial Conventions, commencing at Baltimore, and continued at Memphis and
Charleston, were decidedly antagonistic to the interests of New Orleans; and
this inimical tendency was more than once exhibited in a manner invidiously
offensive and calculated to disturb and wound our amour propre." Ibid., Jan.
17, i8SS-
"DeBow's Review, XVIII, 628.
"Ibid., XVIII, 354, 624, 632, 634.
"Proceedings, in ibid., XX, 340-354; Richmond Enquirer, Jan. 31, Feb. I,
2, 4, 5, 1856. The resolutions are in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXXIV,
392. There were 213 delegates present, of whom 183 were from Virginia.
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short notice was given of the time of the meeting.
52 The chief topic
of discussion at New Orleans was the Pacific railroad; at Rich-
mond, direct trade. Most of the other topics discussed at previous
sessions were considered in a more or less perfunctory manner.
The Richmond convention determined that a greater effort than
theretofore should be made to insure a large attendance at the
next meeting; a committee was appointed to address the Southern
people in its behalf.
83 The Savannah committee on preparations
worked hard. But it was the political situation which was chiefly
responsible for the large attendance at Savannah: the convention
met in December, 1856, a month after the exciting presidential
campaign had resulted in the narrow defeat of the "Black Repub-
lican" party.
64
The fire eating element in the Southern Commercial Conven-
tion had been gradually growing. Several members of the com-
mittee which issued the call for the Savannah convention were
known to be disunionists.55 Many friends of the Union had come
to look upon the convention with distrust, and branded the
Savannah session in advance a disunion scheme.56 The city council
of Nashville, Tennessee, for example, refused to appoint delegates
to the convention, because it feared its disunion proclivities.
57 On
the other hand, the New Orleans Delta, a journal which had been
antagonistic when the dominant purpose was the economic regen-
eration of the South, gave cordial support now that the objects
were becoming political.
58 The convention at Savannah was com-
posed largely of politicians, and a large minority, if not an actual
majority, were disunionists. 59 James Lyon, of Virginia, upon tak-
"DfBow's Review, XX, 340.
"Ibid., XX, 351; XXI, 550-552 (the call).
"Savannah Republican, Oct. 17, 21, 29, 1856. There were 564 delegates from
ten states.
"The Savannah Republican thought that "aside from the known character
and sentiment of the men who compose that committee," there was nothing in
the call that could be tortured into a disunion sentiment. Nov. 17, 1856. The
Republican was a Union paper.
"The Savannah Republican, Dec. I, 1856.
"Ibid., Nov. 25.
MQuoted in the Charleston Courier, Nov. 6, 1856.
"The Savannah Republican, Dec. 16, 1856, thought the convention was by
large odds a "conservative body," but admitted the presence of a considerable
number of disunionists. A list of the delegates is in DeBow's Review, XXII, 82 ff.
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ing the chair, stated the objects of the convention as they had
already been stated several times. He defended the convention
against the charge of disunionism. It was commercial and not
political independence the South sought. But, in a strain quite
common in that day, he "looked to the future," and expressed
the fear that the time might come when the South would have to
defend her rights. For such a time it behooved her to be strong
and ready.60
The convention considered rather perfunctorily the subjects
discussed at previous sessions.
61 Albert Pike was again able to
secure endorsement of his plan for building a railroad to the
Pacific. A. Dudley Mann's scheme for establishing a "steam ferry"
between the Chesapeake and England was endorsed; as was -also
Thomas Rainey's project for a line of steamships from New York
to the La Plata, via Savannah. But the chief interest was in
questions more political in character. Robert Toombs addressed a
letter to the convention proposing that the state legislatures en-
courage direct trade by levying an ad valorem tax upon the sale
of all goods imported into their respective states except goods im-
ported directly from foreign countries. Such a tax, Toombs be-
lieved, would not only enable the states to dispense with direct
taxation, but would also provide ample revenue to carry out works
of internal improvement.
62 The letter was referred to the general
committee, which reported not Toombs' plan but resolutions in
favor of free trade and direct taxation as measures best calculated
to promote direct trade. The report was tabled (by a vote of
57-24) ; but the subject was kept alive by the appointment of a
committee to report upon it at the next session.
63
Resolutions in favor of reopening the African slave trade, an
issue raised shortly before,
61 were introduced and debated at
"Savannah Republican, Dec. 9, 1856; DeBow's Review, XXII, 86-7.
"Proceedings, in Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the South-
ern Commercial Convention, assembled at Knoxville, Tennessee, August 10, 1857,
Appendix: Proceedings of the Southern Convention at Savannah. Also in De-
Bow's Review, XXII, 81-105, 216-24, 307-18; Savannah Republican, Dec. 9-13,
1856; Charleston Courier, Dec. 11-13.
"DeBow's Review, XXII, 102-104; Charleston Courier, Dec. 15, 1856. The
plan was not original with Toombs. For fuller discussion see below, p. 167 f.
"Proceedings and debate, in DeBow's Review, XXII, 92 ff., 307-18.
'The question was fairly launched by Governor Adams, of South Carolina,
in his message to the Legislature, Nov. 24, 1856. Charleston Courier, Nov. 26.
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length, the debate turning not so much upon the propriety of con-
sidering such a question in a commercial convention as upon the
expediency of reopening the foreign slave trade. This question,
too, was carried over by the appointment of a committee to report
at the next meeting of the convention.
65 Resolutions were also
adopted recommending organized Southern emigration to Kansas;
requesting Southern representatives in Congress to inquire whether
their respective states had received their full quota of the public
arms, and to insist that Southern posts be properly fortified;
recommending the establishment of state armories; and expressing
sympathy with the "efforts being made to introduce civilization
in the States of Central America, and to develop these rich and
productive regions by the introduction of slave labor," that is,
with the Walker filibusters.66
The Southern Commercial Convention had now reached a
stage where nothing could be expected from it in the way of ad-
vancing commerce and industry in the South. The committee
which issued the call for the succeeding session at Knoxville
styled it, rather suggestively, the "Southern Convention," and
declared its purpose to be to unite the South upon a sectional
policy. "Every other purpose," said the committee, "is of trifling
importance in comparison with the high moral and social objects
of the Convention. They are intended to spread far and wide,
correct, enlarged, and faithful views of our rights and obligations,
and to unite us together by the most sacred bonds to maintain
them inviolate for ourselves and our posterity."67 At Knoxville in
August, i857,
68
J- D. B. DeBow, already an avowed disunionist,
was made president, and opened the convention with a ringing
disunion speech. He admitted that the convention had built no
railroads and established no steamship lines; but it had caused
the people of the South to understand the importance of all those
things; and they would come in the fullness of time. It had taught
the people that the South had rights a thousand times more valu-
'"DeBow's Review, XXII, 216-224 (summary of the debate).
6t
lbid., XXII, 96-102 (resolutions of the convention in full).
"Ibid., XXIII, 193.
"Proceedings, in Official Report of the Debates and Proceedings of the
Southern Commercial Convention, assembled at Knoxville, Tennessee, August
10th, 1857; DeBow's Review, XXIII, 298-320; New York Herald, 17, 18, 19
(best report). There were 710 delegates from eleven states and Arizona territory.
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able than the Union, and that she had resources sufficient to make
her important in the Union or to enable her to maintain herself
as an independent nation.
69
Resolutions in regard to reopening the foreign slave trade were
introduced and debated at great length. By a scale vote of 66 to
26 a resolution was adopted which put the convention on record
in favor of the annullment of that article of the Webster-Ash-
burton treaty, ratified November 10, 1842, which provided for
keeping a squadron of naval vessels off the coast of Africa for the
purpose of suppressing the slave trade. An amendment offered
by a Tennessee delegate declaring it "inexpedient and contrary to
the settled policy of this country to repeal the laws prohibitory of
the African slave trade" was defeated by a vote of 40 for, 52
against.
70 The amendment was almost identical in language with
a resolution introduced in the House of Representatives, December
15, 1856, by James L. Orr, of South Carolina, and adopted with
only eight dissenting votes.
71 One delegate broached the subject
of free immigration, but it did not meet with favor among the body
of delegates;
72
it was, of course, a much more practical subject.
Another long debate occurred upon the resolution, offered by W.
W. Boyce, of South Carolina, declaring that the system of duties
on imports should be abandoned by the Federal government and
direct taxation be resorted to exclusively.
73 Whatever the merits
of absolute free trade, its establishment in the Union was about as
impossible as was reopening the foreign slave trade.
74
It is true, the former objects of the convention were not com-
pletely lost sight of. A. Dudley Mann's scheme for establishing a
steamship line between Chesapeake Bay and Milford Haven was
debated and endorsement defeated, probably at the instigation of
friends of rival Virginia projects.
75 A resolution was adopted
DeBow's Review, XXIII, 225-38; Richmond Enquirer, Aug. 17, 1857.
"DeBow's Review, XXIII, 309-10; New York Herald, Aug. 18.
"Ibid., Aug. 19; Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., 125-126.
"New York Herald, Aug. 19; DeBow's Review, XXIII, 319.
n
lbid., XXIII, 313 ff.
"The convention was not of a practical bent: a good part of two days was
spent debating a resolution to exclude reporters of Northern newspapers. New
York Herald, Aug. 17, 1857; DeBow's Review, XXIII, 302-305.
"New York Herald, Aug. 17; DeBow's Review, XXIII, 306, 308.
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recommending the extension of state aid to steamship lines be-
tween Southern and foreign ports. The Federal government was
requested to grant to Southern steamship lines the same subsidies
for carrying the mails that it granted to Northern lines. The meet-
ing recommended patronage of home manufactories and of
merchants who imported directly from foreign countries. Resolu-
tions were adopted asking the Federal government to fortify the
harbors of Port Royal, South Carolina, Mobile, Alabama, and
Beaufort, North Carolina, and make them coaling stations for
large government steamers. A resolution recommending taxation
by the Southern states upon sales within their respective borders
of articles manufactured in the North was rejected. A committee
was appointed to memorialize Congress upon the subject of duties
imposed by foreign countries upon American tobacco; 76 the duties
imposed by some countries were very high, and it was felt that
the American government had not made the effort it might have
made to secure their reduction. The Pacific railroad was not
mentioned. There were the usual resolutions relative to Southern
education. The disposition to call for Federal aid for various
purposes is noteworthy.
In the earlier sessions of the Commercial Convention there had
been a sprinkling of public men of more than local prominence,
and, of course, a larger number of local politicians. The majority
of the delegates came from towns and cities; but the planters had
been well represented. In the earlier meetings, as in the later,
there were editors, preachers, physicians, and professors; but there
were also a large number of business men, bankers, merchants, a
few manufacturers, and men interested in promoting particular
railroad projects, steamship lines, or other enterprises, for which
they hoped to secure the endorsement of the convention. By the
time of the Knoxville convention this latter element had practi-
cally ceased to attend. After the Knoxville meeting the dwindling
conservative element also disappeared from the convention, and it
fell everywhere into disrepute except among the disunionists, who
continued to hope that it would serve some useful purpose in mak-
ing Southern men acquainted with each other, in consolidating
"The memorial is in DeBow's Review, XXIV, 291-300.
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Southern feeling, and in harmonizing differences between different
quarters of the South.
77
The Montgomery convention, May, 1858, was well attended.78
The debates, as far as oratory was concerned, were more brilliant
than those of any other session of the series. Among the orators
were Henry W. Milliard and William L.Yancey, of Alabama, rivals
of long standing.
79 But it was not a commercial convention; it was
a gathering of disunionists. The Montgomery Daily Confederation
said, "every form and shape of political malcontent was there
present, ready to assent in any project having for its end a disso-
lution of the Union, immediate, unconditional, final."80 Edmund
Ruffin, of Virginia, himself an ardent secessionist, found only two
delegates outside the Virginia delegation who were not disunion-
ists.81 But the proceedings took a turn which all secessionists even,
could not approve. Practically the whole time of the session was
devoted to debating the question of reopening the African slave
trade. The debate proved the delegates to be hopelessly divided,
not only upon the expediency of reopening the foreign slave trade,
but also upon the more practical question, whether or not agita-
tion for the repeal of Federal laws prohibitory of the slave trade
would promote or injure the cause of disunion.82 Ridiculed both
''Address of the committee which called the Montgomery convention.
Charleston Mercury, April 8, 1858; DeBow's Review, XXIV, 424-28. The Knox-
ville (Tenn.) Citizen thought the call "an invitation to take counsel whether the
Union can be longer maintained or is worth maintaining." Quoted in Charleston
Mercury, April 20, 1858.
"About 400 delegates were present from ten states. Proceedings, in DeBow's
Review, XXIV, 574-606; Montgomery Daily Confederation, May 11-15, 1858.
"Yancey's part in the convention is discussed at length in DuBose, The Life
and Times of William Lowndes Yancey, 358 ff. Cf. Ruffin's Diary, entry for May
13, 1858; DeBow's Review, XXIV, 583-88.
""May 18, 1858. "When the South gets ready to dissolve the Union, all she
has to do is to reassemble the Southern Commercial Convention which met at
Montgomery and give the word." Milledgeville (Georgia) Federal Union, quoted
in the New Orleans Picayune, May 25, 1858. A. P. Calhoun, son of John C.
Calhoun, and a disunionist per se, was president.
^Ruffiin's Diary, May 11, 1858.
"Charleston Mercury, May 15, 1858. The press of South' Carolina was al-
most unanimous in recommending that delegates be sent to Montgomery, think-
ing the result would be to harmonize and consolidate the South. When, how-
ever, the introduction of the slave trade question served only to sow seeds of
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in the North and the South,83 denounced by the Union element in
the South, and distrusted by the cooler headed disunionists,84 the
Vicksburg meeting, in May, 1859, was able to summon only a
corporal's guard, chiefly of the more radical type of disunionists.
For five days the convention indulged in heated debate upon the
great questions confronting the South, particularly the reopening
of the African slave trade, adopted a string of resolutions as long
as those of its predecessors, and adjourned to meet again at the
call of the president.
85 That gentleman chose not to issue the call;
and, thus, rather ingloriously the Southern Commercial Conven-
tion came to an end.
There were reasons for the change in the character of the per-
sonnel and the perversion of purpose of the Southern Commercial
Convention other than the growing intensity of the sectional strug-
gle and the aggressiveness of the disunion elements. With the
exception of the one at Baltimore, these assemblies were practi-
cally mass meetings. The task of insuring a large attendance was,
in the majority of instances, left to a committee of the city council
or board of trade of the city in which the convention was to meet.
Delegates were appointed by governors, mayors, city councils,
boards of trade, and meetings of citizens. In making their selec-
tions they were governed solely by their own judgment; for no
qualifications for membership were prescribed. Distinguished in-
dividuals were sometimes invited by the local committee; a general
invitation was always extended to editors. Not a tenth part of
those designated as delegates attended. No one participated in the
dissension, the press of the state very generally condemned it. Camden, (S. C.)
Journal, quoted in the Montgomery Daily Confederation, May 15, 1858. Ed-
mund Ruffin was very much disappointed at the turn the convention took,
though he saw redeeming features. Diary, May 11-16, 1858.
'"'"Was there ever such another gathering in all this world as the Vicksburg
fire eaters' convention? Let Garrison and his motley crew of old women in
breeches, and would-be-men in petticoats retire from the field. They are tame,
flat and stupid compared with these fiery, fussy, belligerent, and terrible South-
ern salamanders." New York Herald, May 18, 1859.
"When Georgia and Alabama refused to appoint delegates, the Montgomery
Daily Confederation remarked: "These Southern Commercial Conventions have
run their course and we shall hear no more of them forever." May 14, 1859.
"Proceedings in New York Herald, May 18, 21; DeBow's Review, XXVI,
713; XXVII, 94-103, 205-20, 360-65, 468-71 (taken largely from the New York
Herald).
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proceedings who had not been certified as a delegate; 86 but, it is
evident, anyone who desired to attend could readily secure the
necessary credentials. Thus there was nothing in the organization
of the convention to present a change in the character of the
personnel.
When the convention failed to produce the results which its
founders hoped for it, many of its early patrons confessed it a
failure and ceased to attend it. This failure was due in large part
to the inherent limitations of a convention as a means of effecting
a revolution in commerce and industry. It was unreasonable to
expect, as many seem to have expected, a convention to build
railroads, establish steamship lines, erect cotton factories, or open
mines. Numerous examples can be cited of individual local con-
> ventions, particularly railroad conventions, held during the decades
preceding the Civil War which aided greatly in crystallizing the
sentiment of their respective communities in favor of particular
railroad or other projects and in securing subscriptions to the
capital stock. A few might be mentioned which powerfully influ-
enced a city or state to embark upon an internal improvements
program. But a convention representative of many so widely
separated communities and so many conflicting interests as was
the Southern Commercial Convention could not be expected to
accomplish anything so tangible in character.
The convention failed largely, however, to accomplish what it
might legitimately have been expected to accomplish. The meet-
ings were not well managed. No programs were made before
convening; and no efforts were made to have subjects presented
by those best prepared to discuss them. There was no steering
committee. The rules of the House of Representatives were fol-
lowed; the chair recognized the first to claim the floor, and debate
was rarely limited. The most fluent orators were able to monop-
olize the time of the convention to the exclusion of practical busi-
ness men, whose counsels might have been more worth while. As
the objects of the convention were not strictly defined, anyone
with a hobby could secure a hearing. Too large a part of the time
was spent in discussing panaceas, magnificent schemes like the
Pacific railroad or the navigation of the Amazon. Things of just
""However, the conventions sometimes invited distinguished visitors present
to participate in the proceedings as delegates.
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as great importance but appealing less to the imagination, such as
geological surveys, banking facilities, boards of trade, advertising,
encouragement of home industry by correction of the irregularities
of taxation systems or by bounties, were not taken up in real
earnest. Immigration, except of negro slaves, was not discussed.
No consideration was given the possibility of utilizing the poor
white population in productive industry. No invitations were sent
to foreign capitalists.
Great faith was put in the efficacy of resolutions. All resolu-
tions introduced were referred to a general committee composed
of a number of delegates from each state, from which they were
reported after due consideration to be acted upon by the whole
convention. Resolutions deemed important were debated at length,
and the voting thereon would not have been watched more jeal-
ously had the convention been a legislative body framing the laws
of the land.87 Said the New York Tribune: "For a quarter of a
century past she has been holding conventions, at which it has
been resolved that Norfolk, Charleston, and Savannah should be-
come great commercial cities, which obstinately they refuse to
be."88 The convention might have been employed to better advan-
tage had it collected useful information in regard to economic
conditions in the Southern states and disseminated it. Such a work
would at least have contributed to a better understanding of the
causes for the backwardness of the South a useful preliminary
to a prescription of the remedies. The convention left no reports
or publications, however, comparable even to the reports and ad-
dresses of McDuffie, Hayne, Longstreet, and Mallory, of the direct
trade conventions of 1837-1839. This was due to the disinclination
of individuals to contribute anything, except speeches and resolu-
tions, to make the convention a success.
"Voting was by states. In some of the conventions (Memphis and Charles-
ton) each state was allowed one vote, in others a number equal to the state
representation in Congress. This system had some incongruous results; often one
or two delegates from a poorly represented state cast the entire vote of the state,
and thus had as much to do with determining the official action of the conven-
tion as a hundred delegates from another state.
""Reprint, The North and the South, 1854. Also quoted in Charleston Cou-
rier, April 24, 1854. "Much time is consumed in talking, and most scrupulous
attention is paid to punctilio and the rules of debate .... but as soon as the fiat
of the convention has gone forth, the members seem to think that their task is
complete."
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Time and again recess committees were appointed to investigate
and report, to memorialize Congress or the state legislatures, and
for other purposes. With a few exceptions they failed to do the
work assigned them. At Memphis an able committee was named
to prepare for publication and distribution, especially in the man-
ufacturing districts of Europe, a full report of the peculiar facilities
offered by the Southern and Western states for the manufacture
of cotton. This was a very worth-while task. The committee was
not supported in its labors,
89
however, and there is no record that
it made any report. The Charleston convention appointed a com-
mittee of three from each state to gather statistics and other infor-
mation on mining, manufacturing, lumbering, milling, internal
improvements, and capacities for trade and commerce in the
South, to address the people, urge the legislatures to action in
favor of education, manufacturing, shipbuilding, direct trade, and
mining, and report to the next convention. The committee was
divided into five sub-committees with able chairmen.90 This com-
mittee, notwithstanding the immensity of the task imposed upon
it, might have performed a useful service had it gone intelligently
to work. At the succeeding convention the chairmen of the sub-
committees had no reports whatever, and the chairman of the
committee transmitted certain documents and a letter relative to
his duties.91 Naturally this failure to take seriously the work
assigned the committees tended to convince practical men that no
good could come from these meetings. "But it cannot be expected,"
said one delegate, "that a commercial convention can produce any
useful result when committees appointed by it pay no attention to
subjects committed to them, after adjournment."92
In the earlier sessions of the convention an apparently honest
attempt was made to keep party politics out of the proceedings.
It proved well nigh impossible to do so. Politics played a very
large part in the life of the South; from the very first many of the
delegates were politicians; and many of the matters which legiti-
mately came before the convention had become party questions.
Whig and Democratic members of the convention watched mem-
"DeBotv's Review, XV, 268, 432.
"Ibid., XVI, 635; XVII, 325.
"Ibid., XVIII, 357.
"Ibid., XVIII, 524, remarks of Albert Pike.
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bers of the opposite political faith closely to see that they did not
attempt to make political capital from the action of the convention.
The more partisan journals approved or disapproved the conven-
tion according as their party or the opposition party could better
capitalize its proceedings.
93 At Memphis a political debate over
resolutions calling upon the Federal government to appropriate
money for the improvement of rivers and harbors was avoided
with difficulty.
94 The opponents of Federal aid to internal im-
provements, led by General John A. Quitman, forced the omission
from the resolutions on a Pacific railroad, of a clause calling upon
the government to build the main trunk.95 At Charleston the same
questions were fought over. It was evident that a large majority
was willing to ask the government to improve rivers and harbors.
96
A Louisiana delegate threatened to speak all week before he would
see the convention turned into a Whig meeting. Governor Chap-
man, of Alabama, served notice that the next convention would
see few delegates from Democratic Alabama if the resolution was
passed. A Georgia Whig appealed to the convention to keep out
party questions, and the resolution was withdrawn. 97 The intro-
duction of party politics discredited the convention in the eyes of
many who had hoped that some real good would flow from it in
the way of promoting the material prosperity of the South.
Defenders of the Southern Commercial Convention admitted
the justice of many of the criticisms made of it both at home and
in the North. They sometimes countered, however, with the com-
plaint that the fault lay in the failure of Congress and the state
legislatures to act upon the convention's recommendations. And,
with a very few exceptions, it would be impossible to name any
concrete suggestions which were acted upon. This defense over-
""Before the Charleston convention met, the Richmond Enquirer believed it
would be composed of able and practical men and confidently hoped it
would take action towards securing Southern commercial independence. But
some of the views there expressed were too ''federal" to harmonize with the
Enquirer's strict construction principles; and the convention was described as
''an abortion if not something worse." April 4, 14, 21, 1854. Two years later the
Enquirer was again the champion of the convention. Jan. 28, 31, 1856.
^DeBow's Review, XV, 265.
"Ibid., XV, 265 ff., 270 f.
'Ibid., XVII, 261.
"Ibid., XVII, 400 ff.; New York Herald, April 19, 1854.
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looks the fact that the convention might have served the cause in
other ways than through recommendations to legislative bodies;
in fact, it is questionable how far the economic development of
the South could have been promoted by legislation. But this
aside. It was one of the inherent limitations of the convention that
it could not legislate, but only recommend legislation. No doubt
action by the state legislatures or by Congress in accordance with
many of the recommendations of the convention would have
greatly benefited the South. On the other hand, the recommen-
dations were not always well advised, were often indefinite, and,
in general, were not pressed upon the state legislatures and Con-
gress with vigor.
Defenders of the convention claimed for it important results in
the way of creating public sentiment and educating the public in
regard to its objects. It had aroused the public mind, they said,
to the need of diversifying industry, fostering commerce, and de-
veloping the South's natural resources. It had been the means of
disseminating useful information, teaching the South the extent
of her resources, and pointing the way to their utilization. These
claims are true to a degree. Perhaps the judgment of the New
Orleans Picayune was as fair and as near the mark as could be
made. When the movement was initiated, it said, practical men
had hoped that at last the public would be aroused. To some
extent this hope had been realized. The importance of commer-
cial enterprise had been impressed upon the public mind. The
necessity of manufacturing industry to local independence was
generally acknowledged. The certainty of the ultimate growth and
importance of Southern seaports, aided by the completion of pro-
jected internal improvements, was perceived. These results were
due in part to the Southern Commercial Convention.98
Men of the disunionist faction, which had dominated the later
sessions of the Southern Commercial Convention, claimed that the
convention has been a potent means of uniting the South, consol-
idating public opinion, and preparing the people for the crisis. It
had made Southern men more extensively acquainted with each
other, and had shown that, while they might disagree as to meas-
ures, they were one in purpose. The convention had also taught the
people that the South had resources sufficient to maintain herself
"May 20, 1858.
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as an independent nation. According to the Charleston Mercury,
one result of the convention was a knowledge that nothing could
be done in the Union to change the course of Southern commerce;
and "To know our condition, is the first great requisite for alter-
ing it."
99 These claims may be admitted with qualifications. The
meetings of the Southern Commercial Convention no doubt con-
tributed to the spread of disunion sentiment; but it was through
declamation rather than argument. They were conducive to pas-
sion and resentment rather than clear thinking and sound judg-
ment. While they brought men from widely separated states
together in a common cause, they also exposed to view the divi-
sions in Southern opinion, the discordant elements, the local
jealousies, and the inability of too many Southern men to rise
above petty politics. Finally, they countenanced the agitation of
a question, the reopening of the foreign slave trade, which bade
fair to wreck the disunion cause altogether. The Southern Com-
mercial Convention did not tend to put the disunion cause upon
a high plane.
Perhaps the chief significance of the Southern Commercial Con-
vention for the student of the period lies in the fact that a conven-
tion professing the purposes which it did, met year after year,
attracted a considerable degree of interest, and, as long as it re-
tained its original purpose of regenerating the South, commanded
the good will of a great majority of the Southern people.
M
May 16, 1858.
CHAPTER VI
ATTITUDE TOWARD PROTECTIVE LEGISLATION,
FEDERAL, STATE, AND LOCAL, 1840-1860
The attitude of the South upon the tariff was determined in the
main by the dominant economic interests of the section. The
South was practically unanimous in opposition to the Tariff of
1828. One state went to the extreme of declaring it and the amend-
ments of 1832 null and void. There was much sympathy with this
action in other Southern states, particularly Georgia. The South-
ern delegation in Congress was all but unanimous in voting for
the Compromise Tariff of 1833. At this period the demand for
protection came only from the hemp growers of Kentucky and
Missouri, the sugar planters of Louisiana, and mining interests in
Virginia and Maryland.
In the early years of its existence the Whig party in the South
was more strongly anti-tariff than the Democratic. As late as 1840
the party, because of divisions in its ranks, went before the coun-
try without committing itself upon the subject. In 1842, however,
Southern Whigs in Congress, with a few exceptions, were whipped
into line in support of the protective tariff measure of that year.
1
Again in 1844, during a presidential campaign in which Henry
Clay, the champion of the "American System," was the Whig
candidate, every Southern Whig member of the House of Repre-
sentatives but one voted against the McKay bill, which was sup-
ported by every Southern Democrat but one.2 The action of the
Whigs may be attributed chiefly to political considerations; South-
ern Whig leaders felt the need of a broadly national conservative
party, and recognized that it could be built only upon the basis
of compromise.
3 In 1842 the state of the public treasury impera-
tively demanded an increase in the revenues, so that the tariff of
that year could be plausibly defended as a revenue measure offer-
ing incidental protection by discriminatory schedules.
4 In 1844
'Cole, Whig Party in the South, 98, 99.
"Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i Sess., 622; NileS Register, LXVI, 177.
3
Cole, op. cit., loo; National Intelligencer, Jan. 4, 1844, letter of Wm. A.
Graham accepting the Whig nomination for governor of North Carolina; ibid.,
Jan. 13, letter from Wm. C. Rives; ibid., Jan. 20, Feb. 15, Mar. 7.
*National Intelligencer, Mar. 19, 1844, address to the people of Virginia on
the Tariff of 1842 by the Whig State Convention.
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repeal could be opposed upon the grounds that the revenues were
still required, and that the tariff was working well.5 Whigs pointed
to the signs of reviving prosperity after the panic of 1837 as evi-
dence that the tariff was not injuring the South. Furthermore,
they welcomed the cotton factories which were springing up here
and there throughout the Southern states as a justification of the
protective policy, and prophesied that soon the divergence of inter-
ests between the sections, upon which the division on the tariff
issue was based, would cease to exist.6 They charged the slow
progress of manufactures in the South to the hostility of the
Democratic party, and declared the absence of diversified indus-
try to be the cause of the declining prosperity which all deplored.
7
Southern Democrats in Congress were unanimous in opposing
the Tariff of 1842; but the majority at that time did not hold
extreme views. In 1843 Calhoun came forward as the free trade
and reform candidate for the Democratic nomination for the
presidency. Finding his chances poor, he wrote, early in 1844, a
letter announcing his withdrawal.
8 The section devoted to the
tariff was too extreme for his friends outside of South Carolina,
and at their request was modified before the letter was published.
9
The McKay bill, upon which an attempt was made to unite the
Democratic party in the summer of 1844, was a moderately pro-
tective measure.10 Although there was considerable dissatisfaction
with it among Southern Democrats, every Southern Democrat in
the House but one voted for it.11 When a faction in South Caro-
lina proposed to take the defeat of the McKay bill by the defec-
tion of twenty-seven Northern Democrats and the subsequent
publication of Folk's "Kane Letter," designed to hold Northern
tariff Democrats in line, as proof positive that no relief from the
'Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., I Sess., 511, 612; National Intelligencer, Aug. 6,
1844, quoting the Charleston Courier.
*Niles' Register, LXII, 71; LXVII, 132, quoting the Vicksburg Whig; Cong.
Globe, 28 Cong., i Sess., 512, Berrien, of Georgia, in the Senate.
'See ante, pp. 37-41.
*Works, VI, 239-54; National Intelligencer, Feb. 3, 1844.
"''But I soon found, it was altogether too high to be sustained by a large
portion; much the majority; and among them many of the most intelligent and
devoted." Calhoun to Jas. Edw. Calhoun, Feb. 14, 1844, Calhoun Correspond-
ence; Calhoun to Duff Green, Jan. 15, 1844.
K
Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i Sess., 369, text of the bill.
"Ibid., 28 Cong., I Sess., 622; Nlies' Register, LXVI, 177.
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burdens of protection could be expected from the Democratic
party, and sought to put the state again "upon its sovereignty,"
they received remarkably little sympathy outside their own state.
A correspondent of the Charleston Mercury wrote, "It is not to
be disguised that, out of South Carolina, the whole tariff battle
has to be fought over."
12 The Walker tariff, enacted in 1846 after
a sharp struggle, was by no means a free trade measure.13 Tea
and coffee were put on the free list; raw materials used in manu-
factures were taxed only five per cent; duties on most manufac-
tured articles were high enough to afford considerable incidental
protection to those engaged in their manufacture; whereas the
Compromise tariff of 1833 had recognized the principle of a hori-
zontal rate, the Walker tariff contained nine schedules. Upon the
whole, the bill was satisfactory to Southern Democrats. Senator
Haywood, of North Carolina, however, resigned his seat rather
than vote for it.14 He opposed it because it abandoned the prin-
ciples of the McKay bill, upon which the party had appealed to
the country; it broke faith with Northern Democrats; it would
not meet the demands for revenue created by the Mexican War;
it did not give sufficient notice to interests formerly protected; and
together with the independent treasury constituted too great a
revolution in the government's financial policy. On the other hand,
the bill was not revolutionary enough to satisfy some of the free
trade members from South Carolina and other cotton states, and
they voted for it only because they considered it a decided im-
provement over the Tariff of 1842, and because nothing better
could be secured. 15
The election of 1844 nac^ cut down materially the number of
Southern Whigs in Congress. With two exceptions in the House
and one in the Senate, they voted with their colleagues of the
North against the bill.18 After a few years Southern Whigs mani-
fested a disposition to acquiesce in the continuance of the Walker
tariff, and for several years the tariff was not an issue in Southern
politics. Whigs contended that in yielding opposition to the exist-
"Quoted in Niles' Register, LXVI, 435.
"Cf. Dewey, Financial History of the United States, 249-52.
"''Address of Honorable Wm. H. Haywood, Jr., to the people of North Car-
olina," etc., in National Intelligencer, Aug. 19, 1846; Niles' Register, LXX, 410-15.
"Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., i Sess., 1043, W. L. Yancey's speech in the House.
"Ibid., 1053, 1157.
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ing tariff they abandoned none of their principles; for, they said,
the duties were high enough to afford a fair degree of protection,
and protective principles were recognized. From time to time, par-
ticularly from the border states, there came restatements of the
arguments for a protective tariff and reaffirmations of the faith. In
1849, when the Southern people were interested in the possibility
of developing cotton manufactures, a suggestion from Hamilton
Smith, of Kentucky, that the Constitution should be amended to
permit the imposition of an export duty upon raw cotton was re-
ceived in some quarters with favorable comment. 17
As long as the tariff was a party issue the opponents of protec-
tion were inclined to oppose the introduction of manufacturing.
Men too often confused manufactures and protection, and in op-
posing the latter were led into hostility to the former. Calhoun,
indeed, always protested that he was not opposed to manufactures
as such,
18 and the same may be said of other leaders. But, in gen-
eral, there was a feeling that the establishment of diversified in-
dustry would take the edge from the anti-tariff sentiment. 19 The
advocates of diversified industry had to be very chary in asking for
fostering legislation, especially in Democratic states. They fre-
quently gave the assurance that the only thing needed in the way
of encouragement was liberal incorporation laws and freedom from
discriminatory taxation. It was difficult to secure even the passage
of general corporation laws. Corporations were unpopular in the
forties as a result of the experience of the previous decade with
banking institutions, in particular. In 1847-1848 the question of
granting liberal charters to corporations for manufacturing pur-
poses became a political issue in Georgia. Governor Crawford,
Whig, recommended such legislation. He was supported by the
Whig press and a portion of the Democratic press. Other Demo-
""I enclose you a letter of Ex. Pres. Tyler. The only objection he makes to
my first proposition is that it would act as a bounty to foreign cotton growers."
Smith to Hammond, Mar. 4, 1849, /. H, Hammond Papers. Cf. Smith to Ham-
mond, Aug. 14, 1849; DeBow's Review, VII, 48 ff. Smith's suggestion was first
made in two letters to the Louisville Journal. The idea was amplified by S. R.
Cockrill, a planter, of Tennessee. DeBow's Review, VII, 484-90; Western Journal
and Civilian, III, 95-106.
"Calhoun to Abbott Lawrence, May 13, 1845, Calhoun Correspondence;
Works, IV, 183-84.
"Niles' Register, LXVIII, 374 (Aug. 16, 1845), quoting Charleston Mercury.
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cratic organs, however, were persuaded that Crawford's sugges-
tions were parcel of a design to "quench the growing spirit of
Democracy everywhere," and "ride us down by the Massachusetts
policy of incorporated wealth, under the false plea of 'developing
our resources.'
"20 The general incorporation laws were enacted. 21
In 1850, Governor Seabrook, of South Carolina, wrote William
Gregg asking what measures he considered necessary for the en-
couragement of manufactures. Gregg replied that he considered
unnecessary and unwise any pecuniary aid from the state either
in the form of loans or otherwise. The only thing needed was the
"privileges and advantages granted in other states in the use of
associated capital." He told how cheaply goods were being made
in the Graniteville factory; this fact, he said, should "disarm all
opposition from those who fear that we may ultimately join the
Northern people in a clamor for protection ....
"22
After the Walker tariff had been in effect a few years, and the
tariff controversy had abated, opposition to diversified industry
on anti-protectionist grounds gave way to a considerable extent,
and many anti-tariff men and journals strongly supported the
movement to bring the spindles to the cotton and to diversify in-
dustry generally. Typical of their reasoning was the reply of the
Richmond Enquirer to a Whig contemporary's charge of incon-
sistency. Said the Enquirer: "We have never denounced home
industry. We have, however, steadily denounced that hot-bed
system of legislation, whose effect is to pamper one class at the
expense of all others, and especially, to foster the monopolies of
the North, which have flourished and grown fat upon the tribute
of the South. It was to benefit home manufactures and not to
destroy them that we opposed the tariff."
23 There was a common
element in the contention of the free traders that the tariff ben-
s
Hopkins Holsey, editor of the Athens [Georgia] Southern Banner, to Howell
Cobb, Dec. 3, 1847, Toombs, Stephens, Cobb Correspondence.
"DeBow's Review, XVII, 257.
22
Gregg to Seabrook, May 10, 1850, Whitemarsh B. Seabrook Papers. The
absence of general incorporation laws was not an insurmountable obstacle. Little
difficulty was experienced in getting special characters through the legislatures.
The session laws of the various states are full of such special legislation.
"July 23, 1850. James H. Hammond, who certainly could not be charged
with protective principles, carefully distinguished between manufactures and the
protective system. DeBoui's Review, VIII, 508.
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efited New England and Pennsylvania manufactures at the ex-
pense of Southern agriculture, and the contention of those
who labored for Southern industrial independence that it was the
manufacture of Southern staples and the sale to the Southern
people of numerous articles which should be produced at home
which strengthened and enriched the North while weakening and
impoverishing the South. Both arguments represented one section
as paying tribute to the other. This common element made it easy
for anti-tariff men to support efforts being made to diversify
Southern industry.
When the desirability from both the economic and political
viewpoints of making the South commercially and industrially
independent of the North was understood, it was inevitable that a
demand should arise for the protection of home enterprises against
Northern competitors. A tariff might protect American industries
from European competition; but more dangerous to the infant
industries of the South than foreign competition were the firmly
established industries of the North.
In fact, in the forties several Southern states intermittently dis-
criminated in their tax laws in favor of home manufactures. The
laws of Virginia in 1840 and a number of years thereafter ex-
empted articles made within the state from the tax on sales.24 By
act of 1843 South Carolina exempted from this tax "the products
of this State, and the unmanufactured products of any of the
United States or Territories thereof."25 Alabama also, by an act
of January 15, 1844, exempted articles manufactured within the
state from the tax on sales. 26 Taxation during the period was very
light, and these exemptions amounted to little. There were also
as many cases of exemptions of other classes of property from
taxation, for example, farm implements and mechanics' tools.
In the tariff debates of 1844 an^ 1846 anti-tariff men from the
South referred to the possibility of adopting a policy of state pro-
tection. "If the protective policy," said R. B. Rhett, "is wise and
just with foreign nations, it must be equally so between the States,
for there is far more intercourse and affinity of interest between
portions of the United States and foreign nations, than between
MActs of the General Assembly of Virginia, 1839-184.0, act of Mar. 3, 1840.
^National Intelligencer, Aug. 10, 1844, "Precept and Practice of South Car-
olina."
**Acts of the General Assembly of Alabama, 1843-1844, p. 65.
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different portions of the Union."
27
George McDuffie threatened,
in 1844, to resign his seat in the United States Senate, secure a
seat in the South Carolina legislature, and bring forward a propo-
sition to tax all manufactured goods brought into the state.
28
Seaborn Jones, of Georgia, also suggested that Southern states had
a remedy at hand for unjust taxation in "countervailing legisla-
tion, putting excise duties upon manufactured articles which have
not paid revenue duty to the Government."
29
During the political crisis of 1850 and thereabouts many pro-
posals were made in the South for non-intercourse with the North,
discriminatory taxation of Northern manufactures, exclusion of
Northern ships from Southern harbors, cessation of business and
pleasure trips to the North, withdrawal of subscriptions to North-
ern newspapers, and a number of other measures of the same
general character. They can be attributed chiefly to a desire to
retaliate against the anti-slavery party, to arouse the business
interests of the North to the necessity of curbing the abolition
agitation, and to teach the North the "money value of the Union";
but it was an added recommendation that these measures would
tend to promote commercial and industrial independence. J. C.
Calhoun wrote to public men throughout the South requesting
their views upon two lines of procedure for bringing the North to
a sense of justice. One was the assembling of a Southern conven-
tion, the other, retaliation against Northern states for unconstitu-
tional acts.30 In one of these letters he suggested that closing
Southern ports to Northern seagoing vessels would promote direct
trade with Europe.
31
In the Nashville Convention of 1850, retaliation was supported
by a minority as a proper measure to employ in case the North
did not grant justice to the South.
32 At the adjourned session,
November, 1850, the Tennessee delegation supported resolutions
"Cong. Globe, 28 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 658.
"NUei Register, LXVI, 230.
""Cong. Globe, 29 Cong., i Sess., 991.
""Wilson Lumpkin to Calhoun, Nov. 18, 1847; Joseph W. Lesesne to Calhoun,
Sept. 12, 1847; H. W. Conner to Calhoun, Nov. 2, 1848; Calhoun to John H.
Means, Apr. 13, 1849, Calhoun Correspondence.
"Benton, Thirty Years' View, II, 698-700, quotation from a letter from Cal-
houn to a member of the Alabama Legislature, 1847.
32
See above, pp. 73-76, for a discussion of the Nashville Convention.
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which accepted the recently adopted compromise, outlined the
line of conduct Northern states would be expected to pursue in
the future, and recommended that, in case this line should be
transgressed, the people of the South resort to the "most rigid
system of commercial non-intercourse" with all offending states,
cities, and communities. The legislatures of the several states were
invited to join in the recommendation. Counties, towns, and
neighborhoods were asked to adopt resolutions against purchasing
or using articles from offending Northern states or communities.
To make it possible to follow these recommendations, it was fur-
ther recommended that the states encourage their own mechanics
and manufactures, and push forward their internal improvements
to the seaboard.33
In Virginia such a remedy met with considerable favor. When,
after the passage of the Compromise of 1850, a disposition was
shown in the North, particularly in Boston, not to acquiesce in the
execution of the Fugitive Slave law, Virginians took fire, and a
strong sentiment for retaliation developed. The citizens of Prince
George County met for the purpose of forming a Southern rights
association.34 Resolutions were adopted pledging those present to
buy in the North no coarse cottons or woolens, ready made cloth-
ing, carriages, buggies, plows, axes, harness in general, nothing
which could be produced in the South or obtained from Europe.
The resolution furthermore pledged them to employ no Northern
teachers; to withdraw patronage from Northern schools, newspa-
pers, and books; to take no pleasure trips to the North; to buy of
no merchant or employ no mechanic not identified with the South;
and to employ no vessels owned or commanded by a North-
ern man or manned by a Northern crew.35 Similar associations
were formed in other counties.36 The most important and per-
manent of the Southern rights associations in the state was the
Central Southern Rights Association of Virginia, which was organ-
"National Intelligencer, Nov. 16, 19, 1850; A. V. Brown, Speeches, Congres-
sional and Political, etc., 318-21 (text of the resolutions );DuBose, Life and Times
of Yancey, 248; Speech of the Hon. Langdon Cheves in the Nashville Conven-
tion, p. 20.
"Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 15, 1850.
"Ibid., Nov. 20, Dec. 10, 1850.
*Ibid., Dec. 31, 1850.
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ized in Richmond in December, 1850," and continued in existence
until the outbreak of the Civil War. Some of the ablest and most
prominent men of Richmond and the state at large were members.
The members were pledged to "use all lawful and constitutional
means in our power to arrest further aggressions of the non-slave-
holding states," and to appeal to the legislature of the state to
enact such laws as were
"prudent and constitutional for effecting,
ultimately, commercial independence" of such states as by laws
or otherwise sought to prevent the execution of the Fugitive Slave
law.38 The first petition addressed by the association to the State
Legislature requested the passage of excise tax laws discriminating
in favor of articles of Virginia manufacture or of direct importa-
tion from abroad. Such taxation was believed to be the most
certain means of securing ultimately Virginia's commercial inde-
pendence and the safety of her property and institutions.39
A year earlier Governor Floyd had suggested discriminatory
taxation in a special message to the General Assembly.
40 In No-
vember, 1850, he introduced the subject in the state Constitutional
Convention.41 In his last message to the General Assembly, shortly
after, he again recommended it. 42 As a member of the Legislature
he championed a bill to impose a tax of five per cent on all goods
brought into the state for sale except direct imports.
43 The Dem-
ocratic press of the state generally supported the plan of discrim-
inatory taxation.
44 In the opinion of the Richmond Enquirer, it
would check the abolition movement in the North, "give tone and
strength to Southern manufactures, commerce and all the interests
of the South," and ward off disunion.45 The Enquirer charged the
Whigs with inconsistency in opposing Floyd's proposal while ad-
vocating a higher tariff.
46 The conservative press generally op-
"Richmond Enquirer, Dec. 10, 13, 17, 24, 31, 1850.
^Virginia Documents, 1850-1851, doc. LX, "Petition of the Central Southern
Rights Association of Virginia, and Accompanying Documents," p. 5.
w
lbid., doc. LX; DeBow's Review, XII, 109.
"Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 15, 1850.
"Ibid., Nov. 19, 1850.
Ibid., Dec. 3, 1850; Virginia Documents, 1850-1851, doc. I.
"Richmond Enquirer, Jan. 31, 1851.
"Ibid., Nov. 15, 22, 1850, quoting a number of Virginia newspapers.
"Dec. 13, 1850.
"Dec. 17, 1850.
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posed the plan.
47
They denounced it as calculated to lead to a
dismemberment of the Union and as "subversive of the true in-
terests of the Southern states." In the North it would not injure
the abolitionists but rather the friends of the South; for the
former were not engaged in commerce. It was said to be unconsti-
tutional; the National Intelligencer called it "another form of nulli-
fication."48 In opposing Floyd's proposal the Whigs resorted to
good free trade arguments : Virginia must depend upon the North
for materials with which to construct her internal improvements;
she could not rely upon her own resources. Were discriminatory
taxation imposed, the North would lose a market, and both sec-
tions would be sacrificed to the cupidity of England. The tax
would be paid by the consumer. 49 The Whigs were not, of course,
animated by any feeling of hostility to the cause of Southern com-
mercial and industrial independence.
Senator Berrien, of Georgia, a Whig, in public speeches ex-
pressed views similar to those of Governor Floyd. At Macon he
was reported to have said that he did not wish the Georgia Con-
vention to propose non-intercourse nor an import tax, as both
would be unconstitutional; but he thought it best to recommend a
measure by which Northern goods, after they had arrived in
Georgia and had been delivered into the hands of the merchants,
should be charged with a high and discriminatory tax. Such a
measure would encourage Georgia manufactures, greatly abridge
importations of Northern goods, and arouse the North to a sense
of the power of the South to protect herself.
50 In Alabama, South-
ern rights associations were formed, and resolutions adopted
similar to those adopted by the associations in Virginia. 51 In
Mississippi, members of the Southern rights party expressed them-
selves in favor of excluding by legislative enactment goods manu-
factured north of Mason and Dixon's line. 52
In South Carolina, after the passage of the Compromise of 1850,
public opinion was, as we have seen, widely divided in regard to
"Richmond Whig, Jan. 2, 22, Feb. 12, 1851; National Intelligencer, Dec. 9,
12, 17, 28, 1850.
*T)ec. 17, 1850, editorial.
"Richmond Whig, Jan. 2, 22, 1851.
""Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 15, 1850.
"Ibid., Nov. 22, 1850; DeBow's Industrial Resources, III, 122.
"'Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., I Sess., Appx. 284.
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the proper policy to be pursued. In the hope of unifying the
state, J. H. Hammond brought forward a "Plan of State Action,"
which, although not adopted, met with considerable favor.
63 He
proposed that the State Convention declare the right of secession;
prohibit citizens from holding Federal offices outside the state;
refuse to accept Federal appropriations for any purpose; impose
a double tax upon the property of non-residents; "as far as it
constitutionally may," impose taxes upon manufactures of non-
slaveholding states; encourage manufactures by granting liberal
charters to companies; encourage agriculture; and with state funds
"aid in the establishment of direct commercial intercourse with
foreign nations, by steamships adopted to purposes of war, in
case of need." Already Governor Seabrook had recommended the
encouragement of manufactures by liberal corporation laws54 and
the Legislature had discussed a proposal to levy discriminatory
taxation upon Northern goods.
55
A bill was introduced in the North Carolina Legislature, No-
vember, 1850, to impose a tax of ten per cent upon goods brought
into the state from non-slaveholding states after January i, i852.
56
The House of Commons adopted resolutions introduced by a Whig
member which declared57 that ( I ) North Carolina was absolved by
the abolition agitation from further obligation to protect Northern
manufactures by a tariff; (2) if North Carolina industries re-
quired protection, it could be "better effected by State than by
Congressional Legislation;" (3) the Walker tariff was high enough;
(4) and requested that members of Congress from North Carolina
vote against any increase. These resolutions were adopted by
votes of 105-2, 62-32, 75-18, and 84-8 respectively, Whigs as well
as Democrats composing the majorities.
68 Even before these reso-
**/. H. Hammond Papers, No. 22,198, a broadside printed by the Charleston
Mercury, accompanied by a note to the editors, dated April 29, 1851; Hammond
to Wm. Gilmore Simms, April 29, 1851; A. P. Aldrich to Hammond, May 16,
Nov. 10; Hammond to Simms, May 29, July i; Maxcy Gregg to Hammond,
Nov. 14, 1851. Edmund Ruffin to Hammond, Nov. 13, 1851.
^Richmond Enquirer, Dec. 3, 1850.
"National Intelligencer, Dec. 9, 12, 1850.
""Richmond Enquirer, Nov. 29, 1850.
"Richmond Whig, Jan. 17, 1851.
**Cong. Globe, 31 Cong., 2 Sess., Appx. 206, Thomas L. Clingman, in the
House, Feb. 15, 1851.
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lutions had been adopted, Southern Whig members of Congress,
particularly from North Carolina, had defeated attempts made in
the first session of the Thirty-first Congress to revise the tariff
upward in the interest, chiefly, of the Pennsylvania iron industry.59
The action of the North Carolina Whigs was indicative of a
marked falling off in tariff sentiment in the South. So staunch a
protectionist organ as the Richmond Whig wavered in its faith,
and warned manufacturers that they need not expect further pro-
tection.60 For several years after the attempt of the iron interest
in 1850 to secure higher duties, the tariff question was not before
Congress or the country except for occasional attempts of Southern
and Western congressmen to secure the remittance or repeal of
the duty on railroad iron. North as well as South came to ac-
quiesce in the Walker tariff, with the exception, in the South, of
men of the South Carolina school, who professed to find the Tariff
of 1846 oppressive, just as they had found that of 1842 to be.61
The Walker tariff, however, proved an excellent revenue pro-
ducing measure, receipts exceeded expenditures, and an accumu-
lating surplus in the treasury finally forced Congress to undertake
revision. A late attempt in the second session of the Thirty-third
Congress, March, 1855, failed;
62 but it was generally understood
that the next Congress must act. Contemporaneously, agitation
was started by extreme anti-tariff men in the South for the aban-
donment of the tariff system altogether and the substitution of
direct taxation. In the Southern Commercial Convention, Savan-
nah, December, 1856, resolutions were reported which pronounced
the tariff to be the cause of the decline of Southern commerce and
declared for absolute free trade and direct taxation.63 The reso-
lutions were not adopted, but were referred to a committee in-
structed to report at the next convention.
'"Cong. Globe, 31 Cong., i Sess., 1728, 1812, 1951; ibid., 31 Cong., 2 Sess.,
Appx. 206, Clingman's explanation of the action of North Carolina men.
""Jan. 17, Feb. 12, Mar. 19, 21, and 31, 1851.
61
Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., 2 Sess., 35, Woodward, of South Carolina, in the
House, Dec. 10, 1852.
62The House attached sections reducing the tariff as a rider to the Civil and
Diplomatic bill, the Senate struck them out. Ibid., 33 Cong., 2 Sess., 914, 1088,
1178.
"DeBow's Review, XXII, 92.
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The Tariff of 1857 was passed after short and rather desultory
debates in the House and Senate. The debates contained remark-
ably little of a sectional nature, and the only interests greatly dis-
satisfied were the iron manufacturers and the wool growers. The
bill as finally passed was written by Senator Hunter, of Virginia.
As did Secretary of the Treasury Guthrie, Hunter took a fairly
liberal attitude toward the manufacturing interests.
64 The rates
were somewhat lower than those of the Walker tariff. In one re-
spect, however, the bill was more in accord with protective prin-
ciples than the former act; it provided for free raw materials where
the demand was for manufactures. Cotton manufactures were
favored by leaving the duties nearly as high as those of the Tariff
of 1846. Some objection was raised by Southern members to the
enlarged free list. The only out-and-out free trade views expressed
came from South Carolina men. Senator A. P. Butler said, "Cotton
would rise to twenty cents tomorrow ... if we had no tariff."
65
Representative W. W. Boyce, of Charleston, declared for free
trade and direct taxation.66 Only two Southern congressmen
voted against the bill.
67 Outside Congress there was little dissatis-
faction except among the ultras. DeBow, for example, was at first
inclined to approve the measure as a step in the right direction,
but later found that "the manufacturers have again had a victory
in the adroit combinations made."68
The free trade faction in the South followed up this partial vic-
tory over protection by a general attack against every form of
protection and privilege granted by the Federal government. In
the Southern Commercial Convention, at Knoxville, August, 1857,
W. W. Boyce again brought forward the proposal for free trade
and direct taxation. A committee reported it adversely, while the
debate showed sharp divisions of opinion.69 A Virginia delegate
offered resolutions declaring that the merchant vessels of foreign
nations should be admitted to the United States coasting trade
"Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., Appx. 328 ff., speech in the Senate, Feb. 26,
1857; ibid., 36 Cong., i Sess., 3188.
K
Ibid., 34 Cong., 3 Sess., Appx. 350.
"Ibid., 34 Cong., 3 Sess., Appx. 215 ff.
"Ibid., 34 Cong., 3 Sess., 971; Appx. 358 (votes in the House and Senate).
"DeBow's Review, XXII, 381, 554.
"Ibid., XXIII, 305, 309, 310-15.
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upon the same footing as our own.
70
Roger A. Pryor, of Virginia,
secured the appointment of a committee to memorialize Congress
for the repeal of the fishing bounties, which benefited New Eng-
land particularly.
71 In the next session of Congress W. W. Boyce
secured the appointment of a select committee of the House to
inquire into and report upon a reduction of the expenditures of
the government, the navigation laws, the existing duties on im-
ports, and a resort exclusively to internal taxation. 72 As chairman
of the committee, Boyce brought in an able and elaborate report,
presenting all the free trade arguments.
73 Senator C. C. Clay, of
Alabama, attacked the fishing bounties, and secured the passage
through the Senate, 1858, of a bill repealing them.
74 He regarded
this action as but the initial step to the repeal of the "ship-build-
ing, coast-wise trade, and other monopolies now enjoyed by the
North to the wrong of the South." 75 The policy entered upon dur-
ing the preceding decade of subsidizing steamship lines by making
liberal contracts for carrying the mails was repeatedly attacked by
Southern Democrats led by Senator Hunter, of Virginia.76 After
June 14, 1858, no new contracts were made; finally, on October
I, 1859, notice was given of complete abrogation of existing con-
.
tracts.77
The Tariff of 1857 had been in operation but a few months when
the financial crash of that year occurred. Imports fell off greatly,
and shortly the treasury was confronted by a deficit. It soon be-
DeBow's Review, XXIII, 306, Fuqua, of Virginia.
"Ibid., XXIII, 307. The subject was not a new one. It had been brought
up in previous commercial conventions, and time and again in Congress. See,
e. g., ibid., XVII, 204, Ruffin in the Southern Commercial Convention in Charles-
ton, 1854.
"Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., I Sess., 509.
"DeBow's Review, XXV, 1-27; Charleston Mercury, June i, 4, 1858.
"Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., I Sess., 1930 ff., Clay's speech, May 4, 1858; ibid.,
35 Cong., i Sess., 2239, vote upon passage of the bill.
"C. C. Clay to VVm. Burwell, May 7, 1858, Wm. M. Burwell Letters. Cf.
DuBose, Life and Times of W. L. Yancey, 368 ff., quoting letter from Yancey
to Thomas J. Orme, May 22, 1858.
"Hunter's most famous speech on the subject is in Cong. Globe, 32 Cong.,
i Sess., 1147 ff. (April 21, 1852). He termed the policy the adoption of the
"protective system in one of its very worst forms."
"Bates, American Navigation: the Political History of Its Rise and Ruin,
346 (a table of mail subsidy legislation); U. S. Statutes at Large, Act of June
14, 1858.
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came apparent that another revision of the tariff would have to
be undertaken. The discussion then provoked revealed that in
certain quarters of the South the same feeling against the tariff
existed as had been displayed in 1832 and 1844. After the Kansas
question had been temporarily put at rest in the spring of 1858
by the passage of the English Bill, Senator Hammond told his
constituents that the state could now remain in the Union "with
honor." He gave warning, however, that an attempt would be
made in the next session of Congress to increase the tariff, and
declared that the
"plantation states should discard any govern-
ment" which adopted protection. "Unequal taxation is, after
all, what we have most to fear in this Union."78 A. P. Calhoun, in
an address in which he advocated secession, also put the tariff
foremost among the grievances of the South.79 In Georgia there
was a group of free traders, led by John A. Jones, who were as
violent in their opposition to the tariff as were those of South
Carolina. The Montgomery Daily Confederation thought free
trade had already "culminated into universal sanction and adop-
tion" in the Southern states, and pronounced "woe to the states-
man that should attempt to lend himself to any move to restore"
the protective system.
80
President Buchanan in his annual message, 1858, and Secretary
of the Treasury Cobb in his annual report, both recommended a
revision of the tariff; but the Democratic caucus considered it
inexpedient to make any changes in the tariff during the session.81
In the next Congress, the Thirty-sixth, the Republicans controlled
the House. Justin S. Morrill, of Vermont, reported a bill whose
level of rates was about equal to that of the Tariff of 1846, al-
though it was constructed more in accord with protective prin-
ciples.
82 The bill was passed over the opposition of the
Democrats.83 There was little sectionalism in the debates; few
Southern men spoke upon the bill. Several Southern Democrats
"Charleston Mercury, July 22, 1858, Feb. 3, 1859.
"DeBow's Review, XXVI, 476.
'"Feb. I, 1859.
"Montgomery Daily Confederation, Feb. 3, 1859.
si
Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., i Sess., 1830 ff.
"Ibid., 2056.
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declared their willingness to restore the Tariff of i846.
84 The
Democratic Senate postponed action upon the bill until the short
session, 1860-1861, when, after the secession of several Southern
states had withdrawn a number of senators from the opposition, it
was passed.
On the very eve of the Civil War, however, there still lingered
in some quarters of the South a sentiment for a protective tariff.
The Louisiana sugar planters persistently demanded protection.88
In Virginia, Tennessee, and North Carolina there were interests
which asked for governmental encouragement. Even in South
Carolina such men as Richard Yeadon, of the Charleston Courier,
and William Gregg retained their tariff views to the end.86 And
in general, it is safe to say, the South as a whole was not com-
mitted to free trade, but rather to a tariff for revenue with inci-
dental protection. Many Democratic leaders admitted the
propriety of discrimination in duties within the revenue limit.
Only in South Carolina, if, indeed, in any state, would a majority
have been willing to substitute internal taxation for duties upon
imports.
Nor can the general opposition to a high tariff, the agitation for
free trade, and the concerted attack upon monopolies, bounties,
and special privileges of all kinds be taken as proof that the
doctrine of laissez faire had come to prevail in the South more
than elsewhere. A protective tariff was opposed not only because
it fostered manufactures at the expense of the planting interests,
but also because the manufactures were in the North. Likewise,
the fishing bounties were opposed not only because they were
bounties, but also because they directly benefited only New Eng-
land. The navigation laws were objectionable to Southern men
not only because they enhanced freight rates in coastwise trade,
but also because the shipping industry which profited thereby was
almost a monopoly of the North. If we turn our attention to local
policies, we find about as much disposition in the South as else-
where to attempt by legislative enactments to modify the courses
capital and labor might take.
"Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., I Sess., 3187, Jefferson Davis in the Senate. Cf.
Charleston Mercury, Feb. 26, 1859, quoting Rep. Taylor of Louisiana.
"DeBow's Review, XXII, 320-25, 433-36; XXVI, 481.
**Ibid., XXX, 102 f., for an expression of Gregg's views.
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The policy of encouraging manufactures and direct trade by
levying discriminatory taxes upon goods manufactured in the non-
slaveholding states and upon articles imported from foreign coun-
tries through Northern ports, or by offering bounties or granting
exemption from taxation to home industries, was kept under ad-
visement in the South until secession. In the Southern Commercial
Convention in Charleston, 1854, General Tilghman offered in
behalf of the Maryland delegation a resolution that the legislatures
of the Southern states should encourage manufactures and com-
merce
"by the granting of bounties and all such other benefits and
privileges as the powers reserved and possessed by the States may
permit."
97 His arguments were strikingly similar to those which
might be employed in the advocacy of a protective tariff. The con-
vention appointed a committee upon the subject of promoting
"Southern and Western manufactures and mining operations,"
and recommended the encouragement of direct trade either by
exempting the goods imported from taxation or by allowing direct
importers an equivalent drawback or bounty.88 D. H. London,
president of the Central Southern Rights Association of Virginia
thought: "If there were absolute free trade, Southern ports would
soon surpass the North, not only in commerce but in industry and
arts." Since, however, it was impossible to secure free trade, he
thought the state legislatures should place an excise tax upon in-
direct imports.
89
In Georgia, in 1854, a proposal was being discussed to exempt
from taxation property of corporations engaged in manufactur-
ing.
90 At the same time, Nelson Tift, of the Albany Patriot, and
others were advocating as a purely retaliatory measure the imposi-
tion of a tax of one hundred per cent upon the sale of goods from
states which did not observe their constitutional obligations.
91 A
Democratic party convention, 1855, unanimously adopted resolu-
tions requesting the Legislature to enact effective retaliatory
measures.92 Somewhat different was the proposal submitted by
"DeBow's Review, XVII, 255.
Ibid., XVII, 254, 258.
""Charleston Courier, Mar. 16, 1854, D. H. London to F. W. Connor.
"DeBow's Review, XVII, 257.
n
lbid., XVII, 399; Savannah Republican, Dec. 25, 1856.
"Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, 183.
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Robert Toombs to the Southern Commercial Convention in
Savannah the following year.93 He proposed to secure direct trade
"by imposing a State tax of per cent, ad valorem upon all goods,
wares, and merchandise offered for sale within the State, other
than those which shall be imported from foreign countries." The
rate should be high enough to prevent all indirect importations of
foreign merchandise and "to raise sufficient revenue for all the
wants of the State, without imposing upon the people any capita-
tion or other direct tax whatever."
"Levy our taxes on con-
sumption," he said; "it can be more easily paid; we shall then
fill our treasury to the extent of our wants, protect ourselves
against the unjust legislation of our sister States, bring direct
trade to our ports, give profitable employment to our capital and
labor, educate our people, develop all our resources, and build up
great, powerful, and prosperous commonwealths, able to protect
the people from all dangers from within and from without." Such
a tax, with the exemption of direct imports, would be constitution-
al, he said, and could be easily collected. This plan, it will be
observed, did not call for discriminatory taxation upon sales of
Northern made goods; it would have operated as hardly upon
Georgia manufactures as upon those of New England. Toomb's
proposal was not widely endorsed.
94
The Southern Commercial Convention which met at Richmond,
January, 1856, adopted by acclamation a resolution recommending
the release of direct importations from license fees.95 About the
same time ex-Governor Floyd introduced a bill in the Virginia
House of Delegates providing for an excise tax upon goods
brought into the state for sale except goods directly imported from
abroad.96 Attacks were made upon the merchants' license tax and
the tax on sales, which were imposed both by the state and mu-
nicipal governments.
97 These taxes were said to act as bounties to
induce retail merchants to go outside the state to purchase their
stocks; for if they bought of home jobbers who, in turn, bought
*3DeBow's Review, XXII, 102 ff. The latter was headed, Washington, Ga.,
Dec. 6, 1856.
"Savannah Republican, Dec. 22, 25, 1856, quoting other journals.
mDeBow's Review, XX, 351.
""Richmond Enquirer, Feb. 16, 20, Mar. 14, 1856.
"Ibid., March 2, 5, 1856, letters signed "Junius."
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of Virginia importers, the consumers paid the taxes three times,
whereas if the retailers bought in states where no such taxes were
levied, the consumers paid the taxes only once.
98 The Finance
Committee of the House of Delegates was dominated by the plant-
ing interests of the tidewater region, and proposals for tax reform
met little favor." However, a provision was included in the tax
bill of 1856 allowing the importing merchant a deduction from the
amount of sales on which he paid license tax equal to the value of
the goods imported by him plus the duties paid upon them.100
This was not a very considerable concession; for a sales tax upon
imported goods sold in the original packages was unconstitu-
tional.101 .
After the John Brown Raid at Harper's Ferry, October, 1859,
the Central Southern Rights Association of Virginia became active
again.
102 In a memorial to the General Assembly it presented
commercial independence as the "means of remedy and redress"
for the grievances of the South. The memorialists asked that the
pilot fees be decreased upon vessels owned in Virginia and upon
vessels from foreign nations and increased upon Northern vessels
engaged in the coasting trade. They would give bounties for
direct importations of goods most needed within the state. They
recommended that importing merchants be reimbursed for duties
paid and exempted altogether from the license tax.
103 In response
to the memorial the House of Delegates passed a bill exempting
direct importations from all sales taxes. It was defeated in the
Senate, largely by the votes of members from districts having the
largest slave populations.
104 An act of February 29, 1860, exempted
DeBow's Review, XX, 623; ibid., XXVIII, 316, argument of D. H. Lon-
don, president of the Central Southern Rights Association of Virginia, before
the General Assembly.
"Richmond Enquirer, Feb. 20, 21, 1856, Report of the Finance Committee,
Muscoe R. H. Garnett, Chairman.
100
Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia, 1855-1856, act of Jan. 5, 1856. A
similar provision was in the tax act of Mar. 30, 1860.
10IBrown vs. Maryland, 12 Wheaton, 419; DeBow's Review, XXVIII, 178.
""Ibid., XXVIII, 356-7.
Ibid., XXVIII, 173-182. Cf. ibid., XXVIII, 314-324, "Argument of D.
H. London before the General Assembly of Virginia"; ibid., XXIX, 466-88, "Com-
mercial, Agricultural, and Intellectual Independence of the South," by D. H.
London.
Ibid., XXIX, 471, 472.
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vessels four-fifths owned in Virginia from the payment of pilot
fees.105 But so difficult was it to secure fostering legislation that
an enactment ambitiously entitled an "Act to Encourage Direct
Foreign Trade" provided only for the exemption of Virginia flour
from the small inspection fees if exported in ships four-fifths owned
in Virginia.
106
In other Southern states, legislation similar to that proposed in
Georgia and Virginia was advocated. Louisiana, by act of the
Legislature, March 18, 1852, offered a bonus of five dollars per
ton for every ship of over one hundred tons built in the state.
107
There was sentiment in the state for the extension of aid in a
similar manner to other industries.108 The Alabama Legislature
exempted the sale of all foreign goods directly imported into the
Southern states from any description of state, county, or city tax-
ation.109 South Carolina exempted goods imported in vessels
owned in the state from taxation while in the hands of the im-
porters.
110 In Mississippi discriminatory taxation was advocated
both as a means of retaliation against Northern aggression and of
promoting direct trade and developing manufactures. 111 In Ten-
nessee there was discussion of the desirability of liberalizing the
tax laws.112 - Tennessee and South Carolina appropriated money
in aid of mechanics' institutes whose purpose was to encourage
manufactures and the mechanic arts.113 The legislatures of North
Carolina, Alabama, Mississippi, and Arkansas took a first step
toward developing the mineral resources of those states by pro-
viding for geological surveys.
114
of the General Assembly of Virginia, 1859-1860, p. 145.
Ibid., 167, act of Mar. 31, 1860.
Acts of the Legislature of the State of Louisiana, etc. 129. The act was
somewhat modified three years later. Act of Mar. 15, 1855.
108New Orleans Picayune, Jan. 17, 1858; Kettell, Southern Wealth and North-
ern Profits, 66. .
lwDeBow's Review, XXVIII, 492.
""Richmond Enquirer, Mar. 24, 1854, Mar. 5, 1856.
DeBow's Review, XXIX, 233-6, 545-61; Charleston Mercury, Nov. 24,
1859, message of Governor McWillie, of Mississippi, Nov. 8.
"'Republican Banner and Nashville Whig, Oct. 6, 1856, message of Governor
Andrew Johnson.
"'DeBow's Review, XXIX, 499.
Ibid., XXIV, 403 ff.; XVII, 677 ff.; XXVII, 350.
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The sum total of protective legislation enacted in the South,
either in the form of discriminatory taxation upon Northern goods,
exemption of home manufactures and direct imports from state
taxation, or in the form of bounties, was small. The fact cannot,
however, be taken without qualification as due to the prevalence
of free trade opinions. Discriminatory taxation was advocated
as a mode of retaliation for the aggressions of the North as well
as a measure of political economy. It was a remedy decidedly
unfriendly to the North, subversive of one of the primary pur-
poses of the Constitution, and likely to disturb the peace between
the sections and lead to disunion. It was extremely doubtful that
laws could be so framed as not to be held in violation of the
Federal Constitution and, for that matter, the constitutions of
some of the Southern states. Such measures were opposed by
moderate men who were trying to allay sectional feeling rather
than aggravate it, as well as by bona fide free traders who might
have been content with their political significance. Furthermore,
measures of discriminatory taxation or of non-intercourse would
have been unsuccessful unless taken in concert by a number of
states. Charleston and Savannah, for example, were rivals for
much the same territory; discriminatory taxation in one's state
and not in the other's might have put the cities upon unequal
terms.115
State and local encouragement of desired industries by loans,
bounties, and tax exemptions were not objectionable from the
political standpoint, though their efficacy may be doubted. That
they were not employed to a greater extent was partly due to the
fact that the Southern people put the building of internal im-
provements first in their programs for developing the South. Taxes
had to be increased to meet the growing expenditures on their
account, and the people of the South were not accustomed to
heavy taxation. In the case of manufactures and mining, there
was no considerable class directly and primarily interested in
securing protective legislation. The influence of directly interested
parties was further lessened because they were generally Northern
men or foreigners. State legislatures were too frequently controlled
1U
C. G. Memminger, Commissioner to Virginia, in an address to the Virginia
Legislature, 1860. DeBow's Review, XXIX, 770. Also in Capers, Life and Times
of Memminger, 247 ff.
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by professional politicians, and their time monopolized by consid-
eration of national issues and policies to the sacrifice of state
interests.
As far as principles and theories are concerned, it was not a
very far cry from the advocacy of fostering commerce and indus-
try by discriminatory taxation or by granting bounties and draw-
backs to the advocacy of the extension of public credit or of
capital in aid of steamship lines to Europe or other enterprises.
It should not be forgotten that Southern commercial conventions,
even those in which most was said about free trade, were con-
stantly calling upon the state and Federal governments to grant
financial aid to projects for promoting the objects of the conven-
tions. And, in relation to laissez faire and free trade doctrines,
what shall be said of state and municipal aid to railroads and
other internal improvements? Every Southern state lent aid to
internal improvements.
116
Virginia was almost bankrupt by her
loans. After 1852 Tennessee extended aid to the extent of $8,000
per mile to every mile of railroad built within her limits.
117
Georgia, in addition to aiding the construction of other roads,
built, owned, and operated a railroad from Atlanta to the Ten-
nessee line, near Chattanooga. North Carolina followed a very
liberal policy.
118 So also, did Louisiana and Mississippi. Texas
offered liberal grants of public lands. By no means least in the
extent of financial aid to internal improvements was that free
trade state, South Carolina. No city in the South voted more
money to further the construction of railroads than did Charleston.
It is true, state aid to internal improvements met with opposition
in the South; but the alignment upon the question by .no means
coincided with the alignment upon the tariff, Federal aid to in-
ternal improvements, or Federal subsidies and bounties, although
there was a tendency in that direction. In Virginia the Demo-
cratic party was in power when the immense debt was contracted
116
It is impossible to develop this subject here. For brief accounts, see
Million, J. W., State Aid to Railroads in Missouri, ch. VI; DeBow's Review,
XX, 386-389.
UTThe Commissioner of Railroads reported in October, 1857, that the state's
obligations to railroads were about $16,000,000. Hunt's Merchants' Magazine,
XXXVIII, 243.
"The railroad debt of North Carolina in 1860 was 8.833,305. DeBow's
Review, XXIX, 245.
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for aiding railroads, turnpikes, and other internal improvements.
In North Carolina the Democrats were in power when aid to rail-
roads was voted upon the largest scale; in fact, after 1848 the
Democratic party was recognized as being more favorable to the
policy of state aid than the Whig. Texas, Mississippi, and Arkan-
sas were overwhelmingly Democratic during the fifties; yet all had
internal improvement programmes. Alabama, partly because of
her peculiar geographical divisions, lent no aid to railroads, and
not a great deal to any form of improvements; but there was a
strong sentiment for state aid. In 1855 a nearly defunct Whig
party almost won the state election by raising the issue.119 Mobile
lent heavily to the construction of the Mobile and Ohio railroad.
Only one degree removed from the proposals to encourage in-
dustry and commerce by legislation were the innumerable pleas ad-
dressed to the people to patronize home industries and enterprises,
to buy Southern-made in preference to Northern-made goods, to
purchase from Southern jobbers and importers rather than from
Northern, to hire Southern teachers and mechanics wherever pos-
sible, to use school books published in the South, to patronize
home literature, to cease sending their youth to Northern. colleges,
and to visit Southern rather than Northern pleasure resorts. Every
one of these pleas asked the individual, either directly or by im-
plication, to sacrifice his own immediate profit or preference to the
supposed public good. And all admitted the propriety of appeals
for patronage of home industry. Every Southern commercial con-
vention, when the members could not agree upon more effective
plans for promoting its objects, fell back upon resolutions appeal-
ing to the people to patronize home enterprises; for upon such
resolutions all could agree.
There were many, indeed, in the South who believed patronage
of home industry to be the most efficacious means for achieving
economic independence. An associate justice of the Supreme Court
of Alabama said the efforts made to promote direct trade and
manufactures had begun at the wrong end; the demands for the
goods should be created first, and the steamship lines and fac-
tories would follow. Let the people resolve to buy nothing made
or grown in the North if they could buy a substitute made or
grown elsewhere; let them resolve to buy nothing imported into
""DuBose, Life and Times of Yancey, 311.
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a Northern port if they could buy a substitute imported into a
Southern port.
120 A letter of a Charleston mercantile house ex-
pressed the opinion that little could be effected by legislative
enactments "as long as we are in the Union; a non-intercourse law
will be a dead letter, and bounties of goods of direct importation
will not result in any large increase in importations." What was
necessary was a determination on the part of the people to patron-
ize Southern merchants.121 There was much impatience with the
magnificent schemes which some men, particularly in the Southern
Commercial Convention, were bringing forward for achieving the
regeneration of the South, and the advice was given to pay more
attention to little things. "Great steamships, and grand expan-
sions, and magnificent speeches will do well enough, but there are
little things, and a thousand of them, too, which might have a
little attention, and perhaps lead to some small advantages. Could
there not be some purpose, some real resolution to encourage not
only by precept, but by example, a little home industry?"122
William Gregg, protectionist though he was, put Southern pat-
ronage of Southern imports and domestic industry foremost as a
measure for promoting direct trade and manufactures.
123 He sug-
gested the formation of societies and clubs for practising and
preaching patronage of home industries.124 He charged that the
people preferred Northern-made articles because they were North-
ern-made.125 Women did not consider themselves in fashion un-
less their clothing came from New York. There was "a rage for
cheap Yankee goods." Merchants who handled Southern-made
goods had to conceal their origin. The failure of so many South-
ern cotton factories during the hard years following 1849, he at-
tributed largely to the want of home patronage.126
Gregg was not alone in his complaints. Fifty-eight Charleston
importing and jobbing houses ran an advertisement in the papers
in the form of an address to the merchants of the South and South-
lMDeBotv's Review, XXIX, 104-107.
Ibid., XXVIII, 589.
Ibid., XXIV, 573 (taken from a Virginia paper).
12
*Gregg, "Southern Patronage to Southern Imports and Domestic Industry,"
in ibid., July, 1860, to Feb., 1861.
iu
lbid., XXX, 222.
iaSee especially ibid., XXIX, 629, 776.
"'Ibid., XXX, 102.
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west. They urged their claims for the patronage and custom of
merchants of the interior, and begged them to "lay aside the
prejudice (for it is only a prejudice) that your customers prefer
goods from New York to those from Charleston . . ,"127 Norfolk
merchants advertised goods as "just from the North."
128 The plaint
was made that "The very men who most vehemently abuse the
Yankees and their humbugs, are generally the first to contradict
their own doctrines . . . ." The city council of Charleston sent to
Troy, New York, for a fire alarm bell, although one could be pro-
cured at home. Charleston mechanics were greatly aroused over
the incident.129 Individuals protested against the continual harp-
ing upon Southern dependence; instead of advertising weaknesses
they proposed to tell of possessions and possibilities. Occasionally
journals of the Southern Rights persuasion declared their desire
to publish only Southern advertising matter. The results were
disappointing; their columns continued to be filled with Northern
advertising. DeBow rather bitterly remarked that he was con-
vinced the South had nothing to sell.130
These constant appeals to individuals to patronize home indus-
tries and home importing merchants were unobjectionable, but
could not be otherwise than ineffectual except, possibly, during
short periods of great excitement of the public mind.
After the John Brown Raid at Harper's Ferry a determination
was expressed on all sides to practise stern and uncompromising
non-intercourse with the North as the best means of silencing the
abolitionists and teaching the North the money value of the Union.
The governors of several states recommended throwing Southern
ports open to the world and levying high excise taxes upon North-
ern made goods. The legislatures of Virginia and Tennessee
adopted resolutions pledging the enactment of effective measures
of retaliation.131 Southern travel in the North fell off. Many
Northern teachers and agents were driven from the South. Oc-
casional business firms cancelled orders for Northern goods.
Northern firms reported a falling off in their Southern business,
'"Charleston Mercury, Dec. 17, 1859.
I38W. S. Forest, Sketches of Norfolk, 410.
129Charleston Mercury, June I, 1858.
DeBow's Review, XXII, 555, 556; XXVIII, 124, 493.
XXIX, 559.
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and the business interests of the Northern states became
alarmed.132 Citizens of Baltimore hastened to declare Baltimore
ready to take the place of more northern cities as a commercial
center for the South.133 Southern men did not fail to note that the
ill feeling between the sections operated as a form of protection
to home industries. "Let non-intercourse be established, and how
easy it will be for Georgia to supply half of the Southern States
with plantation goods such as she now manufactures."
134 Mer-
chants were advised to take advantage of the excited state of the
public mind to establish direct trade.135
The South produced no Horace Greeleys or Henry C. Careys;
but a discussion of free trade versus protection in the South would
be incomplete without mention of George Fitzhugh, of Virginia.
A lawyer by profession, he took up his pen, about 1850, to defend
the South and slavery. He proved himself a bold, ingenious,
learned, and prolific, though quite eccentric and erratic, writer.
The South conceded him a place alongside Dew, Harper, Ham-
mond, and Stringfellow as a Southern apologist. With his defense
of slavery and his attack upon free society, with its exploitation of
labor by capital, we are not here directly concerned. Although
not consistently, he was generally aligned with those who believed
the South should diversify industry, build up cities and towns, con-
struct internal improvements, and conduct her own commerce. He
was particularly interested in improving Southern education, both
secondary and primary, and in developing Southern literature and
"Southern thought."
Fitzhugh repudiated laissez jaire, and declared the world "too
little governed." Fitzhugh believed in small nations. He repeated-
ly depicted the evils of centralization, not only of government but
also of commerce, industry, finances, and literature. He dedicated
his Cannibals All to the Honorable Henry A. Wise, because "I am
acquainted with no one . . . who has seen so clearly the evils of
centralization from without, and worked so earnestly to cure or
'"Charleston Mercury, Dec. 29, 1859, quoting the Boston Commercial Bul-
letin; Wolfe, Helper's Impending Crisis Dissected, 128 ff., 164-6, quoting North-
ern papers.
lssDfBow's Review, XXVIII, 331, quoting the Baltimore Prices Current.
"'Wolfe, Helper's Impending Crisis Dissected, 129.
DeBow's Review, XXX, 223.
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avert those evils by building up centralization within."
136 And
centralization without, he declared to be the "daughter of that
Southern goddess, Free Trade." The free traders were "old fogies,
sitting like an incubus on the South."
137 The disease under which
the South suffered was free trade free trade with the North. The
protection Fitzhugh demanded was against the North, not against
Europe. He agreed with Southern free traders that a protective
tariff imposed by the Federal government would be unconstitu-
tional. He thought a revenue tariff afforded ample incidental
protection against foreign nations; it was sufficient to enable the
North to almost monopolize the Southern market. When the re-
sults of the elections of 1858 threatened the enactment of a pro-
tective tariff, he suggested that state protection could neutralize
and
"peaceably and lawfully nullify federal protection." Fitzhugh
would not wait for the South to unite upon measures of protec-
tion, but have each state take such individual action as it saw
fit.
138 When non-intercourse was suggested, he espoused it. "Dis-
union within the Union," as he termed it, would "lead at once to
direct trade encourage, promote, and build up, Southern com-
merce, manufactures, agriculture, education, etc.," and make the
South independent at the same time it was bringing the aboli-
tionists to terms.139 He considered disunion to be a measure that
would put an end to free trade with the North; but as late as the
middle of 1859, at least, was inclined to prefer the "State protec-
tive or taxing system" because it was "safer than disunion, equally
efficient, and," so he said, "involves no breach of the constitu-
tion."140
It did not escape Fitzhugh's notice that the South had largely
abandoned, if she had ever practised, a let-alone policy. "For
twenty years past," he said, "the South has been busy in protect-
13
*Cannibals All, or Slaves Without Masters, Richmond, 1857. In addition to
this work Fitzhugh wrote, Sociology for the South, or the Failure of Free Socie-
ties; Slavery Justified (pamphlet, 1849); and numerous articles for DeBow's Re-
view and other periodicals.
""DeBow's Review, XXVI, 659, 662. See Sociology for the South, especially
chs. I, XIV.
188
Fitzhugh's views upon state protection are concisely set forth in an article,
"State Rights and State Remedies," DeBow's Review, XXV, 697-703.
""Ibid., XXVIII, 7, article entitled ''Disunion Within the Union."
lto
lbid., XXVI, 661.
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ing, encouraging, and diversifying Southern industrial pursuits,
Southern skill, commerce, education, etc." Fitzhugh was not far
from the truth when he said: "The South has not only adopted
the protective policy, but, strange to say, the editors, legislators,
and statesmen, who are loudest in professing free trade doctrines,
are, invariably, the warmest advocates of exclusive and protective
state legislation." And there was also a measure of truth in the
statement: "Southern commercial conventions are composed of
this class of men, who are actively at work in endeavoring to en-
courage, direct, and control Southern pursuits, by legislation and
all other feasible means, while they profess to be par excellence
free trade men. . . . "141
From this survey of their attitude toward protective tariffs
and state and local measures to encourage industry and commerce,
1840-1860, we may conclude that just prior to secession the South-
ern people were by no means thoroughly committed to laissez faire.
With regard to duties upon foreign imports, while a respectable
minority wanted absolute free trade, the great majority favored
a tariff for revenue with incidental protection. The sentiment for
protection would have been stronger had it not been for the con-
viction that, while North and South were bound together in the
Union, tariffs would redound almost wholly to the advantage of
the former. In case the South should become independent, a con-
siderable protectionist party might be expected to develop.
DeBow's Review, XXV, 699-701.
CHAPTER VII
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE DISUNION
MOVEMENT, 1852-1860
After the defeat of the disunion movement of 1850-1851 the
disunionists were comparatively quiet for a few years. The strug-
gles over slavery were temporarily abated. All parties seemed to
turn with more or less earnestness to efforts to see whether some-
thing could not be done in an organized way to hasten the economic
and social progress of the South a policy which Unionists had
earlier supported as a substitute for disunion. It was during this
short period that the Southern Commercial Convention was insti-
tuted, and went about its work with a hope of accomplishing re-
sults. Meanwhile, however, the Southern Rights wing strengthened
its control of the reunited Democratic party. In doing this it was
aided materially by the Pierce administration. In his distribution
of the patronage Pierce tried to conciliate the Southern Rights
faction, and failed to recognize the more conservative element.
He submitted himself largely to the guidance of the radical South-
ern leaders in the formulation of policies. Meanwhile, too, the
Whig party began to dissolve.
In 1854 the lull in the quarrel over slavery was rudely inter-
rupted by the repeal of the Missouri Compromise the motives
of which we shall not pause to discuss. The repeal served as the
occasion for the organization of a sectional party in the North,
which in turn reacted to strengthen the hands of the extremists in
the South. The Kansas troubles and the presidential campaign of
1856, with its threat of the election of the candidate of a sectional
party, called forth again threats of disunion, and once more the
subject was canvassed in all its aspects. From this time on little
reserve was shown in expressing disunion sentiments.
The session of the Southern Commercial Convention held in
Savannah a month after the election showed unmistakably the
growth of disunion sentiment, and proved to be the last controlled
by the conservative element; its successors were little more than
gatherings of disunionists. A large proportion of the representa-
tive newspapers of the South, especially of the cotton states, openly
and almost constantly advocated disunion. The Richmond En-
quirer, in the summer of 1857, complained that the Charleston
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Mercury "does nothing from year's end to year's end but to an-
nounce the speedy dissolution of the Union."
1 Among others
scarcely less open in their advocacy of disunion were, not to men-
tion South Carolina journals, the Richmond Examiner, Roger A.
Pryor's Richmond South, the Columbus (Georgia) Corner Stone,
the Mobile Register, the Mobile Mercury, the Montgomery Ad-
vertiser and Gazette, the New Orleans Crescent, the New Orleans
Delta, the Vicksburg True Southron, and the Memphis Appeal.
J. D. B. DeBow had by this time become an avowed disunionist,
and DeBow's Review was disunionist in the whole tendency of its
teaching. The Review had some quite able writers among its con-
tributors, had won for itself a considerable circulation and much
prestige, and exercised great influence in the South. The avowed
secessionists in Congress had come to be a considerable group,
which included Miles, Keitt, and Bonham, of South Carolina,
Iverson, of Georgia, Roger A. Pryor, of Virginia, John A. Quit-
man, J. D. McRae, Reuben Davis, and Barksdale, of Mississippi,
C. C. Clay and J. L. Pugh, of Alabama, and Wigfall, of Texas.
Many who did not publicly avow themselves secessionists were
known to lean strongly in that direction. Outside of Congress
were dozens of men of reputation and influence, most conspicuous
of whom was William Lowndes Yancey, of Alabama, who devoted
their best energies to advancing the cause of disunion. Through
public agitation and discussion and the later meetings of the
Southern Commercial Convention,2 through private conferences
and the wide correspondence carried on by various individuals
some unsuccessful attempts were made at organization3 the dis-
unionist leaders in the several states became acquainted with each
other, came to have a good understanding of the state of public
*August 13.
^Edmund Ruffin's Diary gives a good understanding of the way in which the
Southern Commercial Convention, aside from the formal meetings, was used to
promote the cause. See entries covering the session at Montgomery, which Ruffin
attended.
'League of United Southerners. Hodgson, Cradle of the Confederacy, 393-
396; DuBose, Life and Times of Yancey, 377; Charleston Mercury, Aug. 3, 1858;
Montgomery Daily Confederation, May 21, 1859, quoting an editorial in the
Mobile Mercury; DeBow's Review, XXV, 250.
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sentiment in all quarters of the South, and strove to approach an
agreement in regard to the proper policies to be pursued.
4
Disunionists frankly expressed their hope that a pretext could
be found which would precipitate the cotton states into a revolu-
tion. 5 Their desire to make an issue in part explains the agitation
for repealing the laws against the foreign slave trade. When the
Southern members in Congress compromised the Kansas question,
in April, 1858, by accepting the English bill, several prominent
disunionists expressed their disappointment that an issue had not
been made.6 Finally, the issue was presented when, largely
through the agency of the disunionists, the Democratic party was
split in twain at Charleston and Baltimore, and the triumph of a
sectional party made inevitable.
The discussion of disunion during the several years preceding
the actual launching of the experiment left no phase of the subject
untouched. Every possible angle of the question was explored-
the ability of the Southern states to support a separate govern-
ment; the probability of their being permitted to secede without
war; the attitude the border states would take in case the cotton
states should secede; the most desirable boundary line; the di-
vision of the territories; the policies the new confederacy should
pursue with respect to commerce with the North and Europe, the
tariff, the navigation of the Mississippi, the Pacific railroad, immi-
gration, the slave trade, expansion of the confederacy to the south-
ward, and the military establishment; the effect of dissolution
*In a letter to Roger A. Pryor, Yancey said he did not expect Virginia to
take the initiative. "Her position as a border state, and a well considered South-
ern policy (a policy which has been digested and understood and approved by
some of the ablest men in Virginia, as you yourself must be aware) would seem
to demand that, when such movement takes place by any considerable number
of Southern states, Virginia .... should remain in the Union." Hodgson, op. cit.,
397; National Intelligencer, Sept. 4, 1858.
"W. L. Yancey to James S. Slaughter, June 15, 1858, in Hodgson, op. cit.,
393; DuBose, Yancey, 376.
"Yancey to Thos. J. Orme, May 22, 1858, in Montgomery Daily Confedera-
tion, June S, 1858; DuBose, Yancey, 366-75; M. L. Bonham, of South Carolina,
in the House of Representatives, June 9, Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., I Sess., Appx.
509-11. A correspondent of the Charleston Mercury wrote of the Southern Com-
mercial Convention at Montgomery: "I have not met a single man except the
Virginians who approves the late compromise in Kansas." May 15, 1858.
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upon the prosperity and development of the South as a whole and
of particular classes, interests, and localities.
The various arguments in favor of disunion did not appeal with
equal force to all disunionists. Many emphasized the greater se-
curity of slavery in a separate republic and the freedom from the
quarrels over slavery, which seemed interminable in the Union;
and there can be no doubt that, could the slavery quarrel have
been hushed, and the issue amicably settled, disunion sentiment
would never have reached alarming proportions or have been
translated into action. Others were prone to contemplate the
glories of a great republic stretching from the Ohio to Panama and
encircling the Gulf of Mexico. Others were influenced by the
possibility of reopening the foreign slave trade. Too many poli-
ticians, it must be said, felt that their political careers had been
blighted in the Union, and hoped for better fortune in the nar-
rower confines of a Southern confederacy. But almost all dis-
unionists believed, or professed to believe, that the South in the
Union was being exploited economically for the benefit of the
North; that the Southern states had somehow become tributary
provinces of the Northern; that Northern wealth largely repre-
sented the product of Southern labor; and that, could the Southern
states but cut loose from their Northern connections and be per-
mitted to work out their own destiny in their own way, their
prosperity would be greater and their development quickened.
The arguments advanced in support of these propositions were
similar to those used in 1850 and 1851, but had been modified to-
some extent by circumstances. Since that time there had been
much discussion of diversification of industry and development of
varied resources; commercial conventions had been held and
public opinion educated; and various plans for regenerating the
South had been tried or proposed, and, in general, had failed.
Whereas in the earlier period most of those who hoped for a
diversification of Southern pursuits had held aloof from or had
opposed the disunion movement, in the latter many of that class,
despairing of success in the Union, lent it their support.
The doctrine that the South paid more than her share of the
taxes and received less than her share of the disbursements had
been so frequently repeated that it was becoming generally ac-
cepted. One estimated at $50,000,000 the sum the South paid
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annually, and at $10,000,000 the amount returned in the form of
expenditures; $40,000,000 annually would be saved by going out
of the Union. Such a sum distributed among the states would give
an enormous impetus to manufactures and all other branches of
industry which suffered from a deficiency of capital in the South.7
Southern men did not cease to attribute Southern decline to un-
equal taxation and disbursements.
8
Direct trade with Europe would follow, it was said, closely upon
the heels of separation; for importers would never pay the duties
imposed by the North in addition to the moderate duties imposed
by the Southern confederacy. "With a horizontal duty upon all
imposts it would be impossible for foreign products to come to us
by way of the cities of the North."9 If necessary, navigation laws
could be enacted discriminating against Northern shipping. For-
eign ships would flock to Southern ports; Northern ships would
be transferred to the South. Northern seaports would decline;
Southern would flourish.10 The South, having control of its own
commerce, would control the "exchanges" also, and thus become
financially independent. The establishment of direct trade would
give an impulse to every other pursuit: "Manufactories would
then grow up, commerce would extend, mechanical arts would
flourish, and, in short, every industrial and every professional
pursuit would receive a vivifying impulse."11
Of all those who speculated in regard to the proper policy of a
new confederacy, it is worthy of note that very few proposed that
the government should be supported without resort to duties on
''DeBow's Review, XXI, 543. Similar statements are in the Charleston
Mercury, Feb. 25, 1858, quoting the Mobile Mercury; DeBow's Review, XXX,
252; ibid., XXI, 532; speech of J. A. Jones, of Georgia, in Vicksburg, New York
Herald, May 21, 1859.
sjohn Forsyth's lecture on "The North and the South," Mobile, 1854,
DeBow's Review, XVII, 368-73; ibid., XIX, 383-4; ibid., XXVI, 476 (A. P. Cal-
houn, 1859); ibid., XXX, 436 (DeBow, 1858); W. P. Miles, of South Carolina,
in House of Representatives, Mar. 31, 1858, Charleston Mercury, Apr. 17;
Southern Literary Messenger, XXXI, 238; "Barbarossa" [John Scott], The Lost
Principle, or the Sectional Equilibrium, Pt. I, ch. V; Claiborne, Life and Corre-
spondence of John A. Quit-man, II, 186-7.
'DeBow's Review, XXI, 543.
"Ibid., XXI, 519; XXV, 373; XXIII, 604; Cong. Globe, 33 Cong, i Sess.,
375 (Preston S. Brooks).
"DeBow's Review, XXIX, 462.
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imports. It is true many spoke of a free trade republic; but "free
trade" was generally equivalent to "tariff for revenue only."
Almost all would have had low duties; but while some told how
low they would be and emphasized the blessings of free trade,
others dwelt upon the incidental protection which would be af-
forded by a tariff for revenue. Said Willoughby Newton, a Vir-
ginia disunionist of long standing, "A tariff for the support of the
new government would give such protection to manufacturers that
all our waterfalls would bristle with machinery."12 Men from
border states were more inclined to speak of the advantages of
protection against Northern competition than were men from the
cotton states, though the latter often held out as an inducement
to Virginia and North Carolina to go with the Gulf states the
probability that they would supplant New England in manufac-
turing for the South. There were free traders, however, who
thought it might be well to leave the Northern slave states out of
the confederacy lest they should demand protection for their in-
dustries. Disunionists believed that, in case of separation, the
North would have to resort to direct taxation to support her gov-
ernment; for she would no longer be able to import on Southern
account, and she could not tax imports from the South, since
they were chiefly raw materials.
13 The consequences of direct
taxation would be the transfer to the South of much capital in-
vested in manufactures.
The disunionists often took a somewhat skeptical attitude to-
ward the efforts which were being made to promote Southern
commerce and industry while the Union continued. Each failure
confirmed their opinion that such efforts were futile. The Charles-
ton Mercury said that in the Union "Direct trade with the cus-
tomers of the South in Europe is an impossibility. .. .Norfolk,
Charleston, Savannah, Mobile, are only suburbs of New York."14
According to a contributor to DeBow's Review, the process of de-
velopment went on much more slowly than in the North, and
must as long as the South remained in the Union with the North
to lean upon. Disunion would call for and foster a variety of
home products. Pride would demand protection for home indus-
Review, XXV, 373 (Sept., 1858).
"Ibid., XXI, 541-44.
"May 20, 1858.
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tries. Diversification would develop and unfold the wealth of the
South. "True, we might, in the course of time, unfold this wealth
in the Union, but not till the teeming North has 'embellished all
her slopes,' and of her superabundance and for lack of other lands
to conquer, empties her surplus on us, ... With all these aids
and stimulants we must advance with equal or faster steps than
they."
15 A. J. Roane, of Virginia, wrote: "Experience has demon-
strated that direct trade to Southern ports cannot be established
to any considerable extent in the Union. It can only be accom-
plished by the stress of the necessity which separation would cre-
ate."16 In Virginia the opinion was held that in case of disunion
the very necessity of her condition of estrangement from the
manufacturing North would impel her to add a manufacturing
phase to her already innumerable sources of wealth.
17
As we have seen, certain south Atlantic ports, particularly of
Virginia, which was slowly building the Chesapeake and Ohio
railroad, aspired to export and import for the Ohio and
the upper Mississippi valleys, and had high expectations of
the beneficial effects of such a commerce upon the prosperity
of the seaboard regions. A considerable part of the exports and
some of the imports of the Northwest still followed the Mississippi
river with New Orleans as their port of entry and departure. The
people of New Orleans, furthermore, hoped to retain or increase
her share of the Western commerce by the building of north and
south railroads. There continued to be considerable exchange of
products between the South and the West. It was to be presumed
that the people who profited or expected to profit by this Western
trade would be loath to have a measure taken which might injure
that trade and destroy the prospects of future benefits from it.
Disunionists sought to overcome the objections of those who yet
expected much of Western trade in the way of promoting South-
ern prosperity. To meet the demands of New Orleans and pre-
serve peace with the West, they generally agreed that, in case of
separation, it would be necessary to guarantee free navigation
of the Mississippi; it was frequently suggested that Western
products be admitted free of duty.
18 Some Southerners professed
"DeBow's Review, XXIII, 471-474 (Nov., 1857). Cf. ibid., XXI, 177-186.
"Ibid., XXIX, 463.
"New York Herald, October 23, 1860.
^DeBow's Review, XXX, 93 (Maj. W. H. Chase, of Florida).
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to believe that, in case of a dissolution of the Union, the close
commercial relations of the two sections and the absolute neces-
sity to the West of the Mississippi river as an outlet for her com-
merce would induce the West to cast her lot with the South rather
than with the East; 19 they were not averse to admitting free states
into their slaveholding republic.
It is rather strange how tenaciously Southern men on the eve
of secession clung to the belief that the old alliance of the South
and West, based upon commercial relations and common opposi-
tion to the tariff and financial policies of the East, still continued.
For example, Governor Wickliffe, of Louisiana, in his message of
January, 1859, said: "The position of the Northwestern States
of the Mississippi Valley, on this question [slavery] is of especial
interest to us. These States are, by geographical position, com-
mercially our allies, whether slave or free, while many of the
States on the Atlantic side of the Alleghanies are necessarily
hostile in commercial interest. ... It is cheering to find our com-
mercial allies of the Northwest sustaining our Southern policy."
20
This statement is accurate in no particular. The value of the trade
between the West and East was several times greater than the
value of the trade between the West and South. Not only did
most of the foreign imports of the West come by way of the East;
but by far the larger part of Western exports went that way. The
travel between East and West was much greater than between
South and West. Much Eastern capital was invested in the West.
In politics, too, the West and East had been drawing closer
together. The tariff no longer divided them as it did in the days of
Calhoun. Both stood for a liberal policy in regard to improve-
ment of rivers and harbors. The South had abandoned her old
liberal attitude on the public lands question, and steadily opposed
homestead bills and land grants to railroads; while in some
quarters the old demand for distribution of the proceeds from the
sale of public lands was revived. The East, on the other hand,
was inclined to support the public lands policies of the West. On
the immigration question, the West agreed with the East rather
"Senator Hammond, of South Carolina, Mar. 4, 1858, Cong. Globe, 35 Cong.,
I Sess., 961; "Barbarossa," The Lost Principle, 225; DeBow's Review, XXIII, 603,
(Edmund Ruffin).
30New Orleans Daily True Delta, Jan. 19, 1859.
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than with the South; the same was true of the Pacific railroad
question. On the paramount issue of slavery, the people of the
free states of the Northwest were rapidly losing their old indiffer-
ent attitude, and becoming more hostile to the institution.
Along with their pictures of the prosperity and progress which
would follow the formation of an independent Southern confeder-
acy, disunionists frequently advanced arguments to prove that it
would be accompanied by no countervaling disadvantages. Seces-
sion would be peaceful, they said, because the interruption of
Southern trade, in case the North should undertake coercion, would
bring such prostration to Northern industry and commerce that she
would not have the means to go to war. Furthermore, England
and France would not permit a blockade, because a cutting off of
the supply of cotton would bring ruin to important industries.21
Thus the disunionists had an argument at every turn.
About the time of Lincoln's election there was published a
volume by Edmund Ruffin entitled, Anticipations of the Future to
Serve as Lessons for the Present Time, in the Form of Extracts
of Letters from an English Resident in the United States, to the
London Times, from 1864 to 1870, etc.22 Ruffin was a man of con-
siderable ability. He was known throughout the South, and his
name carried great weight because of his long record of valuable
services to Virginia and the South at large, chief of which were his
contributions to improved methods of agriculture. He was a
secessionist of long standing, and one of the leaders of the move-
ment.23 His book gives such a complete statement of the disunion
arguments, colored perhaps by his Virginia viewpoint, that a
summary of it is desirable.
Ruffin allowed Lincoln to serve one term and his more radical
successor, Seward, to serve part of one without a dissolution of
the Union. When, however, Seward proposed to stand for a
"DeBow's Review, XXIII, 596-601; XXIX, 457-463; XXX, 95 if.
22The earliest notice I have seen of the book was in the National Intelligencer,
Nov. 15, 1860, which said the work belonged to the "disunion literature of the
current day." It was published anonymously, but the authorship was evident
from the appendage of a series of essays on "The Causes of the Independence of
the South" which had appeared in 1856 and of which Ruffin was known to be
the author. Essays were in Richmond Enquirer, Dec. and Jan., 1856-1857; De-
Bow's Review, XXII, 583-93; XXIII, 266-72, 546-52, 596-607.
23For a brief biographical sketch, see ibid., XI, 431-436.
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second term, six cotton states seceded. Whereupon, after some
attempts at settlement, the Federal government established a
blockade of Southern ports, and war ensued, the northern slave
states remaining neutral. By May, 1868, because of the loss of
Southern trade and cotton, there were great suffering, threatening
mobs, and sanguinary riots in the North. Northern merchants and
manufacturers felt very severely the loss of $40,000,000 due them
from the South and sequestered by the government of the new
confederacy. The South suffered also from the blockade; but there
were compensations in that it taught the Southern people to be
independent of the North. Soon Virginia, North Carolina, and
Maryland found it no longer possible to remain neutral, and
entered the war on the side of the South. Another $50,000,000 of
debts were sequestered. The North did not attempt to carry the
war into the border states. In July, 1868, it was reported that
the imports and revenues of the North had fallen off tremen-
dously; for the "greater part of the former importations to North-
ern ports and in Northern ships, was for transhipment to and con-
sumption in the Southern states."
24 In August outbreaks and
violence were reported in the impoverished Northern cities; New
York was sacked and burned a rather bitter commentary on the
supposed friendship of the South and New York City. Soon the
North was unable to continue the war; and a truce was made.
By February, 1869, renewal of commercial intercourse and
peaceful relations had given a wonderful impulse to trade and
business in the South. But Southern merchants had entirely
ceased going to the North to purchase goods of any kind: "For all
Northern fabrics being now subject to high duties, would thereby
be so much enhanced in price, that but few kinds can be sold in
Southern markets, in competition with European articles subject to
the same rates of duties only or of Southern manufactures, now
protected by the same tariff law which had formerly been enacted
by the superior political power of the North, and to operate
exclusively for the profit of Northern capital and industry."
25
Northern ship owners were transferring their ships to the South;
Northern manufacturers were coming; and much Northern capital
was seeking investment there. A month later it was reported that
the "commercial prosperity of the South is growing with a force
"P. 283.
"P. 318.
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and rapidity exceeding any previous anticipations of the most
sanguine early advocates for the independence of the Southern
states."26
The Western states had taken but little part in the war. The
South had granted them free trade and free navigation of the
Mississippi. Because of this indulgent and conciliatory treatment
the people of the Northwest had not tried to open direct trade with
Europe, but were content to trade principally with New Orleans.
On April 7, 1869, it was reported that New England and the West
were at loggerheads over the tariff.
27 The volume closes with a
prediction that the North would soon split, the Western states,
upon their own offer, going with the South. "And should New Eng-
land be left alone, thenceforward its influence for evil on the
Southern states will be of as little effect, and its political and
economical position scarcely superior, to those conditions of the
present republic of Hayti."
28
By April 14, 1869, it was reported, commercial treaties had been
made by the South with European powers. No duties were to be
over 20 per cent. The treaties might be terminated after ten years.
The tobacco growers, who had so often in the old Union requested
the government to attempt to secure a relaxation of the heavy
duties imposed upon their product by France and England, now
had their wishes gratified.'
29
Ruffin's book was written during a political campaign when it
was well understood that, in case of Lincoln's election, the cotton
states would in all probability secede; but its content was only an
amplification of a series of letters published in the Richmond
Enquirer in December, 1856, and January, 1857. And the argu-
ments for secession which he used were typical of the secessionist
-per se propaganda to which the people of the South had been ac-
customed for at least a decade.
Southern people were strengthened in their expectations of
beneficial economic effects to follow secession by a class of poli-
ticians, writers, and newspaper editors representing those
Northern commercial and mercantile interests whose business was
largely with the South, and those Northern manufacturing inter-
2C
P. 323.
"P. 328.
*P. 338.
"P. 329. Cf. "Barbarossa," The Lost Principle, 176 ff.
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ests who either sold their products in the South or purchased their
raw material there, or both. The best known and most trust-
worthy individual of this class was Thomas Prentice Kettell,
mentioned before in connection with the secession movement of
1850. He was, in 1860, the editor of Hunt's Merchants' Magazine.
His views carried considerable weight, especially in the South,
where his free trade principles, his sympathetic attitude on the
slavery question, and his interest in Southern economic develop-
ment had long been known. Early in the presidential campaign of
1860 there was published a book by him entitled, Southern Wealth
and Northern Profits, As Exhibited in Statistical Facts and
Official Figures; Showing the Necessity of Union to the Future
Prosperity and Welfare of the Republic. The book showed an
excellent understanding of the commercial and financial relations
of the North and South; the conclusions were supported by tables
of statistics, largely drawn from official sources. The burden of
the book was, as the title indicates, that the South produced
wealth, but that this wealth accumulated in the North: Capital,
said Kettell, accumulates slowly in all agricultural countries and
rapidly in commercial and manufacturing countries.30 He de-
scribed the resources of the South, her enormous production of
cotton and numerous other products, and her immense exports to
the North as well as to Europe. He further showed the extent of
Southern purchases in the North, the value of the commerce
carried for the South by the North, the Northern tonnage so
employed in short he discussed every form of profit derived by
the North from her relations with the South. The total profits
the North derived annually from Southern wealth he summarized
in the following table:
31
"P. 126.
S1
P. 127. There is no way to check these items with any accuracy, were it
worth while to do so. The fishing bounties were paid from the general revenues,
and, therefore, by both North and South in proportions of their respective con-
tributions. The second is undoubtedly greatly exaggerated. The average yearly re-
ceipts from customs, 1856-1860 inclusive, was $54,487,600. Assuming that the
people of the South paid as much per capita as the people of the North, which
they probably did not (See ante p. 103.), the South paid about $21,440,000 an-
nually. A part of this at least was disbursed in the South. The sixth item is
probably much too large. So, also, is the last. Northern investments in the South
and loans and extensions of credit greatly exceeded in amount Southern invest-
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Bounties to fisheries, per annum $ 1,500,000
Customs, per annum, disbursed at the North. . . . 40,000,000
Profits to Manufacturers 30,000,000
Profits to Importers 16,000,000
Profits to Shipping, imports and exports 40,000,000
Profits on Travelers 60,000,000
Profits of Teachers, and others, at the South,
sent North 5,000,000
Profits of Agents, brokers, commissions, etc 10,000,000
Profits of Capital drawn from the South 30,000,000
Total from these sources $232,500,000
In sixty years, according to Kettell's estimate, $2,770,000,000
had been transferred from the South to the North in these ways.
Such heavy drains had prevented the accumulation of capital in
the South.32
Kettell's arguments were addressed to the Northern people; he
urged them not to endanger their prosperity by the unnecessary
agitation of the slavery question. The South and West were por-
trayed as having great natural resources, whereas the East had
few; the prosperity of the latter depended upon manufacturing
and shipping for others.33 He described the efforts which had been
made in the South to make the section independent of the North,
and the progress already made toward that goal; these he at-
tributed to the anti-slavery agitation. He considered the possibil-
ity of a dissolution of the Union. In that case, "it is quite apparent
that the North, as distinguished from the South and West, would
be alone permanently injured." As for the South, "in the long
run it would lose after recovering from first disasters nothing
by separation." 34
Disunionists saw in Kettell's book an argument for secession.
John Townsend, of South Carolina, cut Kettell's estimate of
Northern profits from Southern industry to less than half
$105,000,000 annually or $2,100,000,000 in twenty years. What
would not this sum have accomplished for the South in twenty
years? he asked. Direct trade and flourishing cities. "Domestic
ments in the North and deposits of Southern funds in Northern banks. The
item should read, "interest on Southern debts to Northern citizens;" at any rate
such an item, and it would not be a small one, should be included in the table.
"P. 127.
"P. 75-
"P. 75-
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manufactures would have occupied every water power, and the
whole South, wealthy and equipped, and armed at every point,
would have been able to defend herself against the world."35
DeBow, another disunionist, in his review of Southern Wealth and
Northern Profits, said: "The author deserves, by his labors, not
only on this occasion, but during a long and active career, the
most substantial recognition, as one of the noblest and truest
patriots, the most profound economists, and ablest statistical
philosophers of the age."
36
Of Northern newspapers which encouraged the Southern people
to believe that disunion would be followed by unprecedented
prosperity, none was more widely read and quoted or wielded
greater influence in the South than the New York Herald. It kept
close watch of events and the state of public opinion in the South,
and should have known, perhaps did know, the temper of the
people. It constantly advocated a policy of meeting Southern
demands and avoidance of wounding Southern sensibilities in
order that the South might not be compelled to resort to measures
which would work injury to the navigating, mercantile, and
financial interests of New York, which the Herald represented. In
case of disunion, according to the Herald, the imports of the
Northern confederation would so fall off that it would have to
resort to direct taxation, while the South would have ample
revenue. Manufactures would be established in the South with
Northern capital. Northern shipping would rot at its docks. Part
of the Northern population would migrate to the South, so the
disproportion in numbers would cease to exist. The value of real
estate in the North would be greatly reduced.37
The views which disunionists, and others both South and North,
held in regard to the economic benefits to follow the formation of a
Southern confederacy did not go uncontroverted in the South.
Conservative journals, such as the New Orleans Picayune, perhaps
the best newspaper in the South, the Montgomery Daily Confed-
eration, the Republican Banner and Nashville Whig, and the
Savannah Daily Republican, did not consider that the Union
*The South Alone Should Govern the South. And African Slavery Should
Be Controlled by Those Only Who Are Friendly to It (pamphlet), 3rd edition,
P- Si-
^DeBoiv's Review, XXIX, 213.
"October 30, 1860, editorial, for example.
193] THE DISUNION MOVEMENT, 1852-1860 193
injuriously affected the economic interests of the Southern states.
Said the Picayune, 1858: "One of the most erroneous ideas,
strangely obtaining considerable currency at the South, is that
which attributes apparent decay of the older, and comparative slow
growth of the younger Southern States, to a fixed policy of the
General Government, assumed to be partial to sections in which
slavery does not exist."
38 The Montgomery Daily Confederation
said, 1859: "Nor are we wanting in a proper appreciation of the
value of the Union. . . . We sing no anthems to its glories, at
the same time we cannot forget that under it, we have grown to be
a great, prosperous, and after all, a happy people."
39
Occasionally
DeBow's Review contained an article which refuted the views
presented by the majority of its contributors.40 Conservative
statesmen often described the South as prosperous, and attributed
that prosperity to the Union. Such a one was Alexander H.
Stephens.
41 Senator Bell, of Tennessee, in his speech on the
Lecompton bill, 1858, described the disunionists perseoi the South,
and expressed his dissent from their doctrines.
42
Disunionists were forced to admit on the eve of the war that
the South was enjoying a comparative degree of prosperity; and
they expressed concern lest a feeling of content with their eco-
nomic condition would make the Southern people incapable of
maintaining their rights.
43 The Charleston Mercury found it
necessary to protest against an editorial of the New Orleans Bee,
"an inveterate old Whig paper," for intimating "that the Southern
people are so cankered by prosperity as to be incapable of resist-
ing the sectional domination of the North, and that the Union will
ssMay 22, 1858.
"May 19, 1859. A year earlier it had said: ''We scout the position so often
assumed that we are inferior that we are degraded in this Union . . . That the
North does our trading and manufacturing mostly is true, and we are willing that
they should. If we thought as some seem to think on the subject, we should
boldly raise the standard of secession, and never cease the strife until the Union
were dissolved." May 19, 1858.
"XXIV, 431-39, e.g.
"Letter to J. J. Crittenden, Jan. 2, 1860; address to his constituents, Aug.
14, 1857, Toombs, Stephens, Cobb Correspondence, 415 ff.
"Ccng. Globe, 35 Cong., I Sess., Appx., 139-40.
"Speech of R. B. Rhett, July 4, 1859, in Charleston Mercury, July 7; ad-
dress of Col. A. P. Aldrich at the fair of the South Carolina Institute, Nov. 17,
1859, ibid., Nov. 19.
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be continued because of this prosperity."
44 Disunionists found it
necessary, also, to allay the fears of those engaged in industry and
commerce who, while desirous of Southern industrial and com-
mercial independence, believed that the sudden disruption of
established relationships which disunion might cause would pros-
trate their business. 45 Much of the disunion argument seems to
have been designed to win over this class of men.
Some of the leaders in the various efforts made to effect an
industrial and commercial revolution in the South were not con-
vinced by the arguments of the unconditional disunionists. James
Robb, to whom more than to any other individual belongs the
credit for the successful building of the New Orleans, Jackson,
and Great Northern railroad, undertook to expose the fallacies of
the secession arguments. It would be suicide for the South to
abandon the Union. The pursuits of the people of the South were
incompatible with any considerable progress in manufacturing
and commerce. The remedy for dependence upon the North was
not secession but a change of habits. The South had better be
dependent ypon the North than upon Europe. "The Southern
mind is deluded in the belief that England and France will give
to a separate Southern Confederacy, founded on Slavery, Free
Trade, and Cotton, their entire sympathies." If self-interest did
not appeal to New England, would it appeal to England and
France? The belief that the withdrawal of Southern trade would
ruin the East was too absurd to merit notice. "Where," he asked,
"is the evidence of the prosperity of the Southern States being
seriously endangered by a continued fellowship with New Eng-
land? Our material progress for the last fifteen years is without
example, . . .
" 46
William Gregg, one of the ablest and sanest thinkers in the
South upon questions affecting the economic interests of the sec-
tion, was not a secessionist per se.*
7 The South was not ready
"April 30, 1859.
"See, for example, A. J. Roane in DeBow's Review, XXIX, 462.
"Letter to Alexander H. Stephens, Nov. 25, 1860, in a pamphlet, A South-
ern Confederacy. Letters by fames Robb, late a citizen of New Orleans, to an
American in Paris and Hon. Alexander H. Stephens, of Georgia, pp. 11-24.
"The statements relative to Gregg's position are based upon a series of
essays on "Southern Patronage to Southern Imports and Domestic Industry"
which appeared in DeBow's Review, July, 1860. to February, 1861, but all of
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for independence, he said. The Southern people should make
themselves commercially and industrially independent of the
North before going out of the Union. There would be no ad-
vantage in turning from the Yankees and relying upon Europe.
48
Free trade among the states he considered the greatest bond of
Union; and at the time he wrote, 1860, still thought it, "if proper-
ly poised and equalized throughout our common country, will
dispel the dark cloud which hangs over truth and justice . . ,"
49
Yet Gregg was not oblivious to some of the possible advantages of
disunion. If a line were drawn which would be a barrier to the
importation of Northern locomotives, for example, two years
would not elapse before the South would manufacture them her-
self. Disunion would stop the practice followed by Southern banks
and money lenders of employing their money in New York rather
than at home, which was- a "monstrous barrier to Southern
enterprise."
50
Yet, after giving due weight to such Union arguments as we
have just analyzed, it remains that the disunionist arguments in
regard to the material benefits of their project were not adequately
refuted in the South. Unionists more frequently took the course of
appealing to the common history of the American people, their
common republican institutions, the greatness of the Union, its
prestige among the nations of the earth, its vast military strength,
the weakness and insignificance the South would have as an
independent nation, her inability to protect an institution con-
demned by the opinion of the world, and the danger of plunging
the country into fratricidal war. They also found it effective to
cast aspersions upon the motives of the secessionist leaders, to
represent them as restless spirits, broken down politicians, dis-
appointed in their political ambitions.
Northern men contributed but little to a true understanding of
the causes of the disparity of the sections in prosperity and
progress, and of the effect which a division of the Union might
have upon the great material interests of the country; such an
which were written before Lincoln's election. But see Victor S. Clark in The
South in the Building of the Nation, V, 323.
"DeBow's Review, XXIX, 78, 79, 773. 778.
"Ibid., XXX, 217.
"Ibid., XXIX, 79, 495.
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understanding, it is believed, would have tended to allay disunion
sentiment. Northern men were not as well informed as they
should have been of the number of disunionists per se in the
South, nor of the arguments they advanced. Practically all of the
discussions dealing with disunion were colored by partisan bias.
As we have seen, representatives of those business interests of the
East which were closely allied with the cotton power exaggerated
the value of the Southern connection and the injurious effects of
disunion upon the North. They sought to fix the guilt for en-
dangering the Union upon the Northern "fanatics" who were
agitating the slavery question. Republican and anti-slavery
writers and oraters, who, it must be remembered, were not trying
to win converts in the South but to build up a great party in the
North, dealt with disunionism in a variety of ways. They de-
nounced as mercenary those who would calculate the value of the
Union in dollars. They commonly charged that threats of dis-
union were mere gasconade for the purpose of frightening North-
ern men into voting for Southern measures. They often, also, as
did William H. Seward in his great speeches during the campaign
of 1860, protrayed the magnitude of Northern productions and
Northern internal commerce as compared with the products ex-
changed between the sections, and minimized the value of the
Southern trade and Southern raw materials to the North and the
injury which would be inflicted upon Northern interests by dis-
union.51 Senator Wilson, of Massachusetts, said cotton was not
king; cotton made but one-seventeenth part of the manufactures
of the North. 52 The Republicans, and anti-slavery men generally,
attributed the "decline" of the South and its dependence upon the
North chiefly to the blighting effects of slavery; they saw no hope
of remedy so long as slavery continued to exist.53
"In a speech at Palace Garden, New York City, Nov. 2, 1860, he said:
"New York is not a province of Virginia or Carolina, any more than it is a
province of New York or Connecticut. New York must be the metropolis of the
Continent." New York Herald, Nov. 3.
"Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 169, speech of Mar. 20, 1858, in
reply to J. H. Hammond's "Mud-sill" speech of Mar. 4.
"The speech of Senator Wilson just quoted is a good example. Another is
Hannibal Hamlin's reply to Hammond, Mar. 8, II, 1858, Cong. Globe, 35 Cong.,
i Sess., 1002-1006, 1025-1029.
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Perhaps the ablest and most philosophical exposition of moder-
ate Republicanism made between 1854 an<i J 86i is George M.
Weston's Progress of Slavery, a work which it would have been
well worth the while of Southern thinkers to study. We are here
concerned only with those of the propositions he sought to es-
tablish which relate to disunion. He told of nullification in South
Carolina and of its partisans and sympathizers in other slave
states. "The real cause of this Southern predisposition to listen
to the appeals of the Palmetto nullifiers, was Southern discontent
at the prosperity of the North. . . . Refusing to see the true
cause of their own misfortunes, and eager to attribute them to
every cause but the right one, they insisted that they alone were
the real producers of wealth, and that the North was thriving at
their expense." This doctrine of the nullifiers had been steadily
insisted upon during the following quarter of a century. "It has,
without doubt, become the settled conviction of large numbers of
persons in the slave States, that in some way or other, either
through the fiscal regulations of the Government, or through the
legerdemain of trade, the North has been built up at the expense
of the South." 55 These were the views which prompted disunion.
He illustrated the reasons for wanting to dissolve the Union by an
extract from a public address of John Forsyth, of Mobile:
I have no more doubt that the effect of separation would be to
transfer the energies of industry, population, commerce, and
wealth, from the North to the South, than I have that it is to the
Union with us, the wealth-producing States, that the North owes
its great progress in material prosperity. . . . The Union broken,
we should have what has been so long the dream of the South
direct trade and commercial independence. Then, our Southern
cities, that have so long languished in the shade, while the grand
emporia of the North have fattened upon favoring navigation laws,
partial legislation by Congress, and the monopoly of the public
expenditure, will spring into life and energy, and become the
entrepots of a great commerce.
36
The slavery agitation was not the cause of disunion feeling but
the pretext, according to Weston. The disunionists had been
chiefly instrumental in getting it up: "It is quite notorious that it
"Published in 1858.
"P. 68.
"P. 69.
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is not the slaveholding class at the South which particularly
favors nullification."
The impoverished condition of the South, which Weston consid-
ered the source of the disunion feeling, he thought attributable in
part to slavery and in part to, "that unnatural diffusion of their
population over new territories," which the Republican party was
opposing.
57 There were no internal elements of change in slave
society. The slaves were held to their condition by force. The
masters were confined to planting by the want of flexibility and
adaptibility in the character of the labor which they controlled
and upon the proceeds of which they subsisted. The non-slave-
holding whites were degraded by slavery with no hope of escape
from their abject poverty.58 There was no hope from any
elements of such a population of the growth of towns, of the
mechanic arts, or of manufacturing and commercial interests.
"Throughout the South, towns are built up only by Northern and
European immigration, and without it there would be scarcely any
manifestation of civilization. Mills, railroads, cotton presses, sugar
boilers, and steamboats, are mainly indebted for their existence in
the Southern States to intelligence and muscle trained in free
communities."59 The redemption of the South would come only
with the gradual encroachment of the free-labor system of the
North and Europe and the non-slaveholding regions of the South
upon the slave belts. That encroachment had begun, or soon
would begin. As the slave area should be contracted, the discon-
tented area would also be diminished, and the Union would be
strengthened. "If the course of events in the immediate future
be such as may reasonably be anticipated, no separate Southern
Confederacy could possibly embrace more than a few States in
the southeast corner of the existing Union; and the scheme of such
a Confederacy would be put down by the good sense of the people
in that quarter, if, indeed, their patriotism would allow it to be
even entertained."60
"P. 58.
"P. 13-
"P. 15.
T. 70.
CHAPTER VIII
FACTORS WHICH TENDED TO ALLAY DISCONTENT
WITH THE SOUTH'S ECONOMIC SYSTEM,
1850-1860
During the decade 1850-1860 there were factors and conditions
whose tendency was to make the people of the South better con-
tent with their economic system and position. These factors were
in part economic, in part political and social. The economic
factors tended also, in part not altogether, to allay Southern
sectionalism. That on the whole sectional feeling increased during
the period was due, in the main, to other and stronger factors.
Southern agriculture was comparatively prosperous during the
decade. This was especially true of the cotton planting industry.
During the decade of 1840-1850 the average price of cotton at
Southern seaports was 8 cents;
1
during the following decade it was
10.6 cents. 2 The price was steadier also during the later period.
The higher price level was maintained in spite of a rather remark-
able succession of large crops from 1851 to 1861. The average
yearly production during the first decade was 2,155,400 bales,
and during the second, 3,374,100 bales,
3 an increase of over 56
per cent, while the total value of the cotton produced during the
latter period was about double that of the former. The crop of
1852-1853, the largest to that time, brought cotton planters nearly
$150,000,000. This crop was exceeded both in amount and ag-
gregate value by that of 1855-1856. A considerably smaller crop
the following year brought in an even greater aggregate, which was
exceeded the next year, although the financial crash of 1857 cost
the planters many millions. The high-water mark of the ante-
bellum cotton industry was reached in 1859-1860, when a crop
of 4,861,000 bales was sold for nearly $250,000,000.
The tobacco and sugar industries were almost as prosperous.
As a result of the development of improved varieties and better
methods of curing, the demand for tobacco increased, and produc-
tion in the United States grew from 200,000,000 pounds in 1849
*C. F. M'Cay, of Georgia, in Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXIII, 602.
*DeBow's Review, XXVII, 106. The increase was due in part to an expand-
ing money supply.
"Donnell, History of Cotton, passim.
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to 434,000,000 in 1859, about 124 per cent. In Virginia and Ken-
tucky, the leading tobacco-producing states, the production was
doubled, while in North Carolina it was tripled.
4
Although the
tobacco growers continued to complain of the heavy duties im-
posed by foreign countries upon American tobacco,5 there can be
no doubt that the industry was more prosperous during the
decade before the Civil War than in any other period since
colonial times. The sugar industry was a somewhat uncertain one.
The crop fluctuated widely from year to year because of occasional
early frosts and other unfavorable weather conditions. The price
fluctuated even more widely, being dependent not only upon the
crop in the United States and the tariff, but also upon the crop in
Cuba and Hayti, whence sugar was imported.6 In 1856 the crop
in Louisiana, which produced virtually all of the United States
sugar, was only 73,976 hogsheads, and sold for $110 per hogshead.
In 1858 the crop was 362,296 hogsheads, and the price $69.
However, the industry seems to have been more prosperous from
1850 to 1860 than during the previous decade. The average price
was $63, and the average crop 273,450 hogsheads from 1850-1860;
the same items for 1840-1850 were $49.75 and 165,150 hogsheads
respectively.
7
It was an axiom in the South that when the planting sections
were prosperous, the grain-growing and stock-raising regions were
also prosperous. In the decade before the war their prosperity was
enhanced by the readier access to market which improved roads
and newly built railroads afforded. At the same time competition
with the agricultural states of the Northwest was rendered less
injurious because prices were kept up by the growing demand of
the East and Europe for foodstuffs.8
*Meyer Jacobstein, The Tobacco Industry in the United States, 38-39;
Eighth Census, Agriculture, Introduction, pp. xcvi-xcvii.
*"Barbarossa," The Lost Principle, 176 ff.; memorial to Congress, by a com-
mittee of the Southern Commercial Convention, Knoxville, in DeBow's Review,
XXIV, 291-300, Apr. 1858; ibid., XXVI, 315.
'Ibid., XIX, 353, XXII, 320-25, 433-36; Robertson, A Tew Months in
America, 88; Stirling, Letters from the Slave States, 182.
7DeBow's Review, XXIX, 524; Eighth Census, Agriculture, Introduction,
xcix.
'Ibid., cxli, cxlvi-cxlix (tables illustrating growth of trade between the West
and the East and Europe).
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The growing degree of content with the rewards of the cotton
industry was reflected in the increased frequency of expressions
of fear for the security of America's monopoly of the production
of raw cotton. Livingston was said to have reported that cotton
grew in the interior of Africa.
9 Attention was given to the possi-
bility that India might be stimulated to increased production.
Much interest was taken in the Cotton Supply Association, which
was organized in 1857 by English spinners for the purpose of
stimulating cotton production in India and elsewhere.10
It has always been true in the South that when cotton prices
have risen pleas for the diversification of agriculture have fallen
upon deaf ears; so it was during the decade before the War. The
agricultural reformers in the cotton belt pleaded with the planters
not to make more cotton, but to raise their own hogs, cattle,
horses, and mules, and to grow their own corn and wheat thus
they would cut down expenses and conserve the fertility of the
soil. The reformers told the planters that the high prices were
only temporary, and were caused in part by the increased gold
supply resulting from the opening of the California mines.11 The
rise in the price of cotton was no greater than the rise in the
prices of other things.
12 A small cotton crop, they said, and
truly, often brought a greater aggregate than a large one. But
planters could not resist the temptation to take advantage of
prevailing high prices by increasing their acreage.13 Somewhat
better transportation facilities between the planting and the farm-
ing regions promoted the tendency to specialization. The agri-
culture of the planting belts was no more diversified, if as much,
in 1860 than in 1850.
The sugar and cotton planters seem to have resorted, to no
diminishing extent, to Tennessee, Kentucky, Missouri, and states
'DeBow's Review, XXIV, 580; Donnell, History of Cotton, 466.
"Donnell, op. cit., 454, 466, 478; Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLIII, 640.
"DeBow's Review, XIV, 280.
"Address of A. P. Aldrich at the fair of the South Carolina Institute, 1859,
Charleston Mercury, Nov. 19, 1858.
"'The price of cotton has raised the price of land, so there is no chance of
buying you a cleared plantation now. And during such prices it would be folly
to take hands from making cotton in Baldwin to clear the place in Dooly, so we
shall have to let planting affairs remain in 'statu quo.'
"
John B. Lamar to
Howell Cobb, Feb. 7, 1850, Toombs, Stephens, Cobb Correspondence.
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even farther north for horses and mules, hay, bacon, pork, and
beef, and even corn and flour. "There is no reason," wrote a
planter, "why Tennessee, Arkansas, Mississippi, Alabama,
Georgia, and Texas should not raise all of their own horses and
mules. There is no earthly reason why these states should not
also raise all their own corn, hogs, cows, etc."
14
James L. Orr
described the planter of South Carolina as buying his bacon and
pork, much of his beef, and not infrequently his corn and flour.15
Robert Russell, an English traveler, writing of the planters of
Mississippi, said, "The bacon is almost entirely imported from the
Northern States, as well as a considerable quantity of Indian
corn."
16
Exports of Western produce from New Orleans to the North
and to Europe fell off very rapidly after the building of railroads
from the North Atlantic ports to the West; but there was no
falling off in the total receipts of Western products at New
Orleans.17 This was due in part to the increased demands of New
Orleans herself, in part to the increased demands of the South
generally. Of 1,084,978 barrels of flour received at New Orleans
in 1858-1859, 306,090 were exported to Northern ports, 133,193 to
foreign countries, and 165,397 to other Southern ports.
18 The fol-
lowing year' 965,860 barrels of flour were received at New
Orleans, of which 58,739 went to the North, 80,541 abroad, and
247,231 to other Southern ports.
19 The statistics for corn, bacon,
pork, and other articles produced north of the planting belt show
similar proportions. Moreover, only a portion of the Western
provisions shipped down the Mississippi reached New Orleans. For
example, of 92,919 barrels of flour shipped from Cincinnati in
"DeBow's Review, XIX, 229.
"Ibid., XIX, 21 (July, 1855).
"North America, 265, 290.
"Eighth Census, Agriculture, Intro., clvi, clvii, Tables N and 0; DeBow's
Review, IV, 391; V!, 434; X, 448; XII, 83; XVII, 530; XXIII, 365; XXV, 469;
XXVII, 471-479. "As an outlet to the ocean for the grain trade of the west, the
Mississippi river has almost ceased to be depended upon by merchants." "And
even, at no distant date, all the western grain and flour which found a market
in New York or New England was shipped to New Orleans in steamboats, and
thence around the coast in ocean ships." Eighth Census, Agriculture, Intro., clvii,
civ.
"Ibid., Intro., clvii; DeBow's Review, XXVII, 479.
"Ibid., XXIX, 784; Eighth Census, Agriculture, Intro., clvii.
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1860 to points below Cairo, only 35,146 went to New Orleans.20
By 1860 the railroads were carrying no inconsiderable amounts of
provisions from the West and the farming sections of the South
into the planting sections.
21
A comparison of the census reports for 1850 and 1860 indicates
that the agriculture of the South as a whole was less diversified
in the latter than in the former year. It is sufficient to compare
such large items as cotton, tobacco, corn, wheat, oats, potatoes,
hogs, sheep, cattle, and draught animals.
22 The per capita produc-
tion of Indian corn in the South was 33 bushels in 1840, 32.75
bushels in 1850, and 31 bushels in 1860. The population of the
South increased 23.9 per cent between 1850 and 1860; during
the same time the annual production of cotton had been doubled
and of tobacco more than doubled. In the leading cotton state,
Mississippi, the cotton crop was increased 150 per cent, and the
corn crop, 32 per cent. The percentages for Alabama were 73
and 18, for Louisiana 336 and 65, and for Georgia 41 and o.
South Carolina produced less corn but 17 per cent more cotton in
1860 than in 1850. Tennessee, the leading corn state of the
South, grew no more corn in 1860 than in 1850, but had increased
her cotton crop by one-half. Virginia and North Carolina gained
but little in corn produced; but tobacco production had been
doubled in the one and tripled in the other. During the decade
the annual oats crop had declined in every Southern state except
Virginia and Texas; for the South as a whole the falling off was
over 40 per cent. In 1850 the Southern states produced 4.87
bushels of sweet potatoes per capita; in 1860, 4.16 bushels. There
were fewer hogs in the South in 1860 than in 1850; the leading
hog-raising states, Tennessee and Georgia, showed decreases,
while Virginia, Texas, and Arkansas showed increases. Outside
Texas there were fewer neat cattle in the South in 1860 than in
1850. The number of milch cows, however, increased 20 per cent;
and the production of butter increased from 6.12 to 6.55 pounds
per capita. The number of sheep had increased less than 10 per
cent, and the wool clip but 18. The statistics for hogs, neat cattle,
and sheep may be contrasted with those for draught animals,
""Eighth Census, Agriculture, Intro., clviii.
"DeBow's Review, XXIV, 214.
"Eighth Census, Agriculture, Intro., passim.
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which were employed in the culture of the staples. The number
of mules, oxen, and horses increased between 1850 and 1860 by
103, 42, and 22 per cent respectively. The only important food
stuff of which there was a remarkable increase of production was
wheat. The crop was 17,795,761 bushels in 1850 and 31,441,826
bushels in 1860, a gain of 77 per cent and an increase from 2.5 to
3.5 bushels per capita. The largest gains were made in Tennessee,
North Carolina, and Georgia; they were attributable very largely
to the building of railroads which gave access to market to the
farmers of eastern Tennessee, western North Carolina, upper
Georgia, and north Alabama.
As the great staple industries became more profitable, a
tendency was manifested to boast of the prosperity of the South,
to proclaim her strength rather than her dependence, and to
glorify agriculture and assert its superiority to other industries in
every respect in productivity, in the development of individual
character and strength, as the conservator of the moral and social
order, as a guarantee of the permanence of republican institutions,
and as a basis for the political power of a nation.
Planters had long complained that they were at the mercy of
the
"money power," the Bank of England or combinations of
speculators and spinners, who took advantage of the necessity of
cotton planters to realize quickly upon their cotton in order to pay
advances they had received while their crop was growing. As
late as October, 1851, a cotton planters' convention at Macon,
Georgia, published a scheme for organizing the planters to keep
up the price of cotton.
23 Later in the decade, with demand out-
running production, the "law of supply and demand" seemed
sufficient guarantee against exploitation. "Cotton has outlived
and outgrown the influence of the money power of the Bank of
England," wrote a contributor to DeBow's. "Many years since,
Mr. Van Buren . . . said that a combination of the Bank of
England 'diminished the value of every man's property in
America.' This was particularly true at the South, . . . That
plan was tried to check the rising values in 1856 and 1857; but
for the first time without success. . . . The combinations of
spinners are of no avail; the manufacturing wants exceed the
"DeBow's Review, XII, 110, 121-6, 275-80.
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power of the South."
24 There were even signs of a breaking away
from the deplorable system of advances to planters; and certain it
is that the advances came more frequently from home banks and
less frequently from foreign factors than formerly.
25 The South
was beginning to accumulate the capital with which to market her
staples.
There was reason for self-congratulation also in the way the
South came through the financial crash of 1857. The South was
not as hard hit as the West and North, and, because of large crops
at good prices, recovered more rapidly.
26 Southern merchants
paid their debts in Eastern cities as usual in 1858;" and Eastern
merchants were induced to seek purchasers in the South rather
than in the West.28 Never before had Southern banks held so
large a proportion of the nation's specie as in 1858, 1859, and
i86o.29 This favorable balance may have been due in some degree
to smaller purchases of Northern and foreign goods after the panic,
and, possibly, to a partial carrying out of threats of non-inter-
course in retaliation for Northern
"aggressions"; but the chief
explanation lies in the unusual sums realized from the crops of
those years.
Formerly when comparisons had been made between the slave-
holding and the free states, Southern men had generally been con-
tent to trace
"
'Southern decay' to other causes than Slavery which
in fact is all that saves us."30 In 1849 Ellwood Fisher, of Cin-
cinnati, in a lecture there, maintained, "in opposition to the exist-
ing opinion on the subject," that the "South is greatly the superior
of the North in wealth in proportion to the number of their
"DeBow's Review, XXVII, 107. "Cotton is king. The Bank of England was
until lately, but the last time she tried to put on the screws she failed." J. H.
Hammond in the Senate, Mar. 4, 1858, Cong. Globe, 35 Cong., I Sess., 961.
"DeBow's Review, XXVII, 107; Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLII, 157;
Charleston Courier, Nov. 5, 1860.
~*DeBow's Review, XXVI, 92, 582, quoting the United States Economist.
"Charleston Mercury, Mar. n, 1858, quoting the New York Herald; Hunt's
Merchants' Magazine, XXXVIII, 583.
"Ibid., XLII, 70; DeBow's Review, XXVI, 583.
"Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXXIX, 459; XLII, 157; XLIII, 455.
*J. H. Hammond to Calhoun, Aug. 18, 1845, Calhoun Correspondence.
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citizens respectively."
31 This proposition he sought to demonstrate
by a formidable array of miscellaneous statistics ingeniously
arranged. Both the thesis and the method of demonstration were
comparatively new to the South. J. H. Hammond, reviewing the
lecture for the Southern Quarterly Review, said: "It will be per-
ceived .... that Mr. Fisher strikes out into a bold and to most
persons we doubt not an entirely new train of facts and arguments
in his discussion of this subject." 32 He refuted some of Fisher's
arguments. Fisher's lecture, however, was well received in the
South.33 Both his conclusions and method were followed with in-
creasing frequency in succeeding years, chiefly, no doubt, because
slavery must be defended, but partly because the economic posi-
tion of the South seemed to justify doing so. Alexander H.
Stephens defended slavery by demonstrating the superiority of
the slave state of Georgia over the free state of Ohio in prosper-
ity and all other respects in which abolitionists were wont to make
invidious comparisons.
34 B. F. Stringfellow used Fisher's method
in his pamphlet, Negro Slavery No Evil, as did many other less
able defenders of the institution.
The arguments of those who would diversify Southern industry
were more frequently refuted during the few years preceding the
war than before. This was due in part to improved economic con-
ditions in the South, in part to growing fears on the part of the
dominant social class that diversification would tend to undermine
the existing social order, and in part to the political situation.
"For fifty years," wrote George Fitzhugh, "she [the South] has
been more usefully, more industriously, more energetically, and
more profitably employed than any people under the sun. Yet all
the while she has been envying and wishing to imitate the little
'truck patches,' the filthy, crowded, licentious factories, the mer-
cenary shopkeeping, and the slavish commerce of the North."
35
nLecture on the North and the South, delivered before the Young Men's
Mercantile Library Association, of Cincinnati, 1849 (pamphlet), p. 7. The lec-
ture is in DeBow's Review, VII, 134 ff., 262 ff.
"Southern Quarterly Review, XV, 276.
**DeBow's Review, VII, 134. Fisher was made editor of the Southern Press,
a short-lived organ established in Washington, 1849, by Southern members of
Congress.
"Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens in Public and Private, 429-32; 432-59.
Review, XXIII, 587.
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The Montgomery Daily Confederation, a conservative organ, pro-
tested against the doctrines which found favor in the Southern
Commercial Convention: "That the North does our trading and
manufacturing mostly is true, and we are willing that they
should. Ours is an agricultural people, and God grant that we
may continue so. We never want to see it otherwise. It is the
freest, happiest, most independent, and, with us, the most power-
ful condition on earth."30 Those who attended the Southern
Commercial Convention and interested themselves in schemes for
the regeneration of the South made much of the argument that
commercial and industrial independence would augment the
political power of the South and enable the Southern people to
better defend their rights and interests. But the majority seem to
have preferred to stake the security of Southern rights and inter-
ests upon the efficacy of the "cotton is king" argument, and the
"cotton is king" argument arose from the fact that the people of
the South were chiefly engaged in producing a few great staples
for export.
Frequent reference has been made in former chapters to the
use of this argument in some form or other. It may be briefly
recapitulated: The South produced an immense surplus for export
of great staples, particularly cotton, which had become necessities
for millions of people the world over, supported a large part of the
commerce and trade of the world, constituted the raw material for
factories in England and America employing millions of capital
and hundreds of thousands of hands, and furnished the basis for
American credit in Europe. With the return from their staples the
Southern people purchased manufactured goods from the North
and from Europe and provisions from the West, whose production,
sale, and transportation gave employment to factories, farmers,
shippers, and merchants. When one computes the capital and
labor dependent either directly or indirectly upon the production
and export of Southern staples, he has a stupendous total, and
the Southerner was only too prone to exaggerate the part his cot-
ton played in keeping the wheels of the world's industry in motion.
And cotton and negro slavery were said to be synonymous: the
South had a monopoly of the world's cotton supply; only negroes
held in slavery could make the great crops of cotton; therefore,
"May 19, 1858. See also above, pp. 50-58, and below, pp. 222-23.
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destroy slavery and the mighty structure reared upon it would
come down with a crash.37 Also, as long as the sections were de-
pendent upon each other, the South had at hand a powerful
political weapon in the form of threats to limit the cotton supply,
to manufacture it herself, to conduct her own commerce, to adopt
a policy of non-intercourse, to secede, to do anything, in short,
which would injure interests elsewhere, the prosperity and perma-
nence of which depended upon the continuance of existing com-
mercial relationships between the sections. Furthermore, those who
desired disunion or believed it inevitable could plausibly argue that
secession would be peaceful: the interruption of Southern trade
and the cutting off of the cotton supply, which war would cause,
would so prostrate Northern industry that the section would be
incapable of waging war; England and France would not tolerate
a war which might involve the interruption of their supply of cot-
ton. A Southern confederacy once established, they could further
argue, cotton would be the power which would preserve the
peace and secure favorable commercial treaties.
It is apparent that the continued potency of the "cotton is king"
argument depended upon the South's remaining exclusively agri-
cultural; to the extent the Southern people should become
industrially and commercially independent the argument would
lose force. George Fitzhugh wrote: "Indeed, the South will
commit a fatal blunder, if, in its haste to become nominally inde-
pendent, it loses its present engines of power, and thereby ceases
to be really independent .... It is our great agricultural surplus
that gives us power, commands respect, and secures inde-
pendence. . . ,"
38 It is apparent also that for the "cotton is king"
argument to be -an entirely satisfactory one from the Southern
'"'It seems, indeed, when the whole of the facts brought together are con-
sidered, that American slavery, though of little force unaided, yet properly sus-
tained, is the great central power, or energizing influence, not only of nearly
all the industrial interests of our own country, but also all of those of Great
Britain and much of the continent; and that, if stricken from existence, the
whole of those interests, with the advancing civilization of the age, would receive
a shock that must retard their progress for years to come." Christy, Cotton is
King (second edition) 163.
**DeBow's Review, XXIII, 341 (Dec., 1857). Fitzhugh found reason soon
to change his opinions somewhat.
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point of view, the agricultural system upon which it was based
must be satisfactory to the Southern people.
Southern statesmen and politicians had long used the "cotton is
king" argument in one form or another without reserve and with
considerable effect. During the crisis of 1850, for example, it ap-
peared in the frequent calculations of the value of the Union. But
at no time did cotton seem more powerful, and the Southern
people more inclined to exult in it and wield it as an instrument
of political power, than during the several years immediately pre-
ceding the Civil War. After the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska
bill, Professor Christy, of Ohio, published a very ingenious volume
entitled, Cotton is King, one of whose theses was that an alliance
had been struck between the planters of the South and the pro-
ducers of provisions in the Northwest.
39 But it was chiefly to the
industrial and commercial centers of the North that the appeal was
made. Jefferson Davis,.speaking to a Boston audience in Faneuil
Hall, said: "Your interest is to remain a manufacturing, and ours
to remain an agricultural people. Your prosperity, then, is to
receive our staple and to manufacture it, and ours to sell it to
you and buy the manufactured goods."40 John B. Floyd said in
New York: "I rejoice that the great staples of the South are the
chief means by which your commerce is fostered, and your
mechanics and artisans kept constantly at work."41 During the
campaigns of 1856 and 1860 Southern orators were sent to
Northern cities. R. M. T. Hunter, Robert J. Walker, Henry W.
Hilliard, Herschel V. Johnson, and even William L. Yancey were
all adept in appealing to the business interests.
42
Nor did these appeals to interest fail to raise up powerful allies
for the South in the North the "Northern men with Southern
principles." Leading journals closely identified with the business
interests, such as the New York Herald, the New York Express,
the Boston Post, the Boston Courier, and the Philadelphia Atlas,
defended the South and slavery and described the dire effects upon
the North of goading the Southern states into non-intercourse or
Tp. 144 ff., especially.
*Mrs. Varina Davis, Jefferson Dazis, I, 630.
"DeBow's Review, XXI, 604.
4t
lbid., XXI, 53038; 589-602; Hilliard, Politics and Pen Pictures, 294-302;
New York Herald, Sept. 22, Oct. n, 1860, speeches of Yancey in Washington
and New York.
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secession. Slavery had its defenders in the pulpit and in the
schools. Northern politicians friendly to the South were not
courting Southern popularity only. So effective was cotton as an
argument for slavery that optimistic men from time to time
detected a
"returning sense of justice" in the North and a change
in the attitude of the people of England and France toward
slavery.
43
The improved condition of Southern agriculture in the fifties was
reflected in, and gave rise to, a somewhat different aspect of the
labor problem. Between 1840 and 1850 when prices of cotton
and slaves were low, the feeling was pretty strong throughout the
South that there was a redundancy of labor engaged in the culture
of cotton. Planters welcomed suggestions that slaves be diverted
from cultivating cotton to other labor. The possibility of employ-
ing them in factories and in the construction of internal improve-
ments was canvassed. The experiment was tried in both fields,
and in the latter, at least, proved successful.
44 In the next decade
the prosperity of Southern agriculture, especially cotton growing,
and to some extent the employment of slaves upon works of
internal improvement, created a strong demand for labor. Prices
of slaves rose to unprecedented figures. A contributor to DeBow's,
1856, said the price of field hands had nearly doubled in five
years.
45 A Georgia delegate to the Southern Commercial Conven-
tion, the same year, said negroes were worth from $1000 to $1500
each, and there were ten purchasers to every seller. 46 Frequent
accounts of the sales of slaves affirm the truth of these asser-
tions.47 The prices continued to rise until secession.
This remarkable rise in prices occurred notwithstanding the fact
that the labor force engaged in the production of cotton and
sugar was receiving large increments in addition to the natural
increase of slaves. Partly because of the high prices offered for
"Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, 647 ff.; DeBow's Review, XXIV, 423;
New Orleans Picayune, Jan. 5, 1858; J. H. Hammond, speech at Beech Island.
S. C., July 22, 1858, in Charleston Mercury, July 27.
"DeBow's Review, XXIX, 254; XVII, 76-82; Phillips, American Negro
Slavery, 375-378.
"DeBow's Review, XXI, 158.
"Ibid., XXII, 222.
47
This subject is thoroughly discussed in Phillips, American Negro Slavery,
373-375, and chart, p. 370.
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slaves by planters, and partly because of the influx of foreigners
and the increasing difficulty of controlling slaves in cities, the
slave population of such large cities as Baltimore, New Orleans,
St. Louis, and Charleston declined between 1850 and 1860. The
slave population of Charleston fell from 19,532 in 1850 to 13,909
in 1860; that of New Orleans declined from 16,845 to I 3>385,
notwithstanding there was a remarkable increase in the total
population of the city.
48 In Richmond, Savannah, Augusta,
Columbus, Memphis, Nashville, Mobile, Natchez, and other
towns there was a considerable decline in the proportion which the
slave population bore to the white population.
49 Thousands of
slaves were transferred each year from the border states and the
older cotton states to Arkansas, Mississippi, Louisiana, and
Texas; and there can be no doubt that they went to the cotton
and sugar plantations of those states. Olmsted estimated the
number of slaves annually sold south from the northern slave
states at more than 2O,ooo. 50 Winfield Collins estimated from the
reports of the U. S. Census that during the period 1850-1860,
207,000 slaves were transferred from the selling states, which in-
cluded North and South Carolina, to the buying states. 51 In
Delaware and Maryland the slave population declined during the
decade. 52 In Virginia it increased only 3.88 per cent; in South
Carolina, 4.53 per cent; in Kentucky, 6.87 per cent; in North Caro-
lina, 14.73 Per cent; and in Tennessee but little more. The increase
in the total slave population of the United States during the
decade was 23.39 Per cent, of which at least 20 per cent represented
natural increase. A by no means inconsiderable increment to the
labor force of the planting belts of the cotton states consisted of
slaves imported from outside the United States in violation of
Federal and state laws. Collins considers 70,000 a "moderate and
even low" estimate of the number of slaves imported between
1850 and i86o.53 DuBois, in his Suppression of the African Slave
Trade, asserts that the laws against the foreign slave trade were
^Compendium of the Seventh Census, passim; Eighth Census, Population,
passim. The slave populations of St. Louis, Baltimore, and Louisville were small.
"Ibid.; DeBow's Review, XXX, 70.
""Cotton Kingdom, I, 58 n.
^Domestic Slave Trade, 66.
"Eighth Census, Population, 599.
0p. cit., 20.
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"nearly nullified," and that the increase of illicit traffic and actual
importations in the decade 1850-1860 may almost be termed a
reopening of the slave trade.
54
But these additions to the labor force of the cotton and sugar
plantations were incommensurate with the demand, and could not
be made indefinitely. Considerable speculation was indulged in as
to whence would come the labor which would enable the cotton
planters to extend their operations in the future, and the South
to maintain her position as the chief source of the world's cotton
supply. John M. Cordoza, an old and reliable commercial editor
of Charleston, said the yearly increase in the cotton crop of the
United States was regulated by a fixed law, namely, the increase
in slave population, which was three per cent per annum. True, pro-
duction had been increasing at a more rapid rate because of the
transfer of slaves from the non-cotton states to the cotton belt
and from poorer to more fertile lands within the belt; but this
process could not go on indefinitely. Improved methods and labor
saving machinery could be considered negligible factors in in-
creasing production. He had no fear of foreign competition. 55
Other observers thought the tobacco and grain growing states had
no redundancy of labor, and were unlikely to have "so long as
their present prosperity continues."
56
J. B. Gribble, a New
Orleans cotton factor who reviewed the trade for Hunt's
Merchants' Magazine, believed that the poor whites would be in-
duced by the high prices to labor; in fact a change was already
perceptible, and soon many "small crops" would tell with some
effect upon the aggregate yield.
57 The United States Economist,
1859, pictured the cotton states as prosperous and the prospects
for the future of the cotton industry as brilliant. With the ad-
vancing prices of slaves it would be "impossible to limit the in-
crease of supply to the rule which now governs it, viz., the natural
increase of hands." Cultivation would be undertaken by whites. 58
About 1856 there was begun a lively agitation in the cotton
states in favor of the repeal of the laws prohibiting the foreign
"Pp. 178, 183.
"DeBow's Review, XXII, 337-49 (Apr., 1857).
"'Charleston Mercury, May 4, 1858, article by P. A. Morse, of Louisiana.
The same is in DeBow's Review, XXIII, 480.
"XXXVII, 554-61.
"'Quoted in DeBow's Review, XXVI, 582.
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slave trade; this agitation continued until after secession. The
movement for the renewal of the slave trade may be attributed
in part to the demand of the planting interest for a larger and
cheaper labor supply; to the extent this may be done, the move-
ment testifies to the prosperous condition of Southern agriculture.
The movement and the accompanying discussion also brought out
clearly two divergent conceptions of a proper Southern policy.
One looked to the diversification of industry, the encouragement
of white immigration, and the development of free rather than
slave labor. In this view, the future lay with the white race;
and the South had other interests than slavery. The other con-
ception of policy looked to the preservation of a slave society
and the plantation system, and was antagonistic to any changes
which might endanger the existing social and economic order. A
study of the movement for reopening the slave trade should con-
tribute to an understanding of this deep seated division in
Southern public opinion. The movement illustrates also the
growth of sectional feeling and disunion sentiment and the
existence of sectional divisions in the South, with their basis in
conflicting interests.
As early as 1852, L. W. Spratt, the editor of the Charleston
Standard, advocated the reopening of the African slave trade. For
a few years he was almost alone. In the Southern Commercial
Convention, New Orleans, 1855, a Louisiana delegate introduced
a resolution recommending that Southern congressmen work for
the repeal of the Federal laws against the slave trade; but the
resolution elicited no discussion. 59 The first responsible leader to
publicly espouse the cause was Governor Adams, of South Caro-
lina. In his message to the Legislature, November, 1856, he argued
at length for revival of the trade, examining the subject in all of
its aspects, economic, political, social, and moral.00 The lower
house of the Legislature after a short but animated debate referred
the governor's recommendation to a special committee, which was
permitted to defer its report until the next session. Apparently
only a small minority wished to agitate the subject.61 In South
Carolina, as elsewhere, Adams's recommendation was considered
"DeBow's Review, XVIII, 628.
"Charleston Daily Courier, Nov. 26, 1856.
lDeBow's Review, XXVII, 364. Savannah Republican, Dec. 15, 19, 1856.
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a move to advance the cause of disunion.62 The Savannah
Republican had no idea that it was made in good faith, but only
as the "handmaid and twin sister of Disunion."63 Southern
leaders in Congress hastened to correct the impression which the
discussion in South Carolina was creating elsewhere, and resolu-
tions were introduced and adopted declaring against reopening the
foreign slave trade.
64
But these resolutions failed to check agitation. The subject was
injected into the proceedings of the Southern Commercial Con-
vention at Savannah, December, 1856, and the revival of the trade
was favored by a very aggressive minority. 65 At Knoxville, the
following year, the subject occupied the larger part of the time of
the convention.66 A resolution declaring that the joint patrol
article of the Treaty of Washington, 1842, should be abrogated,
was adopted. At the sessions of the Commercial Convention held
in Montgomery, 1858, and Vicksburg, 1859, the foreign slave
trade was virtually the only subject discussed.67 At Vicksburg
the convention adopted a resolution declaring that "all laws, state
or Federal, prohibiting the African slave trade, ought to be re-
pealed." The delegates from Louisiana, Mississippi, and Arkansas
formed an "African Labor Supply Association," of which J. D. B.
DeBow was made president.68 The avowed purpose of the organ-
ization was not, as the name may suggest, to encourage the im-
portation of slaves notwithstanding the laws against it, but to
conduct an agitation for their repeal.
69
Meanwhile the question had come before the state legislatures.
The Mississippi Legislature, 1857, had before it a plan to charter
the "African Labor Immigration Company" authorized to bring in
"Savannah Republican, Dec. 5, 1856; Daily National Intelligencer, Dec. 2,
1856.
"Dec. 6, 1856.
"Cong. Globe, 34 Cong., 3 Sess., 123-26.
"Proceedings, in Savannah Republican, Dec. 9-15, 1856; DfBow's Review,
XXII, 81-105, 216-24.
""Proceedings, in ibid., XXIII, 298-320.
"Proceedings of the Montgomery session are in ibid., XXIV, 473-491, 574-
6c6. Debate upon the slave trade is in Hodgson, Cradle of the Confederacy,
371-392. Proceedings of the Vicksburg session are in DeBow's Review, XXVII,
94-103, 205-220, 468-471; New York Herald, May 18, 21, 1859.
e
*DeBow's Review, XXVII, 120.
""Letters, Yancey to DeBow, DeBow to Yancey, in ibid., XXVII, 231-35.
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negroes as "apprentices."
70 No action was taken upon it. The
Louisiana House of Representatives, by a large majority, passed a
bill providing for the importation of 2,500 African negroes to be
indentured for a term of not less than fifteen years. A select com-
mittee of the Senate reported the bill favorably. The Senate, by
a majority of only two votes, postponed the bill indefinitely.71
Both the Mississippi and the Louisiana measures were said to be
compatible with the Federal Laws prohibiting the slave trade.
72
In the South Carolina Legislature of 1857-1859 the subject was
again considered. In January, 1859, DeBow wrote: "Certainly no
cause has ever grown with greater rapidity than has that of the ad-
vocates of the slave trade, if we may judge from the attitude it
is assuming in most of our Southern Legislatures."
73 In the press
also the subject received its full share of attention.
The great increase in the illicit foreign slave trade during the
18505 can be attributed largely to the enormous profits made
possible by the high prices slaves were commanding; but the state
of public opinion in the South was also favorable to it. It was
notorious that the lawrs were being violated. The newspapers
commented upon the slave smuggling and sometimes with ap-
proval. Federal officials were remarkably inefficient and apathetic
in the enforcement of the laws against it. It seemed impossible
to get a jury in the South to convict a slave trader.74 In the
Southern Commercial Convention at Vicksburg, L. W. Spratt and
others openly advocated violation of the laws. When opponents
declared the agitation useless because Congress would never legal-
ize the trade, Spratt replied that if the trade were approved by
Southern sentiment, it would matter little what might be the
TONew Orleans Delta, Feb. 9, 1858; DeBow 's Review, XXV, 627.
"New Orleans Picayune, Mar. 5, 21, 27, 1858; DeBow's Review, XXV, 491
ff., 627. The report of the select committee of the Senate is in ibid., XXIV,
421-24.
"Henry Hughes, "State Liberties, or the Right to African Contract Labor,"
in ibid., XXV, 626-53; report of the select committee of the Louisiana Senate,
just cited. But see opinion of Secretary of the Treasury Cobb, House Exec.
Docs., 36 Cong., 2 Sess., IV, No. 7, pp. 632-36.
DeBow's Review, XXVI, 51. See also ibid., XXVII, 493, quoting the
Richmond Whig.
74New Orleans True Delta, May 5, 1859. Also Charleston Mercury, Mar. 4,
II, 1858, quoting the New Orleans Delta; Mercury, May 22, Aug. 5, 1858; Du-
Bois, Suppression of the African Slave Trade, 183-87.
2l6 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SOUTHERN SECTIONALISM, 1 840- 1 86 1 [2l6
course of Congress.
75 More honorable was the suggestion fre-
quently made that the laws against the foreign slave trade were
unconstitutional and should be nullified. The Committee on
Federal Relations of the Senate of Louisiana argued that the
Federal laws against the foreign slave trade were unconstitutional,
and the state was in duty bound to interpose; the legislature had
an unquestionable right to enact a law permitting the importation
of slaves from Cuba, Brazil, etc., and any attempt on the part of
the Federal authorities to interfere with its operation would be
tyranny.
76
We cannot be too critical of the motives either of those who
favored or of those who opposed reopening the African slave
trade. The prominent leaders of the movement were disunionists,
and were known as such before the agitation had well begun.
They saw in the foreign slave trade another issue which would
divide the sections, and in the certain refusal of the North to
permit the revival of the trade another pretext for dissolving the
Union. The debate turned almost as much upon the advisability
of debating the question as it did upon the advisability of reopen-
ing the trade. The Charleston Mercury deplored the agitation of
the question because it divided and distracted the South.
77 Others
answered that if disunionists waited for a united South they
would never get out of the Union.
78 The great majority of the
Unionist leaders and newspapers were opposed to raising the
question. They charged that the agitation had been got up to
promote disunion.
79 Advocates of reopening the slave trade made
the counter charge that its opponents were afraid to debate the
question on its merits. They were willing to sacrifice the interests
"DeBow's Review, XXVII, 212; New York Herald, May 18, 1859. H. S.
Foote branded such utterances as "high treason."
DeBow's Review, XXVI, 485 (extract from the report). Such prominent
men as W L. Yancey and ex-Governor J. D. McRae argued that the Federal
laws prohibiting the foreign slave were unconstitutional. Hodgson, Cradle of the
Confederacy, 379; DeBow's Review, XXVII, 362-64.
T7Mar. 10, 1859. Also speech of R. B. Rhett, July 4, 1859, in Mercury,
July 7-
T8E. g., John A. Jones, of Georgia, in the Montgomery Commercial Conven-
tion, Hodgson, op. cit., 377.
"New Orleans Picayune, Mar. 21, 1858.
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of the South to avoid raising an issue which might endanger the
stability of the Union.
80
The agitation for the revival of the slave trade may be regard-
ed as, in a measure, merely a reaction to the excesses of the
Garrisonian abolitionists in the North. J. J. Pettigru, in his report
to the South Carolina Legislature, said: "It is not intended to
impute directly or indirectly a want of sincerity to the supporters
of the measure; .... but a great many worthy persons are
honestly disposed to make issue with the North from a spirit of
pure combativeness, without regard to ostensible causes."81
It could very plausibly be argued that the reopening of the
African slave trade was necessary if the South were to maintain
the sectional equilibrium upon which the maintenance of her
rights and interests in the Union was said to depend. The North
was said to be gaining three congressmen a year and rapidly
settling new free states and territories by virtue of foreign immi-
gration.
82 How could the South maintain her political equality
when the only class of immigration she could attract and use was
barred? A bitter contest was being waged over Kansas. Kansas,
it was painfully evident, was being lost to the South because there
was no excess of slave population to go into it. Plans for acquiring
Cuba and territory in northern Mexico or Central America with
a view to making slaveholding states of them were said to be
futile without the reopening of the foreign slave trade; for either
there would be no slaves to populate them, and they would be-
come free states; or the older slave states would be drained of
their slave population, and become free states. Alexander H.
Stephens and Jefferson Davis both said the South could not hope
for any great extension of slave territory unless the slave trade
were reopened.
83
Indeed, without population to take advantage of
them, the Kansas-Nebraska bill and the Dred Scott decision were
empty victories. Even without further extension of territory, it
*E. g., W. H. McCardle, of Mississippi, in the Vicksburg convention, New
York Herald, May 18, 1859.
"DeBow's Review, XXV, 306.
"^Temple, of Tennessee, in Southern Commercial Convention, Knoxville, 1857,
ibid., XXIII, 319.
"Stephens's farewell address to his constituents, Augusta, Georgia, July 2,
1859, in Cleveland, Alexander H. Stephens, 647; Davis, quoted in Cairnes, The
Slave Power, 243 n.
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was said, there was a possibility of the loss of Maryland, Ken-
tucky, and Missouri to slavery through the transfer South of the
slave population and the influx of elements hostile to it. "There
is no denying," said Yancey, "that there is a large emancipation
interest in Virginia and Kentucky and Maryland and Missouri,
the fruits of which we see in Henry Winter Davis, Cassius M.
Clay, and Thomas H. Benton."84
Advocates of reviving the slave trade contended that the
measure was necessary to secure slavery against the attacks of
present or future foes within the cotton states themselves. If there
should arise a serious shortage of labor, Northern and European
labor, unfriendly to slavery, would come in to supply the de-
ficiency. Governor Adams, of South Carolina, said, that, if the
South could not supply the demand for slave- labor, "we must
expect to be supplied with a species of labor we do not want, and
which is from the very nature of things antagonistic to our insti-
tutions." 85 Fears were expressed that the "labor base" was
already becoming too narrow. "We need to strengthen this institu-
tion," said Yancey, "and how better can we do that than by
showing the non-slaveholding class of our citizens that they can
buy a negro for $200, which, in a few years, by his care and in-
struction, will become worth a thousand dollars ?"86 Some of these
agitators accepted the "irrepressible conflict" doctrine.
"
.... in
Tennessee, and even Georgia, Alabama, Mississippi, and Louisi-
ana," said L. W. Spratt, "there is a large class of persons who
have to make their own bread with their own hands, and these are
distinctly conscious that there is a difference between 'labor' and
'slave labor.'
" 87
Opponents of reopening the slave trade denied
that it would make slavery more secure: slavery was most secure
when the prices of slaves were highest.
88
They also denied the
presence in the South of a large class inimical to slavery. Roger
A. Pryor characterized it a "foul libel upon the citizens of the
MIn Southern Commercial Convention, Montgomery, DeBow's Review,
XXIV, 587.
"Charleston Daily Courier, Nov. 26, 1856.
"DeBow's Review, XXIV, 587.
"''Report on the Slave Trade Made to the Southern Convention at Mont-
gomery," etc., in ibid., XXIV, 473-91. (Quotation on page 489.)
""E.g., H. S. Foote, in the Vicksburg convention, ibid., XXVII, 219; Pettigru,
Minority Report in S. C. Legislature, ibid., XXV, 176.
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South to thus endorse what Greeley and Seward have been assert-
ing so many years . . ." He admitted that "emigrees" from the
North might be considered hostile to slavery. The facts seem to
have been against Pryor's contention.
89
Everywhere in the South where white laborers came into com-
petition with slaves there was hostility on the part of the whites
toward negroes and their masters and a demand, not for the eman-
cipation of slaves to be sure, but for their exclusion from the
employments in which competition was felt. This spirit was
noticeable especially among mechanics and artisans and unskilled
laborers in the cities. In South Carolina the white mechanics
memorialized the Legislature, 185 8-1859, for laws prohibiting slaves
from hiring their own time and working at mechanical employ-
ments.90 In the Southern Commercial Convention at Vicksburg, Mr.
Purdon, of Mississippi, offered resolutions, which had been adopted
by a meeting of white mechanics, condemning the practice of making
public mechanics of negroes, and declaring that slave labor should
be confined to the corn, cotton, and sugar plantations.91 In Ala-
bama and North Carolina also there was opposition to the em-
ployment of slaves in mechanical pursuits.
92 In the latter state
workingmen's associations began the agitation for the ad valorem
tax upon slave property, which became the leading issue of state
politics during the few years immediately preceding the war.
93
The author of The Impending Crisis of the South claimed to rep-
resent the free labor of North Carolina with whose development
slavery interfered. In New Orleans and other cities of the South
the practice of employing slaves as draymen was abandoned be-
cause of the objections of whites.94 Nor were all of those who
favored the restriction of slave labor to the plantations working-
f DeBow's Review, XXIV, 581.
""Extract from the report of the committee on negro population, J. Harlston
Read, Jr., chairman, in ibid'., XXVI, 600 ff.
"Ibid., XXVII, 102.
"Montgomery Daily Confederation, Jan. 19, 1859; Olmsted, Cotton King-
dom, II, 137; Republican Banner and Nashville Whig, Aug. 18, 1857 (riotous
demonstration of white mechanics of Wilmington, N. C., against negro me-
chanics).
"J. W. Moore, History of North Carolina, II, 137, 138; Wm. K. Boyd,
"North Carolina on the Eve of Secession," in Amer. Hist. Assoc., Rept., 1910,
pp. 168, 174.
"DeBow's Review, XXIV, 602.
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men. Others favored it to prevent a "war between free labor and
slave labor in our midst," to make white labor "aristocratic" and
invite immigration, and to obviate difficulties of controlling slaves
in cities and towns.95 Immigrants from the North and Europe
were generally unfriendly to slavery. There were farming com-
munities in the cotton states from which the whites would have
been glad to have all negroes expelled.
96 In several of the slave-
holding states, notably Alabama, Tennessee, North Carolina, and
Virginia, there were political divisions based upon the division
of each into a farming, largely non-slaveholding section and a
planting section or black belt. The people of the farming sections
were not generally hostile to slavery, but they did resent the
political dominance of the planters. So the fears of Spratt and
others that opposition to slavery might grow up in its very midst
were not at all groundless.
All of these classes hostile or potentially hostile to negroes or
slavery or both were opposed to reopening the African slave trade.
If the South were to have immigration, they preferred that it be
white immigration. They were joined by those who, while devoted
to slavery, feared it to be a doomed institution: if emancipation
should ever occur, they thought, the South would have a quite
sufficient race problem with the natural increase of her existing
negro population.
97
On the question whether or not it would be to the economic in-
terest of the cotton planters and the South to increase the labor
force engaged in the production of cotton by the importation of
slaves from abroad, there was a difference of opinion. In the
opinion of the advocates of reopening the slave trade, the demand
for cotton was growing so rapidly that production could be
materially increased without reducing the price. A failure on the
part of the South to produce sufficient cotton to supply the de-
mand might result temporarily in exorbitant prices which would
stimulate production in other quarters of the globe, and, conse-
quently, cause the loss of America's monopoly and, finally, a
"Charleston Courier, Dec. 28, 1856, letter on "Policy of Planters"; So. Quar.
Review, XXVI, 447.
"Olmsted, A Journey in the Back Country, II, 236, and passim (Putnam's
ed., 1907).
"DeBow's Review, XXVII, 219.
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permanent decline of prices. The cotton crop could not be
sufficiently increased without fresh supplies of labor. Reopening
the African slave trade would supply the deficiency. Further, a
revival of the slave trade would lower the prices of slaves, and
thus reduce the cost of production.
The possibility of producing cotton by white labor received
considerable attention, especially from a class of Northern and
English writers who were interested not so much in the future of
cotton as in the future of slavery.
98 White labor, they asserted,
was cheaper than negro slave labor, and whites could work in the
climate of the cotton belt. Robert Russell, the most competent of
the British observers, put a high estimate upon the advantages of
the plantation system, but saw no bar in the climate to production
of cotton by white labor. He remarked the considerable amount
of cotton already grown in the pine barrens, whose climate was
even warmer than that of the middle zone or uplands, where most
of the plantations were located." Of the people of the South some
believed white labor for cotton production available, but con-
sidered it undesirable; others, waiving the question of desirability,
professed to believe it unavailable. Many seem to have believed
the assertion so frequently made that, as one put it, "In the cotton,
rice, and sugar regions, slave labor is not only more productive,
but is the only species of labor which can be depended upon for
the cultivation of these great staples."
100 Those who made this
assertion knew, of course, that thousands of non-slaveholding
whites were engaged in a small way in the production of cotton.
DeBow estimated the number so engaged in 1850 at 100,000; the
number of slaves employed in the cotton fields he set at
Soo.ooo.101 The great majority of the planter class seem to have
taken little interest in the poor whites, and to have had less faith
in making them productive members of society. As for European
labor, it was not forthcoming, whether for climatic, social, or other
reasons. Said DeBow: "It is plain, and time and events have
M
F. L. Olmsted, Cotton Kingdom, II, 254-59, 265-67; Journey in the Back
Country, 377 ff.; Edward Atkinson, Cheap Cotton by Free Labor, by a Cotton
Manujacturer; Weston, Progress of Slavery, 44; Stirling Letters from the Slave
States, 234, 302 if.; Russell, North America, 284 ff.
"North America, 284, 285. Cf. M. B. Hammond, The Cotton Industry, 94 ff.
100
A. J. Roane, of Washington, DeBow 's Review, XX, 66 1.
101
Industrial Resources of the Southern and Western States, I, 175.
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demonstrated the fact, that it is not European labor which we
want, since that labor, during so long an experiment has not taken
foothold in our limits, evidencing thus an incapacity to adopt
itself to our conditions and to become amalgamated with us."102
Naturally the planters themselves, from economic motives alone
(although this aspect of the matter was not publicly discussed),
would not invite competition from a large number of white farmers,
whether native or immigrant.
Opponents of reopening the slave trade denied that it would
benefit the agricultural interests. -A material increase in the
cotton crop would depress prices. Cheap cotton would benefit
only the manufacturer. America's position as the chief source
of raw cotton was not endangered. Slaves from Africa would
constitute a poor grade of labor, and, therefore, would not lessen
the cost of production, however much they might depress the
price of slaves.
103
Advocates of the reopening of the African slave trade claimed
that it would be beneficial to other industries as well as agriculture.
The great obstacle, they said, was lack of labor. As long as cot-
ton culture paid more for labor than other employments could af-
ford, it was idle to attempt to divert labor to them.
104 The use of
such an argument was plainly an attempt to meet the opposition to
the slave trade ot those who were urging diversification of industry
as a proper policy for the South. The argument was inconsistent
with the contention that renewal of the slave trade would benefit
agriculture. And diversificationists were not desirous of diverting
labor to less profitable industries; in their opinion, the develop-
ment of varied industry would benefit all. The suggestion made,
that slave labor might be used in manufactures, could not carry
great weight. It had been tried with small success. However,
the great obstacle to the development of diversified industry in
the South was not so much lack of labor as a deficiency of capital.
There was much unprofitably employed white labor in the South.
DeBotff's Review, XXVII, 232.
10S
J. J. Pettigru, minority report of a committee of the S. C. Legislature, in
ibid., XXV, 166-185; 289-308; speech of ex-Senator Brooke, of Miss., in the
Vicksburg Convention, ibid., XXVII, 360-62; and most of the speeches and
papers against reopening the slave trade.
1MThe best statement of this argument is in L. W. Spratt, ''Report on the
Slave Trade," etc., Montgomery Convention, in ibid., XXIV, 473-91.
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On the very eve of the war, William Gregg wrote, "The idea that
we lack laborers at the South, and will be under the necessity of
importing wild Africans, is preposterous." He told why the immi-
grant did not come South: When he learns that "one-half of our
white people, who are willing to work, can not procure employment
that able-bodied men are roaming about the country glad to get
work at seventy-five cents per day and find themselves while
similar labor commands a dollar or more at the North and West,
is it at all surprising that he does not come to the South?"
108
We come again to the fact that many of the slaveholding
element in the South, including advocates of the reopening of the
slave trade, feared the development of white labor and sought to
prevent it by keeping the white laborers in a minority. They
neither wished to employ profitably that already in the South or to
invite immigration. Gregg and others of his way of thinking, on
the contrary, had no fear of white labor. They wanted to put
the whites to work as well as the blacks, and they were inclined
to welcome immigration from the North and Europe. They pro-
fessed to believe that a white population, profitably employed,
would not be inimical to slavery. They were not hostile to slavery,
but they saw no necessity for subordinating every other interest
to this single one. Reopening the African slave trade, could it have
been accomplished, would have been a measure to perpetuate the
old order in the South. The New Orleans Picayune took note of
this fact. After describing at some length the progress being made
in manufactures and internal improvements and the changes which
were coming over the South, it said: "It is worse than folly to
arrest the present direction of capital and enterprise by plans
whose effect, if successfully carried into execution, would restore
the former tendency of all Southern enterprise to the channel of
agriculture."
106
It could not be concealed that there was very strong opposition
to the foreign slave trade on moral and religious grounds. L. W.
Spratt, the arch-agitator, said all the women and all the "pious"
were against him.
107 The influx of a horde of barbarians, said
opponents, would change Southern slavery from a patriarchal
1<aDeBow's Review, XXIX, 623, 630.
1MMay 22, 1858.
DeBow's Review, XXVII, 213.
institution to one like that of Cuba, where cruelty and severity
were necessary to control the slaves.
108 The people of the South
were very sensitive to the opinions of the world. "This proposi-
tion, if endorsed, would shock the moral sentiment of Christian-
dom," said Roger A. Pryor.109
The people of the border states were almost unanimously
opposed to the agitation of the slave trade proposal. They were
charged (by W. L. Yancey and others) with being desirous of
maintaining the high prices of slaves because they held the position
of sellers of slaves to the buyers in the cotton states.
110
Virginians,
against whom the charge was particularly made, repelled the
charge with indignation. Virginia was prospering, they said; she
had opened a field for slave labor which rendered it profitable at
home.111 No doubt many slave owners in Virginia and other slave
selling states were interested in keeping prices up; but we need
not emphasize economic motives to explain the opposition in the
border states. They were the states with the largest non-slave-
holding population, the largest foreign element (excepting Louisi-
ana, of the cotton states), and the largest Northern element. In
each of the border states there was considerable emancipation
sentiment. Being nearer the North, their people were more sensi-
tive to criticisms of slavery than the people farther south. Their
institution was milder and more patriarchal; and their moral re-
pugnance to the slave trade had not been blunted by familarity
with it.
It is worthy of note that, although every' coast state had either
laws or constitutional provisions or both against the foreign slave
trade, not one otthem was repealed. Not a single state legislature
went so far as to pass resolutions demanding the repeal of the
Federal laws against it. In Mississippi, where, with the exceptions
108
J. J. Pettigru, Roger A. Pryor, H. W. Milliard, in DeBow's Revitw, XXV,
289 ff.; XXIV, 582, 592.
1<a
lbid., XXIV, 582. Russell formed a different impression. In Charleston
he overheard a conversation on reopening the slave trade. "One made the remark
that the South now paid little regard to what England might think of the
matter ... I was somewhat mortified to find how little impression all that
has been said and written about slavery has had on those whose pecuniary in-
terests are interwoven with the institution." North America, 162.
110
Yancey in the Montgomery Convention, DeBow's Review, XXIV, 585.
niWm. Ballard Preston's reply to Yancey, ibid., XXIV, 595.
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of Louisiana and Texas, the movement was strongest, the Demo-
cratic party was afraid to take it up as a new political issue.
112 In
South Carolina, after two years of agitation, only in the Charleston
district was it made an issue in the political campaign of 1858.113
South Carolina leaders who found the agitation prejudicial to the
cause of disunion by dividing the South were able to silence the
agitation in all but two of the newspapers of the state. Sectional
politics was no doubt largely responsible for the origin of the
agitation. Once begun, however, it is questionable whether con-
siderations of sectional politics did not operate more strongly
against the movement than for it. A fair conclusion perhaps would
be that only in two or three Southwestern slave states was the
movement strong enough to have insured legalizing the reopening
of the trade had not Federal laws imposed an obstacle. And the
strength of the movement there can be attributed chiefly to
economic causes; agriculture was expanding rapidly; thousands
of slaves were being bought for the plantations at prices so high
as to absorb a large share of the profits.
The comparative prosperity of Southern agriculture during the
decade before the War was reflected to a degree in other industries.
In 1850 there were 2,004.37 miles of railroads in the Southern
states, constructed at a cost of $42,181,665. In 1860 the mileage
was 8,946.9, representing a cost for construction of #237,376,O97.
114
Unlike the railroads of the West they had not been built entirely
with capital borrowed in the East or abroad.
115 Southern pro-
moters experienced difficulty in selling their bonds in the North
or in England. Public opinion demanded that the roads be built,
and every expedient was resorted to to sell the stock at home.
Because of the difficulty of raising capital, Southern railroads had
been economically built, and, too often, cheaply constructed and
poorly equipped. Traffic had proved light and dividends generally
small, and the mileage had been extended beyond the immediate
requirements, although by 1860 there was promise of better con-
ditions in the industry.
112
Henry S. Foote, Scylla and Charybdis, 254-56.
DeBow's Review, XXVII, 364, remarks of Mr. Farrow, of S. C.
114
Ringwalt, Development of Transportation Systems in the U. S., 151.
^Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLII, 315; Kettell, Southern Wealth and
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The rapid extension of agriculture, under the influence of higher
prices, naturally absorbed most of the capital accumulated from
the profits of the industry. The building of the railroads likewise
constituted a heavy drain upon the capital of the South. Notwith-
standing, noteworthy extensions were being made in several lines
of industry, and plants already established were prospering.
The railroads brought in with them machine shops and repair
shops. Several rolling mills had been established before 1860. The
value of the bar, sheet, and railroad iron made in the South in-
creased from $1,504,443 in 1850 to $2,458,119 in 1860, or 63 per
cent.116 Railroad cars were made in a few shops; the Tredegar
Locomotive works at Richmond made 19 of the 470 locomotives
made in the United States in 1860. Stationary engines were being
constructed in many places. The production of coal had nearly
trebled, although the aggregate was still small, about one-ninth of
the total production of the United States. The iron industry had
not yet been greatly affected by the coming of the railroads; in
the production of pig iron there was a decline between 1850 and
1860.
During the years just before the war the cotton factories, after
several years of great difficulty, were again prosperous. In 1855
the Georgia factories were reported in thriving condition. A year
or two later similar reports came from northern Alabama and
western Tennessee.117 Occasionally the building of a new factory
was reported. The attention of the North was attracted to the re-
vival.118 General Charles T. James, of Rhode Island, again put
his services at the disposal of any company proposing to establish
new factories.113 During the decade 1850-1860 the number of
cotton factories in Georgia grew from 29 to 33, the number of
hands employed from 2,107 to 2,813, and the value of the product
from $1,395,056 to $2,371,207, or 69.97 per cent. These gains made
Georgia the leading cotton manufacturing state of the South, and,
""All the statistics given in the next few pages are taken from the reports
of the Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth censuses unless otherwise specified. The term
"the South" is used to include only the eleven states which seceded. The census
reports include mining and lumbering with manufacturing; and there would be
no point in making a distinction here.
^Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XXXVII, ill; XXIX, 755-
""Charleston Mercury, May 25, 1858.
DeBow's Review, XXVIII, 244.
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in part, justified her reputation as the "Massachusetts of the
South." Considerable gains were made also in Alabama and
Tennessee. Virginia and North Carolina made no progress in this
industry. South Carolina showed a decline. The revival in the
cotton manufacturing industry came too late to greatly improve
the showing the South as a whole made in 1860. The progress in
the South had been smaller proportionally than in the country
at large, and the product of Southern factories was only one-
fourteenth of the total for the United States.
The value of the product of Southern woolen manufactures in-
creased 143.55 Per cent between 1850 and 1860; the increase for
the country at large was 42.14 per cent. During the same period
the value of men's clothing produced in the South increased 65.96
per cent; in the United States, 51.55 per cent. For boots and
shoes, the percentages of increase were 89.9 and 70.27. The pro-
duction of paper was increased almost threefold, and of printing
over sevenfold. But in the case of each of the items named the
Southern states produced only three or four per cent of the total
output for the United States, a quantity entirely inadequate to
meet the home demand. A respectable beginning had been made
in the manufacture of carriages and coaches, wagons and carts,
saddlery and harness, nails and spikes, sashes, doors, and blinds,
and in cooperage. In the manufacture of agricultural implements
progress had been much slower than in the United States as a
whole; the South produced less than six per cent of the total. Of
the manufacture of one article, however, the South had almost a
monopoly; of 57 cotton gin factories in the United States, 54 were
in the Southern states, notably Alabama. The value of the ships
and boats built in the South in 1860 was $789,870, which sum may
be compared with $11,667,661 for the United States. Of the 631
articles listed by the census as manufactures of the United States
in 1860, 398 were not made in the South in any quantity whatever,
and many others were made only in insignificant quantities. In
these two classes fell such common and necessary articles as hats
and caps, men's furnishings, women's clothing, millinery, carpets
and rugs, furniture and cabinet ware, earthenware, glassware,
hardware and cutlery, tools, and stoves and ranges. Packed meats
may also be mentioned.
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The Southern states made the best showing, both as regards
aggregate value of product and percentages of increase, in types
of manufacture which were closely related to agriculture, or
which were comparatively simple in their processes. Thus the
value of the flour and meal ground increased from $16,581,597 to
$37,996,470, or 129 per cent, between 1850 and 1860; and in the
latter year was equal to nearly one-fourth the total value of all
Southern manufactures. The value of lumber, planed and sawed,
was $19,696,863 in 1860, an increase of 133 per cent over 1850,
and was one-eighth the value of all Southern manufactures. The
value of the tobacco manufactured was $14,612,442 in 1860, 125
per cent more than in 1850. A fourth big item was turpentine,
crude and distilled, valued at $7,409,745. These four items to-
gether accounted for one-half the total value of the product of all
Southern manufactures; and the capital invested in their manu-
facture was nearly one-half the capital invested in all the manu-
factures of the South.
The capital invested in manufactures in the South was 13.6
per cent of the capital so invested in the entire country in i84O,
120
10.4 per cent in 1850, and 9.5 per cent in 1860. The increase in
capital so invested in the South was 51.5 per cent between 1840
and 1850 and 73.6 per cent the following decade; for the entire
United States the percentages were 95.5 and 91.3. Southern manu-
factures employed 88,390 hands in 1850 and 110,721 in 1860, an
increase of 25.3 per cent. In the same period the population of the
eleven Southern states had grown 23.9 per cent. The number of
hands employed in all the manufactures of the United States in
1850 was 957,059, in 1860 the number was 1,311,246, or 37 percent
more. The population of the United States was 35.4 per cent
greater in 1860 than in 1850.
Statistics are not available for a full comparison of the progress
of manufactures and agriculture, but comparison in a few respects
may suffice. Between 1850 and 1860 the value of Southern manu-
factures increased 96.5 per cent. During the same period the value
of the cotton crop increased 102.7 Per cent; the tobacco crop, 119
per cent; the sugar product, 80.3 per cent; and the live stock in
the South, 96.4 per cent. As we have seen, the progress in other
branches of agriculture was not great.
"The statistics for 1840 are meager and can rarely be used for comparisons.
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Southern cities had not established direct trade, nor had they
become industrial centers. Among the cities of the United States
in 1860, New Orleans, Charleston, Richmond, Mobile, Memphis,
Savannah, and Petersburg ranked in size 6, 22, 25, 27, 28, 41, and
50 respectively. In value of manufactures they ranked 17, 85, 13,
79, 74, 65, and 49 respectively. Thus Richmond and Petersburg
only could be considered industrial towns. However, as com-
mercial centers the towns of the South reflected accurately the
prosperity of the section.
The South was not in the throes of an industrial revolution at
the outbreak of the Civil War, and there seems to be little evi-
dence that she was upon the verge of such a revolution. However,
there were factors in the situation which pointed to a more rapid
development of varied industry in the future. Capital which might
be so employed was accumulating. Southern banks had never been
in a stronger condition. The railroads must soon have justified
their construction by giving isolated regions access to market, in-
creasing intercourse, and creating new wants. They were break-
ing down those frontier conditions which, because of the great
extent of the section, the sparse population, and the natural diffi-
culties of forests and rough lands, still lingered in much of the
South. The attention of Southern men had been directed to the
varied resources of the land. Geographical surveys had revealed
the coal and iron fields of Alabama and Tennessee, lying in close
proximity. Railroads were ready to penetrate them, and the pro-
cesses were being developed which would make possible their
utilization. Stock had been taken of the water power, and the
people were beginning to realize what a wealth lay in the forests.
Small industrial towns were springing up here and there. North-
ern men with experience in various branches of industry were
filtering in; Northern capitalists who theretofore had found suffi-
cient fields for investment in the North and West were beginning
to show an interest in the possibilities offered by the South, as were
also, to some extent, English and French capitalists. It is con-
ceivable that a temporary depression in the price of cotton at the
time might have given a decided impetus to the cotton manu-
facturing industry, just as it had promised to do twelve or fifteen
years earlier.
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These facts were not unappreciated in the South. The New
Orleans Picayune, in the autumn of 1858, said the South had been
making progress, slow but positive. "Like a bow in the heavens
after the storm clouds have swept by, we may now see, in look-
ing upon the results of the sectional agitations of the immediate
past, indications of the commencement of a new era for the South
an era singularly marked with home progress."121
So there were factors which operated on the eve of the Civil
War to make the people of the South better content with their
economic system and position. These may be briefly summarized:
(i) The comparative prosperity of Southern agriculture. (2) A
measure of prosperity and progress in other lines of industry. (3)
Confidence that the possession of and the ability to control a large
agricultural surplus for export constituted an element of great
political power. (4) A growing consciousness among slaveholders
that any considerable diversification of industry was incompatible
with the security of slavery. The first two of these would have a
tendency to allay sectional feeling. However, the comparative
prosperity of agriculture was largely the cause of the movement
in behalf of reviving the foreign slave trade, and it had decidely
the opposite effect.
'Quoted in DeBow's Review, XXV, 590.
CHAPTER IX
ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF THE SECESSION OF THE
COTTON STATES, 1860-1861
After the election of November, 1860, the cotton states made
haste to put into execution their threats of secession in case of the
election of a Republican president. In South Carolina the opposi-
tion to secession was very weak and ineffectual. The Legislature
met in special session, November 5. The members were almost
unanimously for immediate, separate secession. A few voices were
raised in favor of cooperation with other Southern states.
1 The
Legislature called a state convention to meet December 17. With
few exceptions only immediate secessionists were elected to it. On
the fourth day that body unanimously adopted an ordinance of
secession. In taking this speedy action South Carolina was not
taking a leap in the dark. Her leaders were confident that other
states would soon follow. They had been assured by disunion
leaders elsewhere that bold action would strengthen the disunion
movements in other states.2 If a conflict with the Federal govern-
ment should ensue, there could be no doubt of the decision of the
cotton states, at least, upon the issue, as it would then be, of
sustaining a sister state against coercion.
Meanwhile vigorous contests were being waged in the other
cotton states between those for immediate and separate secession
on the one hand and coalitions of unconditional unionists, coopera-
tionists, and temporizers on the other. The governors, with one ex-
ception, were secessionists, and the legislatures were controlled by
secessionists. Conventions were called in all the states. Brief
campaigns ensued to influence the election of delegates and the
action of the conventions. These campaigns were conducted
amidst great excitement. Governors and legislatures anticipated
the action of the conventions by seizing forts, arsenals, and other
United States property, and by taking measures to put their
respective states on a military footing. Congressmen sent inflam-
matory messages from Washington, where Senate and House were
'Proceedings and debates in the South Carolina Legislature, New York
Herald, Nov. 9-14, 1860.
'Speech of Mr. Elmore, Commissioner from Alabama, before the South
Carolina Convention, in ibid., Dec. 22, 1860.
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vainly attempting to patch up another compromise to save the
Union. Commissioners from one state to another lent their in-
fluence to the secession cause.
Considering the tactical advantages of the immediate secession-
ists, their opponents showed unexpected strength in three states.
In Alabama they elected 46 of 100 delegates, and claimed to have
cast a clear majority of the votes in the election. In the Conven-
tion they united upon a substitute proposal for a convention of all
the Southern states at Nashville, and waged a bitter fight in its
behalf. The bitterness of the struggle was intensified because the
alignment was the old sectional one between northern (Unionist
in this case) and southern Alabama. The struggle did not cease
when the convention adopted a secession ordinance. 3 In Georgia
the opposition cast 42 per cent of the popular vote.
4 In the Con-
vention their substitute proposal for a convention of all the slave
holding states was defeated by the narrow margin of 164-133;
and this, notwithstanding the fact that Georgia was already as-
sured the cooperation of four states if she should secede. In
Louisiana also the contest was hot, and the popular vote close, al-
though in the Convention the immediate secessionists prevailed by
a large majority. In Texas the tactical advantages lay with the
opponents of secession; for Governor Houston was opposed to it
and refused to call the Legislature in special session. However, a
self-constituted committee of citizens called an election for
delegates to a convention. Their action forced Governor Hous-
ton to assemble the Legislature, which approved the action of the
committee. The Convention met and passed an ordinance of seces-
sion; the people approved its action. After their defeat in the
several states the cooperationist and Unionist leaders, with excep-
tions, expressed a determination to support the course determined
upon by the majority. To conciliate them and their following, the
secessionist majority admitted them to positions of power and
trust in numbers proportionate to, if not in excess of, their
strength.
'Remarks of W. R. Smith in the Alabama Convention. Smith, History and
Debates of the Convention of the People of Alabama, 67 f.; Hodgson, Cradle of
the Confederacy, 502 ff.; letter of T. R. R. Cobb to his wife, Feb. 4, 1861, in So.
Hist. Assoc., Publ., IX 274.
*Avery, History of Georgia, 149.
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On February 4, delegates from six states, soon joined by dele-
gates from a seventh, met at Montgomery. A provisional consti-
tution for the Confederate States of America was adopted. A pro-
visional government was organized. Commissioners were sent to
Washington and to Europe. Measures were taken to provide
revenue and to organize an army and navy. A permanent consti-
tution was drafted by the Provisional Congress and submitted to
the states for ratification.
Meanwhile the secession movement in other slaveholding states
had received decided checks, although aggressive fights had been
waged by the secessionists in several. In North Carolina the Legis-
lature, after much debate, provided for an election for delegates
to a convention and the submission to the people, at the same
time, (January 28), of the question whether or not a convention
should be held. The people elected 82 Unionists and 38 secession-
ists, and decided against the convention by a small majority.5 In
Tennessee the question of holding a convention was submitted to
the electorate and decided adversely by a large majority. In
Arkansas the electorate approved the assembling of a convention,
but elected delegates a small majority of whom were opposed to
immediate secession. The action of Virginia was expected greatly
to influence that of the other border slave states. The Legislature
met in special session at Governor Letcher's call, and provided for
a delegate convention. At the convention election, February 4, the
people returned a distinct majority against immediate secession.
Although the secessionists waged a hard fight in the Convention,
all efforts to pass an ordinance of secession were foiled until after
Sumter. In Maryland and Delaware no conventions met, in the
former because Governor Hicks refused to call a special session of
the Legislature. Governor Magoffm, of Kentucky, recommended
the call of a convention, but the Legislature refused. In Missouri
a Legislature dominated by State Rights Democrats called a con-
vention, but the electorate returned an overwhelming majority of
Union delegates.
As long as any hope remained that Congress or the Peace Con-
ference would agree upon a settlement which would restore the
Union, the people of the border states gave unmistakable evidence
of their desire to remain in the Union. Even after it became clear
that no such settlement was possible, and when the question be-
'dppleton's Annual Cyclopedia, I, 538.
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came one of choosing between the United States and the Confed-
erate States, they seem to have preferred the Union. However,
notice was early given (by North Carolina, Virginia, Tennessee,
and Arkansas) that continued adherence to the Union was con-
tingent upon no attempt being made by the Federal government
to coerce the seceded states. When, after Sumter, President Lin-
coln issued his call for
'troops, these states seceded, and united
their fortunes with the Confederacy. The other border states were
saved for the Union.
With a view to determine whether or not they reveal any evi-
dences of economic motives for Southern sectionalism, it is pro-
posed to analyze (i) the arguments advanced for and against
secession after the election of Lincoln; (2) the alignment of the
people upon the secession issue; (3) the official statements of
causes of secession which were published; (4) contemporary un-
official essays at interpreting events; and (5) the formulation of
the early economic policies of the seceded states and of the Con-
federacy. The considerations determining the action of the border
states were manifestly so different from those determining the
action of the cotton states that they require a separate treatment.
This chapter will deal with the first four points mentioned with
special reference to the cotton states. The succeeding chapters
will deal with the early economic policies of the seceded states and
of the Confederacy and with the peculiar economic considerations
affecting the decision of the border slave states.
There can be no doubt that the arguments for and against se-
cession in the cotton states used after Lincoln's election related
chiefly to the dangers besetting slavery and how the institution
could best be defended. The leading arguments of the secession-
ists may be summarized: (i) The election had resulted in the
triumph of a party which was founded upon and held together by
hostility to slavery, which proposed to exclude it from the com-
mon territories, in spite of a decision of the Supreme Court, which
opposed the acquisition of additional slave territory, which looked
to the ultimate extinction of slavery, and whose candidate had
declared the Union could not exist half slave and half free. If the
South should acquiesce in Black Republican rule, slavery would
be doomed, and the destruction of slavery would ruin the South.
(2) The triumph of a sectional party established a sectional des-
235] SECESSION OF THE COTTON STATES 235
potism of the stronger section over the weaker. Just now slavery
was the interest in gravest danger; but sectional power might be
wielded to the detriment of all the interests of the South. The
Constitution would not protect the weaker section because in the
North the true view of the Union as a federation of sovereign
states had been lost, and the old Federalist idea of a consolidated
government had prevailed. (3) The Constitution was a compact
between equal sovereign states. The Personal Liberty laws of
Northern states were violations of the compact. A violation of
the compact by some of the parties to it released the others from
their obligations under it. (4) The quarrel between the sections
had become so venomous as to subvert one of the purposes for
which the Constitution had been formed, namely, to insure do-
mestic tranquility. The constant denunciation of the South and
slavery by politicians, press, pulpit, platform, and teachers of the
North was a constant insult to the South, and no longer to be
borne. (5) Secession was a constitutional remedy. (6) It would,
in all probability, be peaceful. One party in the North believed in
the constitutional right of secession. Prominent leaders of the
other had declared against coercion. Northern industry would be
paralyzed by the interruption of commerce with the South which
war would entail, and the North would be unable to fight. The
threat of coercion would unite the South, and the Northern people
would perceive the folly of waging war against a united South. (7)
The Southern states, even the cotton states, together possessed
population and resources sufficient to enable them to take their
place among the nations of the earth.
The opponents of immediate and separate secession agreed with
the secessionists that the crisis must not be allowed to pass with-
out some action being taken. They did not consider separate and
immediate secession the proper action, however, for the following
reasons: (i) The election of Lincoln was not a just cause for
secession. He had been elected in a constitutional manner. The
politicians of the South were partly responsible for his election.
The border states would not sustain the cotton states on such an
issue; it was doubtful if the people of the cotton states could be
united upon it. It would be better to wait for some overt act
against the rights of the South on the part of the Lincoln govern-
ment; that would unite the South. (2) Lincoln would be a minor-
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ity president. Both houses of Congress and the Supreme Court
would be controlled by the Democrats. Lincoln could not even
choose a cabinet without consent of the Senate; the interests of
the South were in no immediate danger. (3) The Personal Liberty
laws were unconstitutional and unfriendly; but the South had
never made a united effort for their repeal. This should be done.
If appeals failed, retaliatory legislation might be tried. (4) While
anti-slavery sentiment had become fanatical with many, much of
the anti-slavery agitation was due to politicians, North and South,
who had used the slavery question to inflame the passions of the
people. A revolution in the attitude toward slavery was even then
in progress in the North and in England. The South had many
friends in the North; they should not be deserted. (5) Peaceful
secession was an absurdity unless, possibly, the entire South
could be united. The South was not prepared for war. The masses,
who must fight it, were not convinced of the necessity for seces-
sion. (6) Delay would unite the South. Let all the slave states
get together in convention and deliver an ultimatum. If that were
rejected, all would go out together. The cotton states had no right
to attempt to dictate to the other slaveholding states. (7) The
cotton states alone would make a contemptible, obscure, little
republic whose rights no foreign nation would respect. Wars
and strife would be its lot. (8) The dissolution of the Union
would be hailed in Europe as the failure of free government. It
was a duty to mankind to attempt to preserve it.
These, it is believed, were the arguments most frequently used
in the cotton states during the few weeks which elapsed between
the election of Lincoln and secession.6 Their use, however, can
easily be made to prove too much. The election of 1860 turned
ostensibly upon the slavery issue. The election of a Republican
president had for several years been discussed and announced
as. the proper occasion, or a sufficient cause, for the secession of the
Southern states. An effort had been made during the campaign
to commit as many as possible to secession in case of Lincoln's
election. After the event, conditional disunionists, notwithstanding
the fact that often they attributed the result to the folly or wicked-
The sources upon which this summary is based are too many to enumerate
here. Special mention might be made of Candler, The Confederate Records of
the State of Georgia, Vol. I, and Smith, op. cit.
237] SECESSION OF THE COTTON STATES 237
ness of Southern leaders, could, now that it was a fait accompli,
with justification and good conscience see in it a necessity for
secession. Secession per se sentiment in the South had been a
growth of thirty years. It was a known and dependable quantity.
It could not be increased over night. Unconditional secessionists
would naturally adapt their arguments to fit the occasion. The
occasion required that advantage be taken of the excitement of
the public mind as a result of Lincoln's election. Such considera-
tions as these must be kept in mind in any study of secession.
However, the secession per se arguments were not altogether
neglected during the canvass. Very few advocates of secession
spoke for it without expressing the view that the Union had been
unequal in its material benefits. Scarcely one advocated secession
who did not express the belief that secession would be fol-
lowed by prosperity. Said Yancey at the close of an argument
based upon Northern violations of Southern rights: "While
ever loyal to a constitutional Union, I have been satisfied that
if Alabama, even, reassumed her full power and sovereignty
it would be attended by a glorious prosperity." 7 Most of Alex-
ander H. Stephens's famous Union speech before the Georgia
Legislature, November 14, 1860, was devoted to proving that in the
Union the South as well as the North had "grown great, prosper-
ous, and happy," and was in refutation of one by Robert Toombs,
who had presented a contrary view.8 DeBow's Review continued
to give the unconditional disunionist arguments.
9 The New York
papers commented upon the "commercial view" of the Union
which was being taken at the South.10 The existence of disunion-
ists per se was assumed at every point of the contests to control
the conventions which were to decide the question of secession.
Union orators often prefaced their remarks by saying that their
arguments were not addressed to unconditional disunionists but
only to those who preferred a "constitutional Union" i.e., one in
which the rights of the South would be respected.
11 Secessionists
7
Letter of Nov. 15, 1860, in New York Herald, Nov. 26.
6
Candler, Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, I, 183 ff.; New York
Herald, Nov. 22.
"See especially XXX, 93-101. See also, ibid., 42-53, 114-16.
"I have used the New York Herald and the New York Times.
"For example, Benj. H. Hill in speech at Milledgeville, Ga., Nov. 15, 1860.
Hill, Senator Benjamin H. Hill of Georgia, His Life Speeches and Writings, 238.
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frequently denied being of the per se type; it may have been con-
sidered good tactics to do so.
It is impossible to determine with any degree of accuracy how
many in the cotton states had by 1860 arrived at the conclusion
that the true interests of the South lay in separate nationality ir-
respective of the outcome of the pending presidential election.
There were no test votes on the question. During the presidential
campaign supporters of Bell and of Douglas charged the Breckin-
ridge men with having broken up the Democratic party with the
design of making possible the election of a Black Republican presi-
dent and consequent dissolutions of the Union; they appealed to
the voters to "rebuke" the secessionists. The statement has some-
times been made that the vote for Breckinridge and the combined
vote for Bell and Douglas indicate fairly accurately the relative
strength of the secessionists and Unionists respectively.12 The state-
ment is inaccurate. An analysis of the result of the election shows
that many voted against Breckinridge to rebuke the secessionists,
and many were attracted to Breckinridge by the secessionist ten-
dencies of his following, but in the main the people divided ac-
cording to their old party affiliations. In Georgia, for example,
fourteen counties which elected Union delegates to the State Con-
vention in December went for Breckinridge in November; and
fifteen counties which gave majorities for Bell and Douglas elected
secession delegates.
13 Northern Alabama gave a majority for
Breckinridge (although somewhat less than the normal Demo-
cratic majority) but was strongly against secession. The secession-
ists from principle had steadily grown in numbers. Their leaders
were able and determined. They had become strong enough to
gain control of the Democratic party organization in several
states. But there is no reason to believe they were in a major-
ity except in South Carolina. L. Q. C. Lamar, describing the state
of public opinion in the South shortly after Lincoln's election,
said: "There is a fourth class of energetic, resolute, and high
spirited men who consider the Federal Government a failure, the
connection of Northern and Southern States as unnatural, and the
independence of the latter a supreme good. These are for im-
"See Avery, History of Georgia, 135; Thomas, "Southern Non-slaveholders
in the Election of 1860," Pol. Sci. Quar., XXVI, 227.
"See Phillips, Georgia and State Rights, 205-210.
239] SECESSION OF THE COTTON STATES 239
mediate, unconditional, and even abrupt secession . . . This class
is dominant in one State, commands perhaps a majority in an-
other, and is influential in all."14 The statement was substantially
correct.
After Lincoln's election this class was joined by those who had
not desired secession but believed it necessary under the circum-
stances in order to preserve slavery. The classes which came over
to secession were chiefly Whigs of the black belts and, it would
seem, the propertied, mercantile, and financial elements of the cities
and towns. These classes had been conservative. They had long
protested against useless agitation, believing that the best policy
was one of conciliation and avoidance of contest. Those who persist-
ed in their opposition to secession to the last were chiefly the people
of the farming districts and the back country, where the slave
population bore a relatively smaller proportion to the whites.
They were Democrats of the Jackson type or Whigs of the Clay
type. They had never accepted the teachings of the secessionists.
They were not hostile to slavery; but they did not have the same
interest in its preservation which the planting class had. Party
lines largely gave way during the contests for control of the
state conventions; but in two states at least, Whigs showed them-
selves more favorable to the preservation of the Union than
Democrats of the same districts. The decision in a few localities
was influenced by considerations peculiar to each. These general
statements may be illustrated by a brief analysis of the alignment
upon the secession issue in each of the more populous of the cot-
ton states.
In South Carolina the Unionists of 1851 were with some diminu-
tion of numbers the Unionists of 1860. The only locality in which
there was a pronounced Union sentiment was the up-country
farming district about Greenville. B. F. Perry was the leader
there, as he had been in 1851. Hopes that the commercial interests
of Charleston would be adverse to secession proved ill-founded.
The cooperationists of 1851 did not insist upon waiting for co-
operation in 1860; they were confident it would come.
The secessionists of Georgia in 1861 were the Southern Rights
party of 1850 with accretions. About the only prominent leader
"Letter to P. F. Liddell, Dec. 10, 1860, in Mayes, L. Q. C. Lamar: His Life,
Times and Speeches, 633 ff.
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who had favored secession in 1850 but opposed it in 1861 was
Herschel V. Johnson. Robert Toombs, Howell Cobb, and E. A.
Nesbit were the most prominent of the large number who coun-
selled acquiescence in 1850 and secession a decade later. Georgia
was not divided into sections as were several other Southern
states. The only large compact group of counties which elected
Union delegates to the State Convention lay along the Northern
border. In these counties the white population greatly out-
numbered the black. They had long returned Democratic major-
ities. They had been Unionist in 1850. It is significant that every
county which had a city or considerable town elected secession
delegates, notwithstanding the white population preponderated
in most of them, and most of them could be classified as Whig
counties. The general tendency of the districts in which the
whites constituted a majority to favor maintenance of the Union
and of the black belts to go for secession is illustrated by the ac-
companying table. Counties having a population more than 50
per cent slave are classified as black; others, white. Counties are
classified as Whig which gave Whig majorities at a majority of
the presidential elections between 1844 and 1860; others, Demo-
cratic. Counties are classified as Union, secession, or divided ac-
cording as their delegations in the State Convention voted upon
H. V. Johnson's substitute for the ordinance of secession, which
was the test question.
15
Secession Union Divided Totals16
Black counties 25 13 5 43
White counties 45 39 5 89
Whig counties 25 23 4 52
Democratic counties 45 29 6 80
Whig, black counties 14 12 3 29
Democratic, black counties 1 1 I 2 14
Whig, white counties n II I 23
Democratic, white counties 34 28 4 66
Totals 70 52 10 132
1!
'Journal of the . . . Convention of . . . Georgia, 1861, p. 32.
M
If the counties in which the negroes comprised from 40 per cent to 50 per
cent of the total population be classified as black, the number of such counties
would be increased by 28, of which 20 elected secession, 7, Union delegates, and
one, a divided delegation. Of the 20, 14 were Democratic, 6 Whig. Of the 7, 5
were Whig, 2 Democratic.
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Of 29 counties which elected secession delegates to the Conven-
tion of Alabama, 28 lay in a compact group in the southern part of
the state. Of the 23 Union counties, 22 formed a compact group
in the northern part of the state. This division corresponded
roughly with the division between the black belt and the white
counties; only a few counties in the northern half of the state had
large slave populations, and but few more in the southern half
could be classed as white. The alignment also coincided with an
old sectional alignment which had characterized the state politics
of Alabama.17 The basis of this long standing sectionalism lay
in part in the social differences between the planting region and
the farming section, in part in geography. The people of southern
Alabama found an outlet for their productions through Mobile.
The people of a large part of northern Alabama were cut off by
mountains from seeking the same outlet; the chief outlets for
their productions were the Tennessee river, and, for a few years
before 1860, the Memphis and Charleston and other railroads. All
of these routes led into or through Tennessee. The people of
northern Alabama felt that it would be ruinous to their section
of the state to secede unless Tennessee should also secede. Threats
were made that, in case Tennessee should not secede, north Ala-
bama would separate from the remainder of the state and ask for
union with her.18 The Whigs of southern Alabama, where they
were in the majority, generally went over to the secessionists.
Such Whig leaders as H. W. Milliard, T. H. Watts, and T. J.
Judge now took their stand with Yancey, whom they had hitherto
opposed. The Democrats of northern Alabama, where they were
in a large majority, had always been of the Jackson rather than
the Calhoun wing of the party.
19 Mobile and Montgomery, the
one in a white county, the other a black, both went for secession.
The accompanying table, with items defined as were those of a
similar table for Georgia, may serve to illustrate certain tendencies
to division in Alabama. It does not illustrate the sectional division,
and it does not accurately indicate the position of the Whig party.
"Jack, Sectionalism in Alabama.
"Smith, History and Debates of the Convention of Alabama, passim, es-
pecially remarks of Mr. Clark, of Laurence, pp. 81-90; New York Times, Jan.
1 8, 1861; Journal of the Convention . . . of South Carolina, 1860, 1861, and
1862, pp. 233-234, report of A. P. Calhoun, Commissioner to Alabama.
"Cf. Hodgson, Cradle of the Confederacy, 475.
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Secession Union Totals
Black counties 18 2 20
White counties n 21 32
Whig counties 15 3 18
Democratic counties 14 20 34
Whig, black counties 10 o 10
Democratic, black counties 8 2 10
Whig, white counties 5 3 8
Democratic, white counties 6 18 24
Totals 29 23 52
The opposition to secession in Mississippi centered chiefly in a
few Democratic counties situated in the extreme northern part of
the state and having relatively small slave populations, and in sev-
eral Whig counties with large black populations and lying along the
Mississippi river. The counties in which Vicksburg, Natchez, and
Jackson, the only considerable towns of the state, were located, all
gave majorities against immediate and separate secession. It
would seem that, except in a few northern counties mentioned, the
opponents of secession were chiefly Whigs. In the Convention the
opponents of immediate and separate action were led by Yerger,
a Whig. The continued Whig opposition to secession counter-
balanced in this state the tendency to division between districts
having large and districts having small slave populations. This
fact is illustrated in the following table:
Secession Union Divided Totals
Black counties 21 7 2 30
White counties 23 5 2 30
Whig counties 7 7 2 16
Democratic counties 37 5 2 44
Whig, black counties 7 5 2 14
Democratic, black counties 14 2 o 16
Whig, white counties o 2 o 2
Democratic, white counties 23 3 2 28
Totals 44 12 4 60
The contest in Louisiana presented no remarkable features. Old
party divisions were swept away. In general the parishes with the
largest slave populations went for secession; there were exceptions.
There were few parishes which could not be considered as belong-
ing to the black belt. There were no marked sectional divisions
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in the state. A group of Democratic parishes in the north-central
part of the state and another of Whig parishes near the Missis-
sippi in the southeast corner of the state elected delegates opposed
to immediate secession. New Orleans, which had always been con-
sidered a Union stronghold because of its large foreign and
Northern population and its commerce with states of the upper
Mississippi valley, elected 20 secession and 4 Union delegates. The
city had given a majority for the Bell electors in November; the
population was overwhelmingly white. The result in New Orleans
may be attributed in part to the prevalent excitement and the fail-
ure of the conservative Creole population to poll its full voting
strength in the convention election.
Several of the secession conventions, following the example of
the Second Continental Congress, adopted declarations of the
causes for secession. These documents were drawn up, no doubt,
with less regard to historical accuracy than to the effect they might
have upon public opinion at home, in the border states, in the
North, and even in Europe. They all rest the cause of the South
primarily upon the necessity of protecting slavery against North-
ern assaults.
The South Carolina Convention published two statements of
causes. One, "The Address of the People of South Carolina . . .
to the People of the Slaveholding States . . . ,"
20 was presented
by a committee of which R. B. Rhett was chairman; 21 the other,
"A Declaration of the Immediate Causes which Induce and Justify
the Secession of South Carolina from the Federal Union,"22 was
brought in by a committee of which C. G. Memminger was chair-
man.23 In all probability the chairmen of the respective com-
mittees wrote the reports.
24 Rhett's committee represented seces-
sionists of long standing of the more extreme sort. They were of
the faction which had advocated separate action in 1851-1852.
Memminger represented the more moderate element which had
constituted the cooperationist party in 1851-1852. The Rhett follow-
ing seems to have wished to play up the establishment of a free
10
'Journal, of the Convention of South Carolina, 467-76; McPherson, History
of the Rebellion, 12-15; DeBow's Review, XXX, 352-57.
21
Journal, 21.
**Ibid., 461-466; McPherson, op. cit. 15 ff.
**
Journal, 31, 39.
**Capers, Life and Times of C. G. Memminger, 289-95.
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trade republic for the purpose of enlisting European support. The
group of which Memminger was a member considered it of first
importance to unite the South. It would seem that the two com-
mittees were appointed in order that both factions might express
their views. The Convention showed a disposition to divide along
these lines on several questions.
Of the two documents the "Address" was much the abler and
more worthy of a great cause. The entire substance of it may be
found in Calhoun's last great speech in the Senate, March 4,
1 850," the address of the Nashville Convention,
26 and Rhett's
speech in the United States Senate in which he avowed himself a
disunionist.27 It justified secession by "the accumulated wrongs of
half a century." The great wrong was represented to be the over-
throw of the Constitution and the transformation of the federal
republic into a consolidated democracy, in which a sectional major-
ity in the North could rule over the minority in the South and
carry out its measures of "ambition, encroachment, and aggrand-
izement." A parallel was drawn between the relation of the Thir-
teen Colonies to Great Britain and the relation of the South to the
North. The South had been taxed for Northern benefit; her cities
made "mere suburbs of Northern cities;" her foreign trade "al-
most annihilated." The much employed economic interpretation
of the anti-slavery movement was given: hostility to slavery had
been made the criterion of parties in the North in order to con-
solidate the power of the section to rule the South in the interest
of the former. The address further portrayed the dangers to which
slavery was exposed in a consolidated republic, argued the consti-
tutional right of secession, and appealed to the slaveholding states
to form a slaveholding confederacy.
Memminger's "Declaration of Immediate Causes" was a brief
constitutional argument. It stated the compact theory of the Con-
stitution, and contended that the Northern states had violated the
letter of the compact by their Personal Liberty laws, and the spirit
of it by the anti-slavery agitation and the election to the presi-
dency of the candidate of a sectional party. The declaration was
attacked by Maxcy Gregg, L. W. Spratt, and others on the ground
"Works, IV, 542-73-
^National Intelligencer, July 13, 1850.
"Cong. Globe, 32 Cong., i Sess., Appx., 42-48. See above, p. 83.
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of incompleteness. It set forth only some of the causes; it omitted
the tariff altogether, and laid emphasis on "an incomparably un-
important point." The reply was made that Southern congress-
men voted for the existing tariff; the Whig party had always fa-
vored the tariff; the tariff argument would not appeal to Missouri,
Kentucky, and Louisiana; the issue should not be raised now.
Memminger thought it expedient to put their action before all
the world upon the simple matter of wrongs on the question of
slavery, and that question turned upon the fugutive slave law.28
The declarations of causes adopted by the Georgia, Mississippi,
and Texas conventions bore greater resemblance to Memminger's
"Declaration of Causes" than to Rhett's "Address." Robert
Toombs wrote the Georgia statement of causes.29 He told how the
North had outgrown the South in material prosperity, and at-
tributed the disparity to bounties, tariffs, subsidies, and other
protective legislation. He charged that the anti-slavery agitation
had been fomented in the East for the purposes of winning over
the West from her Southern alliance and uniting East and West
to wield the power of the government to promote sectional inter-
ests. The chief theme of the document, however, was the rise of
the anti-slavery party, the history of aggression upon aggression,
and their culmination in the victory of a sectional party, which
left no protection for the South but the Constitution. No confi-
dence was placed in Republican promises to respect the Constitu-
tion: "They [the Southern people] know the value of parchment
rights, in treacherous hands, and therefore, they refuse to commit
their own to the rulers whom the North offers us." The Mississippi
declaration is fairly epitomized in two sentences: "Our position is
thoroughly identified with the institution of slavery the greatest
material interest of the world. . . . Utter subjugation awaits us
in the Union, if we should consent longer to remain in it."30 The
Texas declaration added little to this except the assertion that
"Debate in National Intelligencer, Dec. 27, 29; McPherson, op. cit., 16 ff.
"
'Journal of the Convention of Georgia, 1861, pp. 104-113. Mr. Nesbit,
chairman of the committee to report an ordinance of secession, said the state-
ment was written by Toombs. Journal, 104.
^Journal of the State Convention [of Mississippi], 86-88.
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the Federal government had failed to protect life and property
upon the frontier.
31
President Davis devoted a large part of his first message to the
Confederate Congress, April 29, 1861, to a discussion of the causes
of secession. The Constitution of the United States provided for a
jederal government, he said; but that had not prevented the rise of
a
"political school which has persistently claimed that the Govern-
ment thus formed was not a compact between States, but was in
effect a National Government, set up above and over the States."
This doctrine gained the more ready assent in the North because,
as that section gained preponderance in Congress, self-interest
tempted her representatives to use their power to promote
Northern interests at the expense of the South. "Long and angry
controversies grew out of these attempts, often successful, to bene-
fit one section of the country at the expense of the other." In addi-
tion there had existed for nearly half a century another subject of
discord, slavery, which involved interests of such "transcendent
magnitude" that the permanence of the Union had long been en-
dangered. With slavery as the issue there had developed in the
North a sectional party, which had finally gained control of the
government. Meanwhile, great interests had developed in the
South. "With interests of such overwhelming magnitude imper-
illed," the people of the South could not consent to live under a
sectional government.
32
Some people in the North believed that President Davis had
emphasized the unequal operation of the government upon the
economic interests of the sections and minimized the slavery ques-
tion for the purpose of influencing opinion abroad. They were dis-
posed to take, as a more accurate interpretation of the causes of
secession, a speech of Vice-President Stephens in which he spoke
of slavery as the corner stone of the new republic. The speech
accorded well with Stephens's earlier utterances. He, it should be
said, was one of the more conservative leaders of the South; he
had never shown sympathy with the unconditional disunionists;
he had taken little interest in those progressive Southern move-
ments which have been described; he opposed secession to the
"Texas Library, and Historical Commission, Journal of the Secession Con-
vention of Texas, 1861, pp. 61 ff.
Annual Cyclopedia, I, 614 ff.
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last. Moreover, his "Corner Stone" speech should be read in its
entirety. He did not fail to pay his respects to a protective tariff
and appropriations for internal improvement. "This old thorn of
the tariff, which was the cause of so much irritation in the old
body politic, is removed forever from the new. . . . The true prin-
ciple is to subject the commerce of every locality to whatever
burdens may be necessary to facilitate it." The people of the
North, he said, wanted to preserve the Union because "they are
disinclined to give up the benefits they derive from slave labor."
According to the reporter, "Mr. Stephens reviewed at some length
the extravagance and profligacy of appropriations by the Congress
of the United States for several years past, . . ,"
33
Unofficial Southern essays at interpreting events after their oc-
currence also fail to show general agreement. Of them, too, it
must be said that they were not made to facilitate the task of the
student. The Charleston Mercury, speaking of the Confederate
Constitution, said: "The system of partial legislation in the im-
position of taxes which has been the prime cause of all the cor-
ruption and sectionalism which have finally overthrown the Union
of the United States is repudiated by this constitution."34 Ac-
cording to J. D. B. DeBow: "At bottom, the quarrel between the
North and South is, Shall the North support itself, or, by means
of Government action and machinery, be supported by the South?
It is the old quarrel of nullification continued under a new
name." 35 A report submitted for the consideration of the
Merchants' and Planters' Convention, at Macon, Georgia, October,
1 86 1, expressed the thought that the "chief of the causes of our
separation must be found in questions affecting our selling the
products of the soil and the purchase of our supplies from others."36
Governor Joseph E. Brown, of Georgia, who was already defend-
ing state rights against the encroachments of the Confederate
government, in his annual message, November, 1861, followed a
chain of reasoning quite like that of President Davis in the mes-
sage already referred to. The people of the North had become
consolidationists because they had found that tariff laws, naviga-
"Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc. pp. 44-49.
"Mar. 15, 1861.
"DeBow's Review, XXXI, 2. See articles in ibid., XXXI, 13-17, 69-77.
"Ibid., XXXI, 333.
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tion acts, fishing laws, etc. had fostered their interests. "By the
instrumentality of these laws, the government of the United
States has poured the wealth of the productive South into the lap
of the bleak and sterile North, . . ." The slavery question had
been used to excite the masses. The Southern people had tried to
maintain state rights. In the same message, with a different bear-
ing (the capacity of the South for self-government), he praised
slavery as conducive to the perpetuity of republican institutions.
37
Others put the emphasis on other causes. L. W. Spratt, the in-
defatigible advocate of reopening the African slave trade, believed
that the South had seceded, or should have seceded, for the pur-
pose of perpetuating slave institutions; by the provision of the
Confederate Constitution prohibiting the foreign slave trade, the
mission of the South had been betrayed.
38 The Reverend Dr. J.
H. Thornwell, some time editor of the Southern Quarterly Review,
sought to put the Southern cause upon the highest possible plane.
The Southern states had seceded because of "the profound convic-
tion that the Constitution, in its relations to slavery, has been vir-
tually repealed." He repudiated the suggestion "that all this fer-
ment is nothing but the result of a mercernary spirit on the part
of the cotton-growing states, fed by Utopian dreams of aggrandize-
ment and wealth, to be realized under the auspices of free-trade, in
a separate confederacy of their own." Considerations of such char-
acter had been advanced in the South not to justify secession, but
to reconcile her to the necessity of it. Neither had secession been
desired to make possible the reopening of the African slave trade;
the agitation of that question had only been the natural reaction
of irresponsible Southern hot-heads to Garrisonian abolition in
the North. 39
Numerous incidents and miscellaneous comments illustrate how
firmly grounded were the opinions relative to the economic effects
of disunion, which had been inculcated by years of disunionist
propaganda. Mayor McBeth, of Charleston, notified agents of
Northern steamship lines that he would not permit the landing of
"Candler, Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, II, 77-125.
'"Letter to Hon. John Perkins, of Louisiana, in Moore, Rebellion Record, II,
357-65-
"The State of the Country: An Article Republished from the Southern
Presbyterian Review (pamphlet, New York, 1861), pp. 6 ff.
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steerage passengers unless it was guaranteed that they would not
become public charges. He expected that paupers, fearing destitu-
tion in the North as a result of the loss of Southern trade, would
flock South.40 Eli T. Shorter, of Alabama, wrote to a friend in
Missouri saying that the people of the South greatly sympathized
with the conservatives of the North and would gladly preserve
them, if possible, from the general bankruptcy which awaited New
York City.41 It seems to have been expected that Northern ship-
ping and Northern capital would be transferred to the South, and
from time to time during the winter of 1860-1861 reports came of
such transfers which had been or were about to be made.42 Evi-
dence will be given later of the disposition shown at an early date
to take advantage of secession to promote schemes for direct
trade; it was said to be desirable to get "started right." As late
as July, 1861, DeBow wrote: "That magic word, Secession, has
transferred thousands of millions of wealth from the North to the
South. The North is bankrupt. Her people must migrate to the
West or starve. . . . They cannot produce their own food and
clothing, and will have nothing wherewith to purchase it. ...
Their local wealth, derived from houses, factories, cities, railroads,
etc., ceased to exist the instant secession became an accomplished
fact."43
In the border slave states, where the majority did not believe
that the election of Lincoln justified precipitate abandonment of
the Union, frequent expression was given by opponents of seces-
sion of a belief that fears for slavery did not constitute the chief
cause for the action of the cotton states, but were largely a pretext.
A notable example is found in Governor Letcher's message to the
"New York Herald, Nov. 15, 1860-. Also ibid., Nov. 20, quoting the New
Orleans Courier and Bee on effects of secession upon North and South; ibid., Dec.
n, on a threatened exodus to the South.
"Quoted in New York Times, Jan. 12, 1861.
"Ibid, Feb. 25, 1861; New York Herald, Nov. 19, Dec. 20, 1861; G. B.
Lamar to Howell Cobb, Mar. 25, 1861, Toombs, Stephens, Cobb Correspondence.
"DeBow's Review, XXXI, 5. Many others wrote and spoke in a similar
strain, for example, Vice-President Stephens, speech at Augusta, July n, 1861,
in Moore, Rebellion Record, II, Doc. p. 276 ff.; Secretary of State Toombs,
instructions to Yancey, Rost, and Mann, commissioners to Great Britain,
France, etc., Mar. 16, 1861, in Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confed-
eracy, II, 7.
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General Assembly of Virginia, January 7, 1861. The cotton states
in seceding without attempting to secure cooperation of all the
slaveholding states were consulting their own interests, he said.
Why should not Virginia consider her own? He criticized the
tendency of Virginians to ignore the just complaints of their own
state against the North and to unite in the complaints of the
cotton states. "The complaints of those states are rather against
the financial and commercial policy of the Federal Government,
than any action or want of action on the subject of slavery."44
John A. Gilmer, of North Carolina, said secession had been an
object in South Carolina for thirty or forty years. The secession-
ists had desired Lincoln's election. They did not want guarantees
for slavery.
45 Governor Hicks, of Maryland, took a similar view.
48
The National Intelligencer put a desire to reopen the slave trade
as the foremost cause of secession.47 John P. Kennedy, of Mary-
land, a former secretary of the navy, told the history of disunion
sentiment in South Carolina. As causes of secession he mentioned
a disposition of Southern leaders to undervalue the strength and
beneficence of the Union; the belief that the planting states paid
all the taxes; visions of a great Southern confederacy including
Cuba, San Domingo, Mexico, and perhaps Central America, with
free trade, powerful alliances, and peopled by "swarms of reen-
forcements from the shores of Africa." He did not overlook the
fact, however, that the slavery quarrel had become "venomous."48
John Bell, of Tennessee, said the disunion movement was led by
men of distinguished ability with whom the expediency of seces-
sion was a foregone conclusion, and who only waited a plausible
pretext "men whose imaginations have been taken possession of,
and their judgments led captive, by the dazzling, but, as I think,
delusive vision of a new, great, and glorious republican empire,
stretching far into the South."
49 Andrew Johnson and W. G.
Brownlow, of Tennessee, attributed secession to the machinations
"Virginia, Senate Journal and Documents, Extra Session, 1 86 1, pp. 9-49, es-
pecially, 13-21.
"Cong. Globe, 36 Cong, 2 Sess., 580 ff.
"Annual Cyclopedia, I, 443.
"Editorials of Nov. 29, Dec. 29, 1860.
"The Border States, Their Power and Duty in the Present Disordered Con-
dition of the Country. (Pamphlet, 46 pp.)
"Letter to A. Burwell, Dec. 6, 1860, in New York Herald, Dec. 12.
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of disappointed politicians, and emphasized the long standing
hatred of the Union in South Carolina.00
"A Kentuckian," in an able pamphlet, South Carolina, Disunion,
and a Mississippi Valley Confederacy, seemed to be well acquaint-
ed with South Carolina history for thirty years, and ascribed to
her the leadership in the disunion movement. "Having made up
her mind to disunion for the sake of re-opening the African Slave
Trade, or for the sake of some other supposed local advantage of
her own, or for the sake of vengeance in her gratification of her
hate to the Union and the nation, her policy was to precipitate as
many of the other Cotton States as she could into disunion also."
Among other objects he mentioned the "cherished policy of free
trade, direct taxation, and no tariff," and disappointed political
aspirations.
51 Union men in Missouri tried to account for the
secession movement by other causes than fears for slavery in a
Union with the free states. General John B. Henderson, Demo-
crat of the Benton wing, said: "They never left this confederacy
... on account of any fear whatever as to their rights in negro
property. It is a false idea of commercial greatness. They have,
since 1832, inculcated a doctrine that a tariff upon imports is a
mere burden upon exports; that their cities have languished under
the revenue laws of the Government; that their fields have become
barren under the oppressions and actions of an unjust govern-
ment. The merchant of Charleston today, candidly and sincerely
believes, in case his government can be established, that South
Carolina can be separated from the Federal Union, Charleston
in the course of ten years will become a New York. The merchants
of Savannah have the same opinion, the merchants of Mobile and
the merchants of New Orleans have the same opinion, and unfor-
tunately I must say that this delusion of the day is entertained
by some of the merchants of the West." Another cause for seces-
sion was the desire to filibuster for Cuba and Central America.
""Speech of Andrew Johnson in the Senate, Feb. 5, 1861, in Cong. Globe,
36 Cong., 2 Sess., 744 ff.; W. G. Brownlow, Sketches of the Rise, Progress, and
Decline of Secession; etc., 1 10 and passim.
'Pp. 4, 8.
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But the excuse which had been given for secession was the one
which found sympathy among the people of Missouri.52
In the North also there was from the first a large class who
professed to believe that the cotton states had seceded chiefly for
other reasons than fears for slavery and a belief that constitution-
al rights had been disregarded. This class reposed no confidence
in compromises and concessions as Union savers or restorers; no
doubt most of them would have been opposed to compromise or
concession upon the slavery issue in any case. They advanced
various explanations of secession. William H. Seward, in a
speech of which the Union savers had expected much, credited dis-
union chiefly to the defeat of Southern politicians and their loss of
power to govern the country. But he did not overlook the influence
of the unconditional disunionists: "More than thirty years there
has existed a considerable though not heretofore a formidable
mass of citizens in certain States situate near or around the delta
of the Mississippi, who believe that the Union is less conducive
to the welfare and greatness of those States than a smaller con-
federacy, embracing only slave States, would be."
53 Senators
Wade, of Ohio, Wilson, of Massachusetts, Cameron, of Pennsyl-
vania, Chandler, of Michigan, and Trumbull, of Illinois, inclined
to take the view that secession was the outcome of a "rule or
ruin" policy on the part of Southern leaders.
54 Senator Simmons,
of Rhode Island, engaged in a colloquy with Thomas L. Clingman
relative to the effect of secession upon revenues North and South
and upon the imports of the respective sections. "I know," he
said, "part of this scheme has been to make Charleston the great
commercial emporium of the South."53 A select committee of the
House of Representatives reported that "the difficulties growing
out of the existence of slavery, however viewed by the common
people, are so far as the leaders are concerned, but a mere pre-
tense, their real object being to overthrow the Government,
^Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri State Convention . . . 1861, Pro-
ceedings, p. 86. See also majority report of the Committee on the Commissbner
from Georgia, ibid., Journal, p. 50 ff.
"Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 343, speech in the Senate, Jan. 12, 1861.
"Ibid., 102, 1088 ff., 494., 1370, 1380 (in order).
K
Ibid., 1476.
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that a Southern Confederacy, of a military character may
arise. . . ."56
The New York Times consistently sought other motives for se-
cession. An editorial of January 4, 1861, gave the desire to reopen
the African slave trade a prominent place among the motives for
secession. A week later "the expectations of great advantages"
which seaboard cities were to derive from a free trade policy were
canvassed. 57 Another editorial of the same issue considered the
long taught belief in the South that, "they supported the Union
that they contributed far more than the Northern States to the
support of the Government that the industry of the North was
entirely dependent upon their staples and that if these should
be withdrawn universal bankruptcy, beggary, and ruin would
instantly overtake the people of the North." Another editorial re-
viewed a disunion per se article by Major W. H. Chase, of Flor-
ida, in DeBow's Review;58 another was headed, "Proportion of
the Burdens of Government Borne by the South;"59 another dealt
with schemes to form "a grand Slave Empire to embrace the
islands of the Gulf of Mexico and the territories facing it."60 A
number of articles of this character from the Times were published
as a pamphlet under the caption, The Effect of Secession upon the
Commercial Relations between the North and the South, appar-
ently intended to influence opinion in the border states. It asserted
that "the leading motive or inducement to Secession has undoubt-
edly been the anticipated material advantages that were to
result."61
Another able pamphlet, The Five Cotton States and New York,
etc., took up and refuted in order the Southern views that (i)
"the commercial policy of the United States is injurious to South-
ern interests;" (2) "the present course of business in the United
States is extremely unfavorable, if not unjust, to the South, espec-
K
Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 1294.
"Jan. 12.
M
Jan. 15, "The Ideas on which Secession is Based."
B
'Jan. 17.
60
Feb. 5.
"P. 3. Daniel Lord was the author.
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ially, the five cotton states . .' .;" (3) cotton is king.
62 Another
pamphleteer, Samuel Powell, in Notes on "Southern Wealth and
Northern Profits," Kettell, thought Kettell's thesis, namely, that
the South had supplied the capital which had accumulated at the
North, was the keynote of secession. He refuted Kettell's state-
ments seriatim. Even the New York Herald, for which no conces-
sions or guarantees to slavery were too great, occasionally as-
cribed to secessionists other motives (similar to those already
mentioned) than a desire to force concessions from the North, or
to protect the institution of slavery.
68
It is believed that such expressions as those quoted above were
representative of the professed opinions of a considerable class
in the Northern and border states, and that these opinions had
some basis in fact. The majority of the people of the North and
of the Unionists in the border states, however, seem, clearly, to
have been of the opinion that the cotton states had seceded
chiefly because of a justifiable or mistaken belief that slavery was
endangered, and that constitutional rights had been violated in
the Union. In the opinion of many, perhaps most of this class,
at least before the organization of the Provisional Confederate
government, the Southern states, with the exception of South
Carolina, could be saved to the Union by concessions and guar-
antees relative to slavery. After the organization of the Confeder-
acy the primary object of the compromisers was to save the border
states.
"Stephen Colwell, The Five Cotton States and New York, or Remarks upon
the Social and Economic Aspects of the Southern Political Crisis, Jan. 1861,
64 pp. See also J. F. Clarke, Session, Concession, or Self-Possession. Which?
(Pamphlet, Boston, 1861, 48 pp.) pp. 7-11.
Tor example, Nov. 19, 1860, Financial and Commercial; Dec. 8, Feb. 19,
1861, editorials.
CHAPTER X
EARLY ECONOMIC POLICIES OF THE CON-
FEDERATE STATES, 1861-1862
As soon as secession was assured in the cotton states, indica-
tions were given of an intention to take advantage of political sep-
aration from the North to promote industrial and commercial in-
dependence. In studying these indications, however, it must be
remembered that from the very first individual seceded states and
the Confederate government were not free to formulate economic
policies with reference solely to their economic effects. In the
brief period before Sumter the policies were determined largely
by the necessity of winning over the border slave states, the desire
to avoid war with the North, which leaders feared, if they did not
expect, and the need for gaining friends in Europe. After Sumter
everything else had to be subordinated to the conduct of the war.
An ordinance was adopted by the Georgia Convention, Janu-
ary 29, 1 86 1, declaring it to be "the fixed policy of Georgia to pro-
tect all investments already made, or which may be hereafter
made by citizens of other states, in mines or manufacturing in this
state, and capital invested in any other permanent improvement."1
A resolution was introduced in the Louisiana Convention to in-
struct the committee on commerce to report on the expediency of
exempting from taxation all capital and property employed in
manufacturing within the state for a term of five years.
2 In the
Texas Convention a resolution was introduced recommending that
the Legislature give adequate protection to the manufacturing in-
terests and enterprises of the state.3 From South Carolina and
elsewhere, before Sumter, came reports of efforts of the people
to make themselves independent of the North industrially as well
as politically. Arguments in favor of home industry appeared.
Southern manufacturers and merchants appealed for patronage
on the ground that the South must be independent in all respects.
4
Secession gave an impetus to projects for establishing direct
1
Journal . . . of the Convention . . . of Georgia, 1861, p. 117.
^Official Journal . . . of the Convention . . . of Louisiana, 34.
journal of the Secession Convention of Texas, 1861, p. 41.
'DeBow's Review, XXX, 371; New York Herald, Mar. 26, 1861, quoting
a number of such appeals; editorial commenting thereon, ibid., Mar. 27.
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trade with Europe. Governor Gist, of South Carolina, asked the
Legislature to guarantee the interest of 5 per cent per annum upon
the capital invested in a line of steamers to Liverpool, which pri-
vate parties proposed to establish.
5 In February, following, a
public meeting was held in Charleston to consider a well advanced
project for establishing a line of three screw propellers between
Charleston and England. A committee was appointed to solicit
subscriptions.
6 The Legislature of Alabama chartered a "Direct
Trade and Exchange Company." 7 The Committee on Commerce,
Revenue, and Navigation of the Louisiana Convention was in-
structed to report upon the propriety of state aid for direct com-
munication by steam between New Orleans and Europe.8
Governor Brown, of Georgia, discussed the subject of direct
trade in his message to the Legislature, December 8, 1860. He
asked authority to send a commissioner to Europe to investigate
a company which had offered to establish a line of five steamers
to made weekly trips between Savannah and a European port if
the state of Georgia would guarantee a 5 per cent return upon the
investment.9 The Legislature chartered the "Belgian American
Company."
10 Thomas Butler King was sent to Europe to promote
direct trade and to represent the state of Georgia in England,
France, and Belgium. He was instructed "to not fail to present a
clear view of the effect which our Federal connection with the
Northern States has had in attracting, or forcing our commercial
exchanges with Europe, coast-wise through the port and City of
New York . . ." He was to show further that the result of seces-
sion "must necessarily be to establish direct commercial and diplo-
matic intercourse with all the world." Northern manufacturers
also, who had been protected by a tariff, must now compete on
equal terms with European manufacturers.
11 When the Legisla-
ture met again in November, 1861, it had at least three direct
trade projects to consider. Two had resulted from King's mission;
the third was that of an association of Georgians who would
"New York Herald, Dec. I, 1860.
'Hunt's Merchants' Magazine, XLIV, 524-5; New York Herald, Mar. 4, 22.
^DeBow's Review, XXX, 381.
"Official Journal . . . of the Convention . . . of Louisiana, 36.
"Candler, Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, II, 6, 7.
10
Ibid., II, 116; Avery, History of Georgia, 131.
"Candler, op. cit. II, 20 ff.
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establish a line of steamers as soon as the blockade should be
raised if the Legislature would subsidize their enterprise.12 In
urging the matter of direct trade, Governor Brown said: "But our
deliverance from political bondage will be of little advantage if we
remain in a state of commercial dependence."
13
In March, 1861, a committee of the Provisional Congress of the
Confederacy was formed to organize an excursion trip from Sa-
vannah to Antwerp via Havre for the purpose of affording South-
ern merchants an opportunity to make arrangements for direct
importations.
14 Up to the time of his departure for England as
a commissioner of the Confederate States, Colonel A. Dudley
Mann pursued his plans for establishing direct trade.15 A conven-
tion of merchants, bankers, and others met in Macon, in October,
1 86 1, to devise a plan to establish credits between the Confederacy
and Europe. DeBow's Review commended the purpose of the con-
vention, saying, "It is necessary to start right on the removal of
the blockade, in order that our former vassalage to the North may
not be renewed."16
Immediately South Carolina had seceded from the Union, her
Convention and Legislature were confronted by the problem of
framing tariff and navigation laws. Each of the other states
which seceded before the organization of the Confederacy had to
solve the same problem. When the Provisional government was
formed the task devolved upon it. The development of the tariff
and navigation policies of the Confederacy was watched with con-
siderable interest at home, in the border states, in the North,
and in Europe, and throws some light upon the motives of
Southern leaders.
When South Carolina seceded, hot heads in the Convention
wished to throw the ports open to the commerce of the world at
once. The Convention rejected the proposal by a large majority,
and provided instead that the revenue and navigation laws of the
United States should be continued in effect, but no duties should
"Candler, op. cit., II, 115-17, 322-24, messages of Gov. Brown, Nov. 6, 1861,
and Nov. 18, 1862; ibid., II, 324, report of a special committee of the Georgia
House of Representatives.
"Ibid., II, 115.
"New York Herald, Mar. 19, 1861.
"Ibid., Mar. 19, 23, 1861.
"DeBow's Review, XXXI, 325. Also ibid., XXXI, 333-47.
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be collected upon imports from states of the late Federal Union,
and no tonnage duties should be collected upon vessels from the
said states. Vessels owned to one-third part by citizens of South
Carolina or of other slaveholding states might be registered as
South Carolina vessels.17 The action upon the tariff was de-
termined by a number of considerations. Revenue was needed.
The members of the Convention were divided upon the relative
merits of direct taxation and a tariff for revenue only. The ma-
jority was not ready to risk a clash with the Federal government
by attempting to collect duties upon goods from other states or
by admitting foreign goods free of duty. The Georgia Convention
adopted an ordinance similar to that of South Carolina by a small
majority, the minority wishing to allow the duties to be paid into
the Federal treasury.
18 In other seceding states similar action
was taken.19
The states in the Mississippi valley were much concerned about
the navigation of the Mississippi river. They wished to continue
their trade with the West, and they did not wish to antagonize
states of the upper valley. Senator Slidell, of Louisiana, while yet
in the United States Senate, promised free navigation of the Mis-
sissippi.
20 An ordinance recognizing the right of the free naviga-
tion of the Mississippi by all friendly nations bordering upon it
was reported to the Louisiana Convention along with the ordin-
ance of secession, and was adopted unanimously.
21 The Missis-
sippi Convention adopted a resolution similar to the Louisiana
ordinance, also by a unanimous vote.22 The Alabama Convention
"Proceedings in Journal of the Convention of South Carolina, 45-47, 67,
83-88, 93-105; debate in New York Herald, Dec. 21, 25, 1860; National Intelli-
gencer, Dec. 25.
"Journal of the Convention of Georgia, 1861, pp. 57, 83, 92, 123. The vote
was 130-119.
"Ordinances and Constitution of the State of Alabama . . . 1861, p. 18,
ordinance of Jan. 23, 1861; Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of the
People of Florida . . . 1861, p. 99; ordinance of Jan. 15, Official Journal . . .
of the Convention . . . of Louisiana, 105, 106, 235, ordinances of Jan. 29. Missis-
sippi, having no seaports, took no action. The Texas Convention took no action
because it was expected that the Southern Convention at Montgomery would
take the matter in hand in a few days.
*"Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 137, 720.
"Official Journal of the Convention of Louisiana, 10, 18, 235.
"Journal of the State Convention [of Mississippi], 24, 68.
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also declared that the navigation of the Mississippi should not
be restricted.23
It was not an easy matter for the Provisional government of
the Confederacy to fix upon a tariff and navigation policy. The
commercial interests of the seceded states desired and expected
free trade or an approximation thereto. Free trade, it was thought,
would mean direct trade.24 It would tend, too, to conciliate the
North and make peaceful separation more possible. As early
as December 5, 1860, Senator Iverson told the United States
Senate that, if the Northern states would let the South go in
peace, the new confederacy would treat them as a favored nation
in the making of commercial treaties.25 Free trade would make
easier the settlement of the navigation of the Mississippi. It
might also win sympathy for the Southern cause in England and
France.26 On the other hand the new government must be sup-
ported; the people were accustomed to indirect taxes, and the
leaders hesitated to test their patriotism at the very start by a
resort to direct taxation. 27 There were those who wanted a ju-
dicious tariff, because it would encourage manufactures. There
were localities with interests to protect; Louisiana sugar interests
demanded a tariff. Others wished to take advantage of the op-
portunity afforded to render the South independent of the North.
When, in the Alabama Convention, W. R. Smith proposed that the
South should continue free trade with states of the old Union,
Yancey said that would reconstruct the "most material elements
of the late Union into a Commercial Union." 28 The attitude of the
border states was very important. One of the influences under-
stood to be deterring Virginia, North Carolina, Tennessee, and
other border states from secession was the fear that manufactur-
2
'Smith, History and Debates of the Convention of the People of Alabama,
1861, p. 184 f.; Ordinances and Constitution of the State of Alabama, 33, resolu-
tion of Jan. 25.
"William Porcher Miles to Howell Cobb, Jan, 14, 1861, G. B. Lamar to
Cobb, Mar. 25. Toombs, Stephens, Cobb Correspondence; National Intelligencer,
Dec. 20, quoting the Charleston Mercury.
K
Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 12.
*G. B. Lamar to Howell Cobb, Feb. 9, 22, Mar. 9, 25, 1861, Toombs,
Stephens, Cobb Correspondence; DeBozu's Review, XXX, 93 ff.
"Junius Hillyer to Howell Cobb, Jan. 30, Feb. 9, 1861, Toombs, Stephens,
Cobb Correspondence.
M
Smith, History and Debates of the Convention of Alabama, 1861, p. 188.
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ing, mining, and other interests there would be sacrificed to the
free trade principles of the cotton states, and the people subjected
to direct taxation. 29
In various quarters duties upon exports were suggested. In his
message of November 7, 1860, Governor Brown, of Georgia, sug-
gested that the power to levy an export duty upon cotton would
be a powerful support to the diplomacy of a Southern confed-
eracy.
30 It would permit the Confederacy to raise ample revenue,
and at the same time make her import duties so much lower than
those of the North that either direct trade would be established,
or the North would have to adopt free trade.31 The possibilities
of export duties as a protection to home industries were not over-
looked. The chief consideration, however, in favor of export
duties was the need of revenue. A small tax on cotton, for
example, could be easily collected and would net a considerable
sum.32 In the border states the suggestion of export duties was
welcomed because it relieved apprehension of direct taxation.83
The committee of the Montgomery Convention on a provision-
al constitution for the Confederate States reported a clause which
forbade protective tariffs and prohibited duties in excess of 15 per
cent, with the proviso that such import and export dudes might be
imposed "as may be expedient to induce friendly political rela-
tions" with nations pursuing unfriendly policies. The clause was
rejected.34 The Provisional Constitution as adopted contained a
clause almost identical with the corresponding clause of the
United States Constitution. 35 Export duties, however, were not
prohibited. On February 9, 1861, the Provisional Congress passed
"Junius Hillyer to Howell Cobb, Jan. 30, Feb. 9, 1861, Toombs, Stephens
Cobb Correspondence; DeBow's Review, XXX, 165; National Intelligencer, Nov.
27, 1860.
s
Candler, Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, I, 52. Also Howell
Cobb in the Provisional Congress, Annual Cyclopedia, I, 157; DeBow's Review,
XXX, 564. See also Correspondence of T. R. R. Cobb (So. Hist. Assoc., Publ,
XI), letter to his wife, Feb. 21, 1861.
"DeBow's Review, XXX, 551-67.
*lbid., XXX, 565; Charleston Courier, Mar. 25, 1861.
"Richmond Correspondence, New York Herald, Feb. 3, 1861.
"Senate Documents, 58 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 234, Vol. I, Journal of the
Provisional Congress of the Confederate States of America, p. 35.
"Constitution for the Provisional Government of the Confederate States of
America, Art. I, 6, I.
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a bill continuing United States laws in force November i, 1860,
which were not inconsistent with the Provisional Constitution; 36
thus the United States tariff and navigation laws were adopted.
February 18, Congress modified the tariff law to admit free of
duty breadstuff's, provisions, agricultural products, living animals,
and munitions.37 By an act of February 28, an export tax of one-
eighth cent a pound was levied on cotton. 38 On February 22,
Congress unanimously passed a law establishing the free naviga-
tion of the Mississippi.
39 By an act of February 26, the United
States navigation laws were virtually repealed, and the coastwise
commerce of the Confederate states thrown open to the ships of
all nations.40 Another act, of March 15, authorized the transit of
foreign merchandise through the Confederate States to points
beyond their borders free of duties.41 Regulations were at once
made to put this act into effect.42 Thus the Confederate govern-
ment slowly took steps in the general direction of free trade.
Meanwhile, the Provisional government was engaged in draft-
ing a permanent constitution for the Confederacy. On March 4
the clause relating to taxes was taken up. As reported from com-
mittee, it was almost identical with the corresponding clause of
the United States Constitution. R. B. Rhett moved to add the
proviso: "but no bounties shall be granted from the treasury; nor
shall any duties or taxes on importations from foreign nations be
laid to promote or foster any branch of industry." This amend-
ment was adopted. Georgia, which had a small manufacturing in-
terest, and Louisiana, which had the sugar industry to protect,
voting in the negative.
43 The following day a clause was adopted
which gave congress the power by a two-thirds majority to lay
duties on exports.
44 Upon motion of Rhett, congress was denied
"Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States
of America, p. 27.
'"Ibid., 28.
"Ibid., 42, Sect. 5.
""Approved, Feb. 25, ibid., 36; Annual Cyclopedia, I, 157.
"Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the Confederate States
of America, 38.
"Ibid., 70.
42New York Herald, Mar. 19, 21; President Davis's Message of April 29,
1861, Annual Cyclopedia, I, 131, 618.
"Journal of the Provisional Congress, 853, 864, 865.
"Ibid., 869. Art. I, 9, 6.
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power to appropriate money in aid of internal improvements in-
tended to facilitate commerce. The Texas delegation voted against
this provision, and the Louisiana delegation was divided.45 Texas
was especially interested in the Pacific railroad, and Louisiana in
the improvement of the navigation of the Mississippi. The Per-
manent Constitution was hailed generally in the South as the end
of protectionism and special privilege of all kinds. Vice-President
Stephens so described it.*
6 The Charleston Mercury termed it,
"the first acknowledgment in the fundamental law of any people,
of the principle of just and equal taxation." It must be rightfully
administered, however.
47 DeBow's Review, said, "The protective
system receives its quietus thus: . . ,"
48 South Carolina free traders,
however, feared the new Constitution left a loophole for protec-
tion, because it placed no maximum limit upon the duties congress
might impose. This was one of the grounds upon which a number
in the South Carolina Convention opposed ratification of the
Constitution;
49 the Convention, however, ratified the Constitu-
tion by a large majority. The provision giving congress the power
to lay duties on exports likewise did not give universal satisfac-
tion.30 In the North, too, a few were inclined to charge that the
South had abandoned free trade principles. The South had
claimed separate nationality, said one, "and it has proclaimed, not
free trade, but a system of virtual, though covert, protection . . .
What shall we say of their Chinese duty upon exports?" 51
The early action of the Provisional Congress in continuing in
force the United States tariff law, that is, the Tariff of 1857, was
not generally satisfactory. The Augusta Chronicle, for example,
thought Congress had done well in ignoring the fallacy of free
trade (Augusta was a manufacturing town); 52 and the action
seemed to have a good effect in the border states.
53 But many
"Journal of the Provisional Congress, 892. The provision made certain ex-
ceptions, Art. I, 9, 6.
**"Corner stone" speech. Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc. pp. 44-45.
**Mar. 5, 1861, quoted in New York Herald, Mar. 19.
"XXX, 484-
*
Journal of the Convention of South Carolina, 207, 214, 253-60.
"Ibid., 253; DeBow's Review, XXXI, 206, 305-13; G. B. Lamar to Howell
Cobb, Feb. 9, 1861, Toombs, Stephens, Cobb Correspondence.
"Powell, Notes on "Southern Wealth and Northern Profits," 29.
"Quoted in New York Times, Feb. 16.
"Report of H. P. Bell, Georgia commissioner to Tennessee, Journal of the
Convention of Georgia, 369.
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feared that it was not calculated to promote direct trade or win
friends in Great Britain and France or conciliate the North and
West. March 2 Mr. Harris, of Mississippi, moved to instruct the
Committee on Finance of the Provisional Congress to enter upon
a revision of the tariff with a view to a reduction of the duties and
an enlargement of the free list. In explanation he said that when
the tariff had been adopted, upon his motion an early revision had
been promised "with a view to the future adoption of that policy
which was to invite the great Northwest to other and cheaper
markets than those to be found in Boston and New York, and
also enable the merchants of the Confederate States to obtain their
goods at lower rates than those purchased by the merchants of
the United States, and consequently be enabled to undersell the
latter. This policy would throw the evils of illicit traffic upon the
shoulders of the Northern States, and put the crown of commercial
supremacy upon the Confederate States in other words, achieve
one of the great positive advantages arising from our separation
from the unfriendly States of North America to wit: commercial
independence."
84 William Porcher Miles, of Charleston, favored
the resolution. He had always supposed the South was desirous
of approaching as near free trade as possible. Judge Withers,
of South Carolina, wanted to hold out free trade to Europe as an
inducement to recognition of the South. A resolution was intro-
duced in the Louisiana Convention, March 26, declaring for entire
free trade with the Western states, both slave and free.65 On May
17 a new tariff bill was passed in Congress over considerable op-
position, chiefly from those who desired a measure calculated to
produce more revenue.
56 The duties averaged about 5 per cent
lower than those of the Tariff of 1857. Most manufactured goods
bore duties of 15 per cent; most important raw materials bore
duties of 10 per cent; the free list included provisions, breadstuffs,
living animals, munitions and munitions materials, and ships. The
bill was to go into effect August 31." Plainly the measure repre-
w
Journal of the Provisional Congress, 97; New York Herald, Mar. 9, debate
on Harris's motion.
"
'Annual Cyclopedia, I, 431; New York Herald, Mar. 27.
50
Journal of the Provisional Congress, 242, act approved May 21.
"Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government, 127-35. The act was
amended in minor particulars by act of Aug. 3. Ibid., 171.
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sented a compromise between the various views of a proper tariff
policy.
Meanwhile the Congress of the United States had taken action
highly satisfactory to the Confederacy when it enacted the
Morrill tariff, approved March 2, 1861. The bill fixed mod-
erately high duties to become effective April i. The opposi-
tion press of the North represented the Morrill act as a
stupendous piece of folly which would result in direct trade
for the South, make it difficult to retain the border states in
the Union, and alienate the sympathies of Great Britain and
France.88 The New York Times, a Republican paper, ob-
posed it. The London Times represented it as a blunder on the
part of the North.
59 In the South it was hoped the difference in
the two tariffs would promote direct trade. Southern journals and
representatives seized the opportunity afforded by the Morrill
bill to play up, for the benefit of foreign opinion, the tariff as a
cause of secession, and to present to foreign nations the view that
it was to their interests to recognize the independence of a people
which would continue to maintain as nearly free trade as its
necessities would allow.60 President Davis and Vice-President
Stephens both announced that as near free trade as possible would
be the policy of the government.
61
Secretary of State Toombs in-
structed Yancey, Rost, and Mann, commissioners to Europe, to
point out the differing views of the North and South upon com-
mercial policy, avoid discussion of slavery, and to assure European
governments that the policy of the Confederacy would be an ap-
proximation of free trade.
62 Later in the year, Secretary Hunter
in his instructions to J. M. Mason stated very forcibly the interest
the British people had in the establishment of a free trade republic
in America. He neglected, however, to emphasize differences over
MNew York Herald, Feb. i, 8, 18, 27, 28, Mar. 4, 15, 19, 23, 29; Carpen-
ter, Logic of History, 146 f., quoting a number of Northern papers. There was
little debate upon the tariff in Congress.
"Quoted in Carpenter, op. cit., 147; to same effect in New York Herald,
Mar. 23, 29, Apr. 6.
mDeBow's. Review, XXXI, 69-77; Savannah Republican, May 22, in Moore,
Rebellion Record, I, Diary p. 5.
w
'Annual Cyclopedia, I, 613; Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc. p. 48.
"Mar. 16, 1861. Richardson, Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, II,
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commercial policy as a cause of separation; the Southern states
had seceded when the government of the Union had threatened
to
"destroy their social system."
63
Yancey, Rost, and Mann pre-
sented with force and effect the advantages to European nations
of an independent Southern confederacy dedicated to free trade.
64
From the first there was a group in the Confederacy which
wanted to make a bold bid for the support of Great Britain and
France by granting them valuable commercial advantages for a
long period of years, and this group was strengthened by the out-
break of the war. President Davis, however, believed the proper
Southern policy to be to conciliate the North, if possible. In his
inaugural address he said: "An agricultural people, . . . our true
policy is peace, and the freest trade which our necessities will
permit . . . There can be but little rivalry between ours and any
manufacturing or navigating community, such as the northeastern
States of the American Union."65 Even after the war began Presi-
dent Davis promised the North treaties of amity and commerce
if it would abandon coercion.66 He relied upon their dependence
upon the South for cotton to secure the good will, even aid, of
European countries. Though, as we have seen, the commissioners
to Great Britain and France had been instructed to represent that
approximate free trade would be the policy of the Confederate
government, they were not authorized to attempt any high
diplomacy.
67
On May 13, 1861, R. B. Rhett, chairman of the Committee on
Foreign Relations, offered resolutions in Congress advising the
negotiation of treaties guaranteeing a low maximum of duties for
a long period of years. Mr. Cobb moved to amend by stipulating
that such treaties should not extend beyond five years. The
amendment was adopted; whereupon, on Mr. Rhett's motion the
63
Sept. 23. Richardson, op. cit., II, 84 ff.
"Letters to Secretary Toombs, in ibid., II, 34, 42, 60. See also letter to
the London Times, by John Lothrop Motley, in Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc.
pp. 209-218; Callahan, Diplomatic History of the Southern Confederacy, 8l,
109 ff.
"Annual Cyclopedia, I, 613.
"Ibid., I, 619, 139-
"Yancey, Rost, and Mann to Secretary of State, Toombs, Aug. 7, 1861,
asking for new instructions, Richardson, op. cit., II, 56-59; DuBose, Yancey,
596.
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whole matter was laid upon the table.68 Congress acted upon the
belief that the war would be short; there were perhaps still hopes
that the North would abandon the war if assured that the Con-
federacy would not adopt a hostile commercial policy. The neces-
sities of the South were not yet felt to be great; the Confederacy
should hold herself free to adopt any commercial policy she might
see fit. Twenty years of free trade with England would destroy
the manufactures of the South. Secretary of State Toombs seems
to have agreed with Mr. Rhett; but President Davis was in accord
with the majority.69 The representatives in Europe were given no
new instructions. As the year wore on and the blockade of
Southern ports tightened, the Administration showed a disposition
to rely upon a shortage of cotton for the factories of England to
bring about the intervention of that country. The exportation of
cotton was forbidden except through Southern ports,
70 and
Yancey, Rost, and Mann wrote Earl Russell that, "To be obtained
it must be sought for in the Atlantic and Gulf ports of those
States." 71
From time to time through 1861 and the early part of 1862, ef-
forts were made in Congress to admit all goods free of duty for a
limited period except from the United States. 72 A bill to that
effect passed the House April 3, 1862, by a large majority but was
not acted upon in the Senate.
73 A convention of merchants and
planters at Macon in October, 1861, had unanimously recom-
mended the suspension of all duties and the adoption of free trade
with all nations at peace with the Confederacy;
74 and sentiment
favorable to the course was manifested elsewhere. 75 But in general
public opinion supported the policy of the government. Confidence
was still felt in the "cotton is king" argument.
76 Those who wished
M
Journal of the Provisional Congress, 214, 253; Charleston Mercury, June
20, quoted in Moore, Rebellion Record, II, Diary p. 13; DuBose, Yancey,
598-602.
"Ibid., 600-602.
'"Act of May 21, Statutes at Large o{ the Provisional Government, 152.
"Richardson, op. cit., II, 70.
""Journal of the Provisional Congress, 277, 290, 489, 547, 743, 820.
"Schwab, Confederate States of America, 246.
"Ibid., 245-
78Gov. Brown, of Ga. Candler, Confederate Records of Ga., II, 115; De-
Bow's Review, XXXI, 536 ff.
"Ibid., XXXI, 400-404; 412 if.
267] EARLY ECONOMIC POLICIES OF CONFEDERATE STATES 267
to make the South industrially independent of the North were
disposed, 1861, to look upon the war and the blockade as a bless-
ing in disguise. DeBow's Review reflected this disposition. In
July, when the people were confident of an early peace, DeBow
wrote :
"Secession, disunion, will avail us nothing if we continue to
have intercourse with the North and to trade with her there is
danger, grave danger, that in making peace with the North we
shall restore the old Union in all save the name." 77 In September,
DeBow wrote: "The blockade will make us very independent at
the South, and thank God for it. Every branch of manufactures is
springing up. Our people need but this spur."
78 President Davis
gave countenance to such an idea in his message of November
18, 1861: "If they [people] should be forced to forego many of
the luxuries and some of the comforts of life, they will at least
have the consolation of knowing that they are daily becoming
more and more independent of the rest of the world." 79 As the war
progressed the sentiment in favor of restrictions on imports and
exports grew.
80 This was due chiefly, no doubt, to a desire to
coerce foreign governments to recognize the Confederacy and raise
the blockade; but in part it was the manifestation of a genuine
protectionist sentiment.
The early tariff and navigation policies of the Confederacy, then,
were determined mainly by the exigencies of the political situa-
tion; but there are sufficient indications that, could they have
been worked out in peace and independence, they would have been
adopted with expectations of great economic benefits to result there-
from. As to what the proper policies were, similar divisions would
have occurred as among the secessionists per se before secession.
The free traders would have won, at least temporarily; but the
sentiment for protective measures would have been much stronger
than the previous attitude of the Southern people on the tariff and
navigation policies of the United States alone would have led one
to expect.
When the cotton states seceded there was considerable discus-
sion there as to what states would ultimately join the Confederacy,
"XXXI, 12. See also XXXI, 396.
^DeBow's Review, XXXI, 329, 518.
Annual Cyclopedia, I, 624
This subject is discussed in Schwab, Confederate States, 246-50.
and as to what states it was desirable should join. There was by
no means a general desire that all the slaveholding states be in-
cluded in the new confederation or that only slaveholding states
be admitted to it. Consideration of other things than the best
method of preserving slave institutions affected judgments upon
the proper limits of the Confederacy.
There were many in the cotton states who preferred that the
border states remain with the old Union; and the number would
have been greater had there been assurance of peaceful secession.
81
Extreme advocates of reopening the slave trade, such as L. W.
Spratt, preferred giving up the border states to abandoning their
favorite project.
82 Extreme free traders and some of those who
believed the best chance of winning independence to lie in enlist-
ing the aid of Great Britain and France by commercial alliances,
feared the protectionist propensities of the people of the border
states.83 Others believed that if the border states remained in the
Union their influence woujd preserve the peace between the Con-
federacy and the Union.
84 The party in favor of leaving out the
border states was quite strong in South Carolina. The great
majority in the cotton states, however, considered it highly im-
portant to win the border states. In addition to a feeling of kin-
ship and homogeneity of interests, there was a conviction on their
part that the best chance for peaceful secession lay in forming
a confederacy so strong that attack by the North would be hope-
less of success.85
While many would have been glad to restrict the Confederacy
to the cotton states alone, a considerably larger number would
have welcomed accessions from the free states of the upper Mis-
81
Jones, Rebel War Clerk's Diary, I, 41; New York Herald, Nov. 20, 1860,
Washington Correspondence; Mar. 10, quoting Charleston Mercury, Mar. 6; ibid.,
Mar. 26.
8J
L. W. Spratt's letter to Hon. John Perkins, Moore, Rebellion Record, II,
Doc. pp. 357-65-
"G. B. Lamar to Howell Cobb, Mar. 25, 1861, Toombs, Stephens, Cobb Cor-
respondence.
*4The reference is to permanent policies. A greater number considered it good
policy for the border states to remain in the Union and hold out a hope of re-
construction for the purpose of warding off conflict with the Federal government
until the Confederate government should be firmly established.
"Address of Fulton Anderson, Mississippi commissioner, before the Virginia
Convention, in Journal of the State Convention [of Mississippi], 219.
269] EARLY ECONOMIC POLICIES OF CONFEDERATE STATES 269
sissippi valley. The desire to strengthen the Confederacy against
its enemies lent support to the hope of Western accessions, as did
the wish to continue commercial relations with the Northwest
without the obstacles of customs lines. The commerce between
the West and South, it may be remarked again, was not considered
indicative of "colonial vassalage" as was that between the East and
South. There was yet surviving also an aspiration on the part of
Southern seaports to supplant Eastern cities in exporting and im-
porting for the upper Mississippi valley. The hope that Western
states would sooner or later find it to their advantage to join the
Confederacy was based chiefly upon an exaggerated idea of the
dependence of those states upon the Mississippi river as an outlet
for their commerce and of the value to the Western people of their
Southern trade. The Southerners did not feel the degree of hostil-
ity toward the people of the West that they felt for the Yankees;
and they believed the people of the West less strongly opposed to
slavery than the people of the East. The opposition to seeking or
accepting, should they be offered, accessions from the West was
based upon the conviction that it had been and should be the
object to establish a slaveholding confederacy; there should be no
continuance of the discord between slave states and free states.
In the Georgia, Mississippi, and Texas conventions ordinances
were introduced which looked to the formation of a confederacy
of slaveholding states only; but they were not adopted.
86 The
Permanent Constitution of the Confederate States gave congress
the power to admit new states by a two-thirds vote; it did not
prohibit the admission of free states.
87 Serious objections to this
clause were raised in the South Carolina Convention. President
Davis, in his inaugural address, called attention to the clause;
but he thought it to be the will of the people not to admit states
which did not have interests homogeneous with theirs. Vice-Pres-
ident Stephens expressed a similar idea in his "Corner Stone"
speech.
88
*
'Journal of the Convention of Georgia, 68; Journal of the Secession Conven-
tion of Texas, 1861, p. 53; Journal of the State Convention [of Mississippi], 33.
""Stephens, Toombs, and Davis all favored leaving the door open. See Hull,
"The Making of the Confederate Constitution," So. Hist. Assoc., Publications,
IX, 284-85, letter of T. R. R. Cobb to his wife, Mar. 6, 1861; 290, Cobb's notes.
'"The Constitution contained a "three-fifths clause" also. When the matter
was being considered by the Provisional Congress, the three-fifths clause was
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Without doubt the opinion was quite extensively held in the
border states and in the North at the time of the secession of the
cotton states that a chief object of secession was to reopen the
African slave trade. The opinion was perhaps justified by
knowledge of the agitation for renewal during the years 1856-1859.
There are strong reasons, however, for believing that the im-
portance of a desire to reopen the slave trade as a motive of
secession was considerably exaggerated, perhaps purposely so.
The discussion of reopening the slave trade of a few years
previous had made very clear that the people of the cotton states
were badly divided upon the question. Disunionists had tried,
and in a measure had succeeded, to silence the agitation because
they found that it weakened the disunion movement. The discus-
sion of those years had made it very clear, too, that the border
states were very strongly opposed to reopening the slave trade.
Disunionists understood also that the sentiment of European na-
tions was against it. Cogent arguments had been presented before
the election of 1860 to show the futility of expecting a Southern
confederacy to reopen it. The prospect of reopening the trade
was not held out to the electors as an inducement to go for seces-
sion during the brief campaign which preceded the election of
delegates to the secession conventions. On the contrary, leaders
early gave the assurance that it was not intended.
89
The conventions of the three most populous cotton states adopt-
ed resolutions against reopening by great majorities and without
hesitation. The Alabama Convention adopted, with only three
dissenting votes, a resolution declaring the people of Alabama op-
posed to the reopening of the African slave trade on grounds of
"public policy." The debate made it very clear that one of the
chief grounds of "public policy" was a desire to win the border
states.90 The Mississippi Convention by a vote of 66 to 13 adopted
a resolution declaring it not to be the purpose or policy of the
dropped upon the motion of Keith, of South Carolina. South Carolina, Florida,
Mississippi, and Louisiana voted for the motion; Georgia, Alabama, and Texas
against. Upon motion of A. H. Stephens the vote was reconsidered, and Missis-
sippi reversed her vote. The states supporting the three-fifths provision, it may
be said, were those having the largest white population in proportion to black.
See Journal of the Provisional Congress, 861, 862, 889.
""Southern Literary Messenger, XXXII, 73.
""Smith, op. cit., 194-211; 228-265.
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people of Mississippi to reopen the slave trade.
91 The Georgia
Convention unanimously adopted an ordinance prohibiting the
African slave trade, and Georgia's commissioners to other states
gave the assurance that the people of their state had no design
to reopen it.
92 The Louisiana Convention, however, seemed to be
in favor of reopening the trade. A resolution declaring the people
of Louisiana opposed to reopening was rejected, 59 to 49; and
another instructing the delegates to Montgomery to resist any and
every attempt to reopen the slave trade and to secure a constitu-
tional provision prohibiting it, was rejected, 83 to 28.
93 An analysis
of these votes does not show that secessionists voted against them
in greater proportion than opponents of secession. The conven-
tions of South Carolina, Florida, and Texas seem to have taken
no action on the matter.
The Provisional Congress put a prohibition of the foreign slave
trade, except from the slaveholding states of the United States,
in both the Provisional and the Permanent Constitution, only
the South Carolina delegation voted, in each case, for a substitute
giving Congress the power to prohibit the trade.
94 There was
strong opposition in South Carolina to the prohibition. It was
strongly criticized in the South Carolina Convention. The
Charleston Mercury protested against the interdiction.
95 L. W.
Spratt was irreconcilable. Much of the South Carolina opposition
to the prohibitory clause, however, was made because it seemed to
admit that slavery was in itself an evil; many of those opposed
claimed not to favor the actual reopening of the foreign slave
trade.96 The Louisiana Convention refused to specifically approve
the action of the Provisional Congress relative to the slave trade,
97
although it ratified both the Provisional and the Permanent Con-
stitution of the Confederate states. Outside these two states there
91
Journal of the State Convention [of Mississippi], 78, 84.
^Journal of the Convention of Georgia, 59, 363, 369.
^Official Journal of the Convention of Louisiana, 28, 29.
94
Journal of the Provisional Congress, 35, 868.
""Mar. 15, 1861, quoted in New York Herald, Mar. 19.
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'W. H. Russell, letter of April 30, 1861, on "The State of South Carolina,"
in Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc. p. 314 ff.
*
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272 ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF SOUTHERN SECTIONALISM, 1 8401861
seems to have been little dissatisfaction with the action of
Congress. Surely if a desire to reopen the foreign slave trade had
been a chief motive of secession, a constitutional prohibition of it
would not have been acquiesced in so readily.
CHAPTER XI
ECONOMIC CONSIDERATIONS AFFECTING THE
DECISION OF THE BORDER STATES
In the border states after the election of Lincoln, secessionists
tried to show that the election of Lincoln, the Personal Liberty laws
of Northern States, and the abolition agitation generally, justified
secession; and the opponents of secession refuted their arguments.
There were those who wished to make continuance in the Union
contingent upon securing further guarantees for slavery; there
were others who thought such guarantees unnecessary. The dis-
cussion of these points differed in no essential respect from the
debate of similar propositions in the cotton states. Also, secession-
ists per se and unconditional Unionists advanced arguments to
show that secession would affect advantageously or detrimentally
the material interests (other than slavery) of their respective
states. But it was understood from the start that the majority of
the people of the border states preferred to remain in the Union
if it could be saved intact; the initiation of secession must come
from the cotton states. Ardent secessionists, therefore, devoted
their first efforts after Lincoln's election to persuading the cotton
states to take the initiative. Within the border states secessionists
devoted their arguments chiefly to prove that it would be to the
interest or honor of their respective states to join a Southern
confederacy should one be formed or, after the event, that it was
to their interest or honor to join the Confederacy.
One alleged economic advantage of the secession of the border
states, especially those east of the mountains, was that it would
give an impetus to manufacturing. The moderate revenue duties
imposed by the Confederate government would amply protect
their manufacturing interests against Northern competition. In
a Southern confederacy the Northern slave states would take the
place of New England in manufacturing for the states farther
south. Thomas L. Clingman described the manufactures of North
Carolina, and said: "The result of only ten per cent duties in ex-
cluding products from abroad, would give life and impetus to
mechanical and manufacturing industry throughout the entire
South." 1 Senator Hunter, the author of the Tariff of 1857,
'Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 4.
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promised the border states, especially Virginia, that in a Southern
confederacy they would take the place of New England and other
non-slaveholding states in manufacturing for the South. "Under
the incidental protection afforded by a tariff, laid without other
views than those for revenue purposes, there would be an un-
exampled development of her vast capacity for mining, manu-
facturing, agricultural and commercial production." 2 Randolph
Tucker, Attorney General of Virginia, advanced a similar argu-
ment.3 The Georgia commissioners to Maryland, Delaware, and
North Carolina urged in behalf of secession that the cotton states
were agricultural, and the states named could manufacture foi
them; Said Mr. Hall, commissioner to North Carolina: "All
your material interests must be promoted by your speedy union
with us in the new government. The princely treasures which have
been hitherto lavished with a generous hand upon ungrateful New
England, will be poured into your lap."*
In the border states the free trade proclivities of the people of
the cotton states were feared, and Unionists played upon this fear.
They showed how free trade would injure manufacturing interests
in the South, and how the tariff would be an apple of discord in
a new confederacy as it had been in the old. Sherrard Clemens,
of western Virginia, said: "It would be for the interest of the coast
States to have free trade in manufactured goods; but how would
that operate on the mechanical and manufacturing industry of
Missouri, Kentucky, Virginia, Maryland and Delaware?" 5 Union-
ists also showed that free trade would mean direct taxation. The
Confederate Congress took cognizance of these speculations in
border states when framing their early tariff legislation and the
Provisional and the Permanent Constitution.6 Their action was
not entirely reassuring, however, since it included placing a pro-
J
Letter on the Crisis, Nov. 24, 1860, New York Herald, Dec. 6; DeBow's Re-
view, XXX, 115.
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4
Journal of the Convention of Georgia, 325, 330, 364.
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Duty, 23.
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hibition of protective tariffs in the Permanent Constitution. John
P. Kennedy, of Maryland, referred to the belief of some that dis-
criminatory duties would be laid on Northern goods with a view to
the establishment of large manufacturing interests in the South.
The Constitution, he said, had already put a veto upon protec-
tion. Once peace should be established, the South would become
friends of the North, and would revert to free trade. Northern
manufacturers could compete with the world in free trade, but
Maryland's could not.
7
Much was said of the commercial advantages which would
accrue to cities of border states, particularly Norfolk, Richmond,
and Baltimore, from their inclusion in a Southern confederacy.
North Carolina had no seaport with prospects of becoming a New
York under the stimulus of free trade and direct trade; it was un-
derstood that the trade of the old North State would have to con-
tribute to the upbuilding of Charleston, Richmond, and Norfolk. 8
In Virginia, however, the commercial benefits of disunion were
well canvassed. They were being discussed at Norfolk and Rich-
mond shortly after Lincoln's election.9 In the Union, said Tucker,
Norfolk and Richmond would still be dependencies of New York.
"With the command of the Southern trade, with her extended
Southern connections, with her commercial facilities, Virginia
would be the great commercial, manufacturing, and navigation
State of the South. Her bottoms would replace those of New Eng-
land her merchants and factors those of New York her factories
those of the free States."10 The efforts being made in Virginia to
develop an extensive foreign trade by building railroads and canals
and making arrangements in Europe, were represented as "utterly
vain so long as our federal system continues."
11 Visions of com-
mercial grandeur in a Southern confederacy explain in a measure
the sympathy with secession manifested in Baltimore. Opponents
of secession, however, were able to show the baselessness of these
"'An Appeal to Maryland," Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc. pp. 368-74.
See also Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri Convention, Journal, 35, report
of the Committee on Federal Relations.
"Clingman in the Senate, Cong. Globe, 37 Cong., Exec. Sess. of Sen., 1476.
"Norfolk and Richmond Correspondence, New York Herald, Nov. 28, Dec.
22, 1860.
10
J. Randolph Tucker in article cited above.
"Willoughby Newton, National Intelligencer, Nov. 24, 1860.
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expectations. Even should Southern independence change the
course of Southern trade, which was highly problematical, what
had Baltimore to hope from the change? they asked. "Will she
import for the South, from the head of the Chesapeake, whilst
Norfolk lies on the margin of the sea at its mouth . . . ?" 12 Even
merchants of St. Louis were led to believe that, somehow, separa-
tion from the North would be conducive to her prosperity and
make her the metropolis of the valley.13
But it was generally recognized that secession offered few or no
positive advantages to the western border states. "Disunion on
the slave line," said one, "carries such obvious and inevitable
destructive results to Kentucky, Tennessee, and Missouri, that
no Utopian projector of a Southern Confederacy has ever yet had
the ingenuity to suggest even the plausible semblance of any
compensating benefit to those three States."14 As far as material
interests other than slavery were concerned, the choice, in case of
a disruption of the Union, between going with the South and
remaining with the North was a choice between two evils. And in
each of the border states the decision was affected more powerfully
by considerations of which alternative would cause less disturbance
and injury to established relations of trade and intercourse than
it was by expectations of positive advantages to result from join-
ing a Southern confederacy.
North Carolina was very slow to secede. Her people were con-
servative. (The state was often referred to as the Rip Van Winkle
of the South.) Leaders of the secession movement had perfect
confidence, however, that North Carolina would go out if Virginia
did so; for, aside from questions of defense, the chief routes of
trade and travel lay across the boundaries of Virginia and South
Carolina. That portion of Virginia which lay between the moun-
tains and the Chesapeake had important commercial connections
with both the North and the South, but the routes of trade upon
which Virginia cities depended for their prosperity were to the
South and Southwest. The most important railroad, the Virginia
M
John P. Kennedy, "An Appeal to Maryland," cited in note 7.
"Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri Convention, Proceedings, p. 86;
New York Herald, Dec. 17, 1860, remarks of Mr. Grow in a meeting of the
St. Louis Chamber of Commerce.
"South Carolina, Disunion, and a Mississippi Valley Confederacy, p. 6.
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and Tennessee, ran via the southwest corner of the state in the
direction of Chattanooga, whence connection was had with Nash-
ville, Memphis, and New Orleans. Another important road, the
Petersburg and Weldon, ran south, and conected with North and
South Carolina roads. The Shenandoah valley, however, and
much of Northern Virginia had been made commercially tributary
to Baltimore.
The commercial interests of Baltimore were an important
factor in the decision of Maryland. Baltimore was the commercial
center for central Maryland, much of northern Virginia, and to a
limited extent for the Susquehanna valley, in Pennsylvania. But
the most important connection was the Baltimore and Ohio rail-
road, which ran up the Potomac river to Cumberland and thence
to Wheeling, with a branch across western Virginia to Parkers-
burg. At Wheeling and Parkersburg connections were made with
the network of railroads in the old Northwest. The possession of
this western connection promoted Union sentiment in Baltimore,
especially because western Maryland and northwestern Virginia
showed strong Union tendencies. John P. Kennedy, of Maryland,
referred to the unfriendliness of eastern Virginia to Maryland's
internal improvement policy and the friendliness of the western
counties. "The true friends and allies of our policy are in the
West. At this moment that region is making its protest against
secession. It is a matter of deepest moment that we should wisely
appreciate this fact."
15
One explanation of the strong union sentiment of western Vir-
ginia was the identity of economic interests with neighboring por-
tions of Ohio, Pennsylvania, Kentucky, and Maryland rather than
with eastern Virginia. The trade of western Virginia went not
across the mountains to Richmond and Norfolk but to Cincinnati,
Pittsburgh, and other cities on the Ohio river, and by the Bal-
timore and Ohio railroad to Baltimore. Governor Pierpont said
secession would be fatal to the material interests of West Virginia.
"Secession and annexation to the South would cut off every outlet
for our productions."
16 It is quite possible that the failure to com-
plete the Chesapeake and Ohio railroad and the James River and
"Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc. p. 373.
"Ibid., II, Doc. p. 158. Also Virginia Senate Journal and Documents, Extra
Session, 1861, p. 20, message of Governor Letcher.
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Kanawha canal before the Civil War was a deciding factor in the
division of Virginia on the secession issue.
17 A desire to unify the
state had been one of the motives of those who zealously sup-
ported these projects. It is possible, too, that, could the
Chesapeake and Ohio railroad have been completed and success-
fully operated before 1861, the ties which bound Virginia to the
Union would have been more difficult to break. It is not without
significance that the leading and most persistent advocate of a
Western connection, Joseph Segar, although a resident of the tide-
water region, declined to go with his state in secession, and became
an exile during the War.
18
In the case of Tennessee, going South would without doubt cause
the least disturbance and injury to established relationships of trade
and intercourse. 19 Most of the cotton of Tennessee went via Mem-
phis to New Orleans. A comparatively small amount went by rail to
Charleston and Savannah. Still less, perhaps, went up the Mis-
sissippi and by other routes to the factories of the Ohio valley.
Tennessee tobacco found an outlet chiefly by way of New Orleans.
Mules, hogs, grain, and whiskey from the farming districts were
sold to the planters of the cotton belt. With the opening of the
Virginia and Tennessee railroad, the export of grain by way of
Virginia began. Imports into Tennessee, however, came from all
directions from New Orleans, from Charleston and Savannah,
to some extent from Virginia, and largely, from Cincinnati, Louis-
ville, and St. Louis by rivers and railroads. It is noteworthy that
while east Tennessee was about as firmly bound to the South by
economic ties as any other part, yet no district in the South had a
population more loyal to the Union. The explanation lies else-
where than in such economic considerations as are here stated.
What has been said of the economic ties of Tennessee was true
in greater degree of Arkansas. There were no railroads. Arkansas
"A Richmond correspondent wrote, in New York Herald, Nov. 22, 1860:
''The facilities of intercommunication between Western and Eastern Virginia, and
the frequent intercourses which result therefrom have procured a unity of sen-
timent between the people of both sections which no one could have anticipated
ten years ago .... They are breaking up the associations of the people of the
West with those of the border free states which were heretofore a necessity of
trade."
"
'Letter of Hon. Joseph Segar to a Friend in Virginia, etc. (pamphlet, 1862).
ie
Cf. Fertig, Secession and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 13, 22.
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products found an outlet chiefly by river routes. Memphis and
New Orleans were the commercial centers. Governor Rector
stated the situation concisely. Arkansas was disposed to be con-
servative as were Maryland, Virginia, Missouri, Kentucky, and
Tennessee. But Arkansas was the natural ally of the cotton states.
She was bound to them by the institution of slavery. Missouri
might rid herself of it; Arkansas could not. "With the mart and
channel of Southern commerce in the possession and control of the
States of Louisiana and Mississippi, what would be the condition
of Arkansas should she determine to adhere to the Union?"20
In Kentucky and Missouri it was generally recognized that as
far as economic interests other than slavery were concerned, the
states had much to lose and little to gain by seceding. Mr. Gamble,
later governor of Missouri, put the matter tersely in the Missouri
Convention: "Our interests as a State are bound up inseparably
with the maintenance of the Union; our sympathies, our personal
sympathies, in a large measure, are with the people of the South."
21
Most of the trade and intercourse of these states was with or by
way of the free states of the North. They were dependent upon
about the same markets as southern Illinois, Indiana, and Ohio.
"It is true," wrote a pamphleteer, "that much the larger amount
of the trade of the Northwest tends to the East, and not to the
South, and if weighed in merely commercial scales the question
of connection, as between the two, would preponderate in favor
of the East."22 The east and west railroads, built during the last
decade or so, had reversed the outlet and outlook of these and
other Western states; and of this the people were well aware. A
correspondent of John J. Crittenden wrote him: "General Scott's
plan would have worked twenty years ago. . . . but since rail-
roads have intervened there can be no division between the people
of the Mississippi valley north of Kentucky (including that state)
and all East and Northeast the 'railroad' tells the story."
23 Dele-
gates in the Missouri Convention said St. Louis owed her greatness
"Message to the Legislature, New York Herald, Dec. 29, 1860.
"Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri Convention, Proceedings, p. 67.
See also the Address of the Border State Convention to the people of the United
States, Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc. p. 352.
'
"South Carolina, Disunion, and a Mississippi Valley Confederacy, 14.
"C. J. Davis to J. J. Crittenden, Jan. I, 1861, /. /. Crittenden MSS.
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to the Union, and nothing should be done to blast her progress.2
*
They also gave consideration to the prospect that the route of the
Pacific railroad would lie across the state. "And Missouri stands
in the pathway of nations; over her soil this pathway must run,
just as inevitably as fate." 25
But if economic and commercial ties made it almost a necessity
that Kentucky and Missouri remain with the North, their com-
mercial relations with the South were so valuable that the destruc-
tion of the Union would be a great blow to their prosperity. St.
Louis and Louisville each had a large Southern trade. Hemp and
tobacco were sent South. Mules and horses, bacon, pork, and
corn were shipped down the Mississippi or over the Louisville and
Nashville railroad or by other routes to the cotton and sugar
plantations. The people of the interior states, not only Kentucky
and Missouri but Illinois, Iowa, Indiana, etc. as well, whose pros-
perity depended so largely upon the internal trade with the South
and upon unimpeded access to the sea, felt that they had a greater
interest in the maintenance of the Union than the people of any
other section. Promises of the free navigation of the Mississippi
and transit of foreign imports and exports across Southern terri-
tory free of duty were too insecure and inadequate to reconcile
them to the establishment of a foreign power between them and
the Gulf.26 Governor MaGomn, of Kentucky, who strongly sym-
pathized with the secessionists, said that the "mouth and sources
of the Mississippi river cannot be separated without the horrors of
Civil War."21 Such facts as these help to explain why the people
of Kentucky and Missouri were so anxious for a compromise to
save the Union.
But considerations of benefits or injuries to economic interests
were by no means the only considerations determining the de-
cision of border states. Others may be briefly summarized.
The question of the relation of slavery to secession in the border
states presents several aspects peculiar to them. The people of
those states were almost unanimously opposed to reopening the
"Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri Convention, Proceedings, 14, 86.
x
lbid., Proceedings, 122.
Annual Cyclopedia, I, 396.
"Great Debates in American History, V, 276. See also Coulter, E. M., "Ef-
fects of Secession upon the Commerce of the Mississippi Valley," Miss. Fal.
Hist. Rev., Ill, 276-300.
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African slave trade. Until it had been prohibited by the Consti-
tution of the Confederate States, the fear that it might be re-
opened had been one of the chief influences retarding the secession
movement.28
The Constitution of the Confederate States gave congress the
power to prohibit the importation of slaves from the slaveholding
states of the United States. The provision was designed to bring
pressure to bear upon them to join the Confederacy; 29 and, al-
though as a coercive measure it was resented in the border states,
it undoubtedly served the purpose for which it was intended. This
was especially true in the case of Virginia, where it was feared the
slave population would soon become redundant if the outlet for
the surplus should be cut off.
30
Secessionists asserted that with seven slaveholding states out of
the Union the remaining would be in a hopeless minority. Con-
stitutional guarantees would no longer suffice to protect slavery
therein, for the free states, then being three-fourths of all the
states, could amend the Constitution as they might see fit, even to
abolish slavery altogether. "If we do not go with the cotton states,"
said J. Randolph Tucker, "our $250,000,000 of slave property
would perish." The North would not tolerate it, and the South
would not buy.31 Opponents, on the other hand, professed to
believe that secession would be destructive of slavery in the border
states. There would be no fugitive slave law; a fugitive who es-
caped across the line would be as surely beyond recovery as he
would be in Canada. In case of war the border states would be
invaded, and the slaves run off. Slave owners, in case of seces-
S8
Washington correspondence, New York Herald, Nov. 22, 1860; Raleigh cor-
respondence, Jan. 12, 1861; National Intelligencer, Nov. 27, 29, Dec. 29, 1860,
Feb. 19, 1861; So. Lit. Mes., XXXI, 472; XXXII, 73; Journal of the Convention
of Virginia, 67; speech of Sherrard Clemens, of Virginia, Moore, Rebellion Rec-
ord, I, Doc. p. 24; South Carolina, Disunion, and a Mississippi Valley Confed-
eracy, 4; Smith, History and Debates of the Convention of Alabama, 198,
208, 210, 251, 259; and see above, pp. 27072.
"Smith, History and Debates of the Convention of Alabama, 236, 252, 258.
Yancey would have prohibited by constitutional proviaion the importation of
slaves from slaveholding states which did not join the Confederacy. P. 252.
"Willoughby Newton, National Intelligencer, Nov. 24, 1860.
"So. Lit. Mes., XXXII, 187.
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sion, would sell or carry their slaves South.32 The dangers were
particularly great in the case of Missouri, said Missourians, for
the state was almost surrounded by free states. 33
Among the most powerful arguments against secession in some
of the border states were the difficulties of defending them against
the North in case of war. The utter impossibility of defending
the Eastern Shore of Maryland and Virginia against a power
which could control the sea and the Chesapeake was pointed out. 34
Central Maryland would either be at once overrun by Northern
troops, or would become a battle ground of the war. 35 The de-
fenseless position of the trans-Alleghany portion of Virginia was
a deterrent influence in that state;
36 and Unionists portrayed the
destruction war would bring to eastern Virginia, perhaps with little
effect. Kentuckians took account of the three free states which
lay on her long northern boundary.
37 Missouri Unionists said
secession could only lead to the military conquest of the state; for
it was surrounded on three sides by free states which must have a
highway across it.38 Unionists demonstrated the folly of surrender-
ing a position in the heart of a vast nation for one upon the
frontier between two nations, which might find causes for frequent
conflicts.39 To these arguments the secessionists could only reply,
before Sumter, that if all the slaveholding states would go out to-
**
Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri Convention, Journal, p. 35; Pro-
ceedings, p. 88; Joseph Holt's "Letter on the Pending Revolution," in Moore,
Rebellion Record, I, Doc. p. 290; Annual Cyclopedia, I, 442; So. Lit. Mess.,
XXXII, 73, quoting M. F. Maury; Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 139, speech
of Andrew Johnson.
"Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri Convention, Journal, 56, report of
the Committee on the Commissioner from Georgia; Proceedings, 88.
3<W. H. Collins, Third Address to the People oj Maryland.
""Speech of Reverdy Johnson at Frederick, Md., National Intelligencer, May
II, 1861; message of Gov. Hicks, Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc. p. 159 ff.
"The Central Committee's address to the people of northwestern Virginia.
ibid., I, Doc. p. 328.
"Ibid., I, Doc. p. 354, 73, 75.
^Journal and Proceedings of the Missouri Convention, Journal, 35, 52; Pro-
ceedings, 89.
"Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc. p. 289, 354; Collins, Third Address, etc.;
South Carolina, Disunion, and a Mississippi Valley Confederacy, 13.
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gether there would be no war; they would form a confederacy so
powerful that the North would not dare attack it.40
Perhaps more effectual than the appeals to the fears of the peo-
ple of the border states were the appeals to their sympathies, pre-
judices, and kinship. They were urged not to stand by and permit,
or assist in, the subjugation of sister Southern states. The deter-
mination of the Federal government to maintain the Union by force
of arms furnished the occasion for the secession of four states. In
the cases of Virginia and Tennessee it is quite doubtful that seces-
sion would have occurred had the seceded states been permitted to
depart in peace.
41 This was the view taken by an element in the
South which wished to precipitate a conflict with the Federal gov-
ernment in order to insure the secession of the border states.
Resistance to coercion was the issue which won over conservative
Tennessee Whigs such as Bell, E. H. Ewing, Neil S. Brown, and
John Callander. 42 It was the issue upon which the secessionists
made their last stand in Maryland, Kentucky, and Missouri.
It is as difficult to identify the secessionists in the border states
as it was the secessionists in the cotton states. In three, the people
were given no opportunity to vote upon the issue until after the
outbreak of war. It is impossible to state just what the issue was
when the elections were held in the other five. It is certain that
in no state did the majority favor secession if the Union could be
preserved or reconstructed without war. In general, it would
seem, about the same classes came, sooner or later, to favor seces-
"So. Lit. Mess., XXXII, 182 ff.; Annual Cyclopedia, I, 730, quoting address
of ten Virginia congressmen; Letter of Hon. Joseph Segar to a Friend in Vir-
ginia, 28.
"Cf. Fertig, Secession and Reconstruction in Tennessee, 20 ff; Rhodes, His-
tory of the U. S., Ill, 344, 378, 383; Beverly Munford, Virginians Attitude toward
Slavery and Secession; J. M. Botts, The Great Rebellion, 205 ff. I do not name
North Carolina in this connection. A large vote was cast for secession in Jan-
uary, when it was still believed a reconciliation could be effected. The House of
Commons unanimously resolved in February that North Carolina would go with
the South if reconciliation failed. Annual Cyclopedia, I, 538. This was the opin-
ion of men in the cotton states. Report of Jacob Thompson, Commissioner from
Mississippi to North Carolina, Journal of the State Convention [of Mississippi],
185. But see J. G. de Roulhac Hamilton, Reconstruction in North Carolina, 21 ff.;
Wm. K. Boyd, "North Carolina on the Eve of Secession," Am. Hist. Assoc., Rept.,
1910, p. 177.
"Moore, Rebellion Record, I, Doc. pp. 72, 137.
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sion which had supported the secession movements in the cotton
states, namely, the people of the planting sections and of the cities
and towns closely identified in interests with them. As in the cot-
ton states, also, the opposition centered in districts in which the
slave population was small in proportion to the white and in
which farming rather than planting was the chief occupation of
the people. Whigs, in general, were more adverse to secession
than Democrats of the same districts.
In North Carolina a convention election of January 28 resulted
in the choice of 85 constitutional Unionists and 35 secessionists.
The opinion seems to have been quite prevalent at the time that
the Union could yet be peacefully reconstructed; the issue, then,
was neither strictly Union versus disunion, nor remaining with the
North versus going with the South. Of 47 counties in the eastern
part of the state, where the slave population was a high per-
centage of the total in most localities, 17 chose secession delegates,
30 Union delegates. Of the counties which went for secession 4
were normally Whig, 13 Democratic; of the counties which re-
turned Union delegates 21 could be classed as Whig, 9 as Demo-
cratic. The secessionist counties were grouped pretty well in the
southeast corner of the state. Of 38 counties in the western part
of the state, in few of which the slaves constituted more than 25
per cent of the population, n selected secession, 27 Union dele-
gates. Of the secession counties 6 were normally Whig, 5 normally
Democratic; of the counties returning Union majorities, 23 were
W'hig, 4 Democratic. The counties which chose secession delegates
were well grouped along the South Carolina border. Wilmington
was strongly Democratic and secessionist; Wake county, in which
Raleigh was located, was normally Democratic but strongly
Unionist.43
In the Tennessee convention election of February 9, 91.803
votes were cast for Union, 24,749 f r secession delegates. Virtually
all of the secession votes were cast in west and middle Tennessee,
but the majority in every section of the state was for Union. 44
At this time the people of Tennessee seem to have believed the
"I have used the classification of delegates made by H. M. Wagstaff, State
Rights and Political Parties in North Carolina, 134.
"Annual Cyclopedia, I, 677; New York Times, Feb. 15, 1861.
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Union could be peacefully reconstructed. 45 On June 8 the action of
the Tennessee Legislature declaring the state independent and
ratifying the Constitution of the Confederate States was submitted
to the people for their ratification. Overwhelming majorities in
west and middle Tennessee approved, but in east Tennessee the
vote was almost as strongly adverse.
46 The slave population of the
latter section was very small in comparison with the white.
An election was held in Virginia, February 4, to choose delegates
to a state convention. The result was considered a Union victory,
although the delegates could not be classified accurately as Union-
ists and secessionists. About 25 or 30 were considered uncondi-
tional secessionists.47 No test vote was held in the Convention
upon a straight-out secession resolution until April 4, when such a
resolution was defeated by a vote of 90-45 ,48 This was long after
it had become apparent that the Union could not be reconstructed
by agreement, but before it became certain that coercion was the
policy of the government. All but 3 of the 45 votes for secession
were cast by delegates from counties now in Virginia; all but 14 by
delegates from east of the Blue Ridge. All of the counties with
large slave population lay in the eastern section; it was the plant-
ing section. Of the 45 votes in favor of secession, 15 were cast by
delegates from counties normally Whig; 30 by delegates from
counties normally Democratic. The delegates from Richmond and
Petersburg, but not the delegate from Norfolk, voted for secession.
After Sumter the convention decided for secession by a vote of
79 to 64.
49 The delegates from northwestern Virginia, now West
Virginia, voted almost solidly against secession; those from east
of the Blue Ridge voted almost as solidly for it; those from the
intervening region were divided. This division in the Convention
reflected quite accurately the divisions among the people, as shown
"Report of H. P. Bell, Georgia Commissioner to Tennessee, Journal of the
Convention of Georgia, 369; Fertig, Secession and Reconstruction in Tenn., 21.
"Moore, Rebellion Record, II, Doc. p. 169.
"Rhodes, History of the U. S., Ill, 309; Tyler, Letters and Times of the
Tylers, II, 621; Annual Cyclopedia, 1, 730.
48
'Journal of the Committee of the Whole [of the Convention of Virginia], 31.
"This is the test vote, not the vote upon the adoption of the ordinance of
secession. Journal of the Secret Session, p. 8.
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by the popular vote on the ordinance of secession of May 23 and
by the subsequent division of the state.50
Maryland and Kentucky declared, finally, for the Union, but
there was strong sympathy in each with the secession movement.
In Maryland the East Shore and the western part were strongly
Unionist. Secession sentiment developed chiefly in the planting
region of central Maryland, and was reflected in Baltimore. In
Kentucky it was strongest in the Blue Grass region of the central
part and the tobacco counties of the southwest. The delegates in
the Missouri Convention who wished to resist coercion of the
seceded states by the Federal government represented, with a few
exceptions, counties along the Mississippi and Missouri rivers.
51
There were the districts which had a considerable slave popula-
tion; there tobacco and hemp were grown.
The opposition of the non-slaveholding districts of the border
states to secession did not, in general, signify hostility to slavery.
It signified, however, a degree of indifference to the preservation
of slavery and a disposition to remember that slavery was not the
only important interest to be considered. This disposition found
frequent expression. For example, Mr. Brodhead, in the Missouri
Convention, said negro slavery was not the only great interest in
Missouri. Slaves comprised less than one-ninth of the taxable
property of the state. The white population was increasing four
times as rapidly as the slave. The slaves were engaged in raising
hemp and tobacco principally. There were mining, manufacturing,
and commercial interests, to carry on which white labor was re-
quired. If Missouri seceded, the white laborers would not come,
"when they know that, so far as our political power is concerned,
we shall be subjected to the cotton lords of South Carolina and
Louisiana." 52 Only in a few localities, such as St. Louis, which had
a large German and Northern population, was there an active hos-
tility to slavery. The Unionists of the border states entered the
war with the understanding that it was a war to preserve the
Union, not to destroy slavery.
Annual Cyclopedia, 737 ff., 743; Rhodes, III, 387.
B1An analysis of several divisions of the Convention.
83
'Journal and Proceedings of Missouri Convention, Proceedings, 122. See also
ibid., Journal, 35; Moore, Rebellion Record, I, 374.
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In two, at least, of the border states, Tennessee and Virginia, the
divisions of the people on the secession issue corresponded rather
closely to long standing sectional divisions. Tennessee sectionalism
was based largely upon social differences between the people of
the east and those of the middle and west. The people of east
Tennessee resented the political domination of the state by the
planting society. While they did not hate slavery, they believed
that the South should be a white man's country, and that one man
was as good as another. They were not disposed to fight in sup-
port of a movement which they conceived to have been inaugur-
ated to perpetuate and establish more firmly an aristocratic social
system. Andrew Johnson was a typical representative of east Ten-
nessee. "We find ..." said he, "that the whole idea is to es-
tablish a republic based upon slavery exclusively, in which the great
mass of the people are not to participate." And again, "We hold
[in east Tennessee] that it is upon the intelligent free white
people of the country that all governments should rest, and by
them all governments should be controlled." 53 The old sectional
division in Virginia had grown in part out of social differences
similar to those in Tennessee, in part from separation by geo-
graphical barriers. Politically it had found expression in disputes
over legislative apportionment, appropriations for and location of
state aided internal improvements, and the apportionment of tax-
ation. It is significant that the Virginia Convention submitted to
the people of the state along with the secession ordinance, an
amendment to the constitution providing that "Taxation shall be
equal and uniform throughout the commonwealth, and all prop-
erty shall be taxed in proportion to its value, . . .
" 54 The pur-
pose of the amendment was, of course, to insure the taxation of
slaves at the same rate as other property; its proposal was a be-
lated effort of the East to conciliate the West. The sectionalism
of North Carolina was not so pronounced, but was not without
bearing upon the alignment upon the secession issue. In North
Carolina, too, the ad valorem issue was agitating the state upon
the eve of secession. It is not possible within the limits of this
"Speech in the Senate, July 21, 1861, Moore, Rebellion Record, II, Doc. p.
425-6. See also speech of Dec. 19, 1860, Cong. Globe, 36 Cong., 2 Sess., 140 ff.
"Journal of the Convention of Virginia, 106, 134, 150; Ordinances Adopted by
the Convention of Virginia in Secret Session, p. 21.
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study to develop the subject of the relation of long standing sec-
tional divisions within several Southern states to the divisions of
the people upon the question of secession; but no study of the
reasons for the attitude taken by the people in the largely non-
slaveholding districts would be complete which does not take them
into account.
The decision of the border states was slowly and carefully made.
It was determined largely by fears for slavery, feelings of sym-
pathy and kinship with the people of the cotton states, and con-
siderations of their position in case of war; but the people of the
border states were also powerfully influenced in their decision by
their judgments as to the probable effect of secession upon the
economic interests, slavery aside, of the localities involved. From
this viewpoint, going with the South or remaining with the Union
appeared as the choice of two evils. Only in eastern Virginia and
in North Carolina did the people of the border states share to any
considerable extent the expectations of great material benefits to
follow secession and the formation of a Southern confederacy
which the people of the cotton states entertained.
CHAPTER XII
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this study we have considered some of the economic aspects
of Southern sectionalism during about twenty years prior to the
Civil War. This period does not by any means include the begin-
ning of such sectionalism.
During this period the people of the South, generally, were
aware of a disparity between the North and South to the advan-
tage of the former in material development population, wealth,
commerce, industry, financial strength, distribution of the comforts
and conveniences of life. Although at intervals the Southern
people were inclined to be satisfied with their degree of prosperity,
their economic organization and methods, and the progress of their
section, in general they felt that they did not enjoy the prosperity
and were not making the material progress that the South's nat-
ural resources and their own efforts entitled them to expect.
This dissatisfaction was not uniformly distributed throughout the
South. It was greatest in the older states. It developed in the
newer states only as conditions there approximated those of the
older. It was greater in the planting than in the farming regions.
It was greatly augmented because a political struggle between the
sections, over slavery especially, called sharp attention to the
relationship between material progress and political power.
The "decline" of the South was attributed to various causes by
those who perceived it. One group persistently emphasized the
alleged unequal operation of the Federal government upon the
economic development of the sections. Somewhat earlier than the
period of this study, Southern leaders, particularly of the planting
regions, had come to hold widely different views from their col-
leagues in other sections as to the proper revenue, expenditure,
and commercial policies to be followed by the Federal government.
They opposed high tariffs, heavy governmental expenditures, aid
to private enterprises, bounties, and special favors of all kinds,
because they thought their section was not equally benefited
thereby. As years went by, and they were not always able to
make their views prevail, they, of the Calhoun school, came to at-
tribute the decline of the South to policies which they had opposed.
This group was strong in the cotton states.
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Others attached comparatively little significance to governmental
reactions upon economic development; they attributed Southern
"decline" chiefly to a too exclusive devotion to undiversified agri-
culture attended, as it was, by industrial, commercial, and financial
dependence upon the North and Europe, and by unsatisfactory
methods of marketing and buying. These conditions had come
about in a natural way; but because of them the Southern people
produced wealth while others enjoyed it. Men of this class would
have diversified agriculture; they pleaded for the introduction of
cotton manufactures; they proposed plans for securing direct trade
with Europe; they dreamed of railroad connections with the
Northwest and with the Pacific which would rehabilitate Southern
cities; they advocated various measures of a protective character
on the part of state and local governments; they asked that sec-
tional patriotism and pride take the form of developing the
economic resources of the South.
These classes, generally, agreed that slavery was not the cause
of the lagging prosperity of the section. They agreed, slaveholders
and non-slaveholders, that slavery, the plantation system, and the
production of great staples must remain fundamental features of
the South's economic system. Some of them, to be sure, were
aware that slavery had off-setting disadvantages in that it re-
stricted the opportunities of white labor, deprived it of leadership,
and, consequently, deprived the South of its full services, and
acted as a bar to immigration. There was a class, also, in the
South which opposed slavery, namely, non-slaveholders of the
laboring class who came into competition with slave labor; but
the class was only beginning to be numerous and vocal.
Not economic reasons only explain the determination of the
great majority to maintain the institution of slavery. Aside from
the fact that it constituted a vast vested interest, that it was es-
tablished in the social organization, and social prestige attached
to the owners of big plantations, was the firm conviction that a
superior and an inferior race could not live side by side (the
negroes were here to stay) without the greatest social disorders
unless the inferior race were in bondage. Some of the staunchest
defenders of the institution refused to support plans for the
economic regeneration of the South, because they feared that, if
successful, they would prove incompatible with the continued se-
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curity of slavery. The majority, however, were either unaware of
the incompatibility or unafraid. Like their fellow Americans in
the other sections, most Southerners were not seeking a static
society. They were willing to adapt themselves to changing cir-
cumstances. And, while progress and change may have been less
rapid in the ante-bellum South than elsewhere in the Union, it is
an error to regard Southern society as stationary.
Those who emphasized the unequal operation of the Federal
government as a cause for Southern decline came early to believe
that independent nationality would result in great material ad-
vantages. Many of those who advanced the various plans for re-
generation mentioned above came eventually to believe that they
could better be carried into effect in an independent republic.
These views presented repeatedly to the Southern people con-
vinced the great majority in the cotton states that, while secession
might not be attended by any vast positive benefits, it would at
least not be attended by any serious disadvantages; thus were
they reconciled to a step which they were convinced was neces-
sary to preserve slavery and maintain Southern honor. When the
auspicious occasion came, the cotton states promptly went out of
the Union. The people of the border states hesitated. With them
slavery was not such a predominating interest. From an economic
point of view they stood to lose whether they went out or stayed
in. But confronted by a fait accompli, and war on one side or the
other, they went with misgivings, where their sympathies, associa-
tions, or interests chiefly lay.
Now what basis had Southern sectionalism in actual economic
facts? There can be no doubt of the divergent economic interests
of the sections; one section was growing less rapidly in wealth and
numbers, and was economically dependent upon the other. The
divergence dated far back, even into colonial times. Fundamental
causes lay in geography, climate, soil, and natural resources. Less
important were conditions of settlement. The South had received
a smaller proportion of thrifty, sturdy, middle class stock than
had the North.
Slavery was both effect and cause. In days when slavery was
considered no evil, natural conditions (soil and climate) explain
why slavery was established and flourished chiefly below New
Jersey. Once established, however, slavery, notwithstanding its
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great services in clearing forests, draining marshes, and growing
great crops of staple products, was responsible for or tended to
perpetuate some of the evils of the South's economic system. It
tended to keep the South exclusively agricultural and to confine
agriculture largely to the production of a few great staples, because
it was best adopted to such an organization. It was largely re-
sponsible for a great mass of undirected, semi-productive white
labor in the South.
But, not too much should be attributed to slavery. The South
was vast in area; population spread easily and, perforce, remained
sparse. In 1860 the oldest portions of the South still possessed
characteristics of a frontier, and their business methods were ap-
propriate thereto; they were still in the exploitation stage. The
South was farther from Europe than the North. Her harbors were
not so good as those of the North. Her mineral resources were
less extensive and less accessible. Her soil, except in localities, was
less productive than that of the Northwest. Her climate was more
enervating than that of other sections.
The differing views of governmental policies grew out of differ-
ent economic conditions. Northern states could be benefited by
protective duties; they demanded them and at times secured them.
There were more Northern enterprises and projects which were felt
to be entitled to government aid; insistent demands were made for
such aid and frequently secured. More Federal officials were re-
quired in the North; supplies and equipment for government needs
could be more readily secured there; consequently most of the
governmental expenditures were made in the North. There was
justice in the Southern complaint that the South paid more in the
form of taxes than she received back in disbursements, and that
the difference was a drain upon Southern resources. But in those
days Federal taxes were comparatively light, and governmental
expenditures comparatively small; the operation of the Federal
government would seem to have been of small consequence in de-
termining the economic condition of sections as compared with
other great economic forces of the time.
What shall be said of the remedies for Southern "decline?"
Much more might have been accomplished than was had the plans
advanced by the progressives been earnestly and intelligently car-
ried out either by the state and local governments or the cooper-
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ative efforts of private citizens; for examples, commercial educa-
tion, better banking laws, improved methods of marketing cotton.
But the remedies lay chiefly in time and the natural order of
events. Greater density of population would have come. Slavery
or no slavery, capital would have come in or would have ac-
cumulated out of the profits of agriculture. White labor must have
been put to work, first, perhaps, in cotton culture and later in
other industries. Cotton manufactures would have sprung up as
they promised to do in the forties, and as they did a few decades
later. The Pacific railroad would have been built. The quantity
of commerce would have become great enough to warrant direct
trade with Europe. The development of the section's forest and
mineral resources would have begun. But the South did not wait
for time and the natural order of events. It is perhaps idle to
speculate in regard to the economic future of the Southern states
if they could have become an independent confederacy without
war threatening national integrity. There is little likelihood that
secession would have proved the magic proponents prophesied;
about the same progress would have been made as in the Union.
Slavery would have endured somewhat longer. The foreign slave
trade would not have been reopened. Some industries might have
been artificially stimulated. A measure of financial independence,
as far as the actual transaction of business was concerned, would
probably have been secured. But the economic advantages would
have been off-set by the disadvantages of increased cost of govern-
ment and the barriers imposed upon trade with states of the
Union, with which trade had formerly been free.
The conditions were not right and the means not present for
the formation among the Southern people of a thorough under-
standing of the great economic problems of the section. The press
was poor and almost wholly partisan. DeBow's Review, after its
founding in 1846, contained almost everything of value written
on the economic conditions and problems of the South. The
volumes were of very unequal merit; many of the articles were
flimsy in character. DeBow himself, while a brilliant journalist,
possessed of a vast fund of information, and a man of prodigious
industry, was neither a man of broad grasp nor an impartial
seeker after truth. Few books of value on economic subjects were
published. Much as was said and written on the slavery ques-
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tion, for example, no considerable study of the economics of
slavery of any value was produced. Too much that was written
was based upon insufficient information and was speculative in
character. A few men apparently did the thinking on economic
questions for the vocal part of the population. The reading public
was small; probably the thinking public also. The platform and
the stump could and did contribute little to an understanding of
economic problems. The schools had not yet become centers of
study and research along economic lines, especially. Men of ex-
perience in large business affairs were comparatively too few, and
seem to have written and talked too little. Much of the population
was volatile and excitable. The bitter sectional quarrel over slav-
ery was not conducive to calm thinking. After all, however, the
remarkable thing is not how much intelligent consideration the
Southern people gave to their economic conditions and problems
but how little. Northerners and Englishmen contributed some-
thing to an understanding of these matters, but too much that they
wrote was unsympathetic in character.
1
And the Northern people as a whole did not have that sympa-
thetic understanding of the complex social and economic problems
of the South which was requisite to peace and amity between the
sections and the eventual solution of those problems. The problems
and interests of the sections were so different that serious conflict
could be avoided only by mutual understanding, sympathy, and
forbearance. The sections drifted into a war which was not inev-
itable.
Notable for either breadth of understanding or sympathetic treatment or
both were: Kettell, Southern Wealth and Northern Profits; Olmsted, A Journey
in the Seaboard Slave States; A Journey through Texas; A Journey in the Back
Country; The Cotton Kingdom; Weston, The Progress of Slavery in the United
States; Russell, North America (English).
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TABLE III REGISTERED AND ENROLLED AND LICENSED TONNAGE
IN STATES AND DISTRICTS OF THE UNITED STATES, 1793-1860*
STATE
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TABLE IV CONSUMPTION OF COTTON IN
THE UNITED STATES, 1840-1861*
(Bales of 500 Ibs. each)
Year
BIBLIOGRAPHY
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS: FEDERAL AND CONFEDERATE
The Sixth Census of the United States: 1840.
The Seventh Census of the United States: 1850.
DE Bow, J. D. B. Statistical View of the United States . . . Being a Compendium
of the Seventh Census . . . Washington, 1854.
KENNEDY, Jos. C. G. Preliminary Report on the Eighth Census. Washington, 1862.
The Eighth Census: 1860.
The Congressional Globe, 26th Congress to the 36th Congress.
Congressional Documents, 26th Congress to the 36th Congress.
COMMISSIONER OF PATENTS. Annual Reports, Agriculture, 1849-1861.
REGISTER OF THE TREASURY. Reports ... on the Commerce and Navigation of
the United States . . .
,
vols. for 1831-1836; 1837-1843; 1845-1847; 1849-1861.
U. S. Statutes at Large, 26th Congress to the 36th Congress.
MATHEWS, JAMES M. The Statutes at Large of the Provisional Government of the
Confederate States of America,from the Institution of the Government, February 8,
1861, to its Termination, February 18, 1862. . . . Richmond, 1864.
Journal of the Provisional Congress of the Confederate States of America (U. S.
Senate Documents, 58 Cong., 2 Sess., No. 234, Vol. I).
PUBLIC DOCUMENTS: STATE AND LOCAL
"Journal, Acts, and Proceedings of a General Convention of the State of Virginia,
Assembled at Richmond . . . 1850 .... Richmond, 1850.
Journal of the Acts and Proceedings of a General Convention of the State of Virginia,
Assembled at Richmond . . . 1861. Richmond, 1861.
Virginia House Journal and Documents, 1840-1861. Richmond.
Virginia Senate Journal and Documents, 1840-1861. Richmond.
Acts of the General Assembly of Virginia (published annually and biennially).
Richmond.
The Convention of the People of North Carolina, Held on the 2Oth Day of May, A. D.,
1861. Raleigh, 1862.
Journal of the State Convention of South Carolina, together with the Resolutions and
Ordinances. Columbia, 1852.
Journal of the Convention of the People of South Carolina, Held in 1860, 1861, and
1862, together with Ordinances, Reports, and Resolutions, etc. Columbia, 1862.
Report of the Commissioners Appointed at the Last Session of the General Assembly
to Inquire into the feasibility of improving the Channel of the Bar ... of
Charleston .... Columbia, 1852.
Report: Containing a Review of the Proceedings cf the City Authorities from the 4th
September, 1837, to the 1st August, 1838. ... By Henry L. Pincknev, Mayor.
Charleston, 1838.
A Digest of the Ordinances of the City of Charleston . . . 1783 to . . . 1844, to
which are annexed the acts of tht Legislature which relate exclusively to the City of
Charleston.
Ordinances of the City of Charleston from . . . August, 1844, to ... Septem-
ber, 1851; and the Acts of the General Assembly relating to the City of Charleston.
1854.
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Ordinances of the City of Charleston , . . 1854, to the 1st December, 1859, and the
Acts of the General Assembly . . . compiled by John R. Horsey . . . 1859.
Journal of the Georgia Convention held in Milledgeville in 1850. Milledgeville, 1850.
Journal of the Public and Secret Proceedings of the Convention of the People of Georgia,
held in Milledgeville and Savannah in 1861, together with the ordinances adopted.
Milledgeville, 1861.
HOTCHKISS, W. A. Codification of the Statute Law of Georgia. Savannah, 1845.
CANDLER, A. D. The Confederate Records of the State of Georgia, Vols. I-III.
Atlanta, 1909-1910.
Ordinances and Constitution of the State of Alabama, with the Constitution of the
Provisional Government and of the Confederate States of Amercia. Montgomery,
1861.
Acts of the General Assembly of Alabama, 1843-1860 (published annually and bi-
ennially). Tuscaloosa and Montgomery.
The Code of Ordinances of the City of Mobile,with the Charter and an Appendix. . . .
By the Eon, Alexander McKinstry. 1859.
Journal of the Convention of the State of Mississippi, and the Act calling the same;
. . . (1850). Jackson, 1851.
Journal of the State Convention and Ordinances and Resolutions adopted in January,
1861. . . . Jackson, 1861.
Proceedings and Debates of the Convention of Louisiana which assembled at . . .
New Orleans, January 14, 1845. New Orleans, 1 845.
Official Journal of the Proceedings of the Convention of the State of Louisiana. New
Orleans, 1861.
Acts of the Legislature of Louisiana, 1840-1861 (published annually). New Orleans.
Digest of the Ordinances and Resolutions ofthe Second Municipality and of the General
Council of the City of New Orleans, applicable thereto, January, 1848. By
F. R. Southmayd, Sec'y-
TEXAS LIBRARY AND HISTORICAL COMMISSION. Journal of the Secession Convention
of Texas, 1861. Austin, 1912.
MAGAZINES AND PERIODICALS
The American Review: a Whig Journal. . . . 16 vols. New York, 1845-1852.
DeBow's Commercial Review of the South and West. 38 vols. New Orleans, 1846-1870.
Hunt's Merchants' Magazine and Commercial Review. 63 vols. New York, 1 839-1 870.
Niks' Weekly (National} Register (Vols. L-LXXV). 75 vols. Baltimore and Phila-
delphia, 1811-1849.
The Southern Literary Messenger. 36 vols. Richmond, 1834-1864.
The Southern Quarterly Review. 26 vols. Charleston, etc., January, 1 842 to January,
1856.
The United States Magazine and Democratic Review. 43 vols. Washington, 1838-1859.
The Western Journal and Civilian. 13 vols. St. Louis, 1848-1855.
NEWSPAPERS
New York Herald, January-June, 1854; July-December, 1857; January-June, 1859;
July, i86o-June, 1861.
New York Times, 1861.
Baltimore Sun, July, :852-June, 1853.
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Daily National Intelligencer (Washington), 1844-1846; 1850-1851; 1856; 1860-1861.
Richmond Daily Whig, 1851.
Richmond Daily Enquirer, 1838, 1856, 1857.
Richmond Semi-Weekly Enquirer, 1850, 1852-1854.
Raleigh Register, 1839-1840.
Charleston (S. C.) Daily Courier, July, i837-June, 1839; 1854-1856.
Charleston Mercury, July-December, 1838; 1858-1859.
Savannah Daily Republican, January-June, 1837; January-June, 1838; January-
June, 1839; July-December, 1856.
Montgomery Daily Confederation, 1858-1859.
New Orleans Picayune, January-June, 1858.
New Orleans Commercial Bulletin, January-June, 1855.
New Orleans Delta, 1858.
New Orleans True Delta, 1859.
Memphis Daily Eagle, 1845.
Memphis Eagle and Enquirer, 1853.
Memphis Daily Appeal, January-June, 1853.
Republican Banner and Nashville Whig, July, i856-December, 1857.
PAMPHLETS
MALLORY, FRANCIS. Report on the Commercial Condition of the Commonwealth of
Virginia. Presented to the Commercial Convention convened in Richmond, June
J3> 1838- Petersburg, 1838.
Convention of Merchants and Othersfor the Promotion of Direct Trade, 1839. Charles-
ton, 1839.
DICKSON, SAMUEL H. Address delivered at the Opening of the New Edifice of the
Charleston Apprentices' Library Society, January /J, 1841. . . . Charleston,
1841.
Southern State Rights, Free Trade and Anti-Abolition Tract No. I. (Includes Letter
of Langdon Cheves; Jackson's Letter on Texas; J. Q. Adams's Disunion Letter,
etc.) Charleston, 1844.
A Reply to the Letter of the Hon. Langdon Cheves. By a Southerner. Charleston,
GREGG, WILLIAM. Essays on Domestic Industry; or an Inquiry into the Expediency of
Establishing Cotton Manufactures in South Carolina. Charleston, 1845.
-
Inquiry into the Propriety of Granting Charters to the Manufacturers of
South Carolina. By One of the People. Charleston, 1 845.
Journal of the Proceedings of the Southwestern Convention. . . . Memphis . . .
I2th November, 1845. Memphis, 1 845.
HAMMOND, JAMES H. Letters on Southern Slavery; Addressed to Thomas Clarkson,
the English Abolitionist. Charleston, 1848 (written in 1845).
ABBOTT, LAWRENCE. Lettersfrom the Hon. ... to the Hon. William C. Rives of
Virginia. Boston, 1846.
A Voice from the South: Comprising Letters from Georgia to Massachusetts, and to
the Southern States. Baltimore, 1847.
FISHER, ELLWOOD. Lecture on the North and the South; Delivered before the Young
Men's Mercantile Library Association of Cincinnati, Ohio, January 16, 1849.
Cincinnati, 1849.
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Proceedings of the National Railroad Convention, which assembled in the City of St.
Louis, on the fifteenth day of October, 1849. ... St. Louis, 1849.
Minutes and Proceedings of the Memphis Convention assembled October 23, 1849.
Memphis, 1849.
National Plan of an Atlantic and Pacific Railroad and Remarks of Albert Pike made
thereon, at Memphis, November, 1849. Memphis, 1 849.
JAMES, CHARLES T. Practical Hints on the Comparative Cost and Productiveness of
the Culture of Cotton, and the Cost and Productiveness of its Manufacture. Ad-
dressed to the Cotton Planters and Capitalists of the South. 1 849.
SMITH, HAMILTON. Cannelton, Perry County, Indiana, at the Intersection of the East-
ern Margin of the Illinois Coal Basin. . . . Louisville, 1850.
Proceedings of the Convention in Favor of a National Road to the Pacific Ocean.
. . . Philadelphia, April 1st, 2nd and 3rd, 1850. Philadelphia, 1850.
TRESCOTT, WILLIAM H. The Position and Course of the South. Charleston, 1850.
TOWNSEND, JOHN. The Southern States; Their Present Peril and their Certain
Remedy. , 1850.
BRYAN, EDWARD B. The Rightful Remedy. Addressed to the Slaveholders of the
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Union, Past and Future. . . ." Boston, 1850.
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to the Hon. W. J. Grayson, in reply to his Letter to the Governor of South Carolina.
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Graniteville Manufacturing Company. Report of the President and Treasurerfor the
Year 1854. (William Gregg, Pres.) Charleston, 1855.
CAREY, HENRY C.| The North and the South. (Reprinted from the New York
Tribune.) 1854.
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pectations regarding, 187-88, 208;
effects, 266-67
Bluffton movement, 37-39, 152; and
disunion, 69-70; design to revive, 73
Border states, attitude toward disunion
movement (1850), 74, 79, 87; con-
sidered by disunionists (1852-60),
1 8 1, 1 88, 235-36; views on economic
effects of secession, 184-85; sell slaves,
21 1 ; fears for slavery in, 217; against
reopening foreign slave trade, 224;
secession delayed, 233-34; views of
causes of secession of cotton states,
249-52; watch early economic policies
of Confederacy, 257, 259; cotton
states' attitude toward secession of,
268; fear revival of foreign slave trade,
270-72, 281; considerations affecting
decision as to secession, 273-88, 291;
secessionists identified, 283-88; see
also Virginia, Kentucky, etc.
Boyce, W. W., Nullifier and coopera-
tionist (1850), 89; for free trade and
direct taxation, 139, 141, 163-64
Brown, Joseph E., secessionist per se,
73; on causes of secession, 247; on di-
rect trade, 256; on export taxes, 260
Burwell, William, on internal improve-
ments, 127; on Norfolk, 130
Butler, A. P., Nullifier and cooperation-
ist (1850) 89; on tariff, 163
Calhoun, A. P., I43n., on tariff, 165;
Calhoun, John C., and direct trade with
Europe, 17, 29; on state of agricul-
ture, 34; opposes Bluffton movement,
38-39; on Tariff of 1842, 39; on un-
equal operation of Federal govern-
ment, 67, 82; and disunion movement
(1850), 55, 72-74, 82, 90-92; in South-
western Convention, 124-25; candi-
date for nomination for president,
152; and manufactures, 154; on com-
mercial retaliation against North, 157
Capital, deficiency of in South, com-
mercial dependence on North as cause,
20-22, 8 1, 94, 190-91; unequal oper-
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ation of Federal government as cause,
22, 67, 80 ff., 182; as cause of com-
mercial dependence, 22-23, 26, 105;
industrial dependence as cause, 41,
48-49, 190-191; handicaps develop-
ment of manufactures, 45-46, 63, 183;
cotton manufactures to supply, 49;
direct trade with Europe to supply,
99 ff., 183, 184; financial depen-
dence on North, 100-7; handicaps all
enterprises, 104; capital beginning to
accumulate, 204-5; agriculture and
railroads absorb, 226; Northern and
European capital coming, 229, 293;
see also banks and credits
Charleston, direct trade convention
( I 839), 17 ff.; imports, 19; conduct of
commerce, 25; yellow fever, 25n.; and
Cincinnati railroad, 29-30; progress
and aspirations, 97; character of
population, 100; as distributing cen-
ter, no; harbor improvement, 113;
steamship lines and projects, 118,
256; Southern Commercial Conven-
tion, 133-36; aid to railroads, 172;
and secession, 239, 251; see also cities
and towns
Charleston Mercury , and Bluffton move-
ment, 38, 70; disunion organ, 73, 179;
on Southern Commercial Conven-
tion, 150; for disunion, 184, 193; de-
plores slave trade agitation, 216; on
causes of secession, 247; on Confeder-
ate Constitution, 262; against pro-
hibition of slave trade, 271
Cheves, Langdon, approves Bluffton
movement, 38; for disunion, 69, 70;
speech in Nashville Convention, 75n.;
cooperationist (1850), 89
Christy, David, Cotton Is King, 208, 209
Cities and towns in South, few and
small, 12, 296; seaports languishing
and dependent, 15, 20; natural ad-
vantages, 25, 112; aspirations, 96-98;
Northerners and foreigners in, 99-
100; as distributing centers, no-n;
anticipated effects of secession on,
183, 191, 197; slave populations de-
clining, 21 1 ; labor troubles, 53, 219;
and secession, 239-43, passim, 251,
284-85; see also Charleston, New
Orleans, etc.
Civil War, secessionist anticipations,
181, 187, 188-89, 208, 235; affects
economic policies of the Confederacy,
255> 259 ff-> and secession of border
states, 282-83, 29 J ? n t inevitable,
294
Clay, C. C., on fishing bounties and
other protective legislation, 164; dis-
unionist member of Congress, 180
Clingman, Thomas L., on value of
Union (1850), 82; on benefits of
secession, 252, 273
Cobb, Howell, opposes secession of
Georgia (1850), 73, 77, 89; Secretary
of Treasury, on tariff, 165; on foreign
slave trade, 215; and secession, 240;
and tariff policy of Confederacy, 265
Commerce of South, external, amount
of foreign, 12, 15, 295; amount of
foreign goods consumed, 107-10;
extent of, with North and West, 108-
9; little internal commerce, in; with
West, 201-3; see ah commercial de-
pendence, North, and West
Commercial dependence of South, de-
gree and evils of, 12, 15-16, 19-22, 32,
81, 94-104, 127, 128, 190, 207, 208,
290; causes analyzed, 22-25, IO5> 107-
113, 292; remedies proposed in direct
trade conventions, 25-30; secession
as remedy, 80, 83, 183-85, 188, 191-
92, 194-95, 197, 293; various remedies,
113; projects for steamship lines to
Europe, 114-22; considered in South-
ern Commercial Convention, 130-34,
138-39. i4 J-42> H7> 149; discrimina-,
tory taxation as remedy, 156-61, 167-
72, 176-78; commercial non-inter-
course with North as remedy, 157-
58> 175-76; patronage of direct im-
porters as remedy, 173-75; expecta-
tions of commercial progress as cause
for secession, 237, 248-49, 251-54,
256, 263, 275-76; see also Confederate
States, direct trade conventions, ship-
ping and shipbuilding
Compromise of 1850, debated, 72-74;
denounced in Nashville Convention,
75; contests over acceptance, 76-78;
aggravates sectionalism, 128
Confederate States of America, tariff
and commercial policies considered by
disunionists, 181, 183-85, 188-89, 243;
formulated, 257-67 (see tariff policy
of Confederacy); foreign relations
considered by disunionists, 181, 185,
189, 194, 208, 243; policy formulated,
259, 261, 263-67; expansion antici-
pated, 181-82, 250-51, 253; navigation
of Mississippi considered by disunion-
ists, 181, 185, 189; policy formulated,
258-59, 261, 280; admission of West-
ern States considered, 185-86, 189,
268; foreign slave trade policy con-
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sidered by disunionists, 181-82, 270-
72; Confederacy organized, 233;
Provisional Constitution, 233, 260,
271, 274; Permanent Constitution,
233, 261, 269, 271, 274, 281; naviga-
tion laws of, 261.
Congress of United States, attempts
compromise to save Union, 231, 233;
House of Representatives on causes
of secession, 252
Corporations, opposition to, 42, 154
Cotton, prices, 26, 33-35, 60, 102, 199,
201 ; overproduction of, 26, 36 ff., 125,
204; depression in the industry, 33
ff.; factorage system, 101; crop, 199,
203; prosperity of the industry, 199-
225; labor shortage in, 210-13; see
also manufactures
Cotton Is King, 2o8n., 209; cotton is
king argument, 207-10, 266
Cotton planters' conventions, 37, 94,
204
Crawford, Geo. W., Governor of
Georgia, on encouraging manufac-
tures, 42, 154
Credits, long, system of in South, 16,
23, 101, 105-6; cause of commercial
dependence, 23-24; handicaps cotton
manufacturers, 63-64; handicaps im-
porters, 105; signs of breaking away
from, 205
Crittenden, J. J., on necessity of Union,
87; and secession, 279
Davis, Jefferson, leader Southern Rights
Party in Mississippi, 77; and surveys
for Pacific railroad, 135; on Tariff of
1857, 166; appeal to Northern busi-
ness interests, 209; on revival of slave
trade, 217; on causes of secession,
246; and tariff and foreign policies of
Confederacy, 264, 265-67; on ad-
mitting non-slaveholding states to
Confederacy, 269
Dawson, Senator Wm. C., and origin
of Southern Commercial Convention,
129; presides in, 129, 131, 133; op-
poses Pike's plan for Pacific railroad,
135
DeBow, J. D. B., on political aspects of
diversification of Southern industry,
56; objects to disunionists' doctrines,
78; on warehousing system, 93; in-
terest in direct trade, 94; and origin
of Southern Commercial Convention,
128; on objects of, 134; presides, 140;
disunionist, 140, 180; chairman com-
mittee, Commercial Convention, 147;
on Tariff of 1857, 163; and Southern
advertising, 175; reviews Southern
Wealth and Northern Profits, 192; and
revival of slave trade, 214, 215; on
white labor in cotton industry, 221;
on immigration, 221; and causes of
secession, 247; on effects of seces-
sion, 249, 267; characterized, 293
DeBow's Review, for development of
manufactures, 43; disunionist teach-
ings, 1 80, 193, 237; on effects of se-
cession, 257, 267; on revenue clause of
Confederate Constitution, 262; char-
acterized, 293
Democratic party in South, two wings,
66-67, 88-92; attitude toward se-
cession (1850), 76-77, 89-92; and
diversification of industry, 87; and
Southern Commercial Convention,
147; attitude on tariff, 151-54, 161,
163, 165-66; and corporations, 154-
55; and discriminatory taxation, 159,
167; and Federal protective legisla-
tion, 163-64; and state aid to internal
improvements, 172-73; Southern
Rights wing in ascendancy, 179; at-
titude towards secession (i 860-61),
238-43, 284-86
Devereaux, Thomas P., on slavery and
white labor, 53, 54
Direct trade conventions of 1837-39,
origin and objects, 13, 16-18, 30;
composition and temper, 17-18; pub-
lic interest in, 17 f., 31; proceedings,
19-30; slavery and disunion little
consideration, 30-31; results, 32; pro-
ceedings republished, 94
Direct trade convention, at Old Point
Comfort (1850), 115; (1857), 120;
at Richmond (1851), 116; at Bristol,
Va., 120
Discriminatory taxation, see taxation
Disunion movement, see secession move-
ment
Dred Scott Decision, empty victory
without slave trade, 217
Education and culture in South, back-
wardness, 13, 147; effect of manu-
facturing on, 50; discussed in South-
ern Commercial Convention, 132-33,
142, 147, 158; pleas for home patron-
age, 173; George Fitzhugh's interest
in, 176
Elmore, F. H., report on direct trade,
1 8, 25; opposes Bluffton movement,
38; and disunionist movement, 73
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Federal government, see internal im-
provements and taxation and dis-
bursements
Financial dependence of South, 100-7;
see also capital and banks
Fisher, Ellwood, compares North and
South, 205
Fitzhugh, George, doctrines, 176-78;
praises agriculture, 206; on power of
cotton, 208
Floyd, John B., proposes discrimina-
tory taxation of Northern goods, 159-
60, 168
Foote, Henry S., Unionist leader, 77;
denounces Rhett's disunion speech,
83; on value of Union, 86; in Southern
Commercial Convention, 131; op-
poses slave trade, 2i8n.
Forsyth, John, compares North and
South, 47; describes Mobile, 98; on
effects of secession, 197
Gadsden Purchase and Pacific railroad,
135-36
Garnett, M. R. H., The Union, Past and
Future, etc., 79-81; Calhoun Demo-
crat, 92
Georgia, progress of cotton manufac-
tures, 41, 44, 226; disunion movement
(1849-50), 73, 75, 76; question of cor-
poration charters, 154; question of
discriminatory taxation, 160, 167-
68; state aid to railroads, 172; con-
dition of agriculture, 203; secession,
232, 238-40, 245; direct trade pro-
jects, 256; tariff sentiment, 261;
against foreign slave trade, 271
Gregg, William, advocates establish-
ment of cotton manufactures, 40-42,
45, 46; Essays on Domestic Industry,
40-41; manufacturer, 41, 42; on poor
whites, 52, 223; on progress of cot-
ton manufactures, 58, 6 in.; on evils
of commercial dependence, 95; on
Charleston as distributing center,
no; opposes state aid to manufac-
tures, 155; tariffman, 166; on patron-
age to home industries, 174; refutes
disunionist arguments, 194; on
foreign slave trade, 223
Hamilton, Gen. James, 17; opposes
Bluffton movement, 70; on disunion-
ist sentiment in South (1850), 86;
cooperationist in South Carolina, 89
Hammond, J. H., 17; advocates diver-
sification of industry, 35, 49, 50, 155;
and Bluffton movement, 36, 38-39;
compares North and South, 47; on
poor whites, 52; ready for secession,
73;
_
cooperationist (1850), 89; on
panic of 1857, 103, 1040.; on Southern
commerce, 108; on Charleston's
commerce, 113; "Plan of State Ac-
tion," 161; reviews Fisher's pamphlet,
206
Harris, W. P., on tariff policy of Con-
federacy, 263
Hayne, Robert Y., in direct trade con-
ventions, 17; reports on direct trade,
1 8, 21; on long credits, 23; starts son
in importing business, 28
Henderson, Gen. John B., of Missouri,
on causes of secession, 251
Hicks, Governor of Maryland, on causes
of secession, 250, 282
Hilliard, Henry W., on value of Union,
86; in Southern Commercial Conven-
tion, 143; appeals to Northern busi-
ness interests, 209; against foreign
slave trade, 224; and secession of
Alabama, 241
Houston, Sam, Governor of Texas,
opposes secession, 232
Hunter, R. M. T., Calhoun Democrat,
Senator, 91; and Tariff of 1857, 163;
attacks ship subsidies, 164; appeals to
Northern business interests, 209; on
tariff and commercial policies of Con-
federacy, 264; on effects of secession
on border states, 273
Immigration, mostly to non-slavehold-
ing states, 12; manufactures would at-
tract, 57; attitude of South, 57 f.,
213, 220-21, 223; not discussed in
Southern Commercial Convention,
146; considered by disunionists, 181;
immigrants unfriendly to slavery, 220
Industrial dependence of South, see
manufactures
Internal improvements, Federal aid to,
attitude of South, 112-13, 115, 116-
17; discussed in Southwestern Con-
vention, 124-26; in Chicago Rivers
and Harbors Convention, 125-26;
requested for Pacific railroad, 126,
133, 148; considered by Southern
Commercial Convention, 132, 133,
142, 147, 148, 172; prohibited by
Confederate Constitution, 261
Iverson, Alfred, of Georgia, disunionist
member of Congress, 180; on tariff
policy of Confederacy, 259
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James, Charles T., of Rhode Island, in-
terest in cotton manufactures in
South and West, 43, 45-46, 226; on
poor whites, 52
Johnson, Andrew, on causes of secession,
250, 281, 287
Jones, John A., Southern Rights Demo-
crat, 90; free trader, 165; on slave
trade, 216
Kansas-Nebraska bill, 136, 179
Kansas troubles, considered in Southern
Commercial Convention, 140; Eng-
lish bill, 165, 181; fan sectionalism,
179; Kansas question and foreign
slave trade, 217
Kennedy, John P., on causes of seces-
sion, 250; opposes secession of Mary-
land, 275-77
Kentucky, doesn t calculate value of
Union (1850), 87; secession defeated,
233; considerations affecting de-
cision against secession, 279-80, 282-
83, 286; see also border states
Kettell, T. P., on manufactures in
South, 61; estimates value of Union
to North, 81-82, 190-91; quoted in
South, 8 1, 191-92; refuted, 254
King, Thomas Butler, 17; agent of
Georgia to Europe, 256
Labor, in manufactures,^!-^, 45, 51-
55, 62, 2ic, 222; prejudice against
manual, 51; attitude of laboring class
toward slavery and slaveholders, 53-
54, 218-20, 223, 290; shortage of in
cotton and sugar industries, 210-
13, 220-22; see also poor whites,
slavery, slave trade
Lamar, L. Q. C., on secessionists, 238
Letcher, John, Governor of Virginia,
233; on causes of secession, 249
Lincoln, Abraham, 234, 235, 239, 249,
273; see also presidential elections
London, D. H., for discriminatory taxes
on indirect imports, 117, 167
Louisiana, sentiment for Union (1850),
74, 87; for tariff, 151, 166, 259, 261;
state aid to railroads, 172; sugar in-
dustry, 200; condition of agriculture,
203; legislature considers revival of
slave trade, 215-16, 225; secession,
232, 242; and Confederate aid to in-
ternal improvements, 262; and Con-
federate prohibition of foreign slave
trade, 271
Lumbering in South, considered in
Southern Commercial Convention,
133, 147; value of, 228-29
Lumpkin, Joseph H., on cotton manu-
factures in South, 60; secessionist per
se, 73; Calhoun Democrat, 90
Lyon, James, remarks as president of
Southern Commercial Convention,
138-39
McDonald, A. G., for secession of
Georgia, 73, 77; Calhoun Democrat,
90
McDuffie, George, in direct trade con-
ventions, 17; writes address in be-
half of, 1 8; on direct trade, 21, 28n.;
on long credits system, 23; alludes to
secession, 31; supports Bluffton move-
ment, 38; on Tariff of 1842, 39; views
on tariff and secession, 68-69; on state
protection to industry, 157
Magoffin, Governor of Kentucky, and
secession, 233, 280
Mallory, Francis, report in Richmond
Direct Trade Convention (1838), 19
ff.
Mann, A. Dudley, plan for "Steam
Ferry," 119-20, 139, 141, 257; Con-
federate commissioner to Europe,
257, 264-66
Manufactures in South, extent and
growth, 12, 33, 42, 44, 58-59, 226-30;
growth of cotton, 33, 42, 44, 58-59,
226, 298; profits of cotton, 33, 43, 45,
60-6 1 ; beginning of movement to
develop cotton and other, 35-40;
development of movement, 40-46, 127;
evils of dependence on North de-
picted, 40-41, 46-49, 290; benefits of
manufactures, 49-58; opposition, 50-
54, 223, 290; relation of movement to
diversify industry to sectional quar-
rels, 55-58; movement ends, 58-59;
causes for failure, 59-64, 105, 174;
manufactures discussed in Southern
Commercial Convention, 125, 131-
33, 147; people awake to need, 149;
attitude of anti-tariff men, 154-56;
discriminatory taxation of Northern
goods proposed to encourage, 156-61,
167-72, 176-78; commercial non-
intercourse proposed to encourage,
I 57-5^> 175-76; patronage of home in-
dustries
urged,_63, ^173-75, 255; ad-
vocates of diversification become
disunionists, 182, 291; disunion ex-
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pected to promote, 183-85, 188, 191-
92, 194-95, 293; manufacturers re-
assured by disunionists, 194; argu-
ments of diversificationists refuted,
206-10; diversification and foreign
slave trade, 213, 222-23; deficiency of
capital the great obstacle, 222; ex-
pectations of industrial independence
as cause for secession, 249, 273-75,
291; measures after secession to en-
courage manufactures, 255; cotton
manufactures would have come, 293
Marketing system in South; see credits
and cotton factorage
Maryland, depression of manufactures,
6on.; secession defeated, 233; con-
siderations affecting decision for
Union, 274 f., 277, 282-83, 286
Mason, James M,, not disunionist
-per
se (1850), 84; Senator, Calhoun
Democrat, 91; and steamship line,
Norfolk to Antwerp, 116; commis-
sioner to Europe, 264
Mason, John Y., and steamship line to
Europe, 117
Maury, M. F., on warehousing system,
94n.; on Southern merchants, 99;
interest in navigation of Amazon, 118
f.; in Southern Commercial Conven-
tion, 130, 135
Meade, R. K., in Old Point Comfort
Convention, 115; and steamship line
to Europe, 116
Memminger, C. G., 17; on class con-
sciousness of white labor, 53-54; co-
operationist (1850), 89; "Declaration
of Immediate Causes" of secession of
South Carolina, 243-44
Memphis, Southwestern Convention,
124-26; Pacific Railroad Convention,
126; Southern Commercial Conven-
tion, 131-33
Mercantile Convention, Richmond, 116
Merchants and Planters Convention,
Macon, 247, 257; on Confederate
tariff and commercial policies, 266
Merchants in South, prejudice against
mercantile business, 24, 28; lack of
permanent native class of, 99-100
Miles, Wm. Porcher, disunionist in Con-
gress, 1 80; on tariff policy of Confed-
eracy, 263
Millson, John S., report in Norfolk Di-
rect Trade Convention, 19
Mining in South, progress, 12, 226;
mineral surveys, 42, 170; discussed in
Southern Commercial Convention,
147, 167; no class to secure fostering
legislation, 171; fields about to be
opened, 229, 293
Mississippi, State, of, secession senti-
ment, 73-75; secession defeated
(1850), 77; discriminatory taxation
discussed, 160; aid to railroads, 172;
condition of agriculture, 202-3; con-
siders revival of slave trade, 214-15,
224, 270; hostility of white labor to
slavery, 219; secession, 242, 245
Mississippi river, improvement of navi-
gation demanded, 112; as outlet for
Western commerce, 185, 202; ques-
tion of navigation considered by dis-
unionists, 1 8 1, 185, 189; policy of
Confederacy formulated, 258-59, 261,
280
Missouri, secession defeated, 233; con-
siderations affecting decision for
Union, 279-80, 282-83, 286
Mobile, aspirations, 98; business con-
trolled by Northern men, 100; harbor
of, H2; aid to Mobile and Ohio rail-
road, 173; and secession, 241, 251
Montgomery Daily Confederation, on
Southern Commercial Convention,
143, I44n.; on tariff, 165; Union not
detrimental to South, 193; opposes
diversification of industry, 207
Nashville Convention, 71, 128; origin,
73-74; objects and composition, 74-
75, 83n.; proceedings, 75-76; con-
siders commercial retaliation, 157-58
National Intelligencer, opposes discrimi-
'
natory taxation, 160; on causes of
secession, 250
New England, attitude toward South-
ern cotton manufactures, 45; depres-
sion of cotton manufactures, 60-6 1;
methods of meeting Southern com-
petition, 62-63
New Orleans, exports and imports, 15;
character of population, 31, 99; Union
sentiment, 87; and warehousing sys-
tem, 93; awakens to need of railroads,
97; panic of 1857, 102-3; yellow fever,
H2n.; demands improvement of
Mississippi river, 112; railroad con-
ventions, 127; jealous of Baltimore,
130; interest in railroad across Te-
huantepec, 132; Southern Commer-
cial Convention, 136-38; attitude of
South toward, 137; and Western
trade and secession, 185, 189; West-
ern commerce of, 202; hostility of
white laborers to slaves, 219; and
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secession, 243, 251; project for steam-
ship line to Europe, 256
New Orleans Delta, on Southern Com-
mercial Convention, 132, 138; dis-
unionist, 180
New Orleans Picayune, on panic of
1857, 103; on Southern Commercial
Convention, 149; Union not detrimen-
tal to South, 192; against reviving
slave trade, 223; on Southern prog-
ress, 230
Newton, Willoughby, Calhoun Demo-
crat, 92; on economic benefits of
secession, 184; on slavery and se-
cession, 281
New York City, importance of South-
ern trade, 21; financial concentration,
101; finances movement of Southern
staples, 101 f.; advantages over
Southern cities, no ff.; steamship
lines, 114, 117, 122; Southern ex-
pectations of effect of secession on,
1 88, 249
New York Herald, on Southern Com-
mercial Convention, 144; on econo-
mic effects of secession, 192; repre-
sents business interests, friendly to
South, 209; on causes of secession,
254
New York Times, on causes of secession,
253; opposes Morrill Tariff, 264
Non-intercourse with North discussed,
157-58, 175-76
Non-slaveholding whites, attitude
toward slavery and slaveholders, u,
53-54, 218-20, 223, 290; attitude
toward secession, 239-43, 283-88;
see also labor and poor whites
Norfolk, direct trade convention, 18;
advantages and aspirations, 96; yel-
low fever, H2n.; proposed steamship
lines, 116 ff.; and secession, 275, 285
North, advantages of union with South,
20 ff., 46, 48-49, 80 fF., 94-96, 104, 115,
182, 1 88, 190-91, 196-97, 207-10;
North and South compared, 24, 33,
47-49, 205-6, 227-29; imports from
South, 12, 108, 190; exports to South,
12, 24, 109, 190; commercial policy
of Confederacy toward North con-
sidered by disunionists, 181, 183-84;
formulated, 258-59, 261, 263, 265-67;
relations of East and West and East
and South compared, 186, 202; effects
of secession on North considered,
1 88, 190-92, 194, 208, 235, 248-49,
253; class of Northerners encourage
disunionists, 189-92; Northern opin-
ions of disunionist sentiment in
South, 195-98; Northern views of
causes of secession, 252-54; see also
capital, commerce, manufactures,
tariff
North Carolina, little interest in direct
trade in 18305, 31; agricultural de-
pression, 34; growth of cotton manu-
factures, 41, 44, 227; disunion senti-
ment, 73, 74, 79n.; disunion argu-
ments refuted, 88; people regret com-
mercial dependence on Virginia and
South Carolina, 97; tariff and dis-
criminatory taxation questions, 161-
62; state aid to railroad, 172-73;
agricultural conditions, 203; ad valo-
rem issue, 219, 287; sectionalism, 220,
287; secession defeated, 233; consider-
ations affecting final decision for
secession, 273-75, 276, 283n., 284,
287
Northerners and foreigners in South,
as merchants, factors, etc., 19, 28,
198; in New Orleans and Mobile, 31;
attitude toward slavery, 57, 220;
merchants in cities and towns, 99-100
Nullifiers, in direct trade conventions,
17; on causes of commercial de-
pendence, 22; origin, 65; party affili-
ations, 66; political principles 67-68;
become disunionists, 68-72, 88-92;
not satisfied by Tariff of 1846, 70,
162; for free trade and direct taxa-
tion, 163-65; see also Democratic
party
Olmsted, F. L., on Southern imports,
108; on domestic slave trade, 211;
and white labor in cotton industry,
221
Pacific railroad, 14, 94, 97, 290, 293;
conventions at Memphis, St. Louis,
and Philadelphia, 126; becomes sec-
tional issue, 127, 135; considered in
Southern Commercial Convention,
130, 132-36, 138, 139, 148; and rail-
road across Tehuantepec, 132; and
Gadsden Purchase, 135; disunionists
consider, 181; Texas interested, 262;
and secession in Missouri, 280
Panic, of 1837, 16; specie payments sus-
pended, 27; general stagnation of
business, 30, 93; in Southwest, 31;
effects of panic of 1857, 102-4, J 99
South weathers better than North,
205
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Patronage of home manufacturers and
merchants urged, 27 f., 63, 113, 142,
173-75, 255
Pettigru, J. J., Unionist in South Caro-
lina (1850), 89; opposes foreign slave
trade, 217-18, 222, 224
Pike, Albert, plan for Pacific railroad,
134-36, 138, 139
Polk, James K., Kane Letter, 38, 162;
vetoes Rivers and Harbors bill, 125
Poor whites, employment in cotton fac-
tories considered, 41, 42, 52-54; tried,
42, 62; character and numbers, 51-52;
responsibility of slavery for, 53, 198,
223, 290; consumed few imports, 107;
production of cotton by considered,
212, 221
Population of South, sparsity, 13, 292;
growing disparity in favor of North,
15, '6, 55, 57, 98, 128, 217, 229, 289;
increase, 203, 211
Presidential elections, of 1856, 138, 179;
of 1860, 181, 231, 234-36, 238
Preston, Wm. Ballard, to Europe in in-
terest of direct trade, 120; on Virginia
as slave selling state, 224
Progress of Slavery, by Weston, 197-98
Pryor, Roger A., on fishing bounties,
164; disunionist in Congress, 180;
opposes revival of slave trade, 218,
224
Public opinion, conditions of formation
in South, 293-94; m North, 294
Quitman, John A., leader Southern
Rights Party in Mississippi, 77; Nulli-
fier, 91; in Southern Commercial Con-
vention, 131, 148; disunionist in
Congress, 180
Railroads in South, anticipated ad-
vantages from railroads to West, 29,
115, 125, 130, 185, 269, 290; projects
for and direct trade, 29, 114; being
rapidly built, 30, 94; New Orleans
roads, 97, 194; economically built,
102, 225; building handicapped by
lack of capital, 104; traffic light, in,
225; Virginia and Tennessee, 114,
276; Chesapeake and Ohio, 115, 277;
projects considered in Southwestern
Convention, 125; in New Orleans
railroad conventions, 127; in South-
ern Commercial Convention, 132,
147; Baltimore and Ohio, 130, 277;
state aid, 172-73; railroads to West
and secession, 185, 269; progress, 203,
225-26, 229; see also Pacific railroad
Republicans, Southern attitude, 138,
179, 181, 234; and economics of
slavery, 196-98; attitude toward dis-
union movement, 196-98; on causes
of secession, 252-53
Retaliation, commercial, against North,
see non-intercourse and taxation, dis-
criminatory
Rhett, R. B., leads Bluffton movement,
38; on Tariff of 1842, 39; disunion
speech in Senate, 83-84, 244; leads
separate-actionists (1850-52), 89; on
state protection of industry, 156;
opposes slave trade agitation, 2i6n.;
"Address of the People of South
Carolina," 243-44; and revenue pro-
visions of Confederate Constitution,
261; and tariff and foreign policies
of Confederacy, 265
Richmond, direct trade convention, 18;
aspirations, 96; mercantile conven-
tion, 116-17; ships flour to Rio de
Janeiro, 117; Southern Commercial
Convention, 137-38; industrial town,
229; and secession, 275, 285
Richmond Enquirer, on diversification
of industry, 49, 155; on Southern
Commercial Convention, 148; dis-
criminatory taxation, 159; disunion-
ist organ, 1 80
Richmond Whig, 42; on disunionism in
South Carolina (1850), 85-86; wavers
on tariff, 162
Rivers and Harbors Convention (Chi-
cago)i 125-26
Robb, James, refutes disunionist argu-
ments, 194
Ruffin, Edmund, 18; Calhoun Demo-
crat, 92; in Southern Commercial
Convention, 143; on economic bene-
fits of secession, 187-89
Russell, Robert, on Southern opinion,
108; on plantation economy, 202;
on white labor in cotton industry,
221; on Southern attitude toward
English opinion, 224
St. Louis, Pacific railroad convention,
126; and secession, 251, 276, 279, 280,
286
Savannah, aspirations, 97; Northerners
and foreigners, 100; Southern Com-
mercial Convention, 138-40; direct
trade projects, 256
Savannah Daily Republican, on South-
ern Commercial Convention, 138; and
value of Union, 192; opposes revival
of slave trade, 214
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Seabrook, W. B., Governor of South
Carolina, and secession movement,
73-74; and state aid to manufactures,
155, 161
Secession movement, attitude of diver-
sificationists, 58; disunionist views of
economic value of Union, 68-69, 72 ;
Bluffton movement and, 69-70;
growth of disunion sentiment, 70-73;
Nashville Convention and, 73-76;
contests over acceptance of compro-
mise of 1850, 76-77; disunionist agru-
ments, 77-88; secessionists (in 1850)
identified, 88-92; disunionists in
Southern Commercial Convention,
137-44. 149-50. 179; George Fitzhugh
and, 177; growth of disunion senti-
ment, 179; methods of propagating,
1 80; issue sought, 181; every aspect
considered, 181-82; various motives,
182; economic arguments for seces-
sion, 182-89, 291, 293; class of North-
ern writers encourages disunionism,
189-92; secessionists refuted in South,
192-95; Northern opinions of move-
ment, 195-98; secessionists agitate
slave trade question, 213-14, 216,
270; secession of cotton states, 231-
33; secession delayed in border states,
233; arguments of secessionists, 234-
35, 236-38; of Unionists, 235-36, 237;
secessionists identified, 238-43; state-
ments of causes, 243-48; expecta-
tions of economic benefits, 248-49;
border state views of causes, 249-52;
Northern views, 252-54; causes as
shown by economic policies of Con-
federacy, 255-70; desire to reopen
slave trade not the cause, 270-72;
considerations affecting decision of
border states, 273-88, 291; secession-
ists identified in, 283-86
Sectionialism, in Albama, 220, 232, 241;
in Tennessee, Virginia, and North
Carolina, 220, 277, 287
Seward, W. H., effects of secession on
North, 196; on causes of secession,
252
Shipping and shipbuilding in South
12, 16, 25, 147, 227; Louisiana bonus,
170
Slavery, basis of sectionalism, n, 13;
question little discussed in direct
trade conventions, 30; as cause of
Southern "decline," 47, 196-98, 290-
92; responsibility for poor whites,
53, 198, 223, 292; hostility toward in
South, 53-54, 218-20, 223, 286-88;
quarrels over augment interest in
manufactures, commerce, etc., 55-58,
98; struggles over cause growth of
disunion sentiment, 68, 71-76, 179,
182, 195, 197; Southern defense,
68, 72, 98, 176, 206-10, 290; quarrel
reaches bitter stage, 128; leads to
threats of commercial retaliation,
157-61, 169-70, 175; West becoming
hostile, 187; attitude of Northern
business interests, 189-92, 196, 209-
10; fears for as cause of secession,
234-36, 239-48, 250, 254, 269, 273,
281, 283-86, 291; in Confederate
Constitution, 269
Slaves, distribution, ii; employment in
factories suggested, 41, 54-55; tried,
55, 62, 210, 222; redundancy of labor,
55, 210; considered necessary to cot-
ton industry, 207, 290; prices rise,
210; shift to black belts, 210-11;
foreign slave trade revived, 211, 215;
demand outrunning supply, 212, 220
ff.
Slave trade, movement to reopen the
foreign, discussed in Southern Com-
mercial Convention, 139, 141, 143-44,
150, 213-15; disunionists and the
agitation, 181; origin and develop-
ment of movement, 212-16; motives
and arguments of advocates and op-
ponents, 216-24; attitude of border
states, 224; strength of movement,
224-25; desire to reopen as cause of
secession, 348, 250-51, 253, 270-72;
fears of revival delay secession of
border states, 280
Smith, Hamilton, advocates manufact-
ures in Ohio valley, 43-46; suggests
export duty on cotton, 154
South Carolina, distress in agriculture,
34, 36, 41; agitation in behalf of
manufactures, 37 ff.; Bluffton move-
ment, 37-40, 69-70; hostility of white
labor to slaves, 53, 219; nullification
in, 65; party divisions, 66 f.; disunion
movement (1849-52), 72-74, 76, 77,
82-85, 89; question of aid to manu-
factures, 155; discriminatory tax-
ation, 156, 160; and tariff, 166; aid to
railroads, 172; agriculture, 203; and
revival of slave trade, 213, 215, 217,
225; manufactures, 227; secession,
231, 239, 243-45, 250-51; projects for
direct trade, 256; and Confederate
Constitution, 262, 269, 271
Southern Commercial Convention, ori-
gin, 123-29; objects and proceedings,
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129-44, 119-20, 162, 163, 167-68,
173, 174, 178; composition, 142, 144;
reasons for changes in objects and
personnel, 144-48; achievements and
results, 134, 140, 145, 146, 148-50;
a criticism of, 174; and growth of dis-
unionism, 179, 180; considers revival
of foreign slave trade, 213-24, passim
Southern rights associations, 77; Central
of Virginia, 117, 158; for measures to
promote commercial independence,
I S9> l &9'i attacks Virginia tax sys-
tem, 169; associations in Virginia, 158;
in Albama, 160
Southern Rights party, 78, 86, 179; in
Georgia, 76, 89; in Mississippi, 77,
90, 160; in Alabama, 77, 90
Southern Wealth and Northern Profits,
190-92, 254
Southwestern Convention, Memphis, on
overproduction of cotton, 37; com-
position and proceedings, 124-26
Spratt, L. W., advocates reopening
foreign slave trade, 213, 215, 218, 220,
222n., 223; and causes of secession,
244, 248; on boundaries of Confeder-
acy, 268; against interdiction of slave
trade, 271
Steamship lines, advantages over sail,
114; Federal government subsidizes,
114; Southern requests for subsidies,
115, 116, 117, 121, 142; Virginia's
interest in, 115; Thompson's pro-
jects, 116-17; projects in South Caro-
lina and Alabama, 118; to Amazon,
proposed, 118; Mann's Steam Ferry
project, 119-20, 139, 141, 257; later
Virginia projects, 120-21; later pro-
jects elsewhere, 121-22; considered
in Southern Commercial Convention,
130-33, 139, 141-42; government sub-
sidies discontinued, 164; projects
after secession, 256-57
Stephens, A. H., in direct trade conven-
tion, 17; against secession (1850), 77;
attributes prosperity to Union, 193;
compares Georgia and Ohio, 206; on
foreign slave trade, 217; Union
Speech, 237; "Corner Stone" speech,
246 f., 269; on effects of secession,
249; and revenue provision of Con-
federate Constitution, 262; on tariff
policies of Confederacy, 264; and
three-fifths clause, 270
Sugar industry, condition of, 200
Tariff acts (United States), Tariff of
1842 and Bluffton movement, 37-40;
Tariff of 1846 and cotton manufac-
tures, 60; nullification in South Caro-
lina, 65-66; Tariff of 1846 doesn't
satisfy Nullifiers, 70; attitude of
South (1828-50), 151-56; tariff senti-
ment falls off, 161-62; free trade and
direct taxation agitated, 139, 141,
162-64; South and Tariff of 1857, 163-
64; and Morrill bill, 165, 254; South-
ern attitude summarized, 88; see
also taxation and disbursements
Tariff policy of Confederacy, anticipa-
tions of disunionists, 181, 183-84, 185,
1 88, 189, 243, 245; considerations
affecting policy of Confederacy, 255,
259, 267; policies of individual states
after secession, 257-58; export duties
proposed, 260; provisions of Provis-
ional Constitution, 260; tariff acts of
Provisional Congress, 260-61; pro-
visions of Permanent Constitution,
261-62; Tariff of May 17, 1861, 262-
63; tariff and diplomacy, 264-67; pro-
tectionist sentiment, 266-67; effect
upon decision of border states, 274-75
Taxation, systems in Southern states
and cities criticized, 28, 168-70; dis-
criminatory taxation of indirect im-
ports proposed, 114, 117; Toombs's
plan, 139, 168; discriminatory taxation
of Northern manufactures proposed,
142, 156-57; discriminatory taxation
in Southern states, 156; discrimin-
atory taxation considered during crisis
of 1850, 159-61; policy under advise-
ment to secession, 167-70; why dis-
crimination not resorted to, 171-72;
George Fitzhugh on, 177
Taxation and disbursements of Federal
government, Southern "decline" at-
tributed to inequality of, 22, 67-68,
80-88, passim, 289, 292; tonnage
duties, ship subsidies, fishing boun-
ties, etc. attacked, 133, 164, 166; free
trade and direct taxation agitated,
139, 141, 162-64; South Carolina
view prevails, 182-83, 197, 291; in-
equality of as cause for secession, 237,
243-54, passim, 291; see also tariff
acts (United States)
Tennessee, disunionists in, 73, 75, 79n.;
tariff sentiment, 151, 166; aid to rail-
roads, 172; conditions of agriculture,
203; political divisions based on
slavery, 220; secession delayed, 233;
considerations affecting decision to
secede, 274, 278, 283, 284; sectional-
ism and secession, 287
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Texas, "Texas or disunion," 38, 69;
aid to railroads, 172; agriculture, 202-
3; and foreign slave trade, 225; se-
cession, 232, 245
Thornwell, Dr. J. H., on causes of se-
cession, 248
Tobacco, foreign duties on, 142, 189,
200; industry prosperous, 199; manu-
factures of, 228
Toombs, Robert, Unionist (1850), 77;
letter on discriminiatory taxation,
139, 167; and secession, 237, 240, 245;
effects of secession, 249; on tariff and
foreign policies of Confederacy, 266;
on admitting new states, 269^
Townsend, John, on benefits of seces-
sion, 83, 191
Tucker, J. Randolph, on benefits of
secession to Virginia, 274, 275, 281
Unionists in South, advocate diversi-
fication of industry, 58, 85, 87, 179;
in South Carolina, 65-66; and Nash-
ville Convention, 75; Union party
(in 1850), 76-77, 89-90; refute seces-
sionist arguments, 85-88, 192-95;
oppose discriminatory taxation, 171;
oppose agitation of slave trade ques-
tion, 216; opposition to secession in
1861, 231-33; their arguments, 235-
36, 237; identified, in cotton states,
238-43; arguments and motives in
border states, 273-83, passim, 286-
88, 291; identified in border states,
283-85
Virginia, commerce, 19, 20, 95; banking
capital question, 24, 27; depression
in manufactures, 6on.; secession senti-
ment (1850), 73, 88, 91; projects for
steamship lines to Europe, 114-18,
119-21; tariff sentiment, 151, 160;
commercial retaliation and discrimi-
natory taxation discussed, 156, 158-
60, 168-70; aid to railroads, 172-73;
agriculture, 203; and domestic slave
trade, 224; secession delayed, 233;
considerations affecting decision to
secede, 274-78, 281-83, 285, 287;
sectionalism, 220, 277, 287
Warehousing system, 93, 125
West, agricultural depression, 34; in-
terest in cotton manufactures, 43;
political alliance with South, 55,
124-25, 209; trade between South
and, 108-9, J 86, 201-3, 207; effects of
secession upon relations of West and
South considered, 185-86, 189, 258,
263, 268, 280
Weston, George M., on disunion move-
ment, 197 f.
Whig party in South, state rights ele-
ment, 66; attitude toward secession
(1850), 74, 76-77, 89-92; and diversi-
fication of industry, 87, 152; and
slaveholding, 92; and Southern Com-
mercial Convention, 147; attitude on
tariff, 151-54, 161-62; and corpor-
ations, 154; and discriminatory tax-
ation, 159; and state aid to railroads,
173; begins to dissolve, 179; attitude
toward secession, 238-43, 284-86
Wilmington, North Carolina, aspira-
tions, 97; improvement of harbor,
1 13; for secession, 284
Wise, Henry A., Calhoun Democrat,
92; on future of Norfolk, 96; and de-
velopment of Virginia, 176
Yancey, W. L., Calhoun Democrat and
disunionist, 90; in Southern Com-
mercial Convention, 143; advocates
disunion, 180; appeals to Northern
business interests, 209; on foreign
slave trade, 2i6n., 218, 224; on eco-
nomic benefits of secession, 237; on
commercial policy of Confederacy,
259; commissioner to Europe, 264-
66; on slave trade provision of Con-
federate Constitution, 28 in.
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